Sweetman v An Bord Pleanala & Ors [2020] IEHC 39 (31 January 2020)

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IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 50 OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2000

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Denis McDonald delivered on 31 January, 2020

1. In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant seeks to quash the decision of the first

named respondent (“the Board”) dated 15th November, 2018 to grant planning

permission for a development of a 67.8 hectare solar farm at Fiddane, Ballyhea, County

Cork. The decision of the Board in this case arose following an appeal by a third party of

a decision by Cork County Council (“the Council”) to grant permission for the

2. The applicant’s case as against the respondent was argued on the basis of three distinct

(a) In the first place, it was argued that the Board acted ultra vires and in breach of the

Planning and Development Regulations, 2001 (as amended) (“the 2001

Regulations”) by failing to include notice of the receipt of the appeal of the decision

of the Council in the weekly Board list not later than the third working day following

(b) Secondly, the applicant contends that the decision of the Board is ultra vires and

not in compliance with the obligations that arise under Directive 2011/92/EU (as

amended) (“the EIA Directive”) in circumstances where (so the applicant alleges)

there was an absence of a proper screening for Environmental Impact Assessment

(“EIA”). The debate in relation to this issue largely centres on whether a

development of the kind proposed here falls within Annex II to the EIA Directive;

in breach of its obligations under Council Directive 92/43/EC (“the Habitats

Directive”) in circumstances where there was a failure to carry out an appropriate

assessment or a proper screening for an appropriate assessment. The debate in

relation to this issue was focused on whether, contrary to the decision of the CJEU

in Case C-323/17 People over Wind v. Coillte Teo, the Board had taken mitigation

3. The Board is not, however, the only respondent to these proceedings. Ireland and the

Attorney General (“the State respondents”) have also been named as respondents to the

proceedings. The basis on which the State respondents have been joined is far from

clear. The case is made that, if the Board made the decision of 15th November, 2018 in

accordance with Irish law, then it must follow that the State has failed to adequately

transpose the Habitats Directive and the EIA Directive. However, no provision of Irish law

is identified in the statement of grounds which it is alleged fails to properly transpose the

provisions of either the Habitats Directive or the EIA Directive. Remarkably, this element

of the applicant’s case occupied no more than one paragraph in the written submissions

delivered on behalf of the applicant. There were, however, some submissions made in

the course of the very helpful oral presentation of the applicant’s case by counsel. As I

understand it, the case which the applicant makes against the State respondents only

arises in the event that the court concludes that, in the context of its approach to the EIA

and Habitats Directive issues, the Board acted lawfully in accordance with Irish law. It is

therefore appropriate that I should defer dealing further with the case against the State

respondents until after I have addressed each of the issues that arise as between the

applicant and the Board (as summarised in para. 2 above). I deal with those issues, in

turn, below. It should be noted that the notice party, IGP Solar 8 Ltd, the notice party,

4. In order to explain the issue which arises in relation to the weekly lists, it is necessary to

bear in mind that Mr. Sweetman was not a party to the planning application process that

took place before the Council. He did not make any submissions or observations in the

course of the process which led to the grant of planning permission. However, under s.

130 (1) (a) of the 2000 Act, any person other than a party to the proceedings before the

planning authority may make submissions or observations in writing to the Board in

relation to an appeal. Under s. 130 (1) (b) submissions or observations must be made

within the period specified in s. 130 (3). That subsection also provides that any

submissions or observations received by the Board after the expiration of that period

5. In turn, s. 130 (3) lays down a number of different time periods depending on the nature

of the process before the Board. In the case of an appeal of the kind in issue here, s. 130

“…the period of 4 weeks beginning on the day of receipt of the appeal by the Board

or, where there is more than one appeal against the decision of the planning

authority, on the day on which the Board last receives an appeal”.

6. The Board is not empowered under the 2000 Act to extend the period prescribed by s.

130 (3). Furthermore, under s. 130 (4), a person who makes submissions or

observations to the Board is not entitled to elaborate upon the submissions or

observations or to make further submissions or observations in writing in relation to the

appeal and the subsection provides that any such subsequent submissions or

observations that are received by the Board from such a person “shall not be considered

by it”. The combined effect of s. 130 (3) and s. 130 (4) is that it is crucial for a person to

whom s. 130 applies (such as the applicant) to ensure that submissions and observations

are furnished to the Board within the relevant four-week period and that the submissions

are as comprehensive and cogent as possible. Once the relevant four-week period has

expired, there is no opportunity to supplement the case made by filing additional written

7. It is important to keep in mind that the relevant four-week time period runs from the date

of receipt of the appeal by the Board. However, a person (such as the applicant here)

who was not a party to the process before the planning authority will obviously not be

immediately aware of the lodgement of the appeal with the Board. Equally, the Board will

be unaware of the existence of any such person. The Board is, therefore, not in a

position to notify such a person in the same way as the Board would notify a party to the

process. The position of parties to the process before the planning authority is addressed

in s. 129 (1) of the 2000 Act. Under that subsection, the Board is required “as soon as

may be after receipt of an appeal” to give a copy to each party (other than the appellant).

Under s. 129 (3) (a) those parties then have a period of four weeks from the date the

relevant appeal is sent to them in which to make submissions or observations in writing

to the Board. In contrast, the time period for persons such as the applicant runs from the

date of lodgement of the appeal and therefore begins to run even before they become

8. In order to give effect to the right of persons under s. 130 to make submissions and

observations, it was necessary to put in place a system for publication of lodgement of

appeals. The way in which persons other than parties become aware of the existence of

an appeal is through the mechanism of the weekly list. Under Regulation 72 (1) of the

2001 Regulations, the Board is required “not later than the third working day following a

particular week, make available a list of … (a) the appeals… received by the Board …

during that week”. For completeness, it should be noted that, subsequent to the events

in issue, the provisions of Regulation 72 (1) were amended by the European Union

(Planning and Development) (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2018 (S.I.

No. 296 of 2018) (“the 2018 Regulations”) under which the Board was also required to

display the appeals for inspection on its website. The 2018 Regulations are not, however,

relevant to these proceedings. The appeal here was lodged with the Board on 22nd

February, 2018. The 2018 Regulations did not come into effect until 1st September,

9. Under Part 1 of the Schedule to the Interpretation Act, 2005 (“the 2005 Act”) a “week” is

defined as meaning the period between midnight on any Saturday and midnight on the

following Saturday. In this case, as noted above, the appeal was lodged with the Board

on 22nd February, 2018. That was a Thursday. Thus, under Regulation 72 (1) of the

2001 Regulations, the Board was required to include the appeal against the decision of

the Council in the relevant weekly list not later than the Wednesday immediately following

22nd February, 2018 namely 28th February, 2018. However, the appeal was not included

in the list of appeals published on the Board’s website on that date. Instead, it was

included in a revised weekly list which was uploaded onto the website on 8th March,

2018. In this context, although Regulation 72 (in its then current form) did not

specifically require the Board to make a list of appeals available on its website, the Board

had adopted the practice of publishing the lists on its website so as to make the lists

readily available to the public. Under Regulation 72 (7) the Board was empowered to

display the list at its offices or by any other means including in electronic form that the

10. As noted above, the appeal from the decision of the Council was not included in the

weekly list published by the Board on its website on 28th February, 2018. The

explanation provided by the Board for the non-inclusion of the appeal in the list published

on 28th February, 2018 is that the Board was undertaking an on-going information

technology (“IT”) systems upgrade involving the migration of large volumes of data from

11. The applicant says that he did not become aware of the appeal until after the decision of

15th November, 2018 was made. In a replying affidavit sworn on behalf of the Board by

Mr. Pierce Dillon, he noted that the applicant has not provided any evidence or

justification as to why the applicant did not see and review the amended and revised

weekly list published by the Board on 8th March, 2018 or at any time thereafter.

12. According to the affidavit of the applicant in response, he did not see the second list and

did not realise that the original list of 28th February, 2018 was incomplete. The applicant

also drew attention to the fact that the weekly lists were in pdf form at that time and

could not be searched using the website’s main search function. Each weekly list had to

13. In a subsequent affidavit sworn on 21st November, 2019 the applicant further explained

“I am certain as I can be that I read the first list for the week ended 23rd February,

2018 when it was published online on 28th February, 2018 because it is my habit to

read the new lists on a Wednesday evening. I did not notice that the proposed

solar farm development in the Blackwater catchment had been added to a

14. In the same affidavit, the applicant observed that, although some changes have been

made to the way in which the Board now publishes its list of new cases each week, it has

not “changed its habit of updating the weekly list long after the deadline for publishing

15. The applicant complains that, as a consequence of the failure of the Board to include the

appeal in the weekly list published on 28th February, 2018, he lost the opportunity to

make submissions in relation to the appeal. The applicant has explained that he has a

long held interest in the protection of the Freshwater Pearl Mussel and, as a consequence,

he seeks to identify planned new developments in river catchments where the species is

known to exist. The Blackwater River has a number of populations of the mussel. One of

the issues which arose in the course of the appeal before the Board was whether the

development had the potential to adversely affect a number of species in the Blackwater

River and its tributaries. The applicant says that he would wish to have made

observations in relation to the freshwater pearl mussel which is a highly endangered

16. The principal issue which arises in this context is whether the provisions of Regulation 72

(1) in relation to the weekly lists are mandatory or merely directory. However, the Board

also seeks to raise a further issue in this context. Although the Board does not challenge

the standing of the applicant to mount a challenge to its decision in these proceedings,

the Board argues that, in the event that the court concludes that the obligation is

mandatory, the court should nonetheless, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse relief to

the applicant on this ground. The Board stresses that the remedy sought is discretionary.

The Board submits that the court, in considering whether to grant such a discretionary

remedy, has tended not to be impressed by purely technical arguments in relation to

alleged breaches of procedure unless the applicant has suffered significant prejudice.

17. The Board has also drawn attention to the fact (which is not denied by the applicant) that

the original application made to the Council for planning permission for this development

had been advertised in the Vale Star, a newspaper circulating in the locality where it is

intended to construct the development. The Board also places some emphasis on the fact

(which again is not denied by the applicant) that the Council had published on its website

weekly lists of planning applications and further information received by the Council in the

course of its consideration of the application made by the notice party (“IGP”). In

response, the applicant has said, on affidavit, that he did not see the advertisement in the

Vale Star. He draws attention to the fact that this newspaper has a very small and very

local circulation and he contends that, in the circumstances (including the fact that he

lives in County Mayo at a considerable distance from the site of the proposed

development), it was unsurprising that he would not see a planning notice published in

that way. He also avers that the notification by the Council of the planning application in

its weekly list was also made outside the statutory time frame and that he did not see the

notification when it was eventually made. It was also strongly urged on behalf of the

applicant that he was entitled in law to make a submission to the appeal to the Board in

this case. The appeal here was made by the Fiddane Solar Action Group who the

applicant said had raised issues of interest to him in particular the need for an EIA

together with the need for a sufficient screening exercise for appropriate assessment.

18. Before turning to any issues that might be said to go to the discretion of the court to

grant relief, it seems to me that the first issue that requires to be addressed is whether

the obligation imposed by Regulation 72(1) of the 2001 Regulations is mandatory or

19. The applicant makes the case that the obligation imposed on the Board under Regulation

72(1) of the 2001 Regulations is mandatory. The applicant places some emphasis on the

use of the word “shall” in this context although, as the applicant acknowledged, in the

course of submissions by his counsel, the use of the word “shall” will not always be

construed as imposing a mandatory statutory requirement. The relevant principle was

explained as follows by Henchy J. in the Supreme Court in the State (Elm Developments

Ltd) v. Monaghan County Council [1981] ILRM 108 at p. 110 where he said:-

“Whether a provision in a statute … which on the face of it is obligatory (for

example, by the use of the word ‘shall’), should be treated by the courts as truly

mandatory or merely directory depends on the statutory scheme as a whole and

the part played in that scheme by the provision in question. If the requirement

which has not been observed may fairly be said to be an integral and indispensable

part of the statutory intendment, the courts will hold it to be truly mandatory, and

will not excuse a departure from it. But if, on the other hand, what is apparently a

requirement is in essence merely a direction which is not of the substance of the

20. If the court concludes that a provision is truly mandatory, then compliance with that

requirement will be regarded as a pre-condition to the validity of any decision affected by

the statutory provision in question unless it can be shown, in the words of Henchy J. in

the State (Alf-a-Bet) Ltd v. Monaghan County Council [1980] ILRM 64 at p. 69 to be:

“… so trivial, or so technical, or so peripheral, or otherwise so insubstantial that, on

the principle that it is the spirit rather than the letter of the law that matters, the

prescribed obligation has been substantially, and therefore adequately, complied

21. The applicant has sought to rely on a number of authorities that have applied the

principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the Elm Developments and Alf-a-Bet

decisions. In particular, the applicant relies on the decision of Kelly J. (as he then was) in

McAnenley v. An Bord Pleanála [2002] 2 I.R. 763 and the decision of Simons J. in

Southwood Park Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2019] IEHC 504. The

applicant also sought to rely on the public participation and access to justice principles

enshrined in the Aarhus Convention although this did not feature in the oral submissions

made by counsel for the applicant at the hearing. In response, the Board argued that, on

a proper construction of the 2001 regulations, the obligation imposed by Regulation 72(1)

was directory rather than mandatory. The Board drew attention in this context to the fact

that the 2001 Regulations do not specify the consequences of a failure to comply with

Regulation 72(1). The obligation is therefore to be distinguished from provisions such as

s. 37 (3), s. 127 (2) and s. 130 (2) of the 2000 Act. In contrast to Regulation 72 of the

2001 Regulations, s. 37 (3) of the 2000 Act provides that certain appeals received by the

Board after the expiration of a prescribed period “shall be invalid as not having been

made in time”. Similarly, s. 127 (2) states that an appeal or referral which does not

comply with the requirements of s. 127 (1) shall be invalid. Section 130 (2) also provides

that submissions or observations by persons other than parties to the appeal which do not

22. On behalf of the applicant, it was argued that the weekly lists should be accurate and

should be published on time so that persons in the position of the applicant will be in a

position to identify appeals of interest to them and to make submissions within the four-

week time limit for doing so. My attention was drawn to the observations of Murphy J. in

O’Connor v. Cork County Council [2005] IEHC 352 and Finlay Geoghegan J. in Linehan v.

Cork County Council [2008] IEHC 76 where, in both cases, it was made clear, in the

context of the equivalent obligation that lies on planning authorities to publish weekly lists

of planning applications, that the public are entitled to rely on the lists as containing all

23. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the obligation imposed by Regulation 72

(1) of the 2001 Regulations is a critical component of the public participation regime.

Against that backdrop and in circumstances where the relevant four-week time limit for

making submissions runs from the date of receipt of the appeal, it was argued that the

word “shall” in Regulation 72 (1) must be read as mandatory. Otherwise, the right of

public participation envisaged by s. 130 (1) would be severally curtailed or entirely

abrogated. It was suggested that the present case was an example of the latter in that it

involved the abrogation of the applicant’s rights to participate in the appeal process and

to make observations in relation to a critically endangered species such as the Freshwater

24. As noted above, the Board places significant reliance on the fact that, in contrast to the

statutory provisions discussed in para. 21 above, Regulation 72 does not provide that a

failure to comply with the obligation imposed by the regulation would render the appeal

invalid. However, I am not persuaded that the absence of such a provision means that

the use of the word “shall” in Regulation 72 (1) must be read as directory rather than

mandatory. There are two decisions which are of particular assistance in this context –

namely the decisions of Kelly J. (as he then was) in Graves v. An Bord Pleanála [1997] 2

IR 205 and McAnenley v. An Bord Pleanála [2002] 2 IR 763. In Graves, there was a

failure to comply to the letter with s. 4 (5) (b) of the Local Government (Planning and

Development) Act, 1992 (“the 1992 Act”). Under that provision, an appeal was required

to be made in one of three ways. In particular, under s. 4 (5) (b) an appeal could be

made by “leaving the appeal with an employee of the Board at the offices of the Board

during office hours”. There was no provision in the 1992 Act declaring that a failure to

follow this procedure would render the appeal invalid. Nonetheless, Kelly J. held that the

obligation imposed by s. 4 (5) was mandatory. In that case, the appeal had been taken

to the offices of the Board within the prescribed time and had been left with a security

guard (who was not an officer of the Board). Although the security guard had, in turn,

passed the appeal to an officer of the Board on the same day, Kelly J. held that the

“The wording of Section 4, sub-section 5 of the Act… is in mandatory terms. It

requires that an appeal be left with an employee of the Board at the offices of the

Board. It appears to me that an appellant who wishes to argue that he has made a

valid appeal would have to be able to demonstrate compliance with the statutory

provisions. …Mr. Graves… cannot prove that the appeal was left with an employee

of the Board at the offices of the Board on the day in question. The fact that an

employee of the Board came into possession of the documents on the 20th

January, 1997 does not appear to me to discharge the obligation of the appellant to

demonstrate compliance with the mandatory requirements of [the sub-section]…”.

25. Subsequently, in McAnenley, an issue arose as to whether the requirements of s. 6 of the

1992 Act were mandatory or merely directory. Under s. 6 of the 1992 Act, a planning

authority was required, where its decision was appealed to the Board, to furnish certain

documents to the Board within a period of 14 days from the date on which a copy of the

relevant appeal had been forwarded to the authority by the Board. Section 6 used the

word “shall” in this context. There was no provision which stated that any failure to

comply with this obligation rendered the appeal invalid. Nonetheless, Kelly J. came to the

conclusion that the obligation on the planning authority was mandatory and that the

failure of the planning authority to furnish certain documents falling within the ambit of s.

6 invalidated the Board’s decision in respect of the appeal. Citing the observations of

“It is suggested that this statutory provision is to be interpreted as not creating a

mandatory obligation on a planning authority. Rather it is said to be permissive.

I am of the view that the legislature in setting up the statutory scheme of appeals

to the respondent had in mind that certain documents would be placed before it

when it is called upon to exercise its de novo jurisdiction involving an appeal to it

The obligation to submit these documents is placed on the planning authority. The

section uses the word “shall”. The intent of the legislature is that there should be

placed before the board the documentary material as specified which was on the

planning authority file and was before it when it made its decision…”.

26. The approach taken by Kelly J. in McAnenley is particularly relevant in light of the

submission made by the Board in para. 2.13 of its written submissions where the

“2.13 It is worth noting that… if the Applicant’s contention… was taken to its logical

conclusion, any slippage by the Board in the requirement to publish a list of appeals

within 3 days of the week following the lodging of an appeal would… render that

appeal a nullity. There is nothing in the language of the Regulation to suggest such

an extreme consequence, nor could it be argued that the Minister, by Regulation,

should have intended such a consequent curtailment of the statutory right of

27. A similar argument might well have been made in McAnenley. The “slip” in that case was

made by the planning authority, the local County Council. Yet, that “slip” in failing to

furnish all of the relevant documents to the Board rendered the subsequent decision of

the Board on the appeal invalid. It may seem harsh that the rights of the parties to the

appeal could be adversely affected by a “slip” on the part of the Board. However, if the

provisions of Regulation 72 are mandatory, then, as McAnenley demonstrates, the failure

to comply with the obligation imposed by the regulation will render any decision of the

Board invalid unless it can be established that the failure to comply was of an

insubstantial or trivial nature (in which case the non-compliance might be excused).

28. I have come to the conclusion that the obligation imposed by Regulation 72 (1) is

mandatory in nature. I have reached that view for the following reasons:

(a) In the first place, I do not believe that any significant distinction can be drawn

between the approach to be taken to Regulation 72 (1) on the one hand and the

approach taken by Kelly J. in Graves and McAnenley in relation to ss. 4 (5) and (6)

of the 1992 Act, on the other. The two decisions of Kelly J. illustrate that, in a

planning context, the use of the word “shall” is particularly important. It is also

significant that in both s. 4 (5) of the 1992 Act (the subject of the decision of Kelly

J. in Graves) and s. 6 of the 1992 Act (the subject of the decision of Kelly J. in

McAnenley) there was no provision declaring that a step taken in breach of the

relevant obligation would render that step (or the underlying appeal) invalid.

(b) Secondly, I must bear in mind that Regulation 72 uses the word “shall”. While the

use of that word does not automatically make mandatory the obligation imposed,

the word “shall” as a matter of ordinary English usage, carries that connotation;

be read in the context of s. 130 of the 2000 Act and in particular in the context of

the strict four-week time limit for the making of submissions by persons who are

not parties to the underlying planning process. In circumstances where the Board

is not empowered by the 2000 Act to extend the four-week time limit for the

making of observations and submissions, it is difficult to see how the obligation

imposed by Regulation 72 (1) could be read as other than mandatory. The failure

to publish a list of appeals on time carries with it the risk that the right to make

submissions might be rendered entirely nugatory or, at the very least, could

significantly curtail the ability of an interested person from making detailed

(d) To interpret Regulation 72 (1) as being merely directory could have very serious

consequences. For example, if there was a failure to publish the weekly list until

very close to the four-week deadline for making submissions – or even after that

deadline – the scheme of public participation envisaged by s. 13 of the 2000 Act

could be entirely undermined. For that reason, it is crucial that the obligation

imposed by Regulation 72 should be performed by the Board on time. There is

accordingly every reason to give the word “shall” in Regulation 72 (1) its ordinary

and natural meaning – namely that it is obligatory (i.e. mandatory) to comply.

The failure to comply with Regulation 72 (1) cannot be said to be insubstantial

29. Nor do I believe that there is any basis upon which I could properly conclude that the

failure by the Board to comply with its obligations under Regulation 72 (1) was

insubstantial or trivial. As Simons J. observed in Southwood Park Residents Association v.

An Bord Pleanála [2019] IEHC 504, the ability of the courts to excuse or waive a breach

of a procedural requirement of this kind is limited. Simons J. referred to the judgment of

“…when the 1963 Act prescribed certain procedures as necessary to be observed for

the purpose of getting a development permission, which may affect radically the

rights or amenities of others and may substantially benefit or enrich the grantee of

the permission, compliance with the prescribed procedures should be treated as a

condition precedent to the issue of the permission. In such cases, what the

Legislature has, either immediately in the Act or mediately in the Regulations,

nominated as being obligatory may not be depreciated to the level of a mere

30. As noted in para. 20 above, the de minimis principle can only be applied where there is

substantial compliance with the relevant statutory obligation such that any non-

compliance with the obligation can be regarded as trivial or insubstantial. In Southwood

there had been a failure to publish on the Board’s website a number of bat surveys. This

was contrary to Article 301 (3) of the 2001 Regulations. Simons J. rejected the

suggestion that the de minimis principle was capable of application. At paras. 41-42, he

explained that it is difficult to apply that principle where the public authority is given no

discretion in the performance of an obligation under a statutory provision. He said:

“41. Where judicial review proceedings are brought alleging a failure to comply with fair

procedures, then it might be appropriate for the court to consider the content of the

documents, and, in particular, to assess whether there is new material in respect of

which a right to reply must be afforded. Typically, this will be done against a

background whereby the decision-maker itself has considered the material and

reached a view on whether or not same contains new material. The High Court, on

judicial review, will normally show some deference to that view. ….

42. The legal position is entirely different where, as in the present case, the decision-

maker has no discretion. In such circumstances, it is inappropriate for either the

decision-maker, or for the court, to embark upon a detailed examination of the

content of the material with a view to determining whether or not it is significant or

otherwise. This is because the Oireachtas has ordained, albeit mediately through

Ministerial Regulations, that all documentation in respect of a planning application

must be posted on a dedicated website. In truth, therefore, the position is closer to

that analysed by the …Kelly J. in McAnenley …. It will be recalled that the breach in

McAnenley was fatal even in circumstances where the content of … one of the

missing documents, i.e. the planning authority's decision, was available in an

31. It was argued in that case that there was no significant difference between a 2017 bat

survey which had been posted on the Board’s website and the 2018 bat survey which had

been omitted. However, Simons J. concluded that it could not be said that the differences

between the two surveys could be regarded as insubstantial. He came to the conclusion,

in the circumstances, that the right to effective public participation had been undermined

as a result of the failure to post the report on the website. This denied members of the

public (including the applicant in that case) the opportunity to make submissions in

relation to the survey and as to the conditions which should be imposed by the Board.

32. Although counsel for the Board made a number of submissions at the hearing as to why

the decision in Southwood should be distinguished, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the

failure to include the appeal in this case in the weekly list published on 28th February,

2018 was a substantial failure to comply with the Board’s obligations under Regulation 72

(1). The failure had serious consequences in that any member of the public (including the

applicant) who happened to read the weekly list on 28th February, 2018 would not be

aware that an appeal had been taken against the decision to grant permission for this

extensive solar farm development in County Cork. This had very serious implications for

the right of public participation and in particular the right available under s. 130 of the

2000 Act. I appreciate that, of course, the appeal was included one week later in a

revised list. However, if a member of the public was unaware of the publication of the

revised list, the right to make submissions would be entirely lost. Even if a member of

the public happened to notice the appeal in the revised list, the fact that the revised list

was not published until one week later meant that there was a shorter time in which to

make submissions. While it was suggested by counsel for the Board that this was not a

substantial interference with the right to make submissions, I regret that I cannot accept

that submission. The legislature has determined that a period of four weeks should be

available for the making of submissions. The legislature has not given the Board any

discretion to extend that period. In circumstances where the relevant four-week period

runs from the date of lodgement of the appeal, the effect of the late publication of the

revised list means that any member of the public who happened to see the revised list

would have only two weeks in which to make submissions or observations. This is

because the relevant four-week period runs from 22nd February, 2018 and the revised

list was not published until 8th March, 2018. This was only two weeks prior to the date of

expiry of the time for making submissions. By my calculation, the relevant time for the

making of submissions expired on either 21 or 22 March 2018. That represents a

substantial curtailment of the time available to make submissions. I cannot accept that

this curtailment can be regarded as insubstantial particularly in circumstances where the

appeal in this case related to such a significant development and where there were a

substantial number of documents to consider and digest before any member of the public

could reasonably be expected to make detailed submissions or observations in exercise of

the right available under s. 130. In the circumstances, there is no scope for application of

the de minimis principle. That principle might be capable of application if, for example,

the appeal in this case had been published in the weekly list on 28th February, 2018 but

some other appeal (in which the applicant had no interest) had not been included in that

list. In that event, there would obviously have been a breach by the Board of its

obligations under Regulation 72 (1). However, as between the applicant and the Board,

the breach would be of a technical or insubstantial nature because it would not have

prevented the applicant from making submissions or observations in the present appeal.

In contrast, for the reasons discussed above, the breach of Regulation 72(1) here cannot

33. Counsel for the Board also submits that, in any event, the court should, in the exercise of

its discretion, decline to quash the decision of the Board in this case. In making this

submission, counsel relies on a number of matters including the fact that the applicant

has had an opportunity (albeit belated) to exercise his right of public participation in that

he is entitled to pursue an argument in these proceedings that there was a breach of the

EIA Directive and the Habitats Directive. The Board also contends that there is no

evidence or justification offered by the applicant for his failure to make a submission or

observation to the Board following the publication of the revised list on 8th March, 2019.

The Board further draws attention to the fact that the underlying planning application to

the Council was duly advertised and was included in the Council’s weekly list.

34. I do not, however, propose to address, at this point, the arguments made by the Board in

relation to the exercise of the court’s discretion. It seems to me that I should defer doing

so until I have considered the remaining issues in these proceedings. Obviously, if the

applicant succeeds in any of the remaining issues, it would be unnecessary to address the

35. The Board (through adoption of the report of its inspector) took the view that there was

no requirement for an EIA in this case. The inspector took the view that solar farms are

not a class of development that is listed in either Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 5 to the 2001

regulations (which mirror the provisions of Annex I and Annex II to the EIA Directive). In

reaching this conclusion, the inspector referred to Class 3 (a) (dealing with industrial

installations for the production of electricity, steam and hot water) Class 10 (b) (iv)

(dealing with “Infrastructure Projects-urban development which would involve an area

greater than … 20 hectares…”) and Class 10 (d) (d) (private roads which would exceed

2,000 metres in length). She expressed the view that solar farms do not fall into any of

36. This view taken by the Board is now challenged by the applicant in these proceedings. In

the statement of grounds, it is pleaded (at para. 41) that the proposed development is:

“an industrial development for the generation of electricity set out over a significant area

within the Munster Blackwater Catchment … that at the very least requires a screening for

EIA under EU and Irish law”. At para. 45 of the statement of grounds, it is also pleaded

that the proposed development should be characterised as an industrial estate

37. At the hearing, the main argument advanced by counsel for the applicant, in the context

of the EIA element of the case, was that the proposed development fell within the ambit

of Class 3 (a) of Annex II which covers industrial installations for the production of

electricity, steam and hot water. In turn, when counsel for the Board came to make his

submissions, he suggested that this issue had not been adequately pleaded. It is true

that, although the applicant’s case against the Board is otherwise very clearly, logically

and succinctly pleaded, there is no specific reference in the statement of grounds to

installations for the production of electricity, steam and hot water. Nonetheless, as

outlined above, para. 41 does refer, in somewhat broad-brush terms, to “industrial

development for the generation of electricity…”. When read in conjunction with the report

of the inspector, I think it is reasonably clear that the applicant intended to refer to Class

3 (a) development. This certainly appears to be the way in which the matter was

understood by each of the respondents. When it came to delivery of their respective

statements of opposition, each of them specifically referred to Class 3 (a). In para. 50 of

the statement of opposition delivered on behalf of the Board, it is expressly pleaded that

Class 3 (a) refers to installations for the production of combined heat and power from

electricity, steam and hot water and therefore does not include the proposed

development. Similarly, in para. 11 of the statement of opposition filed by the State

respondents, it is pleaded that the project is not an industrial installation for the

production of electricity, steam and hot water, as envisaged by Class 3 (a). It therefore

appears to be the case that both sets of respondent understood the plea at para. 41 of

the statement of grounds to refer to Class 3 (a) projects. In the circumstances, it seems

to me that the Class 3 (a) issue falls within the ambit of the case made by the applicant in

his statement of grounds and therefore falls to be considered as a live issue in the case. I

am accordingly required to consider the case made by the applicant with regard to the

Class 3 (a) issue. I must also, in due course, address the other contention made by the

applicant namely that the development should be characterised as an industrial estate

development project within Class 10 (a) of Annex II (although this was not strongly

38. Under Article 2 of the EIA Directive, Member States are required to adopt all necessary

measures to ensure that, before development consent is given, projects likely to have

significant effects on the environment should be subject to EIA. The final sentence of

Article 2 (1) clarifies that the projects in question are those defined in Article 4.

39. In turn, Article 4 (1) provides that the projects listed in Annex I must be made subject to

an EIA in accordance with Articles 5-10. Article 4 (2) addresses projects listed in Annex

II. In the case of such projects, Member States are required to determine whether the

(b) Thresholds or criteria set by the Member State (or by a combination of such an

40. As noted above, the applicant contends that the proposed development falls within Class

“(a) Industrial installations for the production of electricity, steam and hot water

41. The Board submits that the reference in Class 3 (a) to “the production of electricity,

steam and hot water” must be read conjunctively and, accordingly, the proposed project

does not fall within the ambit of that class since it will not generate any steam or hot

water. In contrast, the applicant contends that the reference to “electricity, steam and

hot water” should be read disjunctively and that the proposed project is therefore

captured as an industrial installation for the production of electricity.

42. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that, in accordance with the decision of the

CJEU in Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld [1996] ECR I-5431, the language of the EIA Directive

indicates that it has a wide scope and a broad purpose and should therefore be

interpreted with that principle in mind. In Kraaijeveld, the CJEU had to consider whether

the expression “canalization and flood-relief works” in Annex II to the EIA Directive must

be interpreted as including certain works on a dyke running alongside waterways. The

works in question in that case were designed to alter the frequency with which river

banks and the surrounding areas were submerged. The works required the erection of

dykes along the river banks of a river in the Netherlands. The relevant class of project

was contained in para. 10 (e) of Annex II. However, there was a divergence in how that

class was described in a number of different language versions of the Directive. The

English and Finnish versions referred to “canalization and flood-relief works” while the

German, Greek, Spanish, French, Italian, Dutch and Portuguese versions referred to

canalization and regulation of watercourses. The Danish and Swedish versions contained

only a single expression reflecting the idea of regulating watercourses. Given the

divergence between the different language versions, the CJEU indicated that it was

necessary to bear in mind the purpose and general scheme of the Directive and the court

“The wording of the directive indicates that it has a wide scope and a broad

purpose. That observation alone should suffice to interpret point 10(e) of Annex II

to the directive as encompassing all works for retaining water and preventing floods

— and therefore dyke works — even if not all the linguistic versions are so precise”.

43. The applicant placed particular reliance on a subsequent decision of the CJEU in Case C-

117/17 Comune di Castelbellino which concerned a project to increase the capacity of a

plant for the production of electricity from biogas. The underlying facts of the case are

somewhat complex. In 2012, the relevant Italian authorities authorised the project to

increase the capacity of the plant in question. They did so under a law which was

subsequently invalidated by the Italian Constitutional Court. Italian law was thereafter

amended but in 2015 the authorities again gave permission for the project to proceed.

On both occasions, the Italian authorities came to the conclusion that EIA was not

necessary. The CJEU came to the conclusion that the project fell within Class 3 (a) of

Annex II. The applicant contends that, in taking that approach, the CJEU effectively

treated an installation for the production of electricity as falling within the ambit of Class 3

(a) even where it did not involve the generation of heat or steam. In making that

submission, counsel for the applicant referred in particular to the observations of the

“35. First of all, it should be noted that a project for a plant for the production of

electricity from biogas with a nominal power rating of less than 1 kW does not come

within the scope of paragraph 2(a) of Annex I to [the EIA Directive], which covers

thermal power stations and other combustion plants with a heat output of at least

300 MW, but within that of paragraph 3(a) of Annex II …, which covers projects for

industrial installations for the production of electricity not included in Annex I.

36. Work to increase the capacity of a plant such as that in question in the main

proceedings therefore constitutes a project in respect of which the Member States

44. Counsel for the applicant placed significant emphasis on the way in which the CJEU in

these paragraphs simply referred to “industrial installations for the production of

electricity” without any reference to the production of steam or heat. However, counsel

for the Board disputed this interpretation and suggested that it is clear that the CJEU was

using the words “installations for the production of electricity” as shorthand for the full

terms of Class 3 (a). Counsel for the Board also suggested that the production of

electricity from biogas was likely to generate both heat and steam. Counsel for the Board

suggested that when paras. 35 and 36 are read together, it is clear that the CJEU was

addressing its mind to whether the relevant project was within Annex I or Annex II. It is

unsurprising in the circumstances that the CJEU made no reference to either hot water or

steam. I agree with the observations made by counsel for the Board. Furthermore,

having regard to the considerations outlined in paras. 45-48 below, I believe there can be

no doubt that the generation of electricity simpliciter does not fall within Class 3 (a)

45. Counsel for the Board submitted that a significantly more relevant decision of the CJEU is

to be found in its judgment in Case C-215/06 Commission v. Ireland which concerned the

Derrybrien windfarm. One of the complaints made by the Commission in that case was

that Ireland had failed to ensure that a planning permission relating to a windfarm and

associated works was not made subject to EIA. Notably, the complaint made by the

Commission was not founded on the suggestion that the generation of electricity by a

windfarm fell within Class 3 (a) of Annex II. The complaint made was that the

construction of the windfarm involved the extraction of peat and minerals and also

significant road construction such as to fall within Class 2 (a), Class 2 (c) and Class 10

(d). Counsel for the Board argued that it is inconceivable that, if the EU legislature had

regarded the generation of electricity (without any heat or steam) to fall within Class 3

(a), the Commission would not have relied on Class 3 (a) in its complaint against Ireland

in that case. It is clear from paras. 96-103 of the judgment in that case that the

complaint successfully maintained by the Commission against Ireland was confined to

aspects of the construction of the windfarm and no suggestion was made that the

generation of electricity was itself covered by Annex II. It should be noted that the

relevant development of the Derrybrien Windfarm commenced prior to the coming into

force of the amendments made to the EIA Directive by Directive 97/11/EC (addressed in

“96. Moreover, while it is common ground that installations for the harnessing of wind

power for energy production are not listed in either Annex I or Annex II …, it is not

disputed by Ireland that the first two phases of construction of the wind farm

required a number of works, including the extraction of peat and of minerals …, and

also road construction, which are listed in Annex II …, respectively in point 2(a) and

97. Consequently, [the EIA Directive] was applicable to the first two phases of

98. It follows that Ireland was bound to subject the work on the projects to an impact

assessment if they were likely to have significant effects on the environment, by

virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location (see, to that effect, Case C 72/95

99. However, Ireland states that the competent authorities took the view that Annex II

… was not applicable, since the ancillary works of peat extraction and road

construction were minor aspects of the project of wind farm construction itself.

100. The competent authorities therefore considered that there was no need either to

investigate whether the intended projects were likely to have significant effects on

101. However, the fact that the … projects falling under Annex II … may have been of

secondary importance vis-à-vis the wind farm construction project taken as a whole

did not mean that, by virtue of that fact alone, those projects were not likely to

102. The intended projects of peat and mineral extraction and road construction were

not insignificant in terms of scale by comparison with the overall area of the wind

farm project which covered 200 hectares of peat bog and which was the largest

project of its kind in Ireland, …. In addition, those works were carried out on the

slopes of Cashlaundrumlahan Mountain, where there are layers of peat up to 5.5

103. It follows from those factors, which are not disputed by Ireland, that the location

and size of the projects of peat and mineral extraction and road construction, and

the proximity of the site to a river, all constitute specific characteristics which

demonstrate that those projects, which were inseparable from the installation of 46

wind turbines, had to be regarded as likely to have significant effects on the

environment and, accordingly, had to be subject to an assessment of their effects

46. In my view, it is plain from the approach taken in Commission v. Ireland, that the

generation of electricity through wind energy (which does not involve the generation of

heat and steam) was not considered to fall within Class 3 (a). this conclusion is strongly

reinforced by a consideration of what is now Class 3 (h) of Annex II. This coincides with

the provisions of Class 3 (j) of the original version of the Directive (namely Directive

47. If the generation of electricity (without the concomitant generation of heat and steam) fell

within Class 3 (a) it is difficult to understand why the EU legislature would have

considered it necessary to include Class 3 (h) (i.e. Class 3 (j) in the original version). It is

equally difficult to understand why, in 1997, the EU legislature would have considered it

necessary to include a new class within Annex II to specifically capture wind farm

installations. If the generation of electricity was already covered by Class 3 (a), there

would have been no need to amend the Directive in 1997 to include this new class. Yet, in

1997, as part of an extensive overhaul of the Directive, the EU legislature (in Directive

97/11/EC) expressly included an entirely new class of project in Class 3 (i) of Annex II.

This remains the case under the current version of the Directive. Class 3 (i) provides as

“(i) Installations for the harnessing of wind power for energy production (wind farms)”.

48. In light of the considerations outlined in paras. 45 to 47 above, I have come to the

conclusion that the generation of electricity (without the concomitant generation of heat

and steam) does not fall within Class 3 (a) of the Directive. Like any provision of the

Directive, Class 3 (a) must be read in context. While, of course, the provisions of the

Directive must be given a broad scope, it is clear that, when Class 3 (a) is read in

conjunction with Class 3 (h) and 3 (i), it does not extend to the generation of electricity

unless the project in question also generates heat and steam. There would have been no

need to include Class 3 (h) and 3 (i) if the generation of electricity was already covered

49. There was some debate at the hearings as to whether the use of the words “or” and “and”

in other classes within Annex II could be said to throw light on whether the word “and” in

Class 3 (a) should be read in a conjunctive or disjunctive sense. In light of the

conclusions which I have reached (as set out in paras. 45-48 above) I do not believe that

it is necessary to express any final view on those arguments. In any event, I have

significant doubt as to whether it is helpful to try to interpret the meaning of the word

“and” as used in Class 3 (a) by reference to the use of the word “and” or “or” in wholly

different classes. While each class must be read in context and in light of the purpose

and objective of the Directive, the syntax and punctuation used appears to be peculiar to

each class and it is not possible, in my view, to identify any clear pattern to the way in

which the EU legislature has used either the word “and” or the word “or”. All I can say is

that, on a straightforward reading of the language of Class 3 (a), the word “and” appears

to be used conjunctively rather than disjunctively. I stress, however, that my reasons for

concluding that Class 3 (a) does not extend to the generation of electricity simpliciter are

50. In these circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that the applicant’s case in relation

to EIA must fail. With regard to the alternative case made by the applicant that the

development falls within the ambit of Class 10 (a) which covers “industrial estate

development projects”, I can see no basis for this contention. No sufficient argument was

addressed to me on this issue to persuade me that a solar farm of this nature could be

said to constitute an “industrial estate development project”. In this regard, it is well

settled that the onus lies on the applicant, in judicial review proceedings, to prove his or

her case. In these proceedings, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the

51. This element of the applicant’s case is based on the judgment of the CJEU in Case C-

323/17 People Over Wind v. Coillte Teo which addressed the issue as to whether

mitigation measures could be relied upon by a competent authority when carrying out a

screening exercise (otherwise known as a Stage 1 assessment) for the purposes of Article

6 (3) of the Habitats Directive. It is now well established as a matter of EU law that,

where a development is proposed in the vicinity of a Natura site, the competent planning

authority must carry out a screening exercise essentially to assess whether there is a

prospect that the development may have a deleterious effect on the site in question. If

there is such a prospect, the authority must then carry out a full appropriate assessment

in order to ascertain whether deleterious effects can be avoided. The People over Wind

case concerned a project involving the connection of a windfarm to the national electricity

grid. The project in question was in close proximity to a Natura 2000 site namely the

River Barrow and River Nore SAC which contained a habitat for the Irish subspecies of the

freshwater pearl mussel which is included in Annex II to the Habitats Directive. Under the

relevant Irish regulations, Coillte was itself responsible for any necessary appropriate

assessment of the project. Coillte retained consultants to conduct a screening exercise as

to whether the development could have the potential to have adverse impacts on the

pearl mussel. The screening report prepared by the consultants suggested that, in the

absence of protective measures, the project had the potential for the release of

suspended solids into watercourses which could lead to the release of silt or pollutants

into the pearl mussel population through the pathway of such watercourses. It is well

established that any increase in silt or sedimentation is deleterious to the pearl mussel

and adversely affects its ability to reproduce. However, a conclusion was reached that,

on the basis of the protective measures which were proposed, there was no risk to the

SAC and accordingly it was unnecessary to carry out a full appropriate assessment. The

approach taken by Coillte was challenged by the applicants who contended that, it was

impermissible, as part of a screening exercise for appropriate assessment, to take

mitigation measures into account. In the High Court, Barrett J. referred a question to the

CJEU for a preliminary ruling as to whether mitigation measures can be taken into

account when carrying out screening for appropriate assessment under Article 6 (3) of the

Habitats Directive. The CJEU concluded that such measures could not lawfully be taken

into account at the screening stage. At paras. 34-40 of its judgment, the CJEU explained

“34. … it is settled … that Article 6(3) … makes the requirement for an appropriate

assessment of the implications of a plan or project conditional on there being a

probability or a risk that the plan or project … will have a significant effect on the

site concerned. In the light, … of the precautionary principle, such a risk exists if it

cannot be excluded on the basis of objective information that the plan or project

35. … the fact that … measures intended to avoid or reduce the harmful effects of a

plan or project on the site concerned are taken into consideration when determining

whether it is necessary to carry out an appropriate assessment presupposes that it

is likely that the site is affected significantly and that, consequently, such an

36. That conclusion is supported by the fact that a full and precise analysis of the

measures capable of avoiding or reducing any significant effects on the site

concerned must be carried out not at the screening stage, but specifically at the

37. Taking account of such measures at the screening stage would be liable to

compromise the practical effect of the Habitats Directive in general, and the

assessment stage in particular, as the latter stage would be deprived of its purpose

and there would be a risk of circumvention of that stage, which constitutes … an

38. In that regard, the … case-law emphasises the fact that the assessment carried out

under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive may not have lacunae and must contain

complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all

reasonable scientific doubt as to the effects of the proposed works on the protected

39. It is, moreover, from Article 6(3) … that persons such as the applicants … derive in

particular a right to participate in a procedure for the adoption of a decision relating

to an application for authorisation of a plan or project likely to have a significant

40. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred

is that Article 6(3) … must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine

whether it is necessary to carry out, subsequently, an appropriate assessment of

the implications, for a site concerned, of a plan or project, it is not appropriate, at

the screening stage, to take account of the measures intended to avoid or reduce

52. As appears, in particular, from para. 40 of the judgment of the CJEU, it is not permissible

to take into account, at the screening stage, measures which are intended to avoid or

reduce the harmful effects of a plan or project. The effect of the judgment appears to be

that a court, in a case of this kind, is required to reach a conclusion as to what was the

intention underlying the particular measures in question. This is an issue which has been

considered in a number of recent High Court decisions (which are examined in more detail

53. The applicant in the present case submits that the Board erroneously took into account,

as part of its screening exercise under Article 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive a number of

mitigation measures which IGP proposes to put in place which the applicant contends are

intended to ensure that the construction and operation of the proposed solar farm will not

have a deleterious impact on the freshwater pearl mussel in the River Blackwater.

54. In order to understand the applicant’s case, it is therefore necessary to consider some of

the underlying facts. The proposed site of the development is approximately one

kilometre from the Blackwater River (Cork/Waterford) SAC (“the SAC”). There is a

population of freshwater pearl mussel approximately nine kilometres from the site. The

freshwater pearl mussel is among the species designated as qualifying interests for the

purposes of the SAC. The qualifying interests also include the Atlantic salmon. According

to the conservation objectives for the SAC, there are three populations of pearl mussel in

the River Blackwater which are composed entirely of aged adults with no evidence of

recruitment for at least 20 years. The habitat for the species is currently unsuitable for

the survival of adult mussels or the recruitment of juveniles. This is largely due to over

sedimentation. Thus, any release of sediment into watercourses draining into the

Blackwater would have an obvious deleterious impact on the mussel. It is clear from the

materials before the Board that the construction of the proposed development would

require (inter alia) the potential stripping of overburden material, the stockpiling of such

material on site, the stockpiling of building materials (such as sand and cement), the

storage of fuel on site, and excavation works for construction of fencing, trenching and

the laying of ducts and cables. There are a number of streams in the general vicinity of

the proposed development including the Ardglass stream, the Oakfront stream and

several drainage channels within the site. During the course of the planning process, it

was acknowledged that the primary potential water pollution receptors were these

streams and the drainage channels. The Oakfront stream runs along the eastern

boundary of the site while the Ardglass stream runs close to the western boundary of the

55. According to the screening reports submitted by the developer, IGP, to the Council (which

formed part of the material considered by the Board) there is no “significant potential

source-pathway-receptor link” to the SAC from the development site. The relevant

screening report dealt with the freshwater pearl mussel as follows:-

“These are not found within nine kilometres of the site and the drains within the

site would not create a clear connection by which they would be affected within the

56. However, as the report of the inspector makes clear, she identified that, contrary to the

impression created in the consultants’ screening reports, there is, in fact, a hydrological

connection between the site and the SAC. At p. 32 of her report, the inspector stated:-

“The Ardglass Stream to the west and the Oakfront River to the east discharge to

the Blackwater SAC c.662 m and 1.9 km downstream of the site respectively. The

nearest mapped qualifying interests in the SAC are the whiteclawed crayfish c.3 km

There is a hydrological connection between the site via the drainage ditches to the

designated site. Field drains within the site discharge into the adjacent

watercourses noted above. As a consequence, there is potential for indirect effects

from emissions to ground and surface water during the construction phase such as

57. However, it was argued by counsel for the Board in the course of the hearing before me

that, in circumstances where the developer, IGP, had proposed the protective measures

in issue in the belief that there was no hydrological connection between the development

site and the SAC, the protective measures cannot have been intended to avoid or reduce

the harmful effects of the project on the SAC. Counsel submitted that, in any event, it

was clear from the materials submitted on behalf of IGP during the planning process that

the measures were designed to protect flora and fauna on the development site itself and

that they had not been designed with a view to protecting the SAC.

58. Counsel for the Board drew attention, in this context, to the preliminary construction

environmental management plan (“CEMP”) which stated on p. 5 that the mitigation

measures discussed in s. 6 of the same document were “to ensure that there are no

adverse negative impacts on the hydrological, hydrogeological and ecological features of

the proposed development site”. (Emphasis added). However, it should be noted that, in

s. 5 of the same document, the authors state that the primary potential water pollution

receptors are the Oakfront stream and the Ardglass stream. The tributaries to those

streams and the various drainage channels within the proposed development site were

identified as potential secondary water pollution receptors. In s. 6 of the CEMP, the

authors identify the steps that would be taken to prevent contamination of watercourses.

In particular, it identified that, in advance of construction works taking place, silt fences

would be put in place to prevent any silt laden waters entering the drainage ditches or

seasonal streams which discharge to the Oakfront stream or the Ardglass stream. The

CEMP made clear that these silt fences would remain in place until the site had been fully

landscaped and the risk of silt laden run-off had been minimised. Any trapped silt would

59. In addition, s. 6 of the CEMP described how straw bales would also be used as an

additional precaution. These would be placed in the ditches to intercept any silt laden or

potentially polluting run-off (which had not been kept in place by the silt fences)

migrating towards the Oakfront or Ardglass streams. The CEMP also set out measures in

relation to dust minimisation. Section 6.2.3 stated that no concrete production would

take place on site “due to the sensitivity of the watercourses in the vicinity of the site”.

In addition, no washing down of lorries or any other construction vehicles would take

60. The CEMP also provided that a protection protocol would be put in place which would

implement (inter alia) any recommendations made by Inland Fisheries Macroom “to

ensure the protection of the River Blackwater and its tributaries and the associated

aquatic fauna and any fisheries connected to the site by the river”. In addition, it stated

that weather conditions would be “considered” during all construction operations and no

plant would enter within 100 metres of the Oakfront or Ardglass stream during or

following heavy rain or “other conditions likely to lead to large-scale or additional water

flow that would carry soil or silt into the watercourses”. There were also further details in

relation to the grid connection, site tidiness, operational controls and storm water

61. There were additional mitigation measures set out in the screening reports which were

prepared in the course of the planning process by consultants retained by IGP. The first

such report was prepared in February 2017 in which it was stated that:-

“Construction measures are the only ones that create any major modifications to

62. In s. 6.0 of the February 2017 screening report, it was stated that there would be no

effect on Natura 2000 sites as a result of the project “following standard best practice

procedures and mitigation measures”. In s. 6.1 a number of mitigation measures were

outlined. Hedgerow removal was to be undertaken outside of the bird nesting period.

There was to be avoidance of all marsh areas watercourses and wet drains “to prevent

any downstream effects on water quality and to protect marsh areas”. The marsh areas

in question appear to have been within the development site itself. Cleaning of solar

panels would involve the use of non-toxic cleaning agents and there would be ongoing

monitoring of the site to determine whether any of the measures would require

63. In response to the February 2017 screening report, the Council in September 2017

sought a revised screening report detailing the proposed grid connection and its potential

for significant impacts on the SAC. Thereafter, in November 2017, a revised screening

report was submitted. In the summary at the beginning of the November version of the

“Mitigation measures are proposed for the site’s flora and fauna and none is

64. The November 2017 screening report provided more detail in relation to (inter alia) the

SAC. As noted in para. 55 above, it stated that there was no significant potential source-

pathway-receptor link to the SAC. In s. 5.1.1 (dealing with the effects on the SAC) it now

contained additional information in relation to the grid connection. Section 5.1.1 stated:-

“In the normal execution of construction operations … there will not be any impact

upon habitats or species within or directly adjacent to Natura 2000 sites…. The

watercourses crossed by the electrical ducts required to connect the solar park with

the national grid will not be entered by equipment and the ducts incorporated into

In the eventuality of inappropriate construction procedures or timing, it is highly

improbable that any protected sites are placed at high risk. Ecological risks are

created by the movement of materials to and from the site during excavations,

Further to this, run-off during construction can pose a risk of siltation or the

transfer of contaminants within the water. There are no major rivers through the

site. There are drains within the site but no stream. There will be no operations

likely to affect these drains as the project primarily involves the installation of

banks of solar panels on metal frames that are constructed on-site and can be

introduced without significant modification to existing hedgerow or disturbance to

65. In s. 5.2.1 it was stated that there will be no significant or “measurable” impact on any

protected habitat, flora or fauna from the construction or operation of the project

66. Section 6.0 replicated what had previously been said in the same section of the February

2017 report. It stated that there would be no effect on Natura 2000 sites as a

consequence of the use of standard best practice procedures. It also stated that no

further mitigation measures were required. The report also made clear, at this point, that

a number of measures were intended to be implemented within the site for biological

diversity enhancement and protection. The mitigation measures which are set out in s.

6.1 replicate the measures previously contained in the February 2017 report.

67. When the matter was appealed to the Board, a detailed report was prepared by the

inspector appointed by the Board. In that report, she summarised the grounds of appeal

submitted by Fiddane Solar Action Group. One of the concerns raised in the appeal was

in relation to the streams running along the boundaries of the site (as noted in the CEMP).

The case was made that these should have been identified and considered in the

68. The inspector, in her report, also summarised the submission made by the developer in

response which (inter alia) highlighted that extensive measures were proposed within the

CEMP that “will protect the watercourses from any risk of pollution or contamination”.

69. In s. 7.4.3 of the report, the inspector notes that the construction process for the solar

farm is “relatively low impact”. In particular, she notes that the metal uprights

supporting the solar panels will be driven into the soil without any separate foundation.

Nonetheless, she notes in s. 7.4.4 that there is a potential for silt laden run-off to enter

adjoining watercourses during construction and that this is addressed in the CEMP. In s.

“On the basis of the information provided it is reasonable to conclude that the

proposed development will not impact upon the prevailing drainage conditions or

70. As noted previously, the inspector (in s. 7.11.3 of her report) notes that there is a

hydrological connection between the development site and the SAC. The relevant extract

from the report is quoted in para. 56 above. In the same paragraph, the inspector

identifies that, as a consequence of the hydrological connection, there is the potential for

harmful effects in particular during the construction phase as a consequence of (inter alia)

silt laden run-off. In the immediately following paragraph, the inspector explains why,

notwithstanding this hydrological connection and the potential for harmful effects, she

concludes that the SAC will not be affected by the proposed development:-

“Taking into consideration the incorporation of best practice methods during the

construction phase which are considered an integral part of the development to

protect against sediment and hydrocarbon release, I would concur with the

conclusions of the screening report submitted that no indirect impacts are

envisaged. In terms of the operational phase discharge from the development is to

be to existing greenfield run-off rates. It is not proposed to remove any existing

71. Counsel for the applicant strongly argued that it is clear from this paragraph that the

inspector did take the protective measures proposed in the CEMP into account in reaching

her conclusion that there would be no adverse impacts on the SAC. Counsel argued that,

having regard to the decision of the CJEU in People Over Wind, this was impermissible.

He also drew attention to what had been said by the inspector in the immediately

preceding paragraph (quoted in para. 56 above) where she had acknowledged that, as a

consequence of the hydrological connection there is “potential for indirect effects from

emissions to ground and surface water during the construction phase such as silt laden

run-off, hydrocarbons or other pollutants”. Thus, counsel argued that it was clear that

the inspector had taken into account at the screening stage measures which were

72. Having regard to the approach taken by the CJEU in para. 40 of the judgment in People

Over Wind, the outcome of this issue depends on whether it can be said that the

measures in question were intended to avoid or reduce the harmful effects of the

proposed development. The CJEU did not offer any guidance as to how a national court is

to determine the intention underlying a measure. As a matter of principle, it appears

unlikely that the CJEU could have in mind that the national court would assess this issue

by reference to the declared intention of the developer. That approach would give rise to

a fairly obvious potential for abuse. As a matter of principle, it would therefore appear to

be necessary and appropriate for the national court to adopt an objective approach. This

is the view which has been taken by Simons J. in the Heather Hill case discussed below.

73. The nature of the approach to be taken by the court has been considered in a number of

recent decisions by Barniville, Simons and Quinn JJ. In the first of those decisions,

namely Kelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2019] IEHC 84, Barniville J. dealt with a judicial review

challenge to a decision of the Board to grant permission to Aldi Stores for the

development of a supermarket in Laytown, County Meath. The grounds of challenge

included a contention that the Board had, impermissibly, taken into account mitigation

measures at the screening stage. In that case, the measures in question were

Sustainable Drainage Systems (“SUDS”) measures which were incorporated into the

development design. The Board and the developer resisted the case made by the

applicant on the basis that the SUDS measures were not by way of mitigation but were

standard drainage systems which are required (with limited exceptions) to be

incorporated into all new developments. It should also be noted that, in that case, there

was also affidavit evidence before the court to the effect that there was no direct pathway

between the development site in question and the shoreline in the vicinity of the relevant

74. Barniville J. came to the conclusion that SUDS measures could not be considered to be

mitigation measures as understood in People Over Wind. At pp. 72-73 of his judgment,

Barniville J. explained that there were a number of reasons why he had reached that

“130. The first is that SUDS measures are required by the GDSDS to be incorporated in

all new developments in order to mitigate the impact of the development on the

aquatic environment unless a developer can demonstrate … that inclusion of SUDS

is ‘impractical due to site circumstances or that its effect on the control of run-off

would be minimal, such as for rural sites”…. I have considered the relevant

provisions of the GDSDS … . I note that among the key issues driving the policy

contained in the GDSDS … was the operation of storm water and fire water

drainage systems…. The legal requirements behind the policy are derived from the

Water Framework Directive …. It is clear … from a review of the extracts from the

GDSDS and from the uncontested affidavit evidence … that SUDS ‘is now a

standard component to virtually all projects, regardless of proximity to Natura 2000

sites, and therefore can be considered integral to project design rather than

131. Furthermore, the policy behind requiring … the inclusion of SUDS measures in a

development is not in any way directed to the protection of any European site

which might potentially be affected by a particular development …. It is clear that

the key driver for the requirement to incorporate SUDS … is the Water Framework

Directive and not the Habitats Directive. SUDS are required entirely without

reference to the presence of a European site within the zone of a particular

132. In my view, SUDS measures are not ‘measures that are intended to avoid or reduce

the harmful effects’ of a particular development of a European site. They are not

‘intended’ to have that effect as they are required to be incorporated in

developments for the reason set out in the GDSDS…. They are not required to be

incorporated by reason of the potential effect of a development on a European site.

SUDS measures cannot, therefore, … be regarded as measures that are ‘intended’

to ‘avoid or reduce’ the harmful effects of a development on a European site. …

75. The issue of protective or mitigation measures was subsequently considered by Simons J.

in Heather Hill Management Company v. An Board Pleanala [2019] IEHC 450. That case

was concerned with a proposed residential development at Bearna, County Galway. The

applicant challenged the decision of the Board to grant permission for the development on

a number of grounds. One of the grounds was that, in carrying out a screening exercise

for appropriate assessment, the Board had wrongly taken into account “best practice

measures” and thus had invalidly determined, on the basis of those measures, that there

was no likely effect on the Galway Bay Complex SAC (“the Galway Bay SAC”) and the

Inner Galway Bay SPA (“the SPA”). There was a hydrological connection between the

proposed development site and the Galway Bay SAC and SPA. The matter was dealt with

“The only potential pathways for effects on the SPA and SAC are through

hydrological connections, i.e. the Trusky Stream discharging to Galway Bay at

Barna. There will be no run-off from the site directly to any SAC or SPA. Best

practice measures will be undertaken to minimise emissions to the Trusky Stream

during the construction and operation of the development. These measures will

ensure the protection of water quality and fisheries resources in the Trusky Stream.

Emissions into Galway Bay at Barna from the Trusky Stream will be negligible and

any slight emissions that do enter Galway Bay … will be quickly dissipated by tidal

It is reasonable to conclude that on the basis of the information on the file … that

the proposed development … would not be likely to have a significant effect on …

Galway Bay…. SAC … and [the] SPA… and a Stage 2 Appropriate Assessment … is

76. The question which fell for determination in that case was whether the “best practice

measures” mentioned by the inspector were intended to avoid harmful effects on the

Galway Bay SAC and on the SPA or whether they were intended for some other purpose.

77. In considering the issue, Simons J., at para. 156 of his judgment, observed that the

distinction between measures intended to avoid harmful effects and measures intended

for some other purpose “can readily be applied in cases where the competent authority

has adopted a stepped-approach in its screening determination, such as that adopted on

the facts of People Over Wind. In that case, the screening report … had, first, identified a

potential impact upon the qualifying interest, and, secondly, put forward measures to

78. In the course of the hearing before me, counsel for the applicant submitted that, on the

basis of the report of the inspector, a stepped approach was adopted here in that the

inspector (in the passage quoted in para. 56 above) drew attention to the hydrological

connection with the SAC and stated that, as a consequence, there was a potential for

indirect effects during the construction phase – in particular from silt laden run-off or

other pollutants. However, counsel for the Board sought to emphasise what was said by

Simons J. in para. 158 of his judgment where he warned against the “temptation” to work

backwards from the existence of measures and to assume that “but for” such measures,

the proposed development would be likely to have a significant effect. Simons J. stressed

that the emphasis must always be on the intended purpose of the measure. That said,

Simons J. also stressed (in para. 164 of his judgment) that the label which the parties

choose to attach to a particular measure is not dispositive. Intention must be determined

on an objective basis. Simons J. considered the judgment of Barniville J. in Kelly and

“It follows from this case law that the question of whether a particular measure is

an avoidance / reduction measure falls to be answered by reference to the intended

purpose of the measure. This will require consideration of the rationale for the

imposition of the measure. If, as in People Over Wind, a measure is expressly

described as a protective measure, then it falls within the category of avoidance /

reduction measures which cannot legitimately be taken into account as part of a

stage 1 screening exercise. Conversely, if, as in Kelly …, the measures are required

for purposes entirely unrelated to the Habitats Directive, then the mere fact that

reference is made to same in the context of the discussion of the screening

determination does not invalidate that decision. It all depends on what reliance is

placed upon same. As appears from the inspector's report in Kelly …, there was no

watercourse on the application site … which could act as a pathway to any

79. While Simons J., in that passage, stressed that the mere fact that reference is made to

such measures does not per se invalidate a screening decision, he also made clear in

para. 170 that the fact that the measures might also have a purpose unrelated to the

Habitat’s Directive does not preclude a finding that the measures were also intended to

80. Simons J. analysed the approach taken by the inspector in the passage from her report

quoted in para. 75 above. At para. 168 he drew attention to the fact that there were two

(a) In the first place, she drew attention to the use of best practice measures intended

(b) She also concluded that any slight emissions from the stream that do enter Galway

81. Simons J. observed in the same paragraph that the inspector did not rely solely on

dispersal by the tide in reaching her screening determination. The avoidance/reduction of

82. Simons J. rejected the argument made by the Board and the developer in that case that

the “best practice measures” were intended to address the impact of the proposed

development on the immediate locality rather than on the Natura sites. At para. 170 of

“With respect, this argument cannot be reconciled with the language of the

inspector's recommended screening determination when taken as a whole. It

cannot be overlooked that the inspector chose to make express reference to ‘best

practice measures’ in what is the very summary of the screening exercise. The

inspector self-evidently attached importance to these measures. The fact that the

measures would have a benefit to flora and fauna within the application site does

not preclude a finding that the measures would also avoid / reduce the impact on

the European sites. The two outcomes are entirely compatible. There is nothing in

the judgment in People Over Wind which says that the effect on the European sites

83. Simons J. then analysed the underlying documents in that case including a report

prepared by an ecologist which set out a number of mitigation measures which, in

substance, are quite similar to those proposed in the present case. Simons J. set out his

“177. On the facts of the present case, there is a potential hydrological connection

between the application site and the European sites, via the Trusky stream. The

stream enters the sea at Barna pier, some 1.4 km to 1.5 km east of the Galway

Bay SAC and SPA. Whereas the screening determination does state that any

emissions into Galway Bay would be quickly dissipated by tidal currents, the

determination does not rest exclusively on this factor. Rather, the inspector's

screening determination, which was accepted and adopted by An Bord Pleanála,

makes express reference to ‘best practice measures’ being undertaken to minimise

emissions to the Trusky stream during the construction and operation of the

development. The structure of the screening determination, and the fact that the

inspector thought it necessary to make reference to ‘best practice measures’, in

what is a very short determination, indicates that the inspector was relying upon

the combined effect of the ‘best practice measures’ and dissipation by tidal currents

178. The reference to ‘best practice measures’ can only be understood as referring to the

‘mitigation measures’ as enumerated in s. 6 the ecological report. …”.

84. The judgments of Barniville J. and Simons J. were subsequently analysed and applied by

Quinn J. in Uí Mhuirnin v. Minister for Housing Planning and Local Government

[2019] IEHC 824. That case was concerned with the validity of a foreshore licence granted by

the respondent Minister (“the Minister”) in respect of a renewable energy wind wave and

tidal test facility near Spiddal, County Galway. The decision to grant the licence was

challenged by the applicant on a number of grounds including on the ground that the

Minister unlawfully took mitigation measures into account when carrying out a screening

exercise for appropriate assessment. For the purposes of the screening report in that

case consultants were retained to produce a screening report. That report identified a

number of Natura sites which were relevant for the purposes of the exercise but it came

to the conclusion that there was no potential for significant effects on those sites from the

proposed activity such that a stage 2 appropriate assessment was not required. This

conclusion was set out in s. 3 of the report. No mitigation measures of any kind were

identified in that section of the report. However, s. 4 of the report contained an

assessment of the likely significance of the proposed activity on marine mammals and in

that section of the report a number of mitigation measures were proposed. The report

stated that these mitigation measures were proposed in order to ensure a “low risk” to

85. The consultants’ report in Uí Mhuirnin was subsequently considered by a committee which

concluded that the proposed activity was unlikely to have a negative impact on the Natura

“with the application of mitigating/best practice measures described in the

environmental report, it is likely to reduce the potential impact to negligible levels”.

86. The committee produced its own screening report in which a number of potential impacts

on the relevant Natura sites both during the installation phase and the operational phase

were identified. The report identified the “best practice measures” which were proposed

to protect marine mammals. It contained a statement that there would be no direct or

indirect impact and that the “overall integrity of the Natura 2000 sites will not be

affected”. It then stated that “on the basis of the above” a conclusion could be reached

that there were not likely to be any significant effects as a result of the proposed project.

87. In his judgment, Quinn J. observed that the People over Wind principle is only violated if,

in the first place, potential harmful effects of the project on the relevant Natura site have

been identified. In para. 144 he drew attention to the screening report of the Committee

which had identified a number of harmful effects during both the installation phase and

88. Quinn J. next considered whether the Committee had taken into account measures which

were designed to avoid or reduce the harmful effects in question. In this context, he

rejected the suggestion made by the Minister that the measures in question were directed

solely at the impact on marine mammals. He observed, in para. 148, that the

assessment of impact on marine mammals was interwoven with the assessment of impact

on other species. In the circumstances, Quinn J. concluded that the Committee clearly

fell into error having regard to the principles laid down by the CJEU in People over Wind

89. Taking the decision of the CJEU in People over Wind together with the judgments in Kelly,

Heather Hill and Uí Mhuirnín, it is possible to summarise the relevant principles as

(a) In carrying out a screening exercise, the precautionary principle must be applied;

(b) A stage 2 appropriate assessment must be carried out if, on a screening exercise, it

is not possible to exclude the risk that a proposed development will have a

significant effects on the site concerned is at the stage 2 appropriate assessment

when a comprehensive analysis of those measures can be carried out and a

determination reached as to whether they will or will not be effective;

(d) Taking account of such measures at the screening stage is liable to undermine the

protections afforded by the Habitats Directive. To take account of the measures at

the screening stage runs the risk of circumventing the stage 2 assessment which

(e) It is accordingly impermissible, at the screening stage, to take account of measures

intended to avoid or reduce the harmful effects of a proposed development;

(f) The question of the intention underlying the measures in question is to be assessed

objectively. Thus, the language used in any document generated in the course of

(g) On the other hand, there may be cases where, having regard to the language used

by the competent authority (or in some document relied upon by the competent

authority) it is obvious that the measures in issue were designed to avoid and

reduce any impact on the relevant site. As Simons J. observed in Heather Hill, this

is what happened in People over Wind where the measures concerned were

expressly described as “protective” with reference to the relevant site;

(h) On the other side of the coin, there may be cases where it is clear that the

measures in question were adopted not for the purpose of avoiding or reducing the

potential impact on the relevant site but were adopted solely and exclusively for

some other purpose. This is exemplified in the decision of Barniville J. in Kelly

where the relevant measures were found, as a matter of fact, to be a standard

component in virtually all projects; they were not in any way directed to the

(i) On the other hand, the fact that one of the purposes of the measures in question

may have no connection with a Natura site does not exclude the possibility that

there may be more than one purpose for the measures. In cases where such an

unconnected purpose is identified, it is therefore necessary to consider whether, as

a matter of fact, the measures were also intended to avoid or reduce the impact of

(j) That said, it is not legitimate to work backwards from the existence of measures

and to assume from their existence that the proposed development must be likely,

in the absence of such measures, to have a significant effect on the relevant site.

As Simons J. observed in Heather Hill, any such temptation to take that course

(k) In considering whether measures fall foul of the People over Wind principle, it is not

usually helpful to consider whether the measure is “integral” to the project or is

something “additional”. This is because it may be difficult in practice to draw a

meaningful distinction between the two. A developer may well anticipate the need

for particular mitigation measures and arrange for those to be “built in” to the

(l) In each case, it is essential to analyse the measures in question in the context of

the screening exercise carried out by the competent authority (and any documents

relevant to that exercise) and to determine, on an entirely objective basis, whether

the measures can be said to have been intended to avoid or reduce harmful effects

on a Natura site or whether the measures were designed solely for some other

90. It is now necessary to apply the principles summarised above to the particular

circumstances of this case. In my view, it is clear from the CEMP and the screening

exercise carried out by the inspector on behalf of the Board that the measures set out in

the CEMP to protect watercourses from pollution (in particular silt laden run-off) were

intended to avoid or reduce the harmful effects on the SAC. I have reached that

(a) In the first place, although the screening exercise carried out by the consultants on

behalf of the developer suggested that no mitigation measures were required for

any Natura sites, the information contained within that report was somewhat

equivocal. As noted in para. 64 above, the report stated that “no significant

potential source-pathway, receptor link” (emphasis added) to the SAC had been

identified. While the purpose of a screening exercise is to identify whether a

proposed development may have a significant effect on a Natura site, it would be

difficult to form the view that there was no possibility of there being a significant

effect on the SAC as a consequence of any migration of silt (or other pollutants)

through any pathway (however small) that might exist between the development

(b) On page 11 of the same report, it was stated, with regard to the freshwater pearl

mussel, that: “the drains within the site would not create a clear connection by

which they would be affected within the area of their known occurrence”.(Emphasis

added). Again, having regard to the precautionary principle, that seems to me to

report, it is clear from the CEMP that there was, in fact, a concern about the

possible impact of the development on the River Blackwater. As noted in para. 60

above, the CEMP specifically stated that any recommendations by Inland Fisheries,

Macroom would be implemented “to ensure the protection of the River Blackwater

and its tributaries and the associated aquatic fauna and any fisheries connected to

(d) The concern about the potential impact on the River Blackwater is reinforced by

what is said at p. 11 of the CEMP which described the silt fences and other

protective measures to be undertaken. The express purpose of these measures

was stated to be to prevent any silt laden waters entering the drainage

ditches/seasonal streams and in turn discharging to the Oakfront stream or the

Ardglass stream. It should be recalled, in this context, that neither of those streams

traverse the proposed development site itself. As noted previously, the Ardglass

stream flows approximately 75 metres beyond the western boundary of the

development site while the Oakfront stream flows, at its closest point, adjacent to

the eastern boundary of the site. There appears to be a clear recognition within the

CEMP that there is a connection between the drainage ditches and seasonal

streams on site and the Oakfront stream and the Ardglass stream. This is

reinforced by what is said on p. 11 about the use of straw bales as an added

protection to intercept any silt laden or other polluting run-off “migrating towards

the Oakfront stream or the Ardglass stream due to any potential unforeseen failure

(e) Thus, even prior to considering the report of the inspector, it is evident that the

protective measures described in the CEMP were designed to prevent discharge to

the Oakfront stream and the Ardglass stream. In circumstances where neither of

those streams traverse the development site, this gives the lie to the suggestion

that the measures were intended to protect the development site itself.

Furthermore, the CEMP clearly demonstrates that the construction phase of the

development may give rise to silt. Otherwise, it would not be necessary to put the

measures in place to prevent the migration of silt-laden material. This runs directly

counter to what had been stated in the screening report prepared by the

consultants where, at p. 17, it had stated that: “there are drains within the site but

no stream. There will be no operations likely to affect these drains as the project

primarily involves the installation of banks of solar panels on metal frames that are

constructed on-site and can be introduced without significant modification to

(f) Crucially, both the Ardglass stream and the Oakfront stream discharge to the River

Blackwater which is protected by the SAC. This is confirmed by what is stated by

the inspector at p. 32 of her report. As noted above, she found that there was a

hydrological connection between the development site and the SAC as a

consequence of the field drains which had the potential to discharge into the nearby

Ardglass stream and Oakfront stream. However, even before the inspector reached

that conclusion, it is evident from the CEMP itself that there was an understanding

on the part of the developer of the potential impact of the construction phase of the

development on the River Blackwater and its tributaries. That was expressly

acknowledged on p. 17 of the CEMP (quoted in subpara. (e) above). Given the

contents of the CEMP, it is difficult to understand how the authors of the screening

report prepared by the consultants could have reached the conclusions which they

did. Based on the content of the CEMP, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that

the purpose of the silt fences and the other protective measures described in the

CEMP were intended for any purpose other than the protection of the watercourses

draining into the River Blackwater where the various species in that river (including

the freshwater pearl mussel) could potentially be adversely affected by ingress of

silt-laden water migrating from the construction works on the development site. I

do not believe that there is any plausible basis to suggest that the measures were

designed to protect the flora and fauna on the development site itself. In light of

the contents of the CEMP, and in light of the fact that both the Ardglass and

Oakfront streams were off-site, the silt fences cannot have been designed to

(g) Thus, it seems to me that it should have been obvious to the Board on considering

the materials before it, that the principal purpose of the silt fences and other

protective measures was to protect against the migration of silt or other pollutants

(h) In fact, the inspector clearly saw that there was not just a hydrological connection

between the development site and the SAC but also that there was the potential for

harmful effects during the construction phase of the development. While the

relevant section of her report has already been quoted above, it is worth reiterating

“Field drains within the site discharge into the adjacent watercourses….As a

consequence there is potential for indirect effects from emissions to ground

and surface water during the construction phase such as silt run off,

(i) Having identified the potential that the construction phase of the development

could have adverse impacts on the SAC, the inspector then took into account what

she described as “best practice methods” during the construction phase, in coming

to the conclusion that the development would not have an adverse impact on the

SAC. In reaching that conclusion, the inspector does not appear to have considered

the intention underlying what she described as the “best practice methods”. In

light of the terms of the CEMP, it is clear that the measures in question were

intended to prevent silt-laden run-off. They were not intended to protect the

development site itself but were intended to protect the downstream effects of any

such run-off. From an ecological perspective, the most important feature

downstream of the development is the SAC. It should therefore have been clear to

the Board that the principal purpose of the proposed measures was to protect

against harm to the SAC. In those circumstances, having regard to the decision of

the CJEU in People over Wind, the measures in question could not be taken into

(j) In fairness to the inspector, she appears to have placed some emphasis, in this

context, on the fact that she considered the measures in question to form “an

integral part of the development”. However, subsequent to her report, Simons J.

has made clear in Heather Hill, that this is not the appropriate test. Moreover, any

consideration of the CEMP would demonstrate that the purpose of the measure was

to protect against silt-laden or other deleterious run-off. This could not be said to

have been done for the purposes of projecting flora and fauna on site. It was

clearly aimed at ensuring that there would be no migration of silt into watercourses

91. In the circumstances, it appears to me that the Board was not entitled to take into

account the measures described in the CEMP in carrying out the screening exercise for

appropriate assessment in this case. As a consequence of the decision of the CJEU in

People over Wind, the Board was not entitled to proceed in this way. That error goes to

the jurisdiction of the Board. In the circumstances, the decision of the Board of 15th

November, 2018 appears to me to be invalid and the applicant must be entitled to an

order of certiorari quashing the decision to grant planning permission for the solar farm

development. I will, however, hear the parties as to whether the matter can now be

remitted to the Board in order to carry out a fresh screening exercise and, very probably,

92. For completeness, it should be noted that the applicant also contends that the decision of

the Board is invalid in circumstances where (so the applicant contends) the Board had no

scientific information before it on the risks to the SAC of modifications to Cooliney Bridge,

a structure crossing the Oakfront stream. In this context, it appears that this bridge was

shown in the wrong place on the maps submitted with the planning application. It is

therefore suggested that the bridge in question was never inspected or assessed. I do

not believe, however, that it is necessary to spend time on this issue. While the bridge

may have been shown in the wrong location, it is clear from the screening report

prepared by the consultants retained by the developer that two bridges were considered

for the purposes of the screening exercise. No one has suggested that there were more

than two bridges to be assessed. The view was taken that while the bridges would be

altered to provide access for electrical ducts (that would connect the solar farm with the

national grid) this would not involve any operations within the watercourses crossed by

the ducts. I am not, therefore, satisfied that the applicant has made out a case that there

was a failure to consider Cooliney Bridge. While the bridge may have been shown in an

incorrect place on the map, it seems to me that the bridge was nonetheless assessed.

93. In light of the fact that I have found the decision of the Board to be invalid, there is,

strictly speaking, no necessity to consider the case against the State Respondents. As

counsel for the State Respondents correctly observed in the course of the hearing, the

case against the State Respondents is contingent on the court reaching a conclusion that

the Board acted in accordance with Irish law. The case is made in paras. 48 and 51 of

the statement of grounds that, if the Board made its decision in accordance with Irish law,

then the State Respondents failed to adequately transpose the Habitats Directive and the

EIA Directive. However, one of the striking features of the case made against the State

Respondents is the complete lack of any attempt in the statement of grounds to set out

any basis on which the court might conclude that Irish law fell short of the requirements

of EU law. It seems to me that if a case is to be made against the State alleging that

there has been a failure to properly transpose EU law, any such case requires to be

pleaded specifically and with appropriate particularity. As Barniville J. explained in Kelly,

this is a requirement of O.84 r. 20 (3) which, as Barniville J. observed, was inserted by

way of amendment to give effect to the views expressed by the Supreme Court in A.P. v.

“‘It shall not be sufficient for an applicant to give as any of his grounds for the

purpose of paragraphs, (ii) or (iii) of sub-rule (2)(a) an assertion in general terms

of the ground concerned, but the applicant should state precisely each such ground,

giving particulars where appropriate, and identify in respect of each ground the

facts or matters relied upon as supporting that ground’. (Emphasis added).

94. In Kelly, Barniville J. was prepared to excuse the breach of O. 84 r. 20 (3) in

circumstances where the affidavit evidence provided some additional material which

assisted in the understanding of the case made. In contrast, in the present case, there is

nothing in the affidavits sworn in support of the statement of grounds or indeed in the

written legal submissions furnished in advance of the hearing which throws any light on

the basis for the applicant’s case that there has been a failure to properly transpose either

95. Essentially, what the applicant, in his case against the State respondents, has sought to

do is to reserve his position against those respondents pending a determination as to

whether the Board acted in accordance with Irish law. This is clear, for example, from

“Errors in the application documentation, particularly in the AA Screening Report

have created lacunae, for which the First Named Respondent should have sought

best scientific information, prior to relying on the report. If gaps in scientific

knowledge are allowable in Appropriate Assessment screenings under Irish law,

then the significance of effects on the environment cannot be measured

scientifically or in accordance with the precautionary principles and there has been

96. No basis whatever is set out as to whether there is any provision of Irish law which allows

a competent authority such as the Board to proceed on the basis of gaps in scientific

knowledge. Furthermore, no such provision was identified in the course of the hearing.

In fact, there was no suggestion made during the course of the hearing that there was a

difference between Irish law, on the one hand, and EU law on the other insofar as

97. Similarly, insofar as the EIA Directive is concerned, the only plea which is made (other

than the contingent and unsubstantiated allegation of a failure to properly transpose the

EIA Directive is contained in para. 52 where the following is alleged:-

“The purported EIA Screening was not done in accordance with Annex IIA and

Annex III of the Directive. If the Court determines that the First Named

Respondent carried an EIA screening in accordance with the Directive then it has

98. It is impossible to understand how a case of incorrect transposition arises on the basis of

the second sentence in para. 52 (as highlighted above). It is assumed that the words

“carried out” should be read as “did not carry out”. However, even on that basis, it is

impossible to understand how it could be said that the failure of the Board to carry out an

EIA screening in accordance with the EIA Directive must mean that there has been a

99. The approach taken by the applicant in this case has echoes of the approach taken in

Alen-Buckley v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 311. In that case, as here, the principal

case was made against the Board. However, the State respondents were also joined to

the proceedings on the basis (inter alia) that, if the Board had made its decision in a

manner consistent with the 2000 Act and the 2001 Regulations, then the statutory

scheme was inconsistent with the EIA Directive and that, as a consequence, the State

would, in such circumstances, have failed to appropriately transpose the requirements of

the EIA Directive. Although that formed part of the grounds on which the applicants in

those proceedings sought relief, there was no claim made against the State respondents

in part D of the statement of grounds. In those circumstances, the State respondents

sought an order dismissing the proceedings as against them. Among the arguments

made by the State respondents in that case was that the court would first have to

determine whether the actions of the Board were lawful or otherwise permitted by Irish

domestic legislation before any issue regarding transposition of the EIA Directive could

arise. In light of the fact that no relief was sought against the State respondents in Part

D of the statement of grounds, Costello J. dismissed the proceedings under O.19 r.28 on

the basis that they failed to disclose a cause of action. However, in para. 45 of her

judgment she observed obiter that she also agreed with the arguments of the State

respondents insofar as they relied on O.84 r.20 (3). In the course of her judgment,

“It is noteworthy that the applicants advanced no explanation as to why they did

not seek any relief expressly against the State defendants. It was open to them, …

to have sought declaratory relief to the effect that the Directive had not been

properly transposed into Irish law, …. Of course, such a case would have to be

properly pleaded in accordance with the requirements of O. 84, r. 20 (3)…. No

explanation was provided to the court as to why the applicants did not seek to

identify any provisions of either the Directive or Irish statute law or regulations

upon which they wish to advance their case that Irish law had failed properly to

42. It appears that the applicants wished to reserve their position to see what position

was adopted by the Board. Once the Board had clarified its position then the

applicants would respond. This was made clear in the letter of the 20th March,

2017, which I have quoted above. They stated that ‘… the extent to which any such

domestic law provision appropriately transposes the requirements of the Directives

must be reviewed …’ once the Board has made clear which if any provision of

domestic law it may rely upon. It expressly stated that the issues will become

clearer when these statements of opposition and replying affidavits are filed.

43. The implications of the letter are inescapable. The applicants wish to finalise their

case in relation to the alleged or possible failure properly to transpose the Directive

into national law when they have received opposition papers from the Board. This is

clearly impermissible and contrary to the rules of court. The applicants are required

to advance the case they wish to make in full in the statement of grounds. They

100. As noted above, Costello J. went on to hold that, since no relief was sought against the

State respondents in those proceedings in part D of the statement of grounds, the case

should be dismissed under O.19 r.28. However, it is clear from the passage from her

judgment quoted above that she took the view that it is impermissible and contrary to the

Rules of the Superior Courts for an applicant to make a generalised allegation of a failure

to transpose EU law without specifically identifying the relevant provisions of Irish law and

EU law in issue and explaining how the alleged failure to transpose arises. This follows

from the clear language of O. 84 r. 20 (3) which, in turn, follows from the approach taken

by the Supreme Court in A.P. v. DPP. In that case, Murray C.J. at p. 732 said that:-

“In the interests of the good administration of justice it is essential that a party

applying for relief by way of judicial review sets out clearly and precisely each and

every ground upon which such relief is sought. …” (Emphasis added).

101. In the same case Denham J. (as she then was) said at p. 734:-

“The process requires the applicant to set out precisely the grounds upon which the

“In too many judicial review cases, it will be found that little attention has been

paid to the absolute necessity for a precise defining of the grounds on which relief

is sought until the case is actually before the Court. In my view, this case furnishes

an extreme example of this unfortunate tendency. …”. (Emphasis added).

103. In my view, the case against the State respondents was never properly pleaded in Part E

of the statement of grounds. As Costello J. observed in Alen-Buckley at para. 43 (quoted

above), an applicant for judicial review is required to advance the case he or she wishes

to make in full in the statement of grounds. It is not sufficient to plead a case of alleged

failure to transpose an EU Directive without properly setting out full particulars of the

basis on which it is contended that a specific provision of Irish law fails to comply with a

specific obligation imposed by the Directive concerned. An allegation of a failure to

transpose an obligation of EU law is a serious and significant allegation and accordingly it

is particularly important, in such a case, that the requirements of O.84 r. 20 (3) should be

observed. It is unacceptable that an applicant should make an allegation of failure to

transpose purely on the basis that the applicant apprehends that the relevant competent

authority (in this case the Board) may be in a position to demonstrate, in an area of

activity ultimately governed by European law that it has acted fully in compliance with its

obligations under the relevant Irish law implementing the EU law measure in question.

That is precisely the form of procedure which was condemned by Costello J. in Alen-

104. It should, in any event, be noted that, even if there were a divergence between Irish law

and EU law (and no such divergence has been identified in this case) that would not avail

the competent authority whose decision is in issue in the proceedings. It is clear from the

decision of the CJEU in Case C-378/17 Minister for Justice and Equality v. Workplace

Relations Commission that a competent authority such as the Board is always required to

apply EU law where there is a conflict between a provision of EU law and national law. In

that case, an issue arose as to whether the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) in

Ireland was entitled to disapply Irish law where the WRC came to the conclusion that the

national provision in question was contrary to EU law. The CJEU (in a decision rendered

by the Grand Chamber) held that the WRC was required to disapply national law where it

was incompatible with EU law. At paras. 36-39 of its judgment the CJEU said:-

“36. any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or

judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of EU law by withholding from

the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything

necessary at the moment of its application to disregard national legislative

provisions which might prevent directly applicable EU rules from having full force

and effect are incompatible with the requirements which are the very essence of EU

38. As the Court has repeatedly held, that duty to disapply national legislation that is

contrary to EU law is owed not only by national courts, but also by all organs of the

State — including administrative authorities — called upon, within the exercise of

39. It follows that the principle of primacy of EU law requires not only the courts but all

the bodies of the Member States to give full effect to EU rules.”

105. It is therefore clear that, even if there was a concern that EU law and national law were

not on all fours, the Board could not, if its decision was contrary to EU law, successfully

defend the claim made against it by the applicant in these proceedings on the basis that it

106. For the reasons outlined in paras. 93 to 105 above, I have come to the conclusion that,

irrespective of the outcome of these proceedings as against the Board, the claim against

the State respondents must be dismissed as the statement of grounds failed to properly

107. On the other hand, it is clear that the applicant must be entitled to appropriate relief as

against the Board in respect of the decision of 15th November, 2018. In light of the

findings which I have made above in relation to the screening exercise carried out by the

Board, the decision of the Board is invalid and must be quashed on that ground. In

addition, the applicant has succeeded in his case insofar as Regulation 72 (1) of the 2001

Regulations is concerned. However, the applicant has failed to make out any case that

the proposed solar farm requires to be assessed under the EIA Directive.

108. I will hear the parties in due course as to (a) the precise form of order to be made, (b)

the costs of the proceedings, and (c) whether the matter should now be remitted to the

Board for further consideration in light of the conclusions reached by me in this judgment.

109. In light of my finding in relation to the invalidity of the screening exercise, it does not

seem to me to be worthwhile to consider whether I should withhold relief in relation to

Regulation 72 (1) on any discretionary ground. I will nonetheless hear any submissions

that may be appropriate in relation to the form of relief to be granted in respect of the

Regulation 72 (1) issue.

Result: The Court held that the decision of the Board of the 15th of November, 2018 was invalid and that it should be quashed

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	High Court of Ireland Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Sweetman v An Bord Pleanala & Ors [2020] IEHC 39 (31 January 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2020/2020IEHC39.html Cite as: [2020] IEHC 39

High Court of Ireland Decisions