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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Ryan Air Ltd. v. Aer Rianta CPT [2001] IEHC 12 (25th January, 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/12.html Cite as: [2001] IEHC 12 |
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1. The
Applicant seeks two injunctions against the Respondent pending the trial of
these proceedings.
2. The
first injunction seeks to restrain the Respondent from imposing and recovering
certain monetary charges which were notified to the Applicant on the 7th of
December, 2000, relating to its activities at Dublin Airport.
3. The
second injunction seeks to restrain the operation of ‘
Rules
of Conduct
’
promulgated by the Respondent on the 15th of December, 2000.
4. On
the 22nd of December, 2000, leave was granted by Kinlen J to seek Judicial
Review of each of these decisions of the Respondent. The principal relief
sought is an Order of
Certiorari
seeking to have both the charges and the ‘
Rules
of Conduct
’
quashed by this Court.
5. At
the time that he granted leave Kinlen J also granted interim injunctions
restraining the implementation of both the charges and the ‘
Rules
of Conduct
’
and these injunctions have, subject to a modification agreed before the
President at a hearing on the 29th of December, 2000, continued in force ever
since.
6. This
application seeks to continue these injunctions until the trial of these
Judicial Review proceedings.
7. Mr.
Hogan S.C. on behalf of the Applicant invited me to depart from the well
established principles which apply to the grant of interlocutory injunctions in
considering the Applicant’s case. These principles are well known. They
are that in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction the Court ought to
grant an interlocutory injunction only when satisfied that the Applicant has
demonstrated:-
8. Mr.
Hogan contends that his case in law both as to the invalidity of the charges
and the ‘
Rules
of Conduct
’
is so strong that I ought not to apply these well established principles but
should proceed to grant an injunction pending trial based on the strength of
his case alone and without regard to either adequacy of damages as a remedy or
balance of convenience.
9. I
reject this invitation. I do so on two grounds. First, such an approach is
unprecedented. No case was cited in support of it. It is an invitation which
is extended in the teeth of authoritative statements from the highest Courts
both in this jurisdiction and in England.
10. Later
in his speech an
American
Cyanamid V Ethicon
Lord Diplock said
“the
governing principle is that Court should first consider whether if the
Plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent
injunction he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the
loss he would have sustained as a result of the Defendant’s continuing to
do what was sought to be enjoined between the time of the application and the
time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common law would
be adequate remedy and the Defendant would be in a financial position to pay
them no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the
Plaintiff’s claim appeared to be at that stage”.
11. This
last quotation is relevant not merely to this aspect of the matter but to a
further aspect of this case which I will consider under the heading of adequacy
of damages.
12. These
quotations make it clear that the Court ought not to attempt an evaluation of
the strengths or weaknesses of either sides case at this stage of the
proceedings save in the limited circumstances identified subsequently in the
speech of Lord Diplock which are not relevant here.
13. My
second reason for rejecting the invitation is that even if Mr. Hogan were
correct and there was such a principle which would enable me to depart from the
normal rules governing the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief on the
basis of the Applicant having made out a virtually unanswerable case in law it
would not be applicable here. I am not at all satisfied that the
Applicant’s case is so clear at law as to be unanswerable by the
Respondent. It follows therefore that even if there was a legal basis for this
approach urged upon me by Mr. Hogan it would have no application to the
present case.
14. I
will therefore deal with this case on the conventional and well established
basis upon which the Court exercises this discretionary jurisdiction.
15. The
Applicant has already satisfied Kinlen J of the existence of an arguable case
in respect of its complaints against the Respondent. If it had not done so,
leave to seek Judicial Review would not have been granted. A higher standard
of proof is applicable on this application for an interlocutory injunction
pending trial. In my view it has been achieved both in respect of the charges
and the ‘
Rules
of Conduct
’.
Indeed that much is not seriously disputed by the Respondent’s for the
purpose of this application. I am therefore satisfied that the Applicant has
demonstrated a serious issue for trial in respect of each of the decisions
which are sought to impugned in these proceedings.
16. I
have already quoted a passage from the speech of Lord Diplock setting forth how
the Court ought to approach the question of adequacy of damages. It is clear
that if the Court concludes that damages would be an adequate remedy for the
mischief complained of by the Applicant and the Respondent would be in a
financial position to pay them then no interlocutory injunction should normally
be granted however strong the Plaintiff’s claim appears to be. That is
the test which is applicable here.
17. Insofar
as the question of the charges which are being imposed by the Respondent are
concerned there can be no doubt but that damages would provide a complete
remedy to the Applicant should it have to pay them in the meantime in
circumstances where the charges are subsequently at trial found to be unlawful.
There is no doubt but the Respondent could repay such monies together with
interest thereon and that is not in question. Not merely are damages an
adequate remedy but in the Affidavit evidence before the Court they have even
at this stage actually been quantified. Such being the case it is fatal to the
claim of the Applicants for an interlocutory injunction and indeed was always
so.
18. Accordingly
insofar as the injunction concerning the imposition of these charges is
concerned it is refused and indeed it is difficult to see how it could ever
have been sought.
19. The
position in respect of the ‘
Rules
of Conduct
’
is not so clear. It might well be said that any damage which might occur from
the imposition of this code would not be capable of compensation in damages.
But the gravamen of the Applicant’s case is not that it is at present
being damnified by any provision of the code. Rather it is that one part of
the code would permit the Respondents to unilaterally alter existing alleged
contractual rights which the Applicant contends that it has with the Respondent
in respect of pier A at Dublin Airport. It is not however in dispute that to
date no attempt had been made by the Respondent to operate the provisions of
the code which would allegedly enable it to bring about such a unilateral
alteration to the Applicant’s contractual rights. Not merely that but
the position of the Respondent is dealt with at paragraph 59 of the Affidavit
of the Deputy Chief Executive of the Respondent as follows:-
20. Such
being the position it is clear that the injunction which is sought in respect
of the rules of conduct is sought quia timet.
21. The
principles which are applied by the Court in the grant of interlocutory quia
timet injunctions have most recently been considered by Geoghegan J (when a
Judge of this Court)
in
Szabo
and others v Esat Digifone Limited and others
[1999] 2 LIRM 102
.
In that case Geoghegan J held as follows:-
22. I
am not satisfied that this test has been met by the Applicant here. There is
not in my view a sufficient risk of future injury to justify the immediate
grant of an injunction. The application for this injunctive relief is
premature.
23. Even
if I am wrong in the view which I have expressed concerning the injunction
relating to the ‘
Rules
of Conduct
’
I would nevertheless in any event refuse such injunction on the balance of
convenience.
24. It
appears to me to be highly undesirable that at an Airport catering for 117
airlines and 14 million passengers per annum a clear and comprehensive set of
rules should apply to 116 of those airlines and another set of rules (which
depend on a mixture of custom, practice, informal rules and agreements of
varying types) should apply to 117th airline. That in my view could not be
regarded as good, sensible or orderly management of an airport facility and
ought not to be forced on the Respondent by the Court. The Respondent is
responsible for the management of Dublin Airport, not this Court. It follows
therefore that on this ground also I refuse the injunction sought concerning
the ‘
Rules
of Conduct
’.
26. There
is one other matter to which I ought to allude. An allegation was made by the
Respondent to the effect that in seeking the interim orders from Kinlen J there
was non disclosure of material matters by the Applicant. Three such species of
non disclosure were identified and I have considered them.
27. I
do not depart one iota from the observations which I made in the case of
Adams
v The Director of Public Prosecutions and others
(unreported 12th April 2000) concerning the duty of disclosure in ex parte
applications. There I said
28.
I am not satisfied that there has in the present case been a departure from
these obligations. The Applicant might perhaps have been more prudent to have
put the relevant material before the Court if only to avoid an allegation of
the sort which was made, being made. But the failure to do so does not appear
to me to have amounted to a non- disclosure of material facts. Consequently
this complaint does not give rise to further consideration.
29. The
order of the Court will be to refuse both injunctions pending the trial of
these proceedings.