Minister for Justice & Equality v Maguire, Minister for Justice & Equality v Farrell [2020] IEHC 77 (14 February 2020)

BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Binchy delivered on the 14th day of February, 2020

1. By these applications, the applicant seeks the surrender of each of the respondents

pursuant to European Arrest Warrants dated 10th March, 2017 (“the EAWs”) for the

purpose of the prosecution of each of the respondents arising out of the same events that

occurred in Northern Ireland on 18th June, 2015, in which it is alleged that each of the

2. The hearing of the applications commenced on 5th December, 2019, and concluded on

6th December, 2019. However, further submissions were received by the Court on 17th

December, 2019 in light of further information provided, to which I refer below. The

identity of the respondents is not in dispute and I am satisfied that the persons before the

3. The issuing judicial authority (“IJA”) in each case is stated, at para. I of the EAWs, to be

the District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) sitting at Laganside Court, Belfast Magistrates’

Court. The EAWs were both endorsed by this Court on 20th March, 2017.

4. In each case it is stated that two warrants of arrest have been issued (for each

respondent) in respect of one offence of attempted murder and one offence of possession

of explosives with intent. For the offence of attempted murder, the IJA has in each case

ticked the box for “murder, grievous bodily injury” at para. E (1) of the EAWs. There was

no dispute about this, and accordingly it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate

correspondence in relation to these offences. In relation to the offence of unlawful and

malicious possession and control of an explosive substance, the applicant submits that on

the facts of this case (which I address below) the offence corresponds to an offence under

s. 3(1)(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1883 (as amended by s. 4 of the Criminal Law

(Jurisdiction) Act, 1976 and s. 36 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999) which provides:-

“3(1) A person who in the State or (being an Irish citizen) outside the State unlawfully

(b) Makes or has in his possession or under his control an explosive substance

with intent by means thereof to endanger life, or cause serious injury to

property, whether in the State or elsewhere, or to enable any other person so

Shall, whether any explosion does or does not take place, and whether any injury

to person or property is actually caused or not, be guilty of an offence and, on

conviction on indictment [shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment] for a term not

exceeding 20 years and the explosive substances shall be forfeited.”

5. It was not argued on behalf of the respondents that the actions allegedly undertaken by

the respondents as set forth in the EAWs do not correspond to this offence. I am satisfied

that the actions, if committed in this jurisdiction (or indeed outside the State if committed

by an Irish citizen) would indeed constitute an offence under Irish law and accordingly

6. The EAWs state that the offence of attempted murder is subject to a sentence of

imprisonment for life, and possession of explosives with intent is also subject to a

sentence of imprisonment for life. Accordingly, minimum gravity is established in relation

7. At the hearing of these applications, I was satisfied that none of the matters referred to in

ss. 21A, 22, 23 and 24 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as amended) (the “Act

of 2003”) arise, and that the surrender of the respondents is not prohibited for any of the

8. At paragraph E of the EAWs it is stated that on 18th June, 2015, at approximately 02.45

hours, a serving police officer in Northern Ireland awoke and looked out her bedroom

window to see a male on the ground at the driver’s door of her husband’s vehicle. Her

husband is also a serving police officer. She knocked at the window causing the male to

flee and then called the police. At the scene police found a device underneath the police

officer’s car, which was found to be an improvised explosive device.

9. Police officers travelling to the scene observed two vehicles driving in convoy at high

speed from the direction of the town of Eglinton. These vehicles travelled across the

border, but in the meantime the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”) had passed

on descriptions of the vehicles to An Garda Síochána, and a Garda vehicle identified one

of these vehicles passing through the village of Killygordon (15km from Lifford) and gave

chase to the vehicle. The vehicle was a Volkswagen Passat and matched the description

of one of the vehicles given by the PSNI to An Garda Síochana. The Gardaí successfully

apprehended the Passat which had three male occupants. All three were arrested on

suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. The driver of the Passat is alleged to

be one of the respondents, Mr. Maguire. The other occupants were the other respondent,

10. The EAW relating to Mr. Farrell states that he was taken to Milford Garda Station where

he was interviewed by Gardaí after caution and subsequently released without charge.

Mr. Farrell was found to have in his possession a Toyota car key. The other car observed

travelling in convoy with the Volkswagen Passat was a Toyota. The registration number

of both the Passat and the Toyota had been noted and both vehicles were identified as

having been stolen. The Toyota key taken from Mr. Farrell was tested on the Toyota

(which was later recovered) and it successfully worked in the door locks and ignition. Car

mats from the vehicles were both found to have explosive residue. Forensic examination

of the DNA profile recovered from the Passat matched Mr. Farrell’s DNA.

11. Mr. Maguire was taken to Letterkenny Garda Station where he was also interviewed by

Gardaí (after caution) and released without charge. His DNA profile was recovered from a

different pair of gloves found in the vehicle. A low quantity of explosive material was

detected in one of the gloves, and also on jeans and a Wrangler hooded coat seized from

12. Importantly, during the course of this hearing it was acknowledged by the applicant that

while in custody, each of the respondents received the standard form of caution that they

would receive in this jurisdiction to the effect that they were not obliged to say anything

but that anything that they might say would be taken down in writing and might be given

in evidence. It is common case that this is the extent of the caution given to the

respondents while detained by the Gardaí for questioning, and that the caution did not

extend to warning them that, if they remained silent in custody, inferences might be

drawn from that silence in the event that they were surrendered to Northern Ireland for

trial in that jurisdiction. It is also common case that both respondents elected to exercise

their right to remain silent and that neither made a statement of any kind to the Gardaí.

13. It is relevant at this juncture also to record that prior to the hearing of this application,

the respondents had each issued judicial review proceedings against the applicant

whereby they sought orders of mandamus requiring the applicant to respond to requests

for information in relation to and arising out of their detention by the Gardaí, and further

sought an order of mandamus requiring the applicant herein to provide information

requested by the applicant, purportedly pursuant to the provisions of Directive

2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22nd May, 2012, on the

right to information in criminal proceedings (“the Directive”). The reliefs sought were

refused both in the High Court by Donnelly J. in a decision delivered on 11th February,

2019, and, subsequently, in the Court of Appeal in a decision delivered by that court

(Kennedy J.) on 1st November, 2019. This latter decision in particular has some

relevance to these proceedings in the context of the reliance placed by both respondents

14. In its decision in the judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeal also indicated that

judicial review was not the appropriate mechanism for seeking orders for delivery of the

documentation and other materials that they sought, and that the appropriate application

was for an order of discovery of the same. Accordingly, the respondents each then

moved applications for discovery before this Court, which applications were dismissed in a

decision delivered by this Court on 26th November, 2019. The respondents then appealed

that decision, and that appeal was dismissed in a judgement of the Court of Appeal

15. A decision was taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions not to try the respondents in

this jurisdiction for the offences for which their surrender is sought in Northern Ireland.

Materials gathered by the Gardaí in the course of their investigation have been handed

over to the authorities in Northern Ireland. Although, as will be seen, the respondents

contend that there was a violation of their constitutional rights while in custody, no

allegation was made that these materials were obtained unlawfully by the Gardaí.

16. Points of objection were first filed on behalf of Mr. Maguire on 3rd May, 2017. Seven

objections were raised, but just one of these was pursued at the hearing of the

application i.e. that the surrender of the respondent is prohibited by s. 37 of the Act of

2003, because it would be in breach of his constitutional rights and in particular those

rights guaranteed by Article 38 and 40 of Bunreacht na hÉireann. Specifically, it is

(i.) Evidence taken in violation of his constitutional rights would be tendered against

(ii.) That if surrendered to Northern Ireland he would not enjoy the constitutional

protection of his life, liberty and health as guaranteed by Bunreacht na hÉireann.

17. A further point of objection was filed on behalf of Mr. Maguire on 6th March, 2019. By

this objection, it is pleaded that, if tried for the offences described in the EAW, he will be

required to give evidence in his own defence, failing which an adverse inference may be

drawn by the court based upon his failure to give such evidence in circumstances where

the court is satisfied that the prosecution case against him is sufficiently strong to require

an answer from the defendant. This objection arises out of Articles 3 and 4 of The

Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 (“the 1988 Order”), and it is claimed

that this is contrary to Mr. Maguire’s constitutional right to trial in due course of law

pursuant to the provisions of Article 38 of Bunreacht na hÉireann.

18. In their written submissions, counsel for Mr. Maguire also submitted that he was not

adequately warned, while in Garda custody, of a real and serious risk of an

unconstitutional intrusion of his right to silence in the trial process in Northern Ireland.

19. At the commencement of the hearing of this application, counsel for Mr. Maguire put

forward a further objection on his behalf for the first time. While counsel for the applicant

submitted that it was too late for the respondents to advance new objections, he

conceded that the applicant would not be prejudiced if the objection were allowed, and

accordingly I allowed the objection to be made on behalf of Mr. Maguire. As far as the

formal pleadings are concerned, counsel for Mr. Maguire submitted that this new

objection fell within a general objection made by Mr. Maguire in his points of objection of

3rd May, 2017, where it is pleaded that the EAW does not contain all of the information or

details required by the Act of 2003. Specifically, however, it was now asserted on behalf

of Mr. Maguire that the EAW does not contain the information required by the Directive.

This Directive lays down rules concerning the right to information of suspects or

accused persons, relating to their rights in criminal proceedings and to the

accusation against them. It also lays down rules concerning the right to information

of persons subject to a European Arrest Warrant relating to their rights.”

20. Article 3 of the Directive then deals with the entitlement to information about rights of

suspects or accused persons, and although it is not stated, these by implication are rights

upon arrest, such as the right of access to a lawyer and the right to remain silent. Article

4 of the Directive provides that Member States shall ensure that suspects or accused

persons who are arrested are provided with a written letter of rights, as well as, inter alia,

21. Article 5 is headed “Letter of Rights in European Arrest Warrant Proceedings” and is the

only article that deals specifically with such proceedings in the Directive. It was not

contended by the respondents or argued on their behalf in these proceedings that they

22. Article 6 of the Directive deals with the right to information about the accusation, and

Article 7 sets out the rights of access to the materials of the case. Article 7.1 provides:-

“Where a person is arrested and detained at any stage of the criminal proceedings,

Member States shall ensure that documents related to the specific case in the

possession of the competent authorities which are essential to challenging

effectively, in accordance with national law, the lawfulness of the arrest or

detention, are made available to arrested persons or their lawyers.”

This right is expanded upon and set out in greater detail in sub articles 7.2 – 7.5.

23. Counsel for Mr. Maguire, in advancing this argument, accepts that the Court of Appeal, in

the judicial review proceedings, has already addressed the entitlement of persons

arrested pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant, to information pursuant to the provisions

of the Directive in this regard it is helpful to set forth the conclusions of Kennedy J. on the

“74. Article 1 of the Directive addresses the subject matter of the Directive. The terms

of the article draw a clear distinction between the rights of suspects or accused

persons relating to criminal proceedings and to the accusation against them and the

right to information of persons subject to a European Arrest Warrant. Article 7

which concerns the access to documents does not have application to a person

arrested on foot of a EAW. The provision under the Directive which concerns EAW

proceedings is limited to that of Article 5 which provides for a letter of rights.

Annex II sets out a model letter of rights as provided for in Article 5 whereas the

model for rights to be provided for in terms of Article 4 which concerns suspects or

accused who are arrested or detained is set out in Annex I. It is therefore clear

that the provisions of Article 7 do not apply to a person arrested on a EAW.

75. The appellants are not facing criminal proceedings in this jurisdiction and therefore

cannot rely on the provision of Article 6 or Article 7. Article 5 applies to those who

are arrested for the purpose of the execution of a European Arrest Warrant. Those

persons must be provided promptly with an appropriate letter of rights in terms of

76. In my view there is no basis to distinguish the decision in EP on the basis that the

appellants are seeking information from the authorities in this jurisdiction rather

than from the issuing state. Donnelly J. interpreted the Directive and the rights of

the Directive provides for persons arrested on criminal charges and arrested on a

EAW. The interpretation is not therefore based on whether the information sought

77. In the circumstances I am satisfied that the trial judge was correct in finding that

there was no evidence that the appellants’ rights under the Directive would not be

available to them in the requesting State should they be surrendered.”

24. Counsel for Mr. Maguire, while acknowledging the decision of the Court of Appeal in the

judicial review proceedings as regards the interpretation of the Directive argues that that

decision was in a particular context, and that the context is not the same when this Court

is giving consideration to the application to surrender a person on foot of a European

Arrest Warrant. He submits that there is more at stake than what was sought in the

judicial review proceedings and that in an application such as this, the issue is about the

obligations of the issuing state to ensure that when somebody is arrested elsewhere in

Europe pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant, that person is informed of the basis for

the arrest and provided with relevant information about the arrest, and in particular is

provided with information as regards his/her right to appeal or to challenge in the issuing

state the underlying domestic arrest warrant on which the issue of the European Arrest

Warrant depends. He argued also that the principle of equivalence in European law

requires that persons arrested on foot of a European Arrest Warrant should receive

equivalent treatment to those arrested pursuant to national arrest warrants, and it would

be anomalous and contrary to that principle if those arrested pursuant to a European

Arrest Warrant did not enjoy the full range of rights and entitlements provided by the

25. In advancing these arguments, counsel for Mr. Maguire relied upon a recent reference

made by a court in Bulgaria to the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), in

which the Bulgarian court posed questions as to the applicability of the Directive and in

particular Articles 4, 6 and 7 of the Directive, to a person who has been arrested on the

basis of a European Arrest Warrant. This reference appears to have been procured

through an internet search and the precise status of the reference is unknown. However,

that is not to doubt that such a reference has been made. Counsel for Mr. Maguire

submits that notwithstanding the decision of the Court of Appeal as regards the limited

relevance of the Directive to European Arrest Warrant proceedings, this Court should

defer a decision on this application pending a decision of the CJEU on the reference by the

Bulgarian court, or alternatively that this Court should make a similar reference to the

26. In this regard, counsel for Mr. Maguire further argues that the Court should have regard

to recent decisions of the CJEU concerning the entitlement of public prosecutors to issue

European Arrest Warrants. Initially, counsel referred to cases such as OG (C 508/18), PI

(C 82/19 PPU) and PF (C 509/18). These cases address issues arising out of the issue of

European Arrest Warrants in some Member States by prosecutors, rather than by judges,

and focus on the requirement under the Framework Decision that the issuance of a

European Arrest Warrant must be subject to a dual level of protection, the first being at

the stage of issue of a national arrest warrant , and the second being at the point of issue

of a European Arrest Warrant. They consider how this dual level of protection may be

achieved where it is a prosecutor issues the European Arrest Warrant.

27. Because it was indicated to the Court that there were still further decisions of the CJEU

awaited, in which these matters are also addressed, and which were due to be delivered

on 12th December, 2019 and which might be of relevance to the within proceedings, the

proceedings were adjourned further to 17th December, 2019. The decisions which were

awaited were indeed delivered on 12th December, 2019, although no official translations

were available in English. In any case, counsel for Mr. Maguire produced supplemental

submissions arising out of those decisions on the basis of unofficial translations. In the

case of XD (C-625/19 PPU), in a passage relied upon by the respondents, the CJEU

stated, as regards effective judicial protection in European Arrest Warrant applications

“The Framework Decision 2002/584 forms part of a comprehensive system of

guarantees relating to the effective judicial protection provided for by other Union

rules, adopted in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which

contribute to facilitating the exercise of the rights of the persons sought on the

basis of a EAW even before he or she is handed over to the Member State of

(The use of the words “of programme” are not understood and may be a translation

28. An identical paragraph appeared in another decision delivered on the same date in the

case of YC (C-626/19 PPU) at p. 7 thereof. In these cases, the CJEU held that it is

permissible for the second level of protection in the issue of a European Arrest Warrant to

be provided by means other than judicial oversight in the issue of the warrant, such as by

providing a mechanism to appeal or otherwise challenge the issue of the European Arrest

Warrant, either before or after the surrender of the requested person (see para. 70 of the

decision in YC), or alternatively by affording the requested person the opportunity to

challenge the national arrest warrant, which formed the basis for the issue of the

European Arrest Warrant, as in XD. In both judgments the CJEU, in the course of its

judgment made reference to the provisions of another Directive, Directive 2013/48/EU on

the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings (the “2013 Directive”). At para. 73

“73. Article 10 of Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of

the 22nd October, 2013, on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings

and in proceedings relating to the warrant of European judgment, on the right to

inform a third party upon deprivation of liberty and on the right of persons deprived

of their liberty to communicate with third parties and with consular authorities…,

requires the competent authority of the executing Member State to inform, without

undue delay after deprivation of liberty of the persons whose surrender is

requested, that they have the right to assign a lawyer in the issuing Member

29. Neither Ireland nor the United Kingdom have adopted the 2013 Directive. Counsel

argued that the fact that Ireland has not done so serves to emphasise the importance of

the applicability of the Directive in European Arrest Warrant proceedings. It is submitted

that the EAWs are invalid and defective, since they did not contain information on the

availability, under the laws of the issuing state, of challenging the lawfulness of the

issuing of the EAWs, and nor was such information otherwise provided to the

30. Points of objection were first delivered on behalf of Mr. Farrell on 5th May, 2017. Four

objections were raised by this notice, but just one of these objections was pursued at the

hearing of this application. By this objection, Mr. Farrell puts the applicant on full proof

that the EAW relating to Mr. Farrell is compliant with the Act of 2003, and that the

surrender of Mr. Farrell would be in accordance with the Act of 2003 and the Council

Framework Decision of 13th June, 2002, on the European arrest warrant and the

surrender procedure between Member States (2002/584/JHA) (the “Framework

31. A further point of objection was delivered on behalf of Mr. Farrell on 27th February, 2019.

This is in identical terms to the further point of objection delivered on behalf of Mr.

32. Mr. Farrell also adopted the objection advanced, for the first time, on behalf of Mr.

Maguire at the commencement of the hearing of this application, as summarised at para.

33. Each of Mr. Farrell and Mr. Maguire adopted the objections made by the other. All of the

objections pursued by them at the hearing of the application are summarised above; in

response to a specific question from me, counsel for the respondents confirmed that they

were not pursuing any of the other objections made by them in their points of objection.

34. Since they are so central to these proceedings I set out below the provisions of Articles 3

“Circumstances in which inferences may be drawn from accused's failure to mention

3.— (1) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is given

(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being questioned

under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by whom the

offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied on in his

(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be

prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact, being a fact which in the

circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been

expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case

(a) the court, in determining whether to commit the accused for trial or whether

(b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application made by the accused

(i) Article 5 of the Criminal Justice (Serious Fraud) (Northern Ireland)

Order 1988 (application for dismissal of charge where a case of fraud

has been transferred from a magistrates' court to the Crown Court

(ii) paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Children's Evidence (Northern

Ireland) Order 1995 (application for dismissal of charge of violent or

sexual offence involving child in respect of which notice of transfer has

(2A) Where the accused was at an authorised place of detention at the time of the

failure, paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply if he had not been allowed an

opportunity to consult a solicitor prior to being questioned, charged or informed as

(3) Subject to any directions by the court, evidence tending to establish the failure

may be given before or after evidence tending to establish the fact which the

(4) This Article applies in relation to questioning by persons (other than constables)

charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders as it applies in

relation to questioning by constables; and in paragraph (1) “officially informed”

(a) prejudice the admissibility in evidence of the silence or other reaction of the

accused in the face of anything said in his presence relating to the conduct in

respect of which he is charged, in so far as evidence thereof would be

(b) preclude the drawing of any inference from any such silence or other reaction

(6) This Article does not apply in relation to a failure to mention a fact if the failure

4.—(1) At the trial of any person (other than a child) for an offence paragraphs (2)and

(b) it appears to the court that the physical or mental condition of the accused

but paragraph (2) does not apply at the conclusion of the evidence for the

prosecution, his legal representative informs the court that the accused will give

evidence or, where he is unrepresented, the court ascertains from him that he will

(2) Where this paragraph applies, the court shall, at the conclusion of the evidence for

the prosecution, satisfy itself (in the case of proceedings on indictment conducted

with a jury, in the presence of the jury) that the accused is aware that the stage

has been reached at which evidence can be given for the defence and that he can,

if he wishes, give evidence and that, if he chooses not to give evidence, or having

been sworn, without good cause refuses to answer any question, it will be

permissible for the court or jury to draw such inferences as appear proper from his

failure to give evidence or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any question.

(4) Where this paragraph applies, the court or jury, in determining whether the

(a) draw such inferences as appear proper from the failure of the accused to give

evidence or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any question;

(5) This Article does not render the accused compellable to give evidence on his own

behalf, and he shall accordingly not be guilty of contempt of court by reason of a

(6) For the purposes of this Article a person who, having been sworn, refuses to answer

any question shall be taken to do so without good cause unless—

(a) he is entitled to refuse to answer the question by virtue of any statutory

(b) the court in the exercise of its general discretion excuses him from answering

(7) Where the age of any person is material for the purposes of paragraph (1), his age

shall for those purposes be taken to be that which appears to the court to be his

(a) in relation to proceedings on indictment for an offence, only if the person

charged with the offence is arraigned on or after the commencement of this

(b) in relation to proceedings in a magistrates' court, only if the time when the

court begins to receive evidence in the proceedings falls after that

35. On my direction the central authority here made a request for further information of the

“1. Is it open to a trial court in the Issuing State (Northern Ireland) to draw inferences

pursuant to article 3 and/or article 4 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland)

order 1998 in connection with interviews outside the territory of the Issuing State

(Northern Ireland), specifically those conducted in Milford and Letterkenny Garda

36. A reply to this request for information was received from District Judge Fiona Bagnall,

presiding District Judge at Laganside Courts, by letter dated 10th January, 2020. In this

reply, District Judge Bagnall divided the question asked into two questions, as follows:-

1) Is it open to a trial court in the Issuing State (Northern Ireland) to draw inferences

pursuant to Article 3 and/or Article 4 of The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland)

Order 1988 in connection with interviews outside of the territory of the Issuing

State (Northern Ireland). Specifically, those conducted in Milford and Letterkenny

2) Is it open to a trial court in Northern Ireland to draw inferences pursuant to Article

4 of The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 in connection with

interviews outside the territory of the issuing state, specifically those conducted in

“In an interview conducted in Northern Ireland, the suspect is cautioned in

accordance with Article 3 of the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1988 as follows:

‘You do not have to say anything but I must caution you if you do not

mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court it may

harm your defence. If you do say anything it may be given in evidence.’

` In the circumstances of this case, where the Garda interviews have been conducted

without the caution under Article 3 being administered, the prosecution would not

ask the court to draw inferences pursuant to Article 3 of the 1988 Order and it is

not considered an adverse inference could be drawn by the trial court of its own

38. In answer to the second question posed, District Judge Bagnall replied as follows:-

“It is open to a court to draw an adverse inference under Article 4 of the 1988

Order if either accused does not give evidence on his own behalf at trial. However

this is an entirely separate matter to their decision not to answer questions during

Garda interview. Their position adopted at interview is not relevant to the inference

that can be drawn under Article 4. It should be noted that the ECHR in Murray v.

U.K. has found that the provisions of the 1988 Order did not constitute a violation

39. Affidavits of laws were sworn on behalf of Mr. Farrell by Sean Devine BL, a member of the

Bar of Northern Ireland who has practiced in that jurisdiction continuously since 2007. He

is also a member of the Bar of Ireland. He deposes as to the possible impacts of Articles

3 and 4 of the 1988 Order on the trial of Mr. Farrell. The first affidavit was sworn on 4th

December, 2019, in advance of these proceedings, and his second affidavit was filed on

29th January, 2020, in order to address the response received by this Court from the IJA

to the request for additional information made by this Court pursuant to s. 20 of the Act

40. In his first affidavit, Mr. Devine states, at para. 20, inter alia:-

“In my opinion, having regard to the various statutory provisions relating to the

drawing of inferences from failure to answer questions, it is unlikely that the

prosecution would succeed in persuading a trial judge to draw adverse inferences

from the failure of Mr. Farrell to answer questions during Garda interview.

Regarding the jurisdiction of the trial judge to draw an adverse inference from the

silence of the accused at trial, it is highly likely, in my opinion, that any trial judge

in Northern Ireland would accede to an application by the Crown to draw such

inferences, based on the evidence adduced at trial other than his failure to answer

questions asked by Gardaí. However, I cannot say, as a matter of law, that the

trial judge would not be entitled to take into account the opportunity Mr. Farrell had

to offer explanations to Gardaí, which said opportunity was declined by him.

Indeed, the Crown will be likely to invite the Court to look at ‘all of the

circumstances’ when deciding whether to draw such inferences (and the extent of

those inferences) and that could include his decision not to respond to Gardaí

41. In relation to the adverse inferences which may be drawn under Article 4 of the 1988

“The judge must tell the jury that the burden of proof remains upon the prosecution

throughout and that the defendant is entitled to remain silent. An inference from

failure to give evidence cannot on its own prove guilt. Therefore, the jury must be

satisfied that the prosecution have established a case to answer before drawing any

inferences from silence. Importantly, and perhaps surprisingly, the judge should

not go further and say that the case is not strong and they should therefore be less

ready to draw an inference against him. The rationale being that this would involve

the judge making an assessment at the strength of the prosecution case which

42. In his second affidavit, Mr. Devine addresses the additional information provided by

District Judge Bagnall. In relation to Article 3 of the 1988 Order, he avers that while he

does not take issue with the response given by District Judge Bagnall, nonetheless he

believes “that the Crown will have a wide discretion as to how it puts its case and it is

highly likely that they will place before the Court a detailed exposition of Mr. Farrell’s

known movements and activities in the time immediately after the events that form the

subject of the charges in this case.” At paras. 14 and 15 of his second affidavit he

“14. I say that the explanations from the parties about the fact that the interviews took

place in Milford Garda station and that, for example, no reliance is placed upon

those interviews as the ‘incorrect’ warning was given (i.e. a warning which would

not trigger the use of Article 3) could or would probably lead to judicial questions

15. I say that the precise impact of this is difficult to quantify but I believe that any

impact could only be detrimental to an accused, even in the absence of a statutory

adverse inference under Article 3. I say further that this is especially so within the

context of trial proceedings in Northern Ireland, where practitioners and Courts are

conditioned to the fact that silence during interview can have very significant and

harmful effects upon an accused’s defence at trial, due to the existence of the 1988

Order for such a long time. I say that any trial Court in Northern Ireland would

expect the defence to be keen to adduce an exculpatory account, if given during

interview, and so the absence of such an account would inevitably lead to a

presumption that the accused remained silent. In my opinion, this could only accrue

“I say that the UK response dated 10th January 2020, composed with the kind

assistance of the PPSNI, is couched in suitably and appropriately qualified terms.

That is, it states that “it is considered that” the trial court could not, of its own

motion, take silence in the Garda Station into account in deciding the nature of the

adverse inference from silence in the trial. I would tend to agree with this

proposition, subject to the discussion above in terms of the fact that the existence

of these interviews will inevitably be a significant degree of focus upon Mr. Farrell’s

arrest and detention for a period of time which was consistent with him being

interviewed by police. Under normal circumstances, these interviews would, at the

44. While each of the respondents filed their own points of objection, at hearing each adopted

the objections of the other to the application. The points of objection formally served by

each of the respondents each contain objections that were not pursued at the hearing of

the application, and which counsel for the respondents confirmed were not being relied

upon by the respondents. This decision, therefore, is concerned only with those

objections argued on behalf of the respondents at the hearing of the application, which I

45. I will first address the arguments made as regards the entitlement to information

pursuant to the Directive. The respondents accept that the Court of Appeal has already

ruled, in the judicial review proceedings, on the interpretation and application of the

Directive to these proceedings. However, they seek to distinguish that decision and the

application that was then before that court from the arguments that they are making in

these proceedings that their clients have an entitlement to information under the

Directive. It is suggested that there is some distinction to be drawn between what is

described as a “disclosure matter” in the judicial review proceedings and the information

required to be given at the time of arrest on foot of the European Arrest Warrant.

46. It is correct to say that the respondents, in seeking the reliefs they sought in the judicial

review proceedings relied on more than just the Directive, such as statutory regulations,

fair procedures and due process (see paras. 7-11 of the decision of Donnelly J. in this

Court). Also, some of the materials they sought by way of those proceedings were,

arguably, outside the scope of the Directive, even if the Directive was found to be

applicable, but there is no need to consider that possibility in any detail. I mention it only

because for these reasons there may be some subtle distinction to be drawn between the

context in which the Directive was invoked in the judicial review proceedings and the

context in which it is invoked in these proceedings. But if there is, it is so subtle as to be

47. In para. 6 (ii) of her decision, Donnelly J. records that the respondents were seeking an

order of mandamus requiring the first respondent (in those proceedings) to provide the

information requested by the applicant pursuant to the provisions of EU Directive

13/2012. Both Donnelly J. and, on appeal the Court of Appeal ruled very clearly that the

provisions of the Directive which the respondents are seeking to invoke in these

proceedings are provisions which only have application when a person is arrested, in the

ordinary course of proceedings, to face charges in the same Member State in which that

arrest takes place, as distinct from upon arrest pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant.

The respondents are not charged with any criminal offence in this jurisdiction. In so far as

there was a criminal investigation here, it ended with the decision of the DPP not to

proffer charges against them. The Court of Appeal has clearly ruled that, in European

Arrest Warrant proceedings, the entitlement of arrested persons is restricted to Article 5

of the Directive. Furthermore, Donnelly J. had previously handed down a decision to

precisely the same effect in Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform v. E.P.

48. So far as the reference by the Bulgarian court to the CJEU is concerned, very little is

known about the status of that reference. There is nothing to indicate that it has been

accorded the expedited procedure. No authority was opened to this Court as to the

approach to be taken when a court is informed that questions that might be of relevance

to the deliberations of a court in one Member State, have been sent for consideration to

the CJEU by the courts of another Member State. However, in the particular

1) The uncertainty as to whether or not the reference of the Bulgarian Court has been

2) The objectives of the Framework Decision to provide a simplified and expeditious

system of surrender, between Member States, of persons wanted for prosecution of

3) The fact that this issue has already been the subject of two detailed judgments of

It is my view that it would be both incorrect and undesirable for this Court to defer

decision on this application pending a decision from the CJEU on the reference made by

the Bulgarian court, or for this Court to make any reference of its own to the CJEU.

49. While counsel for Mr. Maguire argued that, since neither Ireland nor the United Kingdom

have adopted the 2013 Directive, this lends even greater force to the argument that the

respondents should be entitled to receive the information provided for under the

Directive, I cannot accept this argument. The fact is that the 2013 Directive has not been

adopted by either the issuing state or the executing state in this application. It is, quite

simply, irrelevant to these proceedings. Moreover, the fact that it has not been adopted

either by this State or by the United Kingdom, cannot be used for the purpose of

overturning or in some fundamental way changing the interpretation of the Directive by

the Court of Appeal. The fact that this State has elected not to adopt one directive,

cannot be a basis to alter the meaning or interpretation of another.

50. Insofar as reliance has been placed upon recent decisions of the CJEU, these cases were

all concerned with problems arising from the issue of European Arrest Warrants by

prosecutors. In the cases referred to above, the CJEU held that the possibility of

challenging the issue of a national arrest warrant or a European Arrest Warrant in the

issuing state can offer a solution to this problem. It appeared to take some comfort from

Article 10 (4) of the 2013 Directive, which deals with the right of access of a requested

person to a lawyer in the issuing state, presumably because that might help to fulfil the

rights of a requested person to challenge the validity of the national arrest warrant or the

European Arrest Warrant. I might add that it is notable that Article 10(6) of the 2013

Directive provides that the right of a requested person to appoint a lawyer in the issuing

state is stated to be without prejudice to the time limits set out in the Framework

Decision. In any case, it is clear that those recent decisions of the CJEU only have

practical application in those Member States in which the European Arrest Warrant is

issued by a prosecutor and not by a court. That does not arise in these proceedings. The

respondents have been accorded their dual level of protection through judicial oversight in

51. Finally, insofar as arguments were advanced on the basis of the principle of equivalence,

they were not developed in any meaningful way and no authorities were opened to the

Court as to its application in these circumstances. The principle of equivalence, in general

terms, is concerned with the obligation of Member States to ensure that the law of the

European Union is applied and enforced by Member States in a manner equivalent to the

domestic law of those states. It does not seem to me to be engaged at all in these

proceedings. There is no question of not applying either the Directive or the Framework

Decision in any manner that is less effective than domestic law. The fact that a person

arrested on foot of a European Arrest Warrant is not entitled to receive the same

information that he or she is entitled to receive if arrested on foot of a national arrest

warrant in respect of the same matters is in no way incongruous. The European Arrest

Warrant is the mechanism by which persons are surrendered in order to face charges (or,

as the case may be, to serve sentences) that are the subject of a national arrest warrant.

It is entirely logical that it is only upon the surrender of the person concerned to face

those charges that he or she will then be entitled to receive the information required by

the Directive. If these rights were to be engaged at the time that a person is arrested

pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant, it would, as I said above, frustrate the time limits

52. For all of these reasons, I consider that the points of objection that have been raised on

the basis of the Directive or the reference made by the Bulgarian court to the CJEU, the

2013 Directive and the recent decisions of the CJEU must be rejected.

53. I turn now to address the objections to surrender advanced on behalf of the respondents

as regards the entitlement of a trial court in Northern Ireland to draw inferences pursuant

to the 1988 Order. The first of these objections arises out of the possible application of

Article 3 of the 1988 Order, particulars of which are set out above. It is first necessary to

consider the opinion of Mr. Devine, counsel retained for Mr. Farrell, but relied upon also

by Mr. Maguire in relation to this objection. This opinion is expressed over the course of

two affidavits, the second being in response to the additional information received from

the IJA. As regards Article 3 of the 1988 Order, the most relevant parts of Mr. Devine’s

opinion are set out in the passages quoted from the affidavits of Mr. Devine at para.s 40,

42 and 43 above. Para.s 42 and 43 set forth passages from Mr. Devine’s second affidavit.

Para. 40 quotes from a passage of Mr. Devine’s first affidavit which was sent to the IJA

with the request for additional information. In its response of 10th January, 2020, to that

“In the circumstances of this case, where the Garda interviews have been

conducted without the caution under Article 3 being administered, the prosecution

would not ask the court to draw inferences pursuant to Article 3 of the 1988 Order

and it is not considered an adverse inference could be drawn by the trial court of its

54. The IJA then addressed whether or not adverse inferences might be drawn under Article 4

of the 1988 Order by reason of the failure on the part of the respondents to answer

“It is open to a court to draw an adverse inference under Article 4 of the 1988

Order if either accused does not give evidence on his own behalf at trial. However,

this is an entirely separate matter to their decision not to answer questions during

Garda interview. Their position adopted at interview is not relevant to the inference

55. Mr. Devine addresses the additional information provided by the IJA in his second

affidavit. He addresses the matter at paras. 12 and following as follows:-

“12. I say that the trial judge would be likely to be made aware that the accused was

arrested and detained for two days. Furthermore, I say and believe that, even if

the Crown did not seek to adduce the fact that Mr. Farrell was interviewed, the

court could ask whether he was interviewed. In those circumstances, it would not

be open to the parties to mislead the court and so the likely and natural outworking

of this would be some judicial questioning in terms of the product of those

13. I say and believe that a court in this jurisdiction would be naturally interested in the

accused’s responses to police questioning and would be accustomed to an interview

being a key part of the investigation. This would be the case even in the context of

14. I say that the explanations from the parties about the fact that the interviews took

place in Milford Garda Station and that, for example, no reliance is placed upon

those interviews as the ‘incorrect’ warning was given (i.e. a warning which would

not trigger the use of Article 3) could or would probably lead to judicial questions

15. I say that the precise impact of this is difficult to quantify but I believe that any

impact could only be detrimental to an accused even in the absence of a statutory

adverse inference under Article 3. I say further that this is especially so within the

context of trial proceedings in Northern Ireland, where practitioners and courts are

conditioned to the fact that silence during an interview can have very significant

and harmful effects upon an accused’s defence at trial, due to the existence of the

1988 Order for such a long time. I say that any trial court in Northern Ireland

would expect the defence to be keen to adduce an exculpatory account, if given

during interview, and so the absence of such an account would inevitably lead to a

presumption that the accused remained silent. In my view this could only accrue to

16. I say and believe that there is a prohibition on references to such interviews under

the law and Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, other than by way of formula

such as, ‘the accused was interviewed but nothing of probative value emerged’.

17. I say that UK response dated 10th January, 2020, composed with the kind

assistance of the PPSNI, is couched in suitably and appropriately qualified terms

that is, it states that ‘it is considered that’ the trial court could not of its own

motion, take silence in the Garda station into account in deciding the nature of the

adverse inference from silence in the trial. I would tend to agree with this

proposition, subject to the discussion above in terms of the fact that the existence

of these interviews will inevitably be a significant degree of focus upon Mr. Farrell’s

arrest and detention for a period of time which was consistent with him being

interviewed by police. Under normal circumstances these interviews would, at the

56. The provisions of the 1988 Order are both detailed and clear. Article 3(1)(A) refers to an

accused being questioned, under caution by a constable. It is clear that neither of the

respondents was so questioned. They were questioned in this jurisdiction, by the Gardaí,

following a caution that is significantly different in its terms to that required for the

57. The argument that is being advanced on behalf of the respondents is to the effect that,

while it is not open to the trial court to draw inferences under Article 3 of the 1988 Order,

it might nonetheless draw adverse inferences from the silence of the respondents during

questioning by Gardaí when looking at “all of the circumstances”. Mr. Devine’s opinion

does not appear to me to be based so much on an interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of the

1988 Order, as on his experience as a practicing barrister in criminal trials in Northern

Ireland. This has led him to conclude that notwithstanding the clear and express

provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the 1988 Order, and the further information provided by

the IJA in its letter of 10th January, 2020, a court might well draw adverse inferences

from the silence of the respondents at Garda questioning, simply because the courts are

used to drawing such inferences where accused persons are questioned, following the

appropriate caution, in accordance with the provisions of the 1988 Order.

58. This opinion places very little faith in the courts of the issuing state to distinguish between

two very different sets of circumstances. It follows that if this Court were to accept Mr.

Devine’s opinion on the issue, it would be failing to accord to the authorities in Northern

Ireland, and in particular to the judiciary in that jurisdiction, the trust and confidence

which this Court is obliged to accord to those institutions pursuant to the express terms of

the Framework Decision, and s. 4A of the Act of 2003, which provides “It shall be

presumed that an issuing state will comply with the requirements of the Framework

Decision, unless the contrary is shown.” In my opinion, it is unthinkable that adverse

inferences can be drawn from the silence of the respondents in Garda custody at a trial in

Northern Ireland and I am obliged to have trust and confidence in the judiciary of

Northern Ireland that no such inferences will be drawn, as indicated in the letter received

59. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that this application should be refused

because they were not warned, while being questioned in this jurisdiction, that they would

not have an absolute right to silence at trial in Northern Ireland, and that adverse

inferences might be drawn (at trial in Northern Ireland) from their failure to answer

questions while in Garda custody. It is submitted that, in failing to so warn the

respondents, there has been a violation of the constitutional rights of the respondents

such that their surrender to Northern Ireland is prohibited . Reliance is placed upon the

decision of the Supreme Court in Larkin v. O’Dea [1995] 2 IR 485.

60. The respondents further rely on the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the matter

of The People (DPP) v. Coddington [2001] 5 JIC 3101, in which the court held that the

direction given by the trial judge was inconsistent with the duty of a trial judge to instruct

the jury that the onus to establish its case, including inferences, beyond reasonable

doubt, remains at all times with the prosecution. The court held:-

“While the trial judge may remind the jury of the fact that the accused had, as is

his right, not given evidence in the trial they must be expressly instructed not to

draw any inference from the exercise of that right. In this case, the learned trial

judge not only recalled that the accused had not given evidence but did so in the

context of the failure of the defence to provide evidence of an innocent explanation

for the presence of the money and without any direction that no inference was to

61. It is submitted that there has been an egregious violation of the respondents’

constitutional rights in failing to inform them in this jurisdiction of the difference between

their rights to silence at trial in this jurisdiction and that which prevails in the requesting

state. It is also submitted that the fact that the respondents will be denied their

constitutional right to silence at trial in Northern Ireland is apparent from the judgment of

the Crown Courts sitting in Belfast in the matter of R v. McVeigh [2019] NICC 8. Those

proceedings involved the trial of Mr. Seán McVeigh, who was tried and found guilty of the

62. It is submitted by the respondents that the right to be presumed innocent includes the

right to silence at trial and is not confined to the boundaries of the State. Article 4 of the

1988 Order will result, therefore, in an egregious breach of the constitutional rights of the

respondents, such as that referred to by Murray C.J. in Minister for Justice and Equality v

Brennan [2007] 3 IR 732 and O’Donnell J. in Minister for Justice v. Balmer [2016] IESC 25,

referred to below. Moreover, there are substantial grounds for believing that there is

a real risk that the constitutional rights of the respondents will be violated at trial in

Northern Ireland, such as to meet the test for refusal of an application for surrender, as

identified in Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform v. Rettinger [2010] IESC 45, and

again more recently, in Minister for Justice and Equality v. Celmar [2019] IESCDET 45.

63. I will first address the argument based on the warning given in custody. It is not in

dispute that the respondents received the appropriate caution from Gardaí prior to

commencement of interviews in Milford and Letterkenny, and that they exercised their

right to silence at interview. There is no obligation on Gardaí to provide separate cautions

of the kind to which they are entitled in the issuing state (upon their surrender), whether

the United Kingdom or any other state, or as may be appropriate in that state. In fact the

Gardaí were not even to know that the respondents would eventually be sought for trial in

Northern Ireland, although they may well have surmised as much. Moreover, this is an

entirely novel proposition, and if accepted would be quite unworkable. As counsel for the

applicant submitted, it would place the Gardaí in a situation where two parallel interviews

might be required, depending on the response of those being questioned to the different

cautions. The reliance placed by the respondents in Larkin v O’Dea is misplaced. In that

case the surrender of the respondents was refused because the court found that evidence

taken from the applicant in that case which was to be used at trial in Northern Ireland

was found to have been obtained, in this jurisdiction, in violation of his constitutional

rights. It follows therefore that he could not be sent to face a trial in which that evidence

would be used against him. While it is also the case that materials obtained by the Gardaí

following upon the arrest of the respondents has been sent to Northern Ireland and is

likely to be used against them at their trial, no argument has been advanced that this

evidence was improperly obtained. For these reasons, this argument must be rejected.

64. I turn next to address the argument that, at the conclusion of their trials, inferences

adverse to the interests of the respondents may be drawn by the court if, having been

warned by the court in the terms required by Article 4 of the 1988 Order, the respondents

either do not give evidence or, that if they do so, they fail to answer any question without

good reason. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that such inferences amount to

an egregious breach of their constitutional rights in this jurisdiction, such that their

65. The right to silence under Irish law and its status as a constitutionally protected right is

well established and recognised in decisions relied upon by the respondents such as

Heaney v. Ireland [1994] 3 IR 593 and The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v.

Finnerty [1999] 4 IR 364, in which case, Keane J. (as he then was) stated:-

“It follows that the right of suspects in custody to remain silent, recognised by the

common law, is also a constitutional right and the provisions of the Act of 1984,

must be construed accordingly. Absent any express statutory provisions entitling a

court or jury to draw inferences from such silence, the conclusion follows inevitably

that the right is left unaffected by the Act of 1984, save in cases coming within ss.

66. It is clear from this decision, and in Heaney, that the right to silence, while enjoying

constitutional protection, is not unqualified and may be abridged by statute. Indeed,

counsel for the respondents acknowledge that the right is not unqualified, but submit that

if it is to be abridged in any way, the person in detention should be warned of any power

that exists allowing adverse inferences to be drawn from a failure to answer questions or

give evidence at trial. In this case, it is submitted that the abridgment of the right to

silence (at trial) under the 1988 Order, coupled with the fact that the respondents were

not informed whilst in custody in this jurisdiction that they would not have a right to

silence at trial, amounts to an egregious breach of the constitutional rights of the

67. Throughout the European Union, Member States operate different procedures at trial. The

fact that procedures will vary from one Member State to another is no bar to surrender. If

it were otherwise, the entire system of surrender provided for in the Framework Decision,

as implemented in the Act of 2003 in this jurisdiction, would collapse. This was recognised

in Minister for Justice v. Brennan [2007] 3 IR 732. In those proceedings, which were

concerned with an argument that provisions in United Kingdom law imposing a mandatory

minimum sentence, which did not take into account the particular circumstances of the

respondent in those proceedings, violated his rights under the Constitution. At paras. 35-

“[35] There is no doubt that the operation of the process for surrender as envisaged by

the Act of 2003, as amended, is subject to scrutiny as to whether in any particular

case it conforms with constitutional norms and in particular due process so that, for

example, the respondent in such an application has an opportunity to be duly heard

[36] However the argument of the respondent goes much further. He has contended

that the sentencing provisions of the issuing State, in this case the United Kingdom,

did not conform to the principles of Irish law, as constitutionally guaranteed,

governing the sentencing of persons to imprisonment on conviction before our

[37] The effect of such an argument is that an order for surrender under the Act of

2003, and indeed any order for extradition, ought to be refused if the manner in

which a trial in the requesting state including the manner in which a penal sanction

is imposed, does not conform to the exigencies of our Constitution as if such a trial

or sentence were to take place in this country. That can hardly have been the

intention of the Oireachtas when it adopted s. 37(1) of the Act of 2003 since it

would inevitably have the effect of ensuring that most requests for surrender or

extradition would have to be refused. And indeed if that were the intent of the

Framework Decision, which the Act of 2003 implements, and other countries

applied such a test from their own perspective, few, if any, would extradite to this

[38] Indeed it may be said that generally extradition has always been subject to a

proviso that an order for extradition, as with any order, should not be made if it

would constitute a contravention of a provision of the Constitution. I am not aware

of any authority for the principle that the extradition or surrender of a person to a

foreign country would contravene the Constitution simply because their legal

system and system of trial differed from ours as envisaged by the Constitution.

[39] The manner, procedure and mechanisms according to which fundamental rights are

protected in different countries will vary according to national laws and

constitutional traditions. The checks and balances in national systems may vary

even though they may have the same objective, such as ensuring a fair trial. There

may be few, if any, legal systems which would wholly comply with the precise

exigencies of our Constitution with regard to these matters. Not all for example will

provide a right to trial by jury in exactly the same circumstances as our

Constitution does in respect of a trial for a non-minor offence. Rules of evidence

may differ. The fact that a person would be tried before a judge and jury in this

country for a particular offence could not, in my view, be a basis for refusing to

make an order for surrender solely on the grounds that in the requesting State he

or she would not be tried before a jury. The exceptions which we have to the jury

requirement, as in trials before the Special Criminal Court, acknowledges that a fair

trial can take place without a jury even though it is constitutionally guaranteed for

[40] That is not by any means to say that a Court, in considering an application for

surrender, has no jurisdiction to consider the circumstances where it is established

that surrender would lead to a denial of fundamental or human rights. There may

well be egregious circumstances, such as a clearly established and fundamental

defect in the system of justice of a requesting State where a refusal of an

application for surrender may be necessary to protect such rights…”

68. Similarly, in Minister for Justice v. Balmer [2016] IESC 25, O’Donnell J., having referred

to a number of cases, including Minister for Justice v. Brennan, said, at para. 31:-

“[31] These cases are all examples of circumstances where objections under s. 37 have

failed. In each case, even assuming that the impugned foreign provision would

have been found to be incompatible with the Irish Constitution if enacted in Irish

law, the court in each case nevertheless found that the surrender of such a person

was not prevented by s. 37, or, indeed by the Constitution of its own force. The

undesirability and inappropriateness of scrutinising foreign laws by reference to

Irish constitutional standards is itself consistent with the approach taken in The

People (DPP) v. Robert Campbell [1983] 2 Ferwen 131 where, notwithstanding the

fact that the trial occurred in the jurisdiction of the courts, the court did not apply

Irish constitutional standards to the detention of suspects in Northern Ireland. Even

though these cases are individual instances, they form a broadly consistent line of

authority. They illustrate an approach which is, moreover, compatible with the

observations of Murray C.J. in Minister for Justice v. Brennan [2007] IESC 21,

[2007] 3 IR 732 and, indeed, both the observations made and the decision in

Nottinghamshire County Council v. KB [2011] IESC 48, [2013] 4 IR 662.”

69. The applicant relies upon the decisions above and also the decision of the Supreme Court

in the case of Minister for Justice v. Buckley [2015] 3 IR 619. In that case, the surrender

of the respondent was sought to face conspiracy charges in the United Kingdom. The

respondent contended that certain provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act,

1984 in the United Kingdom, which permitted the introduction into evidence of materials

that would prove that other persons had been convicted of certain offences, gave rise to a

risk of a violation of his rights guaranteed under Article 38 of the Constitution. In a

passage relied upon by the applicant in these proceedings, O’Donnell J. held as follows, at

“[28] I would, therefore, summarise matters this way. First, the case advanced by the

respondent is hypothetical, in that its actual or likely impact on the respondent is

unclear, and certainly not capable of being characterised as a defect in the system

of justice of the requesting state. Second, even if, hypothetically, ss. 74 and 75 of

the Act of 1984 are not in accordance with the values found in Article 38, it is

immaterial, if the respondent cannot show that what would be at issue would be, or

is likely to be, an “egregious” departure amounting to a denial of fundamental or

human rights (per Murray C.J. in Brennan [2007] IESC 21, [2007] 3 IR 732 at para.

40, p. 744). There would have to be significantly more: a real and substantive

defect in the system of justice, where fundamental rights were likely to be placed at

risk, or actually denied. As Murray C.J. pointed out in Brennan, rules of evidence

“may differ” between states, and that alone does not at all lead to the necessary

conclusion that there is a breach of fundamental rights in the requesting state.

Finally, and again as held in Minister for Justice v. Brennan [2007] IESC 21 and

Nottinghamshire County Council v. KB [2011] IESC 48, [2013] 4 IR 662, the reach

of Article 38, save in exceptional circumstances, goes no further than the

boundaries of the State. There is nothing in Article 38 to suggest anything beyond

that. What is in question, then, is the lawfulness of the surrender of the respondent

in this jurisdiction. I would, therefore, answer the first question in the negative.”

70. It follows that it is necessary to consider whether or not Articles 3 and 4 of the 1988

Order are likely to give rise to an egregious departure amounting to a denial of the

respondents’ fundamental or human rights. In considering this, it is useful at this

juncture to refer to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”) in

the case of John Murray v. the United Kingdom (30 EHRR CD 57), a decision of that court

of 8th February, 1996. In those proceedings, the ECtHR was required to consider, inter

alia, whether or not Articles 3 and 4 of the 1988 Order violated Article 6 of the European

Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”). At paras. 45 and 46 of its decision, the

“45. Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention, there

can be no doubt that the right to remain silent under police questioning and the

privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards

which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6 (art. 6) (see

the Funke judgment cited above, loc. cit.). By providing the accused with

protection against improper compulsion by the authorities these immunities

contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aims of Article 6

46. The Court does not consider that it is called upon to give an abstract analysis of the

scope of these immunities and, in particular, of what constitutes in this context

‘improper compulsion’. What is at stake in the present case is whether these

immunities are absolute in the sense that the exercise by an accused of the right to

silence cannot under any circumstances be used against him at trial or,

alternatively, whether informing him in advance that, under certain conditions, his

silence may be so used, is always to be regarded as ‘improper compulsion’.

47. On the one hand, it is self-evident that it is incompatible with the immunities under

consideration to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused’s silence or on a

refusal to answer questions or to give evidence himself. On the other hand, the

Court deems it equally obvious that these immunities cannot and should not

prevent that the accused’s silence, in situations which clearly call for an explanation

from him, be taken into account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence

Wherever the line between these two extremes is to be drawn, it follows from this

understanding of ‘the right to silence’ that the question whether the right is

71. The court then went on to consider the specific proceedings and noted that while the

proceedings were without a jury, the trier of fact was an experienced judge. It further

noted that the drawing of inferences under the 1988 Order is subject to an important

series of safeguards designed to respect the rights of the defence and to limit the extent

to which reliance can be placed on inferences. It noted at para. 51:-

“In the first place, before inferences can be drawn under Articles 4 and 6 of the

Order appropriate warnings must have been given to the accused as to the legal

effects of maintaining silence. Moreover, as indicated by the judgment of the

House of Lords in R. v. Kevin Sean Murray the prosecutor must first establish a

prima facie case against the accused, i.e. a case consisting of direct evidence

which, if believed and combined with legitimate inferences based upon it, could lead

a properly directed jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that each of the

essential elements of the offence is proved (see paragraph 30 above).

The question in each particular case is whether the evidence adduced by the

prosecution is sufficiently strong to require an answer. The national court cannot

conclude that the accused is guilty merely because he chooses to remain silent. It

is only if the evidence against the accused ‘calls’ for an explanation which the

accused ought to be in a position to give that a failure to give any explanation ‘may

as a matter of common sense allow the drawing of an inference that there is no

explanation and that the accused is guilty’. Conversely if the case presented by the

prosecution had so little evidential value that it called for no answer, a failure to

provide one could not justify an inference of guilt (ibid.). In sum, it is only

common-sense inferences which the judge considers proper, in the light of the

In addition, the trial judge has a discretion whether, on the facts of the particular

case, an inference should be drawn. As indicated by the Court of Appeal in the

present case, if a judge accepted that an accused did not understand the warning

given or if he had doubts about it, ‘we are confident that he would not activate

Article 6 against him’… Furthermore, in Northern Ireland, where trial judges sit

without a jury, the judge must explain the reasons for the decision to draw

inferences and the weight attached to them. The exercise of discretion in this

72. The court then went to analyse the application of the 1988 Order to the specific

circumstances of the case, and having done so it did “not consider that the criminal

proceedings were unfair or that there had been an infringement of the presumption of

innocence”. Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

73. However, the ECtHR also concluded that there had been a violation of the applicant’s

rights under Article 6 of the Convention by reason of the fact that the applicant did not

have access to his solicitor from the outset of his interview by the police, which right was

of particular importance given Article 3 of the 1988 Order, and the implications for the

applicant if he chose to remain silent during questioning .On the basis of this finding, the

respondents argue that, although the respondents in these proceedings at all times had

access to a solicitor, that was in this jurisdiction, and they therefore did not receive the

appropriate advices as regards the 1988 Order. However, as I have already determined

above, there was no obligation on the Gardaí to provide the respondents with any caution

other than the caution that they are obliged to provide in this jurisdiction. Furthermore,

as I have also determined above, on the basis of the evidence before me, and in

particular the response to further information received from the IJA, and also having

regard to my obligation to have trust and confidence that the fundamental rights of the

respondents will be respected upon their surrender, this argument does not advance the

74. Somewhat unusually, in this case, it is possible to see how the court in Northern Ireland

dealt with a person charged with the same offences (arising out of the same alleged acts)

with which it is intended to charge the respondents, and how the court applied Articles 3

and 4 of the 1988 Order in those proceedings. In his written decision in R v. McVeigh

[2019] NICC 8, the judge, HH Fowler QC, reminded himself of the principles to be applied

in deciding whether or not the prosecution proved its case, particularly having regard to

the fact that he was acting as a judge alone, without a jury. He reminded himself that the

burden of proof lies on the crown; that the prosecution must prove the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt; that the court must decide the case only on the evidence

established before it. He noted that the prosecution case depended on circumstantial

evidence, and the principles applicable in considering circumstantial evidence. He

reminded himself that he must consider all of the evidence and guard against distorting

the facts or the significance of the facts to fit a certain proposition and that he must be

satisfied that no explanation other than guilt is reasonably compatible with the

75. He then went on to conduct a detailed analysis of all of the facts and the forensic

evidence. At paras. 109 and 110 of his judgment, under the heading “Defendant’s failure

“[109] At the conclusion of the Crown case the court addressed counsel for the

Defendant in the usual terms stating that if the Defendant chose not to give

evidence the court may draw such inferences as appear proper from their failure to

do so. I enquired if the Defendant intended to give evidence and if not had he been

advised about the inferences which might be drawn if he chose not to do so. Mr

Pownall QC stated that his client did not intend to give evidence and stated that his

client had been advised about the inferences which might be drawn from his failure

[110] The Defendant is entitled not to give evidence, to remain silent and to make the

prosecution prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Two matters arise for him not

giving evidence. The first is that the case is tried according to the evidence. The

Defendant has given no evidence at his trial to undermine, contradict or explain the

evidence given by the prosecution witnesses. Secondly, the law is that the court

may draw such inferences as appear proper from the failure on the part of the

Defendant to give evidence. The court must decide whether it is proper to hold the

Defendant's failure to give evidence against him in deciding whether he is guilty.

The court may only draw an adverse inference against the Defendant for failing to

go into the witness box to give an explanation for, or an answer to, the case

against him if the court considers that it is a fair and proper conclusion for the court

to reach. The court must first be satisfied that the prosecution case is sufficiently

strong to clearly call for an answer by the Defendant. Secondly it must be satisfied

that the only sensible explanation for his silence is that he has no answer or none

that would bear examination. I remind myself that the courts should not find the

Defendant guilty only or mainly because he did not give evidence. But the court

may take into account as some additional support for the prosecution case the fact

that the Defendant has not given evidence when deciding whether the Defendant's

The judge then proceeded to give his conclusions by reference to the evidence and drew

inferences against the defendant on the basis of the evidence, and the fact that the

defendant had chosen to say nothing in relation to the case against him which the judge

76. In addition to relying upon the affidavit evidence of Mr. Devine, the respondents rely upon

the case of R v. McVeigh in support of their argument that, if the respondents exercise

their right to silence at trial in Northern Ireland, this is likely to result in adverse

inferences being drawn by the trial judge, such as occurred in the case of Mr. McVeigh.

While it is acknowledged that in this jurisdiction there is legislation that permits the

drawing of adverse inferences in the context of the failure of an accused person to answer

certain questions under questioning from Gardaí at the investigation stage, there is no

legislation that permits the drawing of inferences from the failure of an accused to give

evidence at his own trial. That, it is submitted, goes beyond the bounds of what is

permissible under the Constitution, and taken together with the fact that the respondents

received no warning, when being questioned by the Gardaí, that such inferences are likely

to be drawn if the respondents are placed on trial in Northern Ireland, would constitute an

77. In considering whether or not Articles 3 and 4 of the 1988 Order will give rise to an

egregious violation of the constitutional rights of the respondents, it is useful to refer to

the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Rock v. Ireland [1997] 3 IR 484 in

its consideration of the constitutionality of the legislation impugned in those proceedings.

“It is the opinion of this Court that, in enacting ss. 18 and 19 of the Act of 1984,

the legislature was seeking to balance the individual's right to avoid self-

incrimination with the right and duty of the State to defend and protect the life,

person and property of all its citizens. In this situation, the function of the Court is

not to decide whether a perfect balance has been achieved, but merely to decide

whether, in restricting individual constitutional rights, the legislature have acted

within the range of what is permissible. In this instance, this Court finds they have

done so, and must accordingly uphold the constitutional validity of the impugned

statutory provisions. While it is true that ss. 18 and 19 could lead to an accused

being convicted of a serious offence in circumstances where he or she might

otherwise have been acquitted, there are two important, limiting factors at work.

Firstly, an inference cannot form the basis for a conviction in the absence of other

“...there is no doubt a strengthening of the State's case but in no sense is it

final and in neither event is the accused required to exculpate himself.”

Secondly, only such inferences “as appear proper” can be drawn: that is to say, an

inference adverse to the accused can only be drawn where the court deems it

proper to do so. If it does not, then neither judge nor jury will be permitted to draw

78. On the basis of these safeguards, the Supreme Court in Rock considered the impugned

provisions to be constitutional. Substantially the same safeguards are to be found in

Article 4 of the 1988 Order. Although it is not expressly stated in Article 4 that, before

Article 4 is triggered the prosecution must have established that the defendant has a case

to answer, on the respondents’ own case this is a requirement. These safeguards were

relied upon by the ECtHR in its conclusion that Article 4 of the 1988 Order did not violate

Article 6 of the Convention. If those safeguards were sufficient for the Supreme Court to

conclude that the impugned provisions in Rock did not give rise to a violation of the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights in that case, then it is difficult to see how Article 4 of the

1988 Order can be said to give rise to an egregious violation of the respondents’

79. Drawing all of the above together, the following is established:-

1) The right to silence in this jurisdiction is recognised under the Constitution and is

accorded protection accordingly. It is not, however, unqualified, and may be

2) While there are certain statutory provisions in this jurisdiction that qualify or

abridge the right to silence, there is no equivalent to Articles 3and 4 of the 1988

Order. To that extent, it is possible that the respondents, if they exercise their

right to silence at trial in Northern Ireland, may suffer a prejudice that they would

3) That however, does not necessarily constitute a violation of their constitutional

rights. The protection afforded by Article 38 of the Constitution does not extend

beyond the boundaries of the State, unless the matters complained of would give

rise to an egregious violation of the constitutional right asserted.

4) Articles 3 and 4 of the 1988 Order do not violate Article 6 of the European

Convention on Human Rights. While the rights protected by the Convention and

the Constitution are not identical, in this fundamental respect they are unlikely to

5) There is no evidence that the manner in which Articles 3 and 4 are invoked in

Northern Ireland is such that would give rise to any cause for concern that the

constitutional rights of the respondents are likely to be violated egregiously, or in

contravention of the principles enunciated in Rock. On the contrary, the application

of Article 4 of the 1988 Order in R v. McVeigh demonstrates the application of the

6) There is a statutory presumption that an issuing state will comply with the

requirements of the Framework Decision which, at Article 1.3, requires Member

States to respect the fundamental rights and principles enshrined in Article 6 of the

Treaty on European Union. Moreover, there is a duty on this Court, pursuant to the

terms of the Framework Decision to have trust and confidence in the issuing

Member State that the respondents’ fundamental rights will be respected.

7) It follows from all of this that the arguments of the respondents that their surrender

to Northern Ireland will give rise to an egregious violation of their constitutional

rights must be rejected. Since all other objections to their surrender have also been

rejected, the Court must order the surrender of the respondents pursuant to s. 16

of the Act of 2003. For the avoidance of any doubt, I should add that I have been

fully satisfied that there has been full compliance with the Act of 2003 as regards

the form and content of the EAWs.

Result: Order made for the surrender of the respondents pursuant to s. 16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003.

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	High Court of Ireland Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Minister for Justice & Equality v Maguire, Minister for Justice & Equality v Farrell [2020] IEHC 77 (14 February 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2020/2020IEHC77.html Cite as: [2020] IEHC 77

High Court of Ireland Decisions