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1. The first named defendant seeks an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim against him for failure to furnish a statement of claim.

2. An interlocutory order has already being made under Section 3 of the Proceeds of Crime Act and a receiver appointed over the assets of the defendants pursuant to Section 7 thereof. These proceedings were commenced by plenary summons and it is submitted on behalf of the defendant that the Rules of the Superior Courts impose a mandatory requirement on the plaintiff to deliver a statement of claim within specified time limits. This has not been done and the first defendant now seeks an order dismissing the proceedings. The relevant rules are so familiar as not to require recital.

3. In support of the application, Dr. Forde referred to the judgment of O’Higgins J. in Murphy -v- GM PB PC Ltd., and Another (Unreported, High Court, O’Higgins J., 4th June, 1999), where (at page 87 following) it was held that a statement of claim was not necessary because interlocutory relief only was then being sought and there was no constitutional requirement to furnish a statement of claim given, as held, that the defendants were aware of the nature of the claim and much of the evidence. Counsel in this motion also sought to distinguish the present case from Murphy in that in the present case an interlocutory order has already being made (as has an order appointing a receiver) and the claim therefore is for final relief.

4. I agree that the present case is different from Murphy on this basis: the judgment in Murphy seems to me to clearly apply only to the interlocutory stage and it is on this basis that I followed it in my own ruling in Mc -v- F and Another (Unreported, High Court, O’Sullivan J., 26th January, 2001).

5. Dr. Forde relies, further, on the rules which mandate the delivery of a statement of claim and points out that in the absence of receipt thereof he cannot put in a defence, raise particulars or “ know the case I have to meet ”.

6. Mr. Murray BL counsel for the plaintiff, does not disagree in principle with Dr. Forde’s analysis of the rules. He suggests that the Act creates a separate cause of action at Section 3 thereof (for interlocutory relief) and that it is possible that separate proceedings might be instituted for relief under Section 4 (a final order), although he acknowledges that this concept was not accepted by O’Higgins J in Murphy. He further points out that Order 19 Rule 20, whilst mandating a statement of claim does not, in terms, authorise the making of an order directing delivery of a statement of claim but rather provides for relief by way of dismissal of the plaintiff’s case unless a statement of claim is delivered in accordance with the rules. He further acknowledges that he would have no great difficulty in delivering a statement of claim for relief under Section 4 and requests that his client would not be burdened with the stigma of an order under Section 27 Rule 1 which provides for an order dismissing the action with costs for want of prosecution. I note, however, that in the alternative the court under this Rule “... may make such other Order on such terms as the Court shall think just ”.

7. It might seem apparent that under this alternative jurisdiction a court might make an order directing delivery of a statement of claim in the context of an application to dismiss but Mr. Murray refers me to authority in England (prior to a change in the rules there in 1962 authorising such an order directing delivery) which suggests that such jurisdiction may not be clear, leading to a situation of some doubt and also to the fact that in 1962 in that country the rules were explicitly amended to provide for such an order directing delivery.

8. As already indicated the present case is, in my view, clearly distinguishable from Murphy. In the present case there is no question of the plaintiff now seeking interlocutory relief, which was the situation in Murphy .

9. I see no reason why the rules should not apply so as to compel delivery of a statement of claim where the relief sought is relief under Section 4 of the above entitled Act. It may be, as suggested in argument, that the rules could have provided differently or more conveniently: this has not happened and in the absence of any particular arrangement, in my view the general rules apply and include a requirement that the plaintiff deliver a statement of claim. Accordingly I make an order directing the plaintiff to deliver a statement of claim and I will discuss with counsel how long may be required.