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High Court of Ireland Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Gibbons -v- Commissioner of an Garda Siochana [2007] IEHC 266 (30 July 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2007/H266.html Cite as: [2007] IEHC 266 |
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Judgment Title: Gibbons -v- Commissioner of an Garda Siochana Composition of Court: Edwards J. Judgment by: Edwards J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation Number: [2007] IEHC 266 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2006 No. 210 J.R.] BETWEEN MARK GIBBONS APPLICANT AND THE COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice John Edwards delivered on the 30th July, 2007.FACTS The applicant is a member of An Garda Síochána. He currently faces disciplinary charges under the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 1989 and the alleged breaches of discipline relate to alleged mishandling of lost property handed into Kevin Street Garda Station by a Mr. Alan Harper on the 19th September, 2001. The lost property in question went missing whilst in Garda custody and it is alleged that the applicant was negligent in his duties and that he did not properly record the lost property or issue a proper receipt for it. The applicant was the member-in-charge of property in Kevin Street Garda Station at the relevant time. On the 1st November, 2003 Mr. Harper wrote a letter to the addressed to the Lost Property Office, Garda Station, Kevin Street, Dublin 2 in the following terms:- “Dear Sirs,
Yours sincerely, Alan Harper.” Though nothing of significance turns on it, Mr. Harper was incorrect in his recollection that he handed in the lost property in question in November, 2001. An examination of the lost property book at Kevin Street Garda Station subsequently revealed that he in fact handed in the property in question on the 19th September, 2001. This letter is characterised in the applicant’s submissions as being “a letter of complaint which disclosed an apparent breach of discipline by unknown members of An Garda Síochána”. It is nothing of the sort. It is merely an enquiry. Garda John Sheridan on behalf of the Lost Property Office at Kevin Street replied to Mr. Harper’s letter by a letter dated the 13th November, 2003 in the following terms:- “Dear Sir,
Yours sincerely, John Sheridan Garda.” On the 15th November, 2003 Mr. Harper replied to Garda Sheridan in the following terms:- “Dear Sir,
Yours sincerely, Alan Harper” On the basis of this information the gardaí went about making enquiries. Arising out of those enquiries an Inspector Will Muldoon telephoned Mr. Harper sometime in January, 2004. Following that telephone conversation Mr. Harper wrote again to Garda Sheridan on the 4th February, 2004, in the these terms:- “Dear Sir,
Yours sincerely, Alan Harper” It would appear that the Garda inquiries continued but they were unsuccessful in locating the property in question. In consequence of this Inspector Muldoon of the Superintendents Office at Kevin Street Garda Street Station wrote to Mr. Harper on the 7th July, 2004 in the following terms:- “Dear Alan,
Thady P. Muldoon Inspector for Superintendent.” The next piece of relevant correspondence was a letter of the 13th of July 2004 from Mr. Harper to Inspector Muldoon responding to the Inspector’s letter of the 7th July. It is fairly characterised as being a letter of complaint and protest in robust terms. Having so characterised it, and as the letter is of some length, it is not necessary for me to recite it. However, I would comment that this is the first letter in the nature of a formal complaint. Unfortunately, Mr. Harper’s letter of the 13th July, 2004 was not responded to and this further irritated an already incensed Mr. Harper, who then wrote directly to the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána on the 14th October, 2004. Again it is not necessary to recite the precise terms of Mr. Harper’s letter to the Garda Commissioner. However, it is fair to say that it elicited an immediate response. The Commissioner immediately passed the matter to the Assistant Commissioner for Human Resource Management at Garda Headquarters who was then Assistant Commissioner W. I. Rice. On the 28th October, 2004 Assistant Commissioner Rice wrote to Chief Superintendent William Donoghue of Pearse Street Garda Station who was the Divisional Officer in charge of the Dublin Metropolitan Region South Central Division. Kevin Street Garda Station is within the Dublin Metropolitan Region South Central Division. Assistant Commissioner Rice’s letter was in the following terms:-
Walter I. Rice Assistant Commissioner” The next thing that happened was that by letter dated the 2nd November, 2004 addressed to the Superintendent at Pearse Street Garda Station, Chief Superintendent Donoghue nominated Inspector Thomas Maguire of Pearse Street Station to conduct what was described in evidence as a “preliminary investigation” of the complaint and required him to report in early course with his observations and recommendations. The letter to the Superintendent stressed that there should be no delay in having the matter fully (my emphasis) investigated and it directed that an interim report should reach the Chief Superintendent’s Office within 30 days of receipt of the file by the investigating officer. It is clear from the affidavit sworn by Chief Superintendent Donoghue on the 27th June, 2006, and indeed from his oral evidence in the course of being cross-examined upon his affidavit before me, that he was of the view, rightly or wrongly, that the task entrusted to him by the Assistant Commissioner involved a two stage process. He stated:-
In any event, Inspector Thomas Maguire went about his preliminary investigation and a preliminary investigation file was submitted to Chief Superintendent on or about the 1st April, 2005. This was read and considered by Chief Superintendent Donoghue who raised certain queries in respect of it relating to issued receipts from the property book and also relating to the hand writing in the property book in respect of entries on the 19th September, 2001 (the date the property was handed into Kevin Street Garda Station). These matters were not covered in the Inspector’s preliminary report. Chief Superintendent Donoghue deposed that on or about the 4th July, 2005 he received a full investigation file addressing his queries of the 7th April, 2005 from Inspector Maguire. He contends that it was on receipt of Inspector Maguire’s report and investigation file on the 4th July, 2005 that he became aware for the first time of the identity of the members of An Garda Síochána who were allegedly negligent regarding the property handed into Kevin Street Garda Station by Alan Harper on the 19th September, 2001 and the alleged failure to secure the same. Upon a consideration of Inspector Maguire’s report he concluded that there was evidence of negligence by way of neglect of duty on the part of three members who were on duty in the public office of Kevin Street Garda Station on the date in question. One of those three members was the applicant in this case, Mark Gibbons. On the 8th July, 2005 Chief Superintendent Donoghue appointed Inspector Thomas Maguire of Pearse Street Garda Station on a form “B. 33”, to investigate alleged breaches of discipline against three members, one of whom was the applicant herein. It was at this point that Inspector Maguire was formally tasked pursuant to Regulation 8 of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989 to investigate the alleged breaches of discipline against the applicant the subject matter of this judicial review. In addition, and as required under the Regulations, the Chief Superintendent furnished Inspector Maguire with a form “B. 33A” for service on the applicant. The form B. 33A is a Notice under Regulation 9 of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989 informing the applicant that he may have been in breach of discipline and briefly outlining the acts of commission or omission alleged. Further, the applicant was formally informed that Inspector Maguire had been appointed Investigating Officer and that he was investigating the matter. On the 27th October, 2005 Chief Superintendent Donoghue received what was described to me as “the full disciplinary investigation file” from Inspector Maguire. Having considered it he caused the applicant to be formally charged with a breach of discipline on the 12th November, 2005 and to be served with all relevant documentation (referred to at the hearing before me as a “book of evidence”). This was done pursuant to Regulation 11 of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 1989. The charging procedure involves serving the accused Garda with what is known as a “Discipline Form” (designated B.30) containing a statement of the charge or charges against him. The B.30 invites the accused to indicate whether he wishes to admit the charge or charges and avail of regulation 13, or not. On the 30th December, 2005 the applicant returned the form B. 30 to the Chief Superintendent’s office via Inspector Thomas Maguire endorsed with an indication that he was denying all charges. At this point the wheels were to be put in motion for the setting up of a formal inquiry in accordance with Regulation 14 of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 1989. However, before any inquiry could be held the applicant applied to the High Court by motion ex-parte on Monday 27th February, 2006 for leave to apply by way of application for judicial review for diverse reliefs including an order of prohibition restraining the respondent from further processing the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant herein in respect of the allegations of breaches of discipline preferred against him. The applicant was successful in obtaining leave to apply for judicial review. Before leaving this review of the facts of the case it should also be stated that the applicant relies heavily on certain additional facts established before me in evidence. Kevin Street Garda Station is located within what is known as “A” District. Mr. Alan Harper’s initial inquiries (and subsequent complaint) were all addressed to Gardaí within “A” district and were dealt with “in-house”, so to speak, within “A” District. Let me hasten to add that I am not suggesting that there was anything remotely improper about this. However, it would appear that Inspector Thady Muldoon on behalf of the Superintendent in “A” district was tasked with looking into the matters raised by Mr. Harper. The evidence establishes that Inspector Muldoon reported to his Superintendent on the 6th January, 2004. The applicant contends that on the basis of this report the Superintendent responsible for “A” District had the following information as of the 6th January, 2004:-
2. Garda James Newman was the officer responsible for entering the lost property under reference number 968/01 in the property book. Garda Newman acknowledged receiving the 9 bags of jewellery. Garda Newman was of the belief that once he had received these items, he had completed the relevant documentation and handed the relevant items over to the member in charge, Sergeant Martin Creighton. However, he was new on the job at the time and could only vaguely remember matters. Therefore, he could not say for certain that he had in fact passed these items over to Sergeant Creighton. 3. The official receipt book in relation to the property gave no further details in relation to the incident apart from the receipt number 227378 (recte 227377). Garda Newman stated he had not written this receipt.
6. Garda Gibbons (the applicant) had been responsible for the entry in the property book which indicated the items had been moved to Shed B but Garda Gibbons could not recall anything else in relation to the property. 7. Sergeant Martin Creighton had been the member in charge in the station on the day in question (readily ascertainable from the roster book). 8. Garda Gibbons (the applicant) had been detailed to work in the public office and was the member of charge of property at the time of the incident which duty involved monitoring property that came into Kevin Street Garda Station and ensuring that property was adequately recorded in the relevant property book and receipt book. Further, it was Garda Gibbons responsibility to ensure that all property was stored in Shed B. Further, as member in charge of property at the time, it was Garda Gibbons’ responsibility to forward property from Shed B to the Divisional Stores. 9. Garda Newman was of the belief that having completed the entry in the property book he may have handed the bags over to another member to place in the property press but he could not recall that for certain. The respondents do not dispute that items 1 – 9 above were known to, or were readily ascertainable by, the Superintendent in charge of “A” District on the 6th January, 2004. The evidence further establishes that one additional piece of information came to light subsequently. On the 21st June, 2004 Sergeant Creighton reported to Inspector Thady Muldoon that although he (Sergeant Creighton) was station house orderly and member in charge of Kevin Street Garda Station on the day of the incident, he had no recollection of receiving the property from Garda Newman and he was of the view that Garda Newman might have handed same to either the station orderly or the console operator. THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS This matter come before me by way of notice of motion dated the 3rd March, 2006, and pursuant to the aforementioned order granting leave dated the 27th February, 2006, seeking the following reliefs by way of a judicial review: 1. An order, by way of prohibition, or in the alternative injunction, restraining the respondent from further processing the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant herein in respect of two alleged breaches of discipline on the 19th September, 2001. 2. A declaration that the failure by the respondent to investigate the matter expeditiously breached the applicant’s entitlement to fair procedures and/or constituted a breach of statutory duty, was ultra vires, and/or breached the applicant’s legitimate expectation that serious allegations of misconduct alleged against him pursuant to the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989, would be dealt with expeditiously. 3. Costs. The grounds upon which the said relief is sought are as follows:- 1. The delay by the respondent in investigating the alleged breaches of discipline by the applicant on the 19th September, 2001, pursuant to the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 1989, was inordinate and inexcusable and breached the applicant’s right to natural and constitutional justice and fair procedures and breached his legitimate expectation that allegations of breaches of discipline alleged against him would be dealt with expeditiously. 2. The respondent has acted ultra vires and in breach of statutory duty in failing to investigate the alleged breaches of discipline as soon as practicable pursuant to Article 8 of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989. 3. The respondent has acted contrary to natural and constitutional justice and fair procedures and/or ultra vires and in breach of statutory duty and/or in breach of the applicant’s legitimate expectation that serious allegations alleged against him pursuant to the Garda Siochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989, would be dealt with expeditiously. 4. The delay by the respondent in processing the alleged breaches of discipline pursuant to the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989 has given rise to the applicant suffering additional distress and anxiety by reason of the fact that he must now defend allegations which date back to 2001, and that delay has prejudiced his ability to defend himself.” The Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989 These regulations, contained in statutory instrument No 94 of 1989, were promulgated on the 28th April, 1989 and prescribed the procedures for dealing with breaches of discipline by members of An Garda Síochána. The scheme of the Regulations is as follows:- Regulations 1, 2, 3 and 4 deal with preliminary matters, including interpretation and definitions. Regulation 5 contains a transitional provision covering enquiries under the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1971 which were not concluded at the date of coming into force of the 1989 Regulations. Regulations 6 and 7 appear under the heading “Breach of discipline”. Regulations 8 and 9 appear under the heading “Investigation”. Regulation 10 appears under the heading “Report of investigation”. Regulations 11 and 12 appear under the heading “Documents to be supplied to the member concerned”. Regulation 13 deals with “Procedure where certain breaches of discipline are admitted by the member concerned”. Regulations 14, 15, 16 and seventeen appear under the heading “Inquiry” and deal with the procedures for the convening of a disciplinary inquiry. Regulations 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 deal with “Inquiry Procedure” and describe the procedures to be followed at a disciplinary inquiry. Regulation 23 relates to “Action by Commissioner on report of inquiry” and regulation 24 relates to “Review by Commissioner of disciplinary action”. Regulation 25 deals with “Appeal Boards” and regulations 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 deal with “Review by an Appeal Board of a decision of an inquiry or a decision of the Commissioner”. Regulations 34 to 39 inclusive deal with sundry matters and Regulations 40 to 42 deal with sanctions. Regulation 43 revokes the 1971 Regulations and there is then a “Schedule” defining such matters as discreditable conduct, misconduct, neglect of duty, disobedience of orders, corrupt or improper practice, breach of confidence, abuse of authority, neglect of health, untidiness on duty or in uniform, misuse of property, intoxication, drinking on duty, unauthorised entering of licensed premises, prohibited spare time activity, criminal conduct and so on. It is clear that in the present proceedings the Court is concerned with that portion of the disciplinary process covered by Regulations 6 to 10 inclusive. These are in the following terms:- “Breach of discipline
7. Nothing in these regulations shall affect the right of the Commissioner or any other member whose duties include the supervision of another member to deal informally (whether by advice, admonition or warning as the circumstances may require) with a breach of discipline of a minor nature. Investigation 8 (1). Subject to regulation 7, where it appears that there may have been a breach of discipline, the matter shall be investigated as soon as practicable by a member not below the rank of inspector (in these regulations referred to as an investigating officer).
(2) Where it appears to an investigating officer that an alleged breach of discipline may constitute an offence, the law and practice applicable to the investigation of offences shall apply in relation to the investigation. (3) An investigating officer shall carry out the investigation either, as he thinks fit, alone or with the assistance of such other members as he may determine. Report of investigation
(2) Upon receipt of a report under this Regulation, the appointing officer shall without avoidable delay –
(b) if he decides to continue the proceedings, cause to be entered on a form (in these regulations referred to as a discipline form) such particulars of the breach of discipline alleged as will leave the member concerned in no doubt as to the precise nature of it. Counsel for the applicant has filed very helpful legal submissions. It is submitted that the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989 are directed in their entirety towards the expeditious resolution of allegations of misconduct on the part of members of An Garda Síochána. Throughout the Regulations the language used makes it clear that an element of urgency is to be observed (e.g. “as soon as practicable,” “as soon as may be” and “without avoidable delay”). It is noted that the phrase “as soon as practicable” is used in Article 8 of the Regulations. The phrase “as soon as practicable” was considered by the Supreme Court in Re: Butler [1970] I.R. 45 and I am referred to the judgment of Budd J. in that case. It was also considered by the High Court in Ruigrok v. The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána (Unreported, High Court, Murphy J., 19th December, 2005). While the judgments in these two cases are certainly of some assistance, even greater assistance is provided to me by the Supreme Court judgment in McNeill v. The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [1997] I.R. 469 which is directly in point. In McNeill the Supreme Court considered the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989 and Hamilton J. had this to say with respect to those regulations:-
In these proceedings, the court is not really concerned with the principles established with regard to the effect of delay on either civil or criminal proceedings because the proceedings instituted by the respondent against the applicant are neither civil nor criminal. They are in respect of breaches of discipline alleged to have been committed by the applicant as a member of the Garda Síochána and must be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Discipline Regulations, which set forth in detail the procedure for dealing with alleged breaches of discipline by a member of the Garda Síochána. If the procedures set forth in the Discipline Regulations are followed and the principle of fair procedures applied, then the court should not intervene.”
THE RESPONDENT’S CASE Counsel for the respondent has also filed very helpful legal submissions. By way of preliminary objection the respondent contends that the applicant was himself guilty of delay in seeking relief by way of judicial review and that he ought to be denied relief on account of that delay. Order 84, r. 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts requires that an application for injunctive relief by way of judicial review should be made promptly, and in any event, within three months of the grounds of the application first arising. The respondent contends that the applicant was served with all relevant documents in relation to the investigation on 12th November, 2004, and upon which the respondent proposed to rely for the purposes of the sworn inquiry into the matters alleged. Accordingly, the applicant was fully aware of all relevant matters for the purposes of initiating judicial review proceedings, so says the respondent. The applicant did not in fact seek leave to apply for judicial review until 27th February, 2006. The respondent contends that he was out of time and on that ground alone the application should be refused. It may be convenient at this point to indicate the applicant’s response to this preliminary objection. The applicant contends that it only became clear that he would be subjected to a sworn inquiry when he received a letter dated 30th January, 2006 from Chief Superintendent Fanning informing him that a sworn inquiry would take place on 7th March, 2006 and specifying the witnesses on which they were to rely. Accordingly, the three month period runs from 30th January, 2006. Leave was granted by Peart J. in the High Court on 27th February, 2006 to seek the reliefs now sought by way of judicial review. Accordingly, the applicant contends he acted promptly and within the specified three months. Moreover, the applicant contends that the respondent has suffered no prejudice by reason of any alleged delay. The respondent says this in relation to the substantive issue in the case. He submits that this application should be viewed in the context of the relatively minor nature of the disciplinary charges facing the applicant. Counsel for the respondent has reviewed the evidence before me and submits that the respondent was not guilty of inordinate delay in investigating and processing the disciplinary matters alleged against the applicant. The court’s attention has been drawn to various explanations offered for the passage of time and in particular reliance is placed upon the testimony of Chief Superintendent Donoghue both in his affidavit and in the course of his cross examination with respect to the matters contained in his affidavit before this Court. It was put to Chief Superintendent Donoghue in the course of cross examination by counsel for the applicant that he did not carry out the Assistant Commissioner’s direction and obtain a brief background report for the purpose of establishing if there might have been a breach of discipline. He disputed this. It was further put to him by counsel for the applicant that all of the information that he required was contained in Inspector Muldoon’s report to the Superintendent at Kevin Street on 6th January, 2004. In response to this Chief Superintendent Donoghue accepted that Inspector Muldoon’s report might have given him the information that he required or at least had gone part of the way. However, Chief Superintendent Donoghue asserted that in his view it was essential not just to establish that there may have been a breach of discipline, but also who it was that may have been in breach of discipline. He indicated that it was necessary to obtain handwriting analysis and to pursue other enquiries for the purpose of seeing if the member or members concerned could be identified. The Chief Superintendent asserted that it would be wrong of him to make allegations against members unless he was sure that those allegations were appropriate. In order to be so sure, he had to identify the members who were potentially negligent and also determine what degree of potential negligence was involved. He contended that he was unable to do that until he had Inspector Maguire’s preliminary report and he further contended that it was necessary, arising out of that preliminary report, to seek certain clarifications from Inspector Maguire. It was therefore his contention that the matter was being progressed at all stages and there was no delay. The respondent further argued in the alternative that even if there was delay, the very fact of delay would not of itself be sufficient to justify prohibition. It was urged upon me that the decision in McNeill v. The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána pre-dates what the respondent characterises as:
1. Certain limited admissions made by the applicant. 2. The relatively minor nature of the alleged disciplinary offences and the likely penalties. 3. The fact that the complaint in this case emerged from a member of the public. 4. The utility of having the disputed facts of this case resolved before an appropriate Tribunal. 5. The fact that it is a largely a “documents” case. 6. The fact that there has been no assertion of an early trial right. 7. The fact that the applicant’s contention that he has been subjected to stress on account of the delay is nothing more than an assertion and is not backed by any kind of medical evidence. 8. The absence of demonstrated prejudice. DECISION With regard to the preliminary issue raised by the respondent I accept the applicant’s submissions and I hold that the application for leave in this case was brought promptly and within time. Turning now to the substantive issue, the facts of this case are clear and there is really no dispute between the parties as to the facts. The real question is as to the correct interpretation of the facts. The applicant contends that the facts as established in evidence exhibit inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the respondent in investigating possible breaches of discipline involving him in accordance with Regulation 8 of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989. The respondent says that the time taken was justifiable and excusable and that there was no delay. I must hold with the applicant on the facts. I am quite satisfied that Chief Superintendent Donoghue acted conscientiously and in good faith, but that he approached the matter on the basis of an incorrect understanding as to what the regulations required of him. I am satisfied that the interpretation of Article 8 of the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations contended for by the applicant is correct. It was incumbent upon him to appoint an investigating officer as soon as it was apparent to him that there may have been a breach of discipline. It was not necessary for him to conduct a comprehensive investigation before doing so. Indeed, it would appear that Assistant Commissioner Rice correctly understood the regulations inasmuch as his letter to Chief Superintendent Donoghue requested him to:
I do not think that the delay goes back to the 6th of January 2004. However, there certainly was delay from the end of 2004. In my view obtaining the brief background report envisaged by A/Comm Rice should have taken no more than eight weeks, which would have taken him up until the end of December 2004. Thereafter he was in delay. Ret Chief Superintendent Donoghue was, I think, incorrect in his belief that the task entrusted to him by the Assistant Commissioner involved the two stage process described by him. The clear intention of the regulations is that the investigation should take place after there has been a determination that “there may have been a breach of discipline”, and not before. I think that Chief Superintendent Donoghue’s concern that it would be wrong to make an allegation against a member unless he was sure that it was appropriate, was an understandable concern but Regulation 8 does not require him to make an allegation against any member in the first instance. All he has to do is to satisfy himself that “there may have been a breach of discipline” by someone. If he is so satisfied he must then appoint an investigating officer to investigate. If, in the course of the investigating officer’s investigation, any particular member of An Garda Síochána is identified as having potentially been guilty of a breach of discipline, then the investigating officer is required to inform that member in accordance with Regulation 9. Regulation 9 requires a member under investigation to be notified “as soon as practicable” after the appointment of the investigating officer. However, if the investigating officer has not identified a particular officer as being in the loop so to speak, he cannot be required to inform him until he has made that identification. So in all the circumstances I am satisfied that there was delay in this case and that it was regrettably inordinate and inexcusable delay. It then falls to me to consider what be the consequences of this delay in terms of whether or not I ought to grant the applicant the relief that he seeks in these proceedings. While I was initially sympathetic to the arguments being advanced on behalf of the respondent I cannot ignore the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of McNeill v. The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána. Even though the McNeill case pre-dates the recent jurisprudence on prosecutorial delay, it is clear in its terms and it is directly in point. Moreover, it was stated expressly in McNeill by Hamilton C.J. that the court was not concerned with the principles established with regard to the effect of delay on either civil or criminal proceedings. The applicant has very strongly urged upon me that the Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations, 1989 embrace a self contained and discreet statutory code and that it must be strictly interpreted. I have to agree with counsel for the applicant. In the circumstances therefore I find that the respondent did not comply with the regulations and in particular that there was a breach of Article 8 of the Regulations. I am therefore disposed to grant the applicant the relief that he seeks and I will hear submissions from counsel as to the appropriate form of the order. |
