BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

1. The Applicant is a single male person of Nigerian nationality who is of Christian belief and whose date of birth is 23rd November 1978. He arrived in the State on the 7th August 2000 having travelled, in a not wholly accounted for fashion via Malta to Ireland. In the standard form of Questionnaire applicable to these matters he states he had primary and secondary education and was from 1995 - 2000 an undergraduate of the University of Ibadan but received no qualifications, noting in the Questionnaire “Uncompleted Programme due to crisis” . An interview with the Applicant took place on the 13 of September 2000, and the interviewer one Pierce O’Flynn made a report thereon which on its face is dated 24th September 2000. The conclusion arrived at was that the application was manifestly unfounded under paragraph 14 Sections (a), (b) and (c) of the Hope Hanlon procedures (viz):-

2. A Mr. Joseph Keaney, Assistant Principal Officer of the Asylum Division of the Respondent’s Department (has sworn an Affidavit in these proceedings on the 4th of December 2001, which explains to my satisfaction the confusion of dates on the documentation between 22nd and 25th September 2000) who considered the recommendation of the case worker (who I am satisfied from Mr. Keaney’s affidavit was one Mr. Pierce O’Flynn) and agreed with it. However, he confined his decision to paragraph 14(b) of the Hope Hanlon procedures. This he did via a letter which on its face is dated the 22nd September informing the Applicant that:-

3. The entitlement to appeal this decision was availed of by the Applicant who had the benefit of legal advice and assistance in the person of one Marie Quirke of the Refugee Legal Service who has addressed the issue of the refusal in considerable detail. The letter concludes:

4. Parenthetically I note the observations made in the course of paragraph 7 indicate an approach to these matters that is more appropriate to an adversarial scheme of things, as in the case of a lis inter partes. The approach is at variance with that as pronounced by the Supreme Court in the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill, 1999 [2000] 2 IR 360 at 395 which has to the following effect:-

5. It is important to note that this letter of appeal was written in the knowledge that the appeal would be decided on the papers available in the case and on any written submissions that might be made by the Applicant or on his behalf. To assist in the preparation of the appeal, a copy of all documents on which the decision to refuse the application was based were furnished to the Applicant who was also advised (in the letter which on its face is dated 22nd September 2000):-

6. Thus it was clear that prior to the appeal, the view being taken by the Respondent was that there was insufficient detail or evidence to substantiate his claim. In the events the Appeals Authority considered the appeal and by recommendation dated 6th October 2000 it expressed its decision in this way:-

7. The outcome of the foregoing was that by letter dated 24th October 2000 the Respondent (in the person of one Linda Grealy, Deciding Officer) the Applicant was informed that:-

8. Neither the decision at first instance or on appeal was challenged under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, within the terms of that order. The Applicant elected at a time when he had the benefit of legal advice to apply to the Respondent pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 of the Illegal Immigrants Act 1999 for leave to remain on in the State on humanitarian grounds. This was done by letter of 9th November 2000, which (inter alia) stated:-

9. In the events which have happened the Respondent signed the deportation order dated 1st March 2001 and Notice thereof with the reasons therefor were set out in a letter dated 12 March 2001. Proceedings by way of Judicial Review were lodged in the Central Office on 28th March 2001 and the proceedings awaited the outcome of the P.L. and B . case determined by the Supreme Court on 30th July 2001. On the matter coming on for hearing it was conceded that it could only proceed on grounds 5, 6, and 9 of the original application. However, a further notice of motion dated 26th November 2001 sought leave (subject in securing an extension of time from the Court) to advance a number of additional reliefs. As in all other cases where an extension of time is involved I permitted the Applicant to present his case in full as if it were the actual application for Judicial Review so that he would have the most ample opportunity to advance whatever merits his case may have had to show good an sufficient reason for extending the time period. The decision of the Supreme Court in G.K. and Others .v. The Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform (unreported 17th December 2001) subsequent to the hearing of this case and before the delivery of this Judgment - permits of a consideration of the merits. In the instant case I declined to extend the time for additional reliefs as no good and sufficient reason had been advanced sufficient to overcome the time restriction under Section 5 (2)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 in particular I find as a fact and as a matter of law that

10. These grounds relate significantly to matters which have already been decided in the P.L. and B . case. The Applicant’s submission was that the Respondent is relying on the maintenance of the integrity of the asylum immigration system as a ground for refusing leave to the Applicant to remain in the State, when the system was manifestly inadequate. I am not satisfied that the system was manifestly inadequate. And furthermore it is a matter within the remit of the Respondent to insure that the integrity of the asylum process and that the system is observed. Otherwise it would be most invidious if it could be carried out in an arbitrary fashion. It is further submitted that the Respondent failed to inform him of the reasons for which the Respondent proposed to make a deportation order. I reject this submission as it is quite clear from my reading of the documents and from what has already appeared in this judgment that the reason why the application was considered manifestly unfounded was because of the failure of the Applicant to supply sufficient details or evidence within the terms of paragraph 14(b) of the Hope Hanlon procedures. It would be invidious of me to lay down what the criteria should be, but each case must have within it a sufficiency of information to enable the decision maker to come to a view to make a decision. Only in such circumstances as the evidence and the details of information are sufficiently adequate to enable that decision to be arrived at in that fashion can decisions be made. The considerations of common good and public policy are clearly matters within the remit of the Minister as set out in Section 3(6) of the Immigration Act 1999 the Minister is obligated to consider such matters. The letter of the 12th March 2001 giving the Applicant notice of the making of the deportation order is impugned by the Applicant on the basis that there is a failure in some regard on the Respondent to give reasons. The reasons set out in the letter were those found by the Supreme Court to be sufficient and adequate within the terms of the P.L. and B. case and are as follows:-

11. This in my judgment meets the requirements of Section 3(3)(b)(ii) of the Immigration Act of 1999. The application for leave was treated as the application for judicial review and I am satisfied that the application should be dismissed.