[2018] IEHC 332
THE HIGH COURT
[2018 No. 8 SSP]
IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
AND/OR
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40.4.2 OF THE CONSTITUTION
BY
LUDOVIC BEUMER AT PRESENT IN CUSTODY IN LIMERICK PRISON
(APPLICANT)
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice David Barniville delivered on the 8th day of June, 2018
1. The applicant is at present in custody in Limerick Prison. He wishes to apply for an enquiry into the legality of his detention in Limerick Prison pursuant to Article 40.4.2 of the Constitution and/or for an order of habeas corpus. He is not legally represented.
2. The applicant relies in support of his application on a signed but unsworn form of affidavit dated 22nd May, 2018 (the “statement”). The statement was forwarded by the General Office of Limerick Prison on 22nd May, 2018 and was received by the Registrar of the High Court on 24th May, 2018. The Registrar acknowledged receipt of the application on 30th May, 2018.
3. The applicant’s statement lacks clarity and is very confusing, not least because the applicant states (at para. 2) that he was “convicted” of the offence of “contempt of court” by Nenagh District Court on 4th May, 2018 and that he was “sentenced” (by that court) to a period of imprisonment until he purged his contempt before Nenagh Circuit Court. It is not at all clear to me from his statement what the applicant alleges occurred. I suspect that the applicant may be mistaken as to the basis of his detention. However, I cannot be certain of this as no order in respect of this detention has been furnished by the applicant with his application.
4. It seems much more likely that the applicant was committed to Limerick Prison by the Circuit Court for breach of an order made by that Court requiring him to vacate certain lands. It is more likely that this is the basis of his detention in Limerick Prison rather than his detention being on foot of a prison sentence imposed by Nenagh District Court. Without sight of the order on foot of which the applicant is detained, I cannot be certain of this. However, the reasons why it appears more likely that his detention is on foot of an order made by the Circuit Court in civil proceedings on foot of a finding of civil content on his part are as follows. First, the applicant refers at para. 2 to the fact that he was found in contempt of court which he says “is a civil matter”. Second, he states in the same paragraph that he is being detained in Limerick Prison until he purges his contempt. Third, it seems to be envisaged that there will be a hearing in the matter before Nenagh Circuit Court on 26th July, 2018, to enable him to purge his contempt. Fourth, at para. 3 of the statement, the applicant refers to a notice of appeal from the Circuit Court to the High Court (sitting on circuit) dated 16th April, 2018. This strongly suggests that the order which the applicant is seeking to appeal is an order of the Circuit Court and that he is seeking to appeal that order to the High Court (sitting on circuit). Fifth, the applicant states (at para. 3) that he was informed by “Clonmel Court Office” in a letter dated 17th May, 2018 that it would be necessary for him to apply to extend the time to appeal to the High Court and that such application had to be made to the Master of the High Court. Again this strongly suggests that the order which the applicant is seeking to appeal (and on foot of which it appears the applicant was committed) is an order of the Circuit Court.
5. For these reasons, I am proceeding to consider the applicant’s application on the basis that he is being detained in Limerick Prison on foot of a committal order made by the Circuit Court following a finding that the applicant is in contempt of court by reason of his failure to comply with an earlier order of the Circuit Court. If I am incorrect in this assumption and if I have incorrectly understood the basis for the applicant’s detention, it will be open to the applicant to renew his application setting out the correct factual situation.
6. The applicant has not provided a copy of the committal order with his application. However, the principal basis on which the applicant appears to contend that his detention is unlawful is that the order (presumably made by the Circuit Court, as noted above) committing him for contempt in civil proceedings requires that he be detained until he purges his contempt. The applicant also appears to challenge the validity of the committal order on the basis that he was seeking legal aid and had sought an adjournment which was refused. In addition, the applicant seeks to argue that that order was wrong in that he had not breached the earlier order of which he was found to be in contempt as he was not required (or ought not to have been required) to vacate a dwelling house on the particular lands. Therefore, he argues that he did not breach the original order.
7. I will attempt to deal with each of these issues in turn, as I understand them from the applicant’s statement. First, on the issue as to the applicant’s detention being on foot of an order which committed him until he purged his contempt, there is no basis for challenging the committal order on this ground. If I am correct in my assumption that the applicant has been committed on foot of an order made by the Circuit Court for civil contempt, then it is appropriate for the applicant to be detained until he purges his contempt. The main purpose of civil contempt is coercive, namely, its object is to compel the person to comply with the order which has been allegedly breached. The period of committal for such contempt is generally until such time as the order in question is complied with (see: Keegan v. de Burca [1973] I.R. 223). While primarily coercive in nature, later judgments have found that there may sometimes be a punitive element in cases of civil contempt (see for example: Flood v. Lawlor [2002] 3 IR 67; Shell E.P. Ltd. v. McGrath and ors [2007] 1 IR 671; and Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd. v. Quinn and ors [2012] IESC 51). Consistent with the primary objective of civil contempt being coercive, the committal to prison of a person found to be in contempt is generally to last until that person purges his or her contempt. Assuming that is what happened in the present case, the fact that the applicant’s committal is until he purges his contempt does not amount to a good ground for challenging the validity of his detention on foot of such committal order.
8. Second, the applicant’s complaints in relation to the finding of contempt and, in particular, his complaint that he was not in breach of the original order as that order required him to vacate the lands only and not the dwelling house, are matters for appeal and do not, in my view, afford a basis for challenging the validity of his detention pursuant to Article 40.4 of the Constitution. While it appears from the applicant’s statement that he may be out of time to appeal the original order to the High Court, he does appear to have been advised that it is open to him to apply to extend the time to appeal. It is not clear from the statement whether the applicant has since made an application to extend the time to appeal to the High Court from the original order or from the order finding him in contempt.
9. The Supreme Court in F.X. v. Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital and another [2014] IESC 1 and Ryan v. Governor of Midlands Prison [2014] IESC 54 (“Ryan”) stated that if an order of the court (on foot of which a person is detained) does not show any invalidity on its face then the correct approach is to pursue the remedy of appeal or to seek leave to seek judicial review rather than to pursue the route of habeas corpus or Article 40.4.2. In such cases, the Supreme Court held that the remedy of Article 40.4.2 would arise only if there has been “an absence of jurisdiction, a fundamental denial of justice, or a fundamental flaw” (per Denham C.J. at para. 18 of Ryan). In my view, the applicant’s complaint that the court (presumably the Circuit Court) ought not to have found him to be in contempt of the previous order on the ground that that previous order did not extend to the dwelling house is a matter more appropriately to be dealt with by way of appeal (subject to the appeal being brought within time or such extended time as the High Court may allow on an application for an extension of time).
10. Third, the applicant argues that he sought an adjournment (presumably of the contempt hearing) to enable him to obtain legal aid but such application was refused (presumably by the Circuit Court judge). The applicant has put forward no material to suggest that the Circuit Court judge acted inappropriately or unfairly in refusing the application for the adjournment. There is no material before the court which could support a conclusion that the refusal of the adjournment in those circumstances amounted to “an absence of jurisdiction, a fundamental denial of justice, or a fundamental flaw” (as those terms were used by the Supreme Court in Ryan, per Denham C.J. at para. 18).
11. In conclusion, therefore, notwithstanding the lack of clarity in the applicant’s application, and doing the best that I can to discern what the applicant’s complaints actually are, I am not satisfied that the applicant has advanced any basis on which to direct an enquiry into his detention pursuant to Article 40.4 of the Constitution or to make a conditional order of habeas corpus pursuant to O. 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. If I have incorrectly understood the factual position, it is open to the applicant to renew his application by putting the correct facts before the court. I should also record that it is always open to the applicant to purge his contempt and to do so at the earliest opportunity which would enable his immediate release thereafter.
12. For these reasons, I refuse the applicant’s application.
