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High Court of Ireland Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> D.P.P. v. Cullen [2001] IEHC 21 (7th February, 2001)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/21.html
Cite as: [2001] IEHC 21

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D.P.P. v. Cullen [2001] IEHC 21 (7th February, 2001)

THE HIGH COURT
1999 No. 1938SS
IN THE MATTER OF
SECTION 2 OF THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1857
AND IN THE MATTER OF
SECTION 51 OF THE COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT, 1961

BETWEEN
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
APPELLANT
AND
JAMIE CULLEN
RESPONDENT

Judgment of Mr Justice Aindrias ÓCaoimh delivered on the 7th day of February 2001

1. Judge William Harnett, a Judge of the District Court sitting at Kilkenny District Court, has stated a case for the opinion of this Court pursuant to section 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 as extended on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions (hereinafter referred to as “the Director”). It is stated that the prosecution against the Respondent came before the District Court on the 13th of January 1998 and thereafter on the 20th of January and the 3rd of February 1998 at Kilkenny District Court on foot of a Summons served on the Respondent alleging an offence of driving with an excess of alcohol in his urine contrary to section 49(3) and 6(a) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as amended.

2. The case stated cites the evidence before the District Court

  1. Garda Frances Dunphy, a member of the Garda Síochána stationed at Kilkenny gave evidence that on the 8th of June 1997 at approximately 4.30 a.m. she was on duty at Castle Road, Kilkenny with Garda Lennon, Garda Furlong and student Garda Foley. Whilst talking with two youths they heard a vehicle coming in their direction from the traffic lights on the Parade up the Castle Road at what appeared to be high speed. It was a small white car. Garda Dunphy stated that she stepped out on to the road and waved her flash light signalling the occupants to stop.
  2. The vehicle, a white Peugeot 205 slowed down but failed to stop. It continued on up the Castle Road. Garda Dunphy observed a male driver and a female blond-haired passenger.
  3. Garda Dunphy and her colleagues immediately got into the patrol car and followed the vehicle up Castle Road. They put on the blue flashing lamp and followed the vehicle into Larchfield, a public place. At 4.32 a.m. Garda Dunphy observed the car pulling into the side of a footpath.
  4. The Gardaí pulled in behind the vehicle and Garda Dunphy got out of the car and proceeded towards the vehicle. As Garda Dunphy walked up to the driver’s side of the car, the driver had one leg out of the car and was clearly emerging from the car. Garda Dunphy asked the driver to stand out from the vehicle. He gave his name as James Cullen, 68 Larchfield, Kilkenny. The vehicle bore registration numbers and letters 88 KK 2690. Whilst Mr Cullen was out of the car, he had to lean against the car and the wall. There was a strong smell of alcohol.
  5. At 4.35 a.m. and as a result of her observations, Garda Dunphy formed the opinion that the Respondent was incapable of having proper control of a mechanically propelled vehicle in a public place due to the consumption of an intoxicant and at that time Garda Dunphy arrested him for that offence and told him of her opinion and of the offence under section 49(2) or (3) of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 to 1994. She explained to him that he was being arrested pursuant to section 49(8) of the said Act. She then explained to him that he was being arrested for drunk driving as he was unable to have proper control of his vehicle due to the fact that he had consumed alcohol.
  6. Garda Dunphy then gave the Respondent the usual oral warnings and in reply he stated that he was coming from a wedding and that he had probably too much to drink.
  7. Garda Dunphy placed the Respondent in the back of the patrol car. He was taken to Kilkenny Garda station arriving there at 4.45a.m. Garda Dunphy brought the Respondent to the public office. The Member in Charge was Garda William Powell. Garda Dunphy introduced the Respondent to Garda Powell and explained to Garda Powell the reason for Mr Cullen’s arrest.
  8. At 4.47 Doctor Miriam Hogan was telephoned. At 5.10 a.m. She arrived at the station. When she arrived at the station Garda Dunphy introduced her to the Respondent as a designated medical practitioner called on behalf of the Gardaí. Garda Dunphy then made a requirement pursuant to section 13(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 and required the Respondent to provide a sample of his urine or to allow the doctor to take a sample of his blood. Garda Dunphy advised the Respondent of the consequences of failure to provide a sample. The Respondent opted to give a sample of urine.
  9. The doctor took a sample of urine from the Respondent and having made the requirements under the Road Traffic Act completed in duplicate the certificate which she had taken from the box provided to her. She left the station at 5.35 a.m.
  10. Garda Dunphy offered the Respondent either one of the samples of his urine which had been taken and read out to the Applicant a statement of his rights contained on the yellow slip. This was to the effect that he might retain either of the two containers. The Respondent took a sample. Garda Dunphy then handed the slip to him which he took. He chose one of the samples.
  11. The Respondent was released from the Garda Station at 5.30 a.m. on the 8th of June 1997 and the sample was sent by registered post by Garda Dunphy on the 9th of June 1997.
  12. Garda Dunphy received a certificate from the Medical Bureau of Road Safety indicating a concentration of 229 mg. of alcohol per 100 ml. of urine.
  13. Garda Dunphy was cross-examined by Mr Eugene O’Sullivan, Solicitor for the Respondent. Garda Dunphy agreed that at all times the Respondent had been polite and was not in any way difficult although there had been some difficulty in relation to the giving of the sample. It was put to her that this was because the Respondent was not aware of his rights and had not been made aware of his rights. In reply Garda Dunphy agreed that she herself had not seen and could not therefore comment as to whether and how the Member in Charge had gone about his duties as a Member in Charge on that particular night.
  14. Garda Dunphy agreed that she was aware of the presence of Sinead Lambert in the Garda Station and was aware that Ms Lambert had attempted to contact a Solicitor and had in fact at one stage a phone book in her hand.
  15. Garda Dunphy agreed that, when Doctor Hogan arrived and the requirement was made pursuant to section 13, the Respondent initially declined to give a sample. Garda Dunphy did not agree that this was because the Respondent was unaware of his rights. She did, however, recall the Respondent leaving the doctor’s room on the requirement being made and that there was some discussion outside with Ms Lambert.
  16. While Garda Dunphy took notes at the time she did not have any note of a complaint having been made by the Respondent that he had not been read out his rights. She agreed that the Respondent was then required to go back into the doctor’s room and the requirement was made pursuant to section 13 and it was pointed out to him how serious a refusal could be. She denied that she did not hand the Respondent the yellow paper and further denied that she did not read out the contents of the yellow slip.
  17. Garda Dunphy stated that she was unaware that the Respondent had refused to sign the custody record book. This was a matter for the Member in Charge.
  18. Garda William Powell gave evidence that at 10 p.m. on Saturday the 7th of June 1997 he took up duty as Member in Charge of Kilkenny Garda Station under the Regulations of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 being the Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Stations Regulations, 1987. He gave evidence by reference to the custody book in front of him.
  19. He stated that at 4.05 a.m. on the 8th of June 1997 Garda Dunphy arrived at the Garda Station with the Respondent in her custody. Garda Dunphy informed Garda Powell at 4.35 a.m. of the fact that Mr Cullen had been arrested for drunk driving. Garda Powell stated that he read over Mr Cullen’s rights and handed him a copy of form C.72 (Information for Persons in Custody). At 4.47 a.m. Garda Lennon rang Doctor Hogan who agreed to come to the station.
  20. At 5.05 a.m. Sinead Lambert called to see the Respondent.
  21. Under cross-examination by Mr O’Sullivan Garda Powell stated that he was relying on what was in the custody book in relation to his recollection of what happened on the morning in question although he had some recollections. He agreed that he was clearly incorrect when he had stated to the Court in examination in chief that the parties had arrived at 4.05 a.m.. He should have said 4.45 a.m.. Garda Powell did not agree that he had failed to read the Respondent his rights or hand him a copy of his rights. He said that he was an experienced Member in Charge and performed the duties of a Member in Charge frequently.
  22. Garda Powell was asked whether he did anything else in performance of his obligations as a Member in Charge on the particular night. In answer he stated that he could not say anymore. He was asked further whether he was saying to the Court that the most he had done was to furnish the rights and hand them over to the Respondent and that this was the totality of his compliance with the Regulations. Garda Powell said that this was correct.
  23. It was put to him that both the Respondent and Ms Lambert would give evidence that she arrived as a friend of the accused and borrowed a phone book for the purposes of telephoning a solicitor. Garda Powell agreed that this was his recollection. He agreed that he handed the phone book to Ms. Lambert. He did not agree, however, that he snatched the book back from her. Garda Powell stated that if somebody wanted to ring a solicitor he would make that call. He did not agree that the purpose of the phone book being handed to Ms Lambert was for the purpose of contacting a solicitor friend of hers to assist the Respondent.
  24. It was put to Garda Powell that he had said to Ms Lambert on the night in question “You have been here before”. Garda Powell denied that he would have said anything like that. He was asked whether he knew Ms Lambert and he replied that he knew her vaguely. Garda Powell was asked whether or not he was personally aware on the night in question that Ms Lambert had been in a garda station a number of years previously for the purposes of the taking of a sample. Garda Powell agreed that he had been so aware on that particular night. It was then put to him that it was incredible that she could state and would give evidence that he had uttered the words “You have been here before” and that he denied it, given that he was in possession of the knowledge of her previous visit at the time of the detention of the Respondent. Garda Powell made no particular comment in relation to this.
  25. Garda Powell was then asked to account for why some of the dates in the custody record book appeared to have been changed. He was not in a position to account for this. He was asked whether it was correct that the Respondent had expressly declined to sign the custody record book. Garda Powell agreed that this was so. He was then asked to read out what it was that Mr Cullen was being asked to acknowledge and Garda Powell confirmed that the signature was to acknowledge the fact that his rights had been read and that he had been handed a copy of his rights. It was put to Garda Powell that the declining by the Respondent to sign the custody record was supportive of his allegation that he had not been informed of his rights nor handed a copy of his rights. Garda Powell agreed that the Respondent had at all times been polite and not aggressive. Garda Powell volunteered the view that everything had gone along perfectly smoothly until the arrival of Ms Lambert at the Garda Station.
  26. Following legal argument the Respondent went into evidence. In his evidence he confirmed that he was 27 years of age, single and that he worked as a tyre fitter and that he had no previous conviction. He confirmed that he had not been in a garda station under arrest before. At about 4.20 to 4.25 a.m. he had been driving his Peugeot car with his girlfriend back from a wedding. He did not see the Garda at the castle although he did see somebody there and was satisfied that he should have stopped. He recalled having been arrested at Larchfield by Garda Dunphy with the other Gardaí there. After being arrested he asked his girlfriend to attend at the Garda Station and she agreed to do so. As there was no room in the squad car she had to make her own way there.
  27. At the Garda Station the Respondent was put sitting down in a waiting area. He stated that he was not handed a copy of his rights nor were his rights explained to him. The first reference to a solicitor was when his girlfriend, Sinead Lambert, arrived at the Garda Station having obtained a taxi to get there. She explained to him that she knew of a solicitor personally who lived in Enniscorthy and that she would try and telephone him. Ms Lambert got a phone book and was looking up the number when the doctor arrived. At this stage the Respondent was brought into a different room which he presumed to be the doctor’s room and Garda Dunphy made a requirement of him to give blood or urine. The Respondent declined initially on the basis that he was not aware of his rights and wanted to know more about the process and what his choices were. He then left the doctor’s room and went out again to talk to Ms Lambert. She was trying to get the number.
  28. Garda Dunphy had explained in the doctor’s room that if he did not give a sample he could be prosecuted for failing to give a sample and disqualified for two years anyway and also liable to be sent to prison for a period of time. Whilst the Respondent was with Ms Lambert the Member in Charge, whom the Respondent had not previously met before, came over and asked Garda Dunphy what the problem was. Garda Dunphy replied that the witness was not prepared to give a sample. At this, the Member in Charge immediately took the book from Ms Lambert’s hand and asked her to get out of the station and mentioned that she had been there before. Ms Lambert obeyed the order of the Member in Charge. The Respondent was amazed at these developments.
  29. The Respondent was then brought back into the doctor’s room and a requirement was again made for him to give a sample and he agreed to give a sample opting for urine. He then provided a sample which was divided in two, placed in two boxes and Garda Dunphy offered one of the samples to him which he took. The Respondent was adamant that he did not receive any yellow piece of paper. He stated that he kept everything that he obtained in the Garda Station that night carefully and that that amounted to the sample and nothing else.
  30. The Respondent stated that Doctor Hogan then left and as the Respondent was leaving Garda Dunphy asked him to sign the custody record book. The Respondent declined to sign, explaining that he had not been made aware of his rights. Garda Dunphy stated that it was not necessary for him to sign it anyway. The Respondent was then given a lift home. He stated that he did want to contact a solicitor that night as he felt there might have been some point to be raised in the fact that he had not been in the car when the Gardaí arrived to him at Larchfield.
  31. The Respondent was then cross-examined by Inspector Roche on behalf of the Appellant. It was put to him that the request to sign the custody book would have been done by Garda Powell as part of his duties. The Respondent said that it was his recollection that Garda Dunphy had asked him to sign it. He stated that it was his first time in a Garda Station and that it was between 4.30 and 5 o’clock in the morning and that he did not know of any solicitor locally not being from the area himself. He never had a need for a solicitor before. When the suggestion was made by his girlfriend that she could contact a solicitor whom she knew, he was very happy that this be done by her on his behalf and he did wish to avail of a solicitor’s advice at that stage.
  32. When asked by Inspector Roche why he did not stop for Garda Dunphy at 4.30 a.m. on the morning of his arrest, given that it was daylight, he replied that he did not see her. It was then put to him that he had already pleaded guilty to a charge of failure to stop contrary to section 109 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961/1968. It was further put to him that his memory was selective and defective and that he had already admitted after caution to Garda Dunphy that he had been coming from a wedding where he had probably had too much to drink.
  33. Sinead Lambert then gave evidence. She stated that she was 24 years of age, single and a hairdresser. She had consumed some alcohol that night but her last drink had been at 1 a.m.. She stated that she had a clear recollection of the incident. They had been at a wedding.
  34. She remembered the Respondent being arrested and brought to Kilkenny Garda Station. She made it clear to the Gardaí that she would like to accompany her boyfriend but there was no room in the car, a fact which she fully understood. She was able to hail a taxi and arrived at the Garda Station a little after 5 a.m.. She announced her presence and introduced herself and explained why she was there and the Garda on duty let her in to see the Respondent who was sitting in the corridor just inside the day room. She asked the Respondent what was going on and the Respondent told her that he had been told to sit there until the doctor arrived and the doctor had not as yet arrived. She stated that she suggested to the Respondent that she give a friend of hers, Rory Deane, a Solicitor in Enniscorthy, a telephone call. There was some discussion between them about the fact that he had been out of the car when the Gardaí came along and that there might be some legal advice to be taken on the matter. The Respondent agreed to the suggestion.
  35. Ms Lambert then went over to the Garda in charge and asked him could she borrow a phone book. She told the Garda that it was to look up a telephone number of a solicitor friend of hers whom she wanted to ring on behalf of her boyfriend. He agreed that that was all right and handed Ms Lambert the phone book. At the same time the Garda mentioned to Ms Lambert that he did not think it really mattered as the Respondent had to give a sample anyway. Ms Lambert then looked up the phone book and as she was looking for the telephone number the doctor arrived. Garda Dunphy brought the Respondent into the doctor’s room. Ms Lambert was still looking up the number when the Respondent came out and asked her if she had obtained the number yet. She heard the Respondent tell the Garda that he wanted to wait before giving a sample, to speak with the solicitor, that his girlfriend was trying to contact. She said that it was clear at this stage that Garda Powell was getting fed up and he came over and grabbed the phone book out of the witness’s hand and said “Get out of here, you’ve been here before”. She stated that she took this to be a reference to the fact that some three years previously she had been arrested and had to give a sample in the Garda Station and had subsequently been disqualified. She stated that she was shocked at the response of the officer and that she left the day room and sat out in the waiting area until the Respondent came out.
  36. In cross-examination Ms Lambert stated that she was perfectly clear in her recollection and that she was not drunk. She had consumed alcohol up until about 1 a.m. only. She had the phone book in her hand not more than three to four minutes. Given the time of day, she was looking up Mr Deane’s private number rather than the office number. It was taking a length of time which she felt was reasonable in the circumstances and she was very upset by the remarks of Garda Powell.
  37. The case stated then recites that Judge Harnett then recalled Garda Dunphy. She told him that she would not have asked the Respondent to sign the custody record book as this would have been the job of Garda Powell. Garda Dunphy was then cross-examined by Mr O’Sullivan on this point and was asked whether or not there was any great significance as to whether she or Garda Powell had asked witnesses to sign the custody record book. She stated that it was significant only in so far as it would not normally be her who would do it. It was put to her by Mr O’Sullivan that if Garda Powell had failed to have this done and that she had noticed it that she would try to correct it. Garda Dunphy made no particular response to this remark but did confirm that in any event it was clear from the custody record book that Mr Cullen had expressly declined or refused to sign it and that what he was refusing to sign was an acknowledgement that he had been given and read and explained his rights.

3. This completed the evidence in the case.

4. Submissions were then made to the presiding Judge. On behalf of the Respondent it was submitted that he had not been informed of his rights either orally or by documentation having regard to the evidence. It was submitted by Mr O’Sullivan that it was clear that the first time the Respondent knew of anything concerning his rights was when his girlfriend arrived at the station and informed him of his rights. Having regard to the clear breach of the custody regulations by the Member in Charge the Respondent had been denied his legal and constitutional rights of access to a solicitor and of advice generally and that accordingly any evidence gathered thereafter should, in the discretion of the Trial Judge, be ruled inadmissible.

  1. On behalf of the Director it was submitted that the Respondent had pleaded guilty to failing to stop for Garda Dunphy on the night in question. He had admitted that they were coming from a wedding and probably had too much to drink. He did give a sample of urine. The presence of a solicitor could not prevent the Respondent from providing a sample of either blood or urine as he was required by law to do so. The Member in Charge was deployed as a permanent Member in Charge at Kilkenny Garda Station and deals with many prisoners. The Respondent was a prisoner and a person entitled to his rights and Ms Lambert was allowed a visit which is all she is entitled to under the regulations. It was to be noted that it was Garda Powell himself who provided Ms Lambert with the phone book and by her evidence she had the phone book for up to four minutes to phone the solicitor, whom she knew.

5. It was further submitted that the Court has a discretion in relation to the failure to comply with the said regulations.

6. Having regard to the evidence which the learned Judge of the District Court heard in this case and to the demeanour of the various witnesses he made the following findings of fact:

7. The opinion of this Court is sought as to whether

  1. He was correct in law in dismissing the said charge brought against the Respondent
  2. In light of the facts as settled in this case, which facts have been agreed, and in full consultation with both the Appellant and Respondent’s legal representatives for this case stated, the Judge asks whether hi is entitled to take the view that the stating of this case amounts to an unwarranted attempt to oust the inherent jurisdiction of the District Court to hear this matter to a reasonable conclusion.

The Law

8. Regulation 8 of the Custody Regulations provides as follows:-

“(1) The Member in Charge shall without delay inform an arrested person
or cause him to be informed :-
(1) The Member in Charge shall without delay give the arrested person or cause him to be given a notice containing the information specified in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph (1) and such other information as the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána with the approval of the Minister for Justice, may from time to time.
(2) Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply only in relation to the Member in Charge of the station to which the arrested person is taken on arrest or in which he is arrested.
(3) The time of the giving of the information specified in paragraph (1) and the notice specified in paragraph (2) shall be recorded. The Member in Charge shall ask the arrested person or cause him to be asked to sign the custody record in acknowledgement of receipt of the notice. If he refuses to sign, the refusal shall be recorded.

9. Section 7(3) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984, being the Act on foot of which the foregoing Regulations are based provides as follows:-

“ A failure on the part of any member of the Garda Síochána to observe any provision of the Regulations shall not of itself ... affect the lawfulness of the custody of the detained person or the admissibility in evidence of any statement made by him.”

Submissions of Counsel

10. Counsel on behalf of the Director refers this Court to the decision of O’Hanlon J. in the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Eric Spratt [1995] 2 ILRM 117. This case concerned a charge of refusing to comply with the requirement of the Garda doctor in relation to a provision of a sample following upon an arrest under section 49 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as amended. In contrast to the present case it is submitted that there was no evidence whatsoever in relation to the compliance or otherwise with the Custody Regulations.

11. O’Hanlon J. having considered the content of the relevant Regulations and the provisions of section 7(3) aforesaid stated, inter alia , as follows at page 122 of the Report:-

“The phrase ‘of itself’ is obviously an important one in the construction of the statutory provisions, and I interpret the subsection as meaning that non-observance of the Regulations is not to bring about automatically the exclusion of evidence of all that was done and said while the accused person was in custody. It appears to be left to the court of trial to adjudicate in every case as to the impact of the non-compliance which the regulations should have on the case for the prosecution.”

12. In the course of his judgment O’Hanlon J. also considered the previous Judgment of Blayney J. in the case of Walsh-v-O’Buachalla [1991]1I.R. 56. The facts of this case were that the Applicant was denied access to a solicitor in circumstances where the arresting Garda believed that the request was not genuine and was made merely for the purpose of delay. The Applicant was informed that he could contact a solicitor as soon as the specimen had been taken. After the specimen was taken the Applicant did not seek to contact a Solicitor. The Applicant sought to quash his conviction on the foregoing grounds. Blayney J. held, assuming the refusal of the Applicant’s request for access to a solicitor was in breach of his constitutional rights, that the certificate of the doctor was nonetheless admissible in evidence since the specimen had been obtained after but not as a result of that breach.

13. O’Hanlon J. approved this decision in the Spratt case stating inter alia, at page 123 :-

“I think that the correct approach in the present case is to pose the same question which Blayney J. asked of himself in Walsh’s case. If a breach of a constitutional right of the accused person took place, as alleged, in what manner was he prejudiced thereby? Was any information obtained which might not have been otherwise obtained?
It is easy to conceive a situation where an accused person in custody is not informed of his right of access to a solicitor, and does not seek legal advice in consequence, and proceeds to make an incriminating statement when a legal adviser might have counselled silence. In this set of circumstances it can be envisaged that the decision of the trial Judge might be to exclude the evidence so obtained.
In the present case, however, as in Walsh’s case, an accused person was in the garda station awaiting the arrival of the registered medical practitioner who was to take a sample of blood or urine, which the accused person was obliged by law to provide for him in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions. Access to a solicitor or advice from a solicitor could not avert this fate, and no further evidence was then required for the purpose of the prosecution save evidence of the circumstances of the arrest, the obtaining of the sample and the formal, technical evidence of what was disclosed by the sample taken.”
In the words of Blayney J.
“It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that if he had had access to a solicitor he could have been advised by him. But what advice could a solicitor have given him? He would certainly not have advised him to commit an offence by refusing to give one or other of the specimens. All he could have done was to confirm that the Applicant was required by law to provide a specimen of blood or urine. No advice could have prevented the specimen being obtained, and, accordingly, the applicant’s not having had access to a solicitor in no way affected its being obtained. (p.60)”

14. Further reliances is placed by Counsel on behalf of the Director upon the decision of this Court delivered by Budd J. in the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions (at the suit of Garda Patrick Dillon) -v- Patrick Devlin (Unreported High Court 2nd September 1998). This case also concerned the charge of drink driving contrary to section 49 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as amended and the evidence given disclosed that the Member in Charge was in breach of Regulation 8(1) in that he failed to inform the Respondent orally of his right to consult a solicitor and to have notification of his being in custody sent to another person reasonably named by him. The Member in Charge did hand over a notice to the Respondent which contained information as to his rights. The charge was dismissed by the District Judge on grounds including this ground. On an Appeal by way of case stated, having considered the Custody Regulations, statutory provisions and case law Budd J. upheld the appeal. In the course of his Judgment he considered all of the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent including submission that the trial Judge must be entitled to consider the particular nature of the breach of the Custody Regulations and the explanation offered for this by the Member in Charge. In the course of his Judgment he stated, inter alia , as follows:-

All this is correct but, on the basis of the impression made on him by the evidence, the District Judge must go on to apply the law as set out in section 7 and the cases cited by adjudicating as to what impact the non-compliance with the regulations has had on the case for the prosecution. I should add that there is no suggestion in the case stated that the District Judge formed the view that he was dealing with a conscious and deliberate violation of the Respondent’s right or of the Custody Regulations or that reprehensible or oppressive behaviour on the part of the Garda tainted the entire prosecution case. Accordingly, on this issue, in view of the words of the statute and the statements of O’Hanlon J. and Blayney J. in respect of the case law it seems to me that there was no actual adjudication on the impact of the breach of the Regulations on the admissibility of the evidence subsequently obtained against the accused and that, accordingly, the learned District Judge was wrong in dismissing the charge on this basis. I should add that it would be for the District Judge to make such findings as are appropriate in light of the guidelines and quoted statements as to the law and then come to his conclusion in the light of his findings made in accordance with the law.”

15. It is submitted by Counsel on behalf of the Director that in applying the principles to the facts of the present case, it is clear that when a breach of the Custody Regulations occurs in any given case there is a duty on the District Judge to form a view as to what effect, if any, this has had on the prosecution case. In the present case it is submitted that the failure on the part of Garda Powell to comply with the Custody Regulations did not, of itself, result in the specimen being taken. The Respondent was under a duty to provide the specimen, and the oral notification to him of his right to have a solicitor or another person notified of his presence in the Garda Station would not have affected this obligation. It is submitted that it is difficult to envisage how the Respondent could have been prejudiced by the failure to orally inform him of his rights in those circumstances.

16. It is further submitted that the District Judge did not adjudicate on the impact of the breach of the Custody Regulations on the Respondent, as he is required to do under the statutory provisions and the case law cited.

17. In light of these submissions it is submitted that I should answer the first question posed in the negative and, with regard to the second question, that this is not a proper question of law for the opinion of the High Court, and without prejudice to this submission, it should be answered in the negative.

18. Reliance is placed by Counsel for the Respondent upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Keating -v- The Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1991] 1I.R.61 where McCarthy J. stated, inter alia , at page 66 of the report:-

If cases arise where the circumstances of arrest are such as to amount to an affront to the constitutional role of the courts, then the District Justice will refuse to proceed with the matter and will discharge the person before him.”

19. In the course of his judgment McCarthy J. stated, inter alia, at page 65 of the Report as follows:-

“In the course of the hearing a Justice of the District Court or a Judge of the Circuit Court, in an appropriate case, is bound to enquire into the circumstances under which particular evidence was obtained and may rule against the admission of such evidence if satisfied that it was obtained in circumstances involving a breach of constitutional rights such as to taint the evidence itself.”

20. Counsel for the Respondent has further made reference to the right of an accused person not to incriminate himself/herself. He submits that the conduct of the Gardaí in this case amounts to an outrage.

21. It was further submitted on behalf of the Respondent that in reaching his decision in this case, the judge of the District Court did so in exercise of his constitutional duty as a judge and in so doing must be considered as having

“a sole and exclusive authority to control and supervise the conduct of proceedings in his own Court within the limit of the jurisdiction conferred upon him.”

22. In this regard Counsel has adopted the language of Gannon J. in the case of case of Clune -v- Director of Public Prosecutions [1991]ILRM 17.

23. In the course of his Judgment in that case Gannon J. stated, inter alia , as follows:-

Many of the procedures which were appropriate to the circumstances when the inferior Courts where administered by lay magistrates have been adapted and adopted in relation to our District Court now administered by fully competent and qualified lawyers, whose independence as judges, not only from the executive but even from their judicial colleagues, must be respected. The Justice sitting in the District Court has the sole and exclusive authority to control and supervise the conduct of proceedings in his own Court within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon him. His independence and authority are secured in his freedom not only from pressures of political or executive nature but also from purported intervention, direction, or control by any Superior Court. If he should be in error it is the interests of the parties to the suit, whether the public or private individual, which require the error to be corrected.”

24. Further reference was made to the decision of Kinlen J. in the case of D.P.P. -v- Dempsey (Unreported, High Court 2/7/1997).

25. With regard to the requirement that the Courts uphold their procedures, further reliance is placed by Counsel for the Respondent on the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Shaw [1982] I.R.1 where at page 61 of the Report Griffin J. stated, inter alia, as follows:-

“Even if his statement is held to have been voluntarily obtained in the sense indicated, it may nevertheless be inadmissible for another reason. Because our system of law is accusatorial and not inquisitorial, and because (as has been stated in a number of decisions of this Court) our Constitution postulates the observance of basic or fundamental fairness of procedures, the Judge presiding at a Criminal trial should be astute to see that, although a statement may be technically voluntary, it should nevertheless be excluded if , by reason of the manner or of the circumstances in which it was obtained, it falls below the required standards of fairness. The reason for exclusion here is not so much the risk of an erroneous conviction as a recognition that the minimum of essential standards must be observed in the administration of justice. Whether the objection to the statement be on constitutional or other grounds, the crucial test is whether it was obtained in compliance with basic or fundamental fairness.”

26. It is submitted on behalf of the Respondent that in the instant case the minimum essential standards were not observed by the Gardaí and that this therefore entitles the Judge of the District Court to dismiss the charge against the Respondent. It is submitted that the constitutional rights of the Respondent were affected by the action of the Gardaí in this case in breach of, firstly, his right to silence and, secondly, his right to a solicitor.

27. In reply, counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that in the first place the right to silence is not absolute and that in the instant case nothing stems from that right. It is further submitted that the right to a solicitor, if breached, was not such as to give rise to the obtaining of any evidence in breach of that right.


Conclusions

28. This Court has been furnished with a copy of the Custody Record in the form of an Annex to the case stated. While it shows at paragraph (C) under the heading “Initial Action Taken”, 22. ‘Information given to arrested person in accordance with Regulation 8(1). Time 4.48 a.m.’, it appears that the figure 8 may have been changed from an earlier time and in regard to the contents of paragraph 23, ‘Notice of rights. Time 4.59 a.m.’ the time specified appears to represent a change from an earlier time. It is to be noted that these changed times have not been initialled, which would be a preferable practice, if there had been an inaccuracy in regard to the original time when these matters where noted.

29. Nevertheless in the instant case the learned Judge of the District Court has concluded on the facts that the Respondent had not been handed notice of his custody rights and had not had his rights read out to him or explained to him. In these circumstances it is not for this Court to pass judgment on this conclusion as the same was reached on evidence before the District Court Judge. It is to be noted that the learned Judge of the District Court found the evidence of the Member in Charge to be faulty and unreliable. This Court must accordingly treat this case in light of these findings.

30. While it is clear that the learned Judge of the District Court concluded on the evidence before him that the legal and constitutional rights of the Respondent had not been accorded to him on the night in question, he states that he dismissed the charge in the exercise of his judicial discretion. It is unclear how, in the exercise of his discretion, he came to the conclusion that the evidence in relation to the concentration of alcohol in the urine of the Respondent should be excluded, in circumstances where, under the terms of the Road Traffic Act, it was a mandatory requirement on the Respondent that he furnish a specimen of his blood or urine when requested to do so. What is clear from the case stated in the instant case is that, while O’Hanlon J. stated in Spratt’s case that it is for the court of trial to adjudicate in every case as to the impact of the non-compliance which the regulations should have on the case for the prosecution, the case stated to this Court does not make any finding in relation to the impact of the non-compliance on the case for the prosecution. Before excluding the evidence I am satisfied that a Judge of the District Court would have to be satisfied that the impact of the non-compliance with the regulations was one which had a material effect on the case for the prosecution. In the context of the taking of a statement from a person in custody it is clear that such may be very material but, as in the instant case, where the giving of a sample was a requirement of law, I am not satisfied that the non-compliance with the regulations was such as to have warranted the dismissal of the charge against the Respondent in the circumstances outlined in the case stated. Accordingly I will answer the first question in the negative. With regard to the second question, insofar as the learned Judge of the District Court has in fact stated a case for the opinion of this Court, no circumstance arises for the answering of the question in the manner put forward. Were the District Court Judge to refuse to state a case upon request being made of him pursuant to the provisions of the Summary of Jurisdiction Act, 1857 that decision would itself be reviewable by this Court.


© 2001 Irish High Court


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