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1. The Plaintiff seeks to enforce the terms of a letter dated the 9th day of June 1998 addressed to it by the defendant, contending that the defendant is contractually bound by its terms (referring to it in the pleadings as “the Pier A Agreement”) or that the plaintiff has a legitimate expectation that the terms will be honoured, such expectation allegedly arising out of the general course of dealings between the parties such dealings particularised as referable to the period after the 9th day of June 1998 (particulars 5, 23rd November 2001).

2. I have had the benefit of seeing the letter upon which the plaintiff relies, although it is not an exhibit before me. If this is indeed the contractual document relied upon by the plaintiff I cannot see how it can maintain a case in the teeth of the clear qualification expressed by the defendant to the effect that “we will not, however, deny any customer a building served stand where one is available.” But it is for the defendant to apply to the Court to stay the proceedings and until that occurs I must make a decision on the discovery application on the pleadings as I find them.

3. I am asked to direct Discovery of background documentation to assist with the Court’s inquiries into the true meaning of the said letter and the intention of the parties. In my view, the letter - the only contract document relied on - must stand or fall on its own terms. In very rare cases of ambiguity parties may seek to re-open the files if seeking rectification . It is not alleged that the letter is ambiguous. It is not its existence or the true construction of its terms that are disputed by the Defendant: it is its legal status.

4. For the same reason proof of the facts relied upon by the plaintiff as its consideration for the said contract cannot be relevant to the Court’s decision as to the legal effect of the letter.

5. In the application for Discovery which is before the Court, the plaintiff also seeks the defendant’s documentation regarding the said course of dealings . I do not have to decide the issue, raised in the defence, as to whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations applies to this relationship. What I have to decide is whether the documentation sought under this heading is probative as to the facts the plaintiff seeks to prove, namely, that the subsequent behaviour of the defendant towards the plaintiff was unambiguously in conformity with the terms of the letter of the 9th day of June 1998 and proving, therefore, the contractual intent and force of the letter.

6. The course of dealings consists of all stand allocation decisions by the defendant for incoming aircraft. Apparently the plaintiff expected, on the strength of the contents of the letter of the 9th day of June 1998 that new stands, mainly adjoining the old Central Terminal Building, would be “used mainly by” the Plaintiff who would get “preferential use of these stands over other airlines”. Since it is clear that the plaintiff is a key customer of the defendant, allocation records will probably show that the plaintiff was allocated these stands more often than not. Instances of allocation to the plaintiff of stands other than the above mentioned or of allocation of these stands to another airline will not be probative of any fact other than that the plaintiff enjoyed frequent but non-exclusive use of these stands and occasional use of others. The quantum of the plaintiff’s use of the relevant stands could be merely a reflection of the plaintiffs overall extent of user of the airport, or it could be referable to the performance of the terms of the letter - the Court will be unable to distinguish. Therefore the evidence as to course of dealings is of no probative value. In any event, even if the pattern showed a complete conformity with the priority access demanded of the defendant such evidence would not elevate the letter of June 9th 1998 to the status of contract.

7. The defendant pleads, as an alternative defence, that a contract or agreement of the sort contended for by the plaintiff would be in breach of the Competition Acts or void for uncertainty or unenforceable by virtue of the Statute of Frauds. Arising out of that the plaintiff seeks discovery of documents relating to the business of the defendant at other airports on the basis that if the defendant operated, elsewhere than in Dublin, pursuant to contracts or agreements of a similar nature, that fact would be relevant in determining the legality or enforceability of the June 9th 1998 agreement. It would not. These are essentially matters of law, to be assessed by the application of principles of law rather than on the basis of the behaviour of the parties, or, indeed, non parties elsewhere.

8. Accordingly, in my view, the only facts in respect of which discovery should be ordered are the alleged breaches and losses flowing therefrom and contributory acts of negligence alleged by the defendant.

9. I now turn to the categories of documents as listed in the Notice of Motion dated 15th November, 2001. The defendants have indicated their consent to discover the documents at paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 4.1, 5 and 9 and I will order discovery accordingly.

10. Applying the reasoning outlined in the foregoing paragraphs to the balance of the categories in respect of which discovery of documents is sought, I will order discovery of category 10, but not categories 2, 3, 4:2, 6, 7 or 8.

11. The reasons advanced, in the letter seeking voluntary discovery, in respect of category 1.3 refer to the legitimate expectation of the plaintiff as deriving from the priority access to South Side stands, allegedly enjoyed by the plaintiff prior to June 1998.

12. Facts prior to June 1998 are excluded from the definition of “general course of dealings and practice” contained in the further and better particulars of the 23rd November 2001, at item 5 thereof, and accordingly discovery of documents now sought at 1.3 should not be ordered.