Neutral Citation: [2015] IEHC 627
THE HIGH COURT
[2015 No. 5 EXT]
IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003 AND 2012
BETWEEN
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM
APPLICANT
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Noonan delivered the 20th day of October, 2015.
1. This is an application brought pursuant to the provisions of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended) (“the Act”) for the surrender of the respondent to the authorities in Northern Ireland. The European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) was issued by Belfast Magistrates Court on the 9th December, 2014 and was endorsed for execution by the High Court on the 13th January, 2015. The respondent was arrested on foot of this warrant on the 10th February, 2015 at the Criminal Courts of Justice, Dublin 7.
2. The four offences, which are the subject matter of the warrant, are alleged to have been committed on the 15th November, 2011. The respondent was charged with these offences before Belfast Magistrates Court on the 16th November, 2011, and was admitted to bail on the 18th November, 2011. It is alleged that he absconded while on bail giving rise to the delay in bringing this application.
3. No issue has been raised as to the identity of the respondent and I am satisfied from the evidence of Sergeant Sean Fallon and Detective Garda Fiona McGuire that s. 16(1)(a) has been complied with and that the respondent is the person in respect of whom the EAW was issued.
4. With regard to s. 16(1)(b), I have examined the original warrant and I am satisfied that it has been endorsed in accordance with s. 13 of the Act for execution. Again, this is not in issue. The EAW states that the surrender of the respondent is requested for the purpose of prosecution and accordingly s. 45 does not apply, thus satisfying the requirements of s. 16(1)(c). With regard to s. 16(1)(d), the sections referred to therein do not apply and therefore the court is not required to refuse surrender on this ground.
5. The EAW gives particulars of the four offences which can be described in concise form as:
Each offence carries a maximum sentence in excess of twelve months imprisonment, and accordingly satisfies the minimum gravity requirements contained in section 38(1)(a)(i).
6. Section (e) of the EAW provides a description of the circumstances in which the offences were committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offences by the respondent. A detailed narrative of those circumstances appears in section (e). In summary, it is alleged that in the early hours of the morning of the 15th November, 2011, a taxi driver, Kieran Logue, picked up three fares, all male, who proceeded to hijack his vehicle and assault him. They then made off in the vehicle. It is alleged that when the vehicle was recovered, damage had been caused to it. It is further alleged that following his arrest, the respondent was conveyed in a police vehicle to which he caused damage.
7. In a letter of the 8th July, 2015 to the respondent’s solicitors, the Chief State Solicitor set out particulars of offences under the laws of the State which are said to correspond with the offences with which the respondent is charged in Northern Ireland. In his notice of objection, the respondent makes a number of points which may be summarised as follows:
1) The respondent’s surrender would expose him to inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment.
2) The passage of time from the date of the offences renders a fair trial impossible.
3) His surrender would be disproportionate.
4) By reason of his ethnic origin as a traveller, he will be treated less favourably than a person who is not of his ethnic origin in his prosecution or punishment. There are reasonable grounds for believing that the EAW issued to facilitate the respondent’s prosecution for reasons connected with his ethnic origins.
5) His surrender is prohibited by s. 38 on the grounds of lack of correspondence with offences under the law of the State.
6) His surrender is prohibited by s. 42 on the grounds of potential proceedings in the State.
9. As the respondent has not sworn any affidavit or adduced any evidence in support of points 1 to 4 above, they can be disposed of immediately. With regard to point 5, I am satisfied that the correspondence referred to above from the Chief State Solicitor sets out particulars of offences which under the laws of the State which correspond sufficiently with the offences set out in the EAW. With respect to point 6, the DPP has confirmed by letter of the 3rd September, 2015, that there is no prosecution either being considered or pending in this jurisdiction in relation to any of the matters the subject of the EAW and I am therefore satisfied that there is no bar to the respondent’s surrender under s. 42 of the Act.
10. In addition to these grounds, the respondent submitted in argument that there is an insufficient link to the respondent in the narrative contained in the EAW and in particular there is no specific allegation of common purpose or complicity by the respondent in the events described therein.
11. The narrative in the EAW refers to the hijacking being carried out by the eldest of the three males in question. That person is not identified and may or may not be the respondent. However it seems to me that this ignores the subsequent facts alleged where all three males chased and assaulted Mr. Logue. This demonstrates clearly that the three males were at all material times acting in concert in the execution of a common purpose and joint enterprise, whether that is specifically alleged or not. The same considerations in my view apply to the assault and the criminal damage charge insofar as it relates to Mr. Logue’s taxi. With regard to the criminal damage to the police car, the respondent is clearly identified as the party allegedly responsible.
12. With regard to an adequate link to the respondent, it seems to me that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform v. Stanford [2009] IESC 83 is relevant. In that case, the High Court (Peart J.) considered a European Arrest Warrant where similar arguments were made and said:
“The principle of mutual recognition must be interpreted in a way which precludes this Court, except in the most obvious and glaring inadequacy and failure to make any link between the person named in the warrant and the alleged offence, from seeking to go behind the description contained in paragraph (e) and in so doing questioning the bona fides of the warrant signed as it is by the issuing judge.
The requirement that the warrant contains a description of the degree of the respondent's involvement in the offences means just that - a description thereof. There is no requirement that a particular level of involvement be described in the sense of having to pass a certain threshold of involvement so as to show anything like a prima facie case. That would be to require a strength of argument demonstration. In my view the principle of mutual co-operation is consistent with the requesting authority being expected to show a degree of participation or involvement by the respondent in the offences set forth in the warrant. Beyond that it is a matter for the requesting authority, who in this case has stated that it has been decided to charge and try the respondent with the charges, to prove its case at trial beyond a reasonable doubt so as to dislodge the presumption of innocence which he presently enjoys as of right. To go further in my view and expect that the requesting authority should at this stage be required to set forth all of its proposed evidence in more detail is not something required by either the letter or the spirit of the Framework Decision.”
13. Peart J.’s remarks were referred to with approval by Denham J. (as she then was) when delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court on appeal where she said:-
14. I am therefore satisfied that in respect of the four offences alleged against the respondent herein, a sufficient link has been demonstrated to him.
15. Accordingly, I am satisfied that none of the points of objection or argument raised by the respondent have any merit and I will therefore order his surrender pursuant to the EAW.
