JUDGMENT of MR. JUSTICE FENNELLY delivered the 20th day of December 2007
1. This appellant, who is charged with a number of serious drugs offences, wants to have the Circuit Court determine in advance of his proposed trial whether a search warrant which was used to obtain the evidence against him was valid and to order that the charges be dismissed. Whether this can be done depends on the interpretation of provisions of section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999, which inserted a new section 4E into the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 (“the Act of 1967”). That Act ended the preliminary examination procedure in the District Court. The trial Court, rather than the District Court, may now be asked to decide whether there is a sufficient case to answer. The appellant failed in his application before the first-named respondent.
2. The Appellant brought the matter before the High Court in an application for Judicial Review. His application was dismissed by Quirke J in a judgment delivered on 8th December 2004.
Procedural history
3. Seven charges have been laid against the Appellant. They all relate to alleged possession of controlled drugs at premises in Clondalkin, Dublin 12 on 20th June 2002. One charge alleges possession for sale or supply of drugs to a value of €13,000 or more contrary to section 15A (as inserted by section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999) and section 27 (as amended by section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999) of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977. I will refer to this as the section 15A charge.
4. The Appellant was charged on 18th April 2003 before the District Court. He was duly served with a book of evidence and returned for trial to the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, where his case has been adjourned from time to time.
5. Counsel for the Appellant applied on 30th March 2004 to have the case against him dismissed pursuant to section 4E of the Act of 1967. According to his affidavit in the present proceedings, the Appellant contended:
“The Book of evidence fails to disclose any, or any admissible evidence to the effect that the drugs the subject-matter of the within prosecution, were lawfully seized by way of lawful authority by the investigating members of An Garda Siochana.
1) The Book of evidence herein fails to disclose any admissible evidence against the accused.
2) The search warrant requested by and issued to the prosecuting Garda failed to include on its face the premises sought to be searched by them and was therefore invalid.”
6. The application was heard before the first-named respondent. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the previous procedure had been radically altered by the Act of 1999 and that the judge at the court of trial now has jurisdiction to determine the validity of a search warrant in an application by an accused person to have charges against him dismissed. According to the affidavit, counsel also submitted that “the procedure expanded the previous legislation by introducing the possibility of adducing oral evidence,” and that the trial court was “entitled to embark on the hearing of an application to dismiss where a point of law or fact is raised by an accused which if successful, would dispense with the requirement of a jury to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused.” (emphasis added).
7. Having heard arguments which largely prefigure those advanced in the High Court and before this Court, the first-named respondent ruled on 11th May 2004 that the validity of search warrants was to be determined at the trial and could not be the subject-matter of an application to dismiss pursuant to section 4E of the Act of 1967.
8. The Appellant obtained leave from the High Court (McKechnie J) to apply for judicial review of the decision of the first-named respondent. The central ground for the application was that the first-named respondent was wrong in holding that section 4E precluded a determination as to the validity of a search warrant.
9. Quirke J dismissed the application for judicial review in a judgment delivered on 8th December 2004. He held that section 4E was “intended to enable an accuse person to make an application to have charges preferred against him dismissed where the evidence upon which the State intends to rely is so weak that there is no probable cause to believe that the accused might be guilty.”
He continued:
“It was clearly not intended that applicants pursuant to s. 4E would be entitled to challenge evidence disclosed in the Book of Evidence on grounds of credibility or weight. I am satisfied also that it was not intended that it should be challenged on grounds of admissibility. Such applicants (and the court hearing the applications) should take the State's case as disclosed in the Book of Evidence at its highest point.
The admissibility of particular evidence will invariably require to be determined by the trial judge during a criminal trial. In determining admissibility the trial judge may require to hear evidence by way of a voire dire or to exercise discretion judicially as to the admission of particular evidence. The validity of a warrant may depend upon the state of mind of the person applying for or issuing the warrant. Enquiry into such matters cannot be properly conducted in isolation from all of the other evidence to be adduced in a criminal trial. It is undesirable that specific findings of fact or law should be made in advance of a criminal trial.
In hearing an application pursuant to s. 4E of the 1967 Act (as amended) the trial court should consider the evidence upon which the State intends to rely on the assumption that it will be adduced lawfully and properly and as outlined in the Book of Evidence. The court must then decide whether, if so adduced, it discloses a 'prima facie' case against the accused.
If so, the accused should be sent forward for trial. If not then the accused person should be discharged.”
Statutory provisions
10. Part III of the Act of 1999 abolished the former system of preliminary examination in the District Court, as it had existed since the passing of the Act of 1967. Under the amended statutory regime, the District Court sends an accused person forward for trial to the appropriate court of jurisdiction. Section 4A of the Act of 1967, inserted by section 9 of the Act of 1999, provides that where “an accused person is before the District Court charged with an indictable offence, the Court shall send the accused forward for trial to the court before which he is to stand trial (the trial court)……”
Section 4E, inserted by the same section needs to be cited in its entirety:
4E.—(1) At any time after the accused is sent forward for trial, the accused may apply to the trial court to dismiss one or more of the charges against the accused.
(2) Notice of an application under subsection (1) shall be given to the prosecutor not less than 14 days before the date on which the application is due to be heard.
(3) The trial court may, in the interests of justice, determine that less than 14 days notice of an application under subsection (1) may be given to the prosecutor.
(4) If it appears to the trial court that there is not a sufficient case to put the accused on trial for any charge to which the application relates, the court shall dismiss the charge.
(5) (a) Oral evidence may be given on an application under subsection (1) only if it appears to the trial court that such evidence is required in the interests of justice.
(b) In paragraph (a) ‘oral evidence’ includes—
(i) any evidence given through a live television link pursuant to Part III of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 , or section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999, or
(ii) a videorecording of any evidence given through a live television link pursuant to that Part or section in proceedings under section 4F.
(6) Where the trial court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that any document required under this Part to be served on the accused or his solicitor be served at the hearing of an application under this section—
(a) the prosecutor shall serve the document on the accused or his solicitor, if any, at the hearing, and
(b) the court may, if it considers it appropriate to do so, adjourn the hearing for that purpose.
(7) Where a charge is dismissed by the trial court under subsection (4), the prosecutor may, within 21 days after the dismissal date, appeal against the dismissal to the Court of Criminal Appeal.
(8) On an appeal under subsection (7), the Court of Criminal Appeal may—
(a) affirm the decision of the trial court, or
(b) quash the decision of the trial court, in which case the trial of the accused may proceed as if the charge had never been dismissed.
11. It is appropriate, at this point, to recall that section 5 of the Act of 1967, repealed by the Act of 1999, had provided that, where an accused person was charged before the District Court with an indictable offence, the judge was to “conduct a preliminary examination of the charge in accordance with the provisions” of the relevant part of the Act. Section 8(1) of that Act provided: “If the justice is of opinion that there is a sufficient case to put the accused on trial for the offence with which he has been charged, he shall send him forward for trial.”
12. Subsections (2) and (4) provided, respectively, for cases where “some indictable offence other than that charged” and cases where only a summary offence is disclosed. Subsection (5) provided: “If none of the foregoing provisions applies, the justice shall order the accused to be discharged as to the offence under examination.”
Submissions for Appellant
13. Mr Michael O’Higgins, Senior Counsel, informed the Court that the Appellant wishes to challenge the legality of the search warrant which was the means used by the Garda Síochána to obtain the evidence against him. He said that, if he succeeds in that objective, he will be able to secure the exclusion of the only evidence against him disclosed in the book of evidence, and there would not then be a sufficient case to put the accused on trial. For that purpose, he would adduce evidence, on the hearing of the application under section 4E, that the premises whose address was on the warrant was not the premises which was in fact searched.
14. The Appellant submitted that, as the court of trial has now the function of conducting the preliminary examination, section 4E does not limit the scope of the investigation that the trial court can enter into in determining the question as to whether an accused person has a case to answer. As the procedure for preliminary examination now vests in the trial court, that court can decide on the validity of search warrants and dismiss any charge pursuant to Section 4E prior to the commencement of a trial before a judge and jury.
Moreover, whether a warrant is legally issued or not is a matter of law. It would be decided at trial, in the absence of the jury.
15. Section 4E permits the admission of oral testimony (subject to the leave of the trial judge). The appellant submits that the intention of the Oireachtas in inserting this section was to circumvent the many voir dire applications that occur during the course of trials. An applicant under section 4E need not rely solely on the alleged facts as disclosed in the book of evidence, but can call witnesses to substantiate the application that he or she is making.
16. The appellant also relied on the sentencing regime governing those convicted of section 15A offences. A person so convicted is subject to a minimum period of imprisonment of 10 years, unless the Court is satisfied that, inter alia, the accused pleaded guilty and indicated an intention to do so at an early stage. Thus the timing of the plea of guilty is critical. Where a person faces a mandatory minimum sentence because he fails to derive a benefit from an early plea, it naturally diminishes the resolve to contest a trial because he runs the risk that such decision would affect his sentence, if convicted.
17. The written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant lay particular emphasis on the risks, in the context of section 15A, of relying on purely technical defences. Section 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act, it is submitted, has huge implications for an accused person who intends to rely on a technical defence.
Submissions of Respondents
18. The Respondents submit that questions of admissibility of evidence are determined by the trial judge in the context of the evidence that he or she has heard and are determined at the time when they arise in the course of the evidence.
19. The appellant claims that all questions of law and fact that would be ruled on in the voir dire of a criminal trial that would result in the charges being dismissed should be capable of being determined in the course of a motion to dismiss. If the appellant is correct, motions to dismiss could presumably canvas all types of issues such as the legality of detention or the admissibility of confessions. This could fundamentally alter the manner in which criminal trials have traditionally been conducted in this jurisdiction. The drafters of the 1999 Act did not intend to effect such a fundamental change in the nature of the criminal process. Such change could only be effected by legislation duly passed by the Oireachtas.
20. The advance determination of such issues would not necessarily assist the administration of justice. If the application pursuant to section 4E were not, contrary to the appellant’s submissions, dismissed because the contested evidence was ruled admissible, that would not necessarily bind the trial court. The accused person would be entitled to run the entire issue of admissibility for a second time at trial, so that there would be no saving. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in Lynch v Moran [2006] 3 IR 389 to the effect that issue estoppel has no role in Irish criminal proceedings.
21. The fact that s 4E provides that oral evidence can be heard “if it appears to the trial court that such evidence is required in the interests of justice” cannot be used as a basis for suggesting that the section intended to alter the fundamental nature of a criminal trial.
22. Mr Paul Anthony McDermott submitted at the hearing of the appeal that the judge should consider the book of evidence, taking the prosecution case at its highest, and assuming the evidence is admissible. He submitted that section 4E constituted the transplantation of the old procedure from the District Court to the court of trial.
23. The Respondents relied on the decisions of Hamilton J, as he then was, in Byrne v Grey [1988] IR 31 and Berkeley v Edwards [1988] IR 217 and that of McCracken J in DPP v Windle [1999] 4 IR 280. Mr McDermott also suggested that the proposal for advance determination of issues of admissibility would be inconsistent with the principle of the unitary nature of a criminal trial as laid down in a number of authorities. The People (Attorney General) v McGlynn [1967] IR 232, Corporation of Dublin v Flynn [1980] IR 357 and DPP v Special Criminal Court & Paul Ward [1999] 1 IR 60 were cited.
Considerations and conclusions
24. Before turning to the interpretation of section 4E, it is essential to identify the precise parameters of what the appellant was asking the first-named respondent to decide. He describes the “grounds” of the application for dismissal of the charges as being that:
25. Both of these arguments could have been advanced without any oral evidence. I am assuming here that the search warrant formed part of the book of evidence. It should be included as an exhibit served pursuant to section 4B, also inserted in the Act of 1967 by section 9 of the Act of 1999. Mr O’Higgins explained that the evidence to be called would be to the effect that that the premises whose address was on the warrant was not the premises which was in fact searched. Thus, very limited evidence would have sufficed and I will return to that. I cannot conceive that the proof of such a simple fact would present any practical difficulty.
26. At any rate, the appellant does not disclose that any such limited application was made to the first-named Respondent. Rather, he appears to have made a very much broader case that the section does not limit in any way the scope of issues that may be determined on an application pursuant to section 4E and that the court may determine issues, not merely of law, but of fact. Again, the appellant does not appear to accept any limits to that power.
27. I propose to consider the matter both on the broad basis advanced in argument and the narrower basis originally proposed before the first-named respondent.
The statutory context of the Act of 1999 provides the most cogent explanation of the scope and purpose of section 4E.
28. Part II of the Act of 1967 laid down rules for the preliminary examination of indictable offences in the District Court. Section 5 imposed the general obligation on a judge of that court. Section 6 dealt with the service of documents constituting what we call the book of evidence. Section 7(1) required the judge to consider those documents and “any deposition or statement taken in accordance with this section and any submissions that may be made by or on behalf of the prosecutor or the accused.” Section 7(2) permitted both the prosecutor and the accused “to give evidence on sworn deposition and also to require the attendance before the justice of any person, whether included in the supplied list of witnesses or not, and to examine him by way of sworn deposition.” Section 8(1) provided:
“If the justice is of opinion that there is a sufficient case to put the accused on trial for the offence with which he has been charged, he shall send him forward for trial.” (emphasis added)
29. It is crucial, as I will explain, that the underlined words have been repeated in section 4E, though the sense is reversed: if “there is not a sufficient case to put the accused on trial…” the charge will be dismissed. (emphasis added). This makes no material difference to the meaning.
30. In DPP v Windle [1999] 4 IR 280 McCracken J considered the jurisdiction of a judge of the District Court to rule on the validity of a search warrant. The accused was charged with certain drugs offences. The prosecution intended to rely on evidence secured on foot of a search warrant. During the preliminary examination, the District Judge raised the question of validity of the warrant. The warrant did not state on its face that the person authorising it was a peace commissioner for the area which comprised the premises which were searched. The District Judge ruled the warrant invalid, the evidence inadmissible, and refused to return the accused for trial. The prosecution applied successfully for judicial review.
McCracken J held (see page 284):
“I am quite satisfied that it is not for a judge conducting a preliminary investigation to determine the validity or otherwise of a search warrant. This is a matter purely for the trial judge, to be determined by him on the evidence before him. If there had been no search warrant in the present case, then certainly the District Judge would have been justified in refusing to send the second respondent forward for trial, as there would have been no evidence to justify the search of his premises, but once a search warrant existed, in my view the question of its validity was one for the trial and not one for a preliminary investigation.”
McCracken J referred, at several points in his judgment, to the fact that further evidence could be called at trial. The decision in Windle is not necessarily conclusive for the purposes of the present application. It does not bind this Court and it is concerned with legislation which has since been repealed. It does, however, highlight the distinction between the decision that there is no sufficient case, a term carried over from the former regime, to put a person on trial and a decision at the trial itself on the hearing of all the evidence.
31. The broader case advanced on behalf of the appellant is, as submitted on behalf of the respondents, extremely far-reaching. The appellant submits that there is no limit to the type of preliminary issue that may be determined on a section 4E application and that the power of the court, on such application, extends to the resolution of disputed issues of fact.
32. I prefer the view of the respondents. This does not necessarily mean that the jurisdiction exercised pursuant to section 4E is identical with the former jurisdiction of the District Court to decline to send a person forward for trial. Some weight should be attached to the fact that the decision is being made by the actual trial court and to the faculty for the admission of evidence.
33. Nonetheless, it would require clear legislative wording to establish an entirely novel jurisdiction to determine, in advance of trial, disputed issues of law or fact. The appellant’s submissions would appear to open the door to determination, for example and probably most notably, of contested admissibility of incriminating statements or disputes about lawfulness of detention. It is notorious that trial courts may spend days or even weeks hearing evidence and cross-examination in the absence of the jury touching on alleged confessions made in garda custody. Hardiman J refers to these problems in the judgment he has just delivered. The parties have referred, in oral and written submissions, to various reports and recommendations for the introduction of procedures such as “plea and directions hearings.” Such procedures have generally been introduced by statute in other common-law countries. The power to make binding preliminary rulings on admissibility would clearly require statutory intervention. What is clear, however, is that no existing legislative authority exists for such procedures in this jurisdiction.
34. There is a further difficulty. If an issue of admissibility is determined not in favour of but against an accused person, it seems clear that such a determination would not be binding at the subsequent trial. This Court decided in Lynch v Moran [2006] 3 IR 389 that issue estoppel has no role in Irish criminal proceedings, either in favour of the prosecution or of the defence. In the absence of legislative provision, therefore, the proposed interpretation might lead to duplication of hearings on contested issues of admissibilituy and thus increase rather than reduce the burden on the courts. This seems to me to be sufficient to dispose of the Appellant’s argument based on convenience and economy.
35. The aim of section 4E was, so far as possible, to confer on the trial court a jurisdiction similar to that exercised by the District Court at the conclusion of the preliminary examination. The question for the court is the same as it was formerly for the District Court: is there a sufficient case to put the accused on trial? The application to dismiss can be made at any time after the return for trial. It is necessarily confined (subject to the evidence issue discussed later) to what is disclosed in what we loosely call the book of evidence. I agree with the view of Quirke J that the court should take the prosecution case at its strongest and assume that the evidence disclosed in the book of evidence is admissible. Put otherwise, is there a prima facie case?
36. Even without the possibility of admitting evidence at the hearing of the application, I would not necessarily approach the issue as strictly as McCracken J did in the Windle case. Some evidence, such as hearsay, may be self-evidently inadmissible. McCracken J himself accepted that, if there were no search warrant, in a case where one was required as a matter of law, the District Judge might hold evidence to be inadmissible and refuse a return for trial.
37. As originally presented, the appellant’s case appears to be of that narrower type. It was argued before first-named respondent that the “search warrant requested by and issued to the prosecuting Garda failed to include on its face the premises sought to be searched by them.” As I have mentioned, Mr O’Higgins phrased the matter somewhat differently: the premises actually searched was not that named in the warrant. In my view, the trial court could decide an issue of that sort on a section 4E application. It may be, however, that the Appellant’s submission depends on the establishment of some simple and uncontroversial fact. At this point, the jurisdiction to admit evidence becomes relevant.
38. The first point to note is that the primary rule is that evidence will not be admitted. That follows logically from the fact that the court is to decide whether a sufficient case is disclosed by the documents forming the book of evidence. However, section 4E provides that “oral evidence may be given on an application under subsection (1) only if it appears to the trial court that such evidence is required in the interests of justice.” I cannot accept that this provision is to be read as constituting a general power for the judge to admit evidence. The purpose of any such evidence must be to cast light on the issue which the court has to determine, namely whether, on the book of evidence, there is a sufficient case to put the accused on trial. Thus, evidence should be admitted to explain the identity of persons, places or things referred to in the documents. It is necessarily difficult to lay down comprehensive rules about this. The guiding principle is the interests of justice, but controlled by the context of the application and the circumstances of the particular case. Always, the issue is whether a sufficient case is disclosed.
39. The extended definition of “oral evidence” given in section 4E to include evidence given by live television link, pursuant to three specified statutory provisions, does not affect the interpretation I have adopted. I have already said that the section permits evidence to be given in the interests of justice in order to cast light on the question of whether there is “a sufficient case.” It is logical that that faculty should include evidence given by live television link where that is permitted. The first two specified provisions, section 39 of the Supreme Court of 1999 and Part III of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 (of which only section 13 is capable of applying) apply only to a person other than the accused. The third, section 4F, also inserted by section 9 of the Act of 1999, relates only to evidence given by deposition or live videolink in the District Court pursuant to an order made by the court of trial after the return for trial. In effect, therefore, that evidence becomes part of the body of evidence to be considered with the book of evidence in an application under section 4E, if available at that time.
40. I am satisfied that it was not intended that section 4E would provide an independent free-standing procedure for the determination of preliminary issues. It would make no sense to provide such a procedure merely for those cases where the accused contended that there was no sufficient case to put him on trial but not to cases where contested evidence formed part only of the material to be produced at trial. If the power existed, it would have to apply to all cases. Put otherwise, the court is not required to determine any such preliminary issue, where the documents disclose other evidence against the accused.
41. The foregoing view receives support from the fact that the prosecution may appeal the dismissal of a charge. No corresponding right is conferred on the defence. That is because, for the prosecution a decision to dismiss is final: it ends the prosecution. Not so, where the charge is not to dismiss the charges. The case proceeds to trial, all defence rights being preserved.
42. Thus, I would reject the broader argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant.
43. That conclusion does not, however, necessarily dispose of the instant case. The subject-matter of the application for judicial review is the decision of first-named respondent of 11th May 2004. According to the uncontradicted evidence of the Appellant the first-named respondent ruled that the validity of search warrants was to be determined at the trial and could not be the subject-matter of an application to dismiss pursuant to section 4E of the Act of 1967. In effect, he declined jurisdiction to consider the question of validity of the search warrant. His decision did not turn on whether he should admit evidence. I am satisfied that first-named respondent erred in reaching this conclusion. To be fair to the learned judge, he may have been faithfully following the decision of McCracken J in Windle. Nonetheless, he should have been prepared to consider arguments on the issue of validity as disclosed in the documents and, possibility, whether evidence should be admitted to explain the circumstances of the search or the identity of the premises though only in the sense that a ruling of invalidity would have the effect of ruling out all the evidence against the accused. I do not think it has been established that there is any overriding rule that the decision on whether there is a sufficient case to put a person on trial precludes the judge hearing such an application to dismiss from ruling that there is no case, where that involves concluding that the only evidence advanced against the accused is plainly inadmissible. An example would be where the only evidence was clearly hearsay. McCracken J acknowledged, in the passage cited, that, if there had been a search without warrant, where one was required, “certainly the District Judge would have been justified in refusing to send the second respondent forward for trial, as there would have been no evidence to justify the search of his premises…” Such a conclusion would necessarily imply a determination that the evidence was inadmissible. This jurisdiction will exist only in the clearest of cases. It does not mean that the first-named respondent, in this case, should have conducted any form of inquiry involving the resolution of disputed issues of fact. Furthermore, he must bear in mind that other evidence given at trial my cast further light on a particular matter. Interpreted in this way, section 4E would not entrench on the unitary nature of a criminal trial. For reasons I have given, it was not the intention of section 4E to confer jurisdiction to determine disputed issues of fact in advance of trial.
44. Finally, I wish to add that I do not accept that the interpretation of the section can be in any way influenced by the tactical considerations concerning the stage at which an accused person should plead guilty to a section 15A offence. The courts cannot take into account the risks an accused person runs by failing to enter a plea of guilty while he raises what the appellant’s submissions describe as a “technical defence.” Legislation imposing, in the public interest, a presumed minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment, subject to mitigation in the event of an early plea stands alone. It cannot affect the exercise of the power conferred on the trial court by section 4E or the interpretation of that section.
45. I would allow the appeal. I would make an order quashing the decision of the first-named Respondent of 11th May 2004. That will enable the trial court to resume consideration of the Appellant’s application for dismissal of the charges against him.
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Hardiman delivered the 20th day of December, 2007.
The applicant, Mr. Cruise, is a defendant in a pending criminal case in which he is charged with seven charges under the Misuse of Drugs Act. These include a charge under s.15A, as inserted by s.4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999, of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977. A particular submission, to be discussed below, arises out of that last mentioned charge. All of these charges relate to an alleged possession of drugs on the 20th June, 2002 at “Farrell O’Brien Premises, Killeen Road, Clondalkin, Dublin 12.”
This case was heard with another case, Phipps v. DPP because both cases raise questions relating to s.4E of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, as inserted by s.9 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999.
Factual background.
Having been charged with the relevant offences, the applicant was eventually sent forward to the Dublin Circuit Court for trial.
On the 11th May, 2004, while the case was pending, the applicant issued a motion in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court pursuant to the provisions of s.4E of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, seeking an order dismissing the charges against him on the following grounds:
This motion was given a return date in the Circuit Court before His Honour Judge O’Donnell. This date was the 30th March, 2004. The learned Circuit Court judge decided that, prior to the determination of the issue before the Court he wished to hear argument as to his jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s application to dismiss. Having heard such argument he ascertained that the substantive issue raised by the appellant in support of his application to dismiss concerned the validity and efficacy of a search warrant issued to An Garda Síochána. The appellant sought to have the charges against him dismissed on the ground that the search warrant was invalid and did not properly describe or relate to the premises where the seizure alleged by the gardaí, according to the statements of evidence, took place.
The learned Circuit Court judge ruled that the issue of the validity of the warrant could not be the subject of an application pursuant to s.4E. He held that he had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on this issue and that it was a matter to be decided on before the trial judge during the course of the trial proper. He cited with approval the decision of McCracken J. in DPP v. Windle [1999] 4 IR 280 as follows:
“I am satisfied that it is not for a judge conducting a preliminary examination to determine the validity or otherwise of a search warrant. This is a matter purely for the trial judge, to be determined by him on the evidence before him. If there had been no such warrant to the present case, then certainly the District Court would have been justified in refusing to send the second respondent forward for trial as there would have been no evidence to justify the search of the premises, but once a search warrant existed, in my view the question of its validity was one for the trial and not for the preliminary examination.”
Subsequent to this decision the applicant sought and obtained leave to seek judicial review of it in the High Court. He was however unsuccessful on the hearing of his application. The learned High Court judge (Quirke J.) cited the same passage from the judgment of McCracken J. (at p.6 of his judgment) and went on to hold: “It seems to me that these remarks apply with equal force to the procedure pursuant to s.4E of the 1967 Act which has now replaced the former preliminary examination before the District Court.”
From this judgment and order of the High Court the appellant now appeals to this Court.
Statutory background.
Between 1967 and 1999 the proceedings preliminary to a trial on indictment took place in the District Court. They took place there pursuant to Part II of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 which was entitled “Preliminary Examination of Indictable offences in the District Court”. By s.5 of the Act this preliminary examination was made mandatory. Section 6 required the service of certain documents on the accused (“The Book of Evidence”) and s.7 provided that:
“(1) The Justice shall consider the documents and exhibits, any deposition or statement taken in accordance with this Section and any submissions that may be made by or on behalf of the prosecutor or the accused.
(2) The prosecutor and the accused shall each be entitled to give evidence on sworn deposition and also to require the attendance before the Justice of any person, whether included in the supplied list of witnesses or not, and to examine him by way of sworn deposition.”
Section 8 of the Act provided that: (1) “If the Justice is of opinion that there is a sufficient case to put the accused on trial for the offence with which he has been charged, he shall send him forward for trial.”
(3) If the Justice is of the opinion that there is a sufficient case to put the accused on trial for some indictable offence other than that charge, he shall cause him to be charged with that offence, proceed in accordance with s.7(4)… and unless s.13 applies, send him forward for trial.
(4) If the Justice is of opinion that a summary offence only is disclosed, and the Attorney General consents, he shall cause the accused to be charged with a summary offence and deal with the case accordingly.
(5) If none of the foregoing provisions applies, the Justice shall order the accused to be discharged as to the offence under examination.”
That procedure, familiar to generations of lawyers, was abolished by the Criminal Justice Act, 1999. Part III of that Act is entitled “Amendments to abolish preliminary examinations”. Section 8 of the Act is entitled “Amendments of s.4 of the Act of 1967.”
Section 9 of the 1999 Act provides for the amendment of the 1967 Act “by the insertion after s.4 of the following part.” The whole of s.9 of the 1999 Act is relevant for the purpose of the present case but it is necessary to set out here only the new provisions of s.4E of the 1967 Act, inserted by s.9. These are as follows, so far as directly relevant:
“(1) At any time after the accused is sent forward for trial, the accused may apply to the trial court to dismiss one or more of the charges against the accused.
(2) Notice of an application under subsection (1) shall be given to the prosecutor not less than fourteen days before the date on which the application is due to be heard.
(3) The trial court may, in the interests of justice, determine that less than 14 days notice of an application under subsection (1) may be given to the prosecutor.
(4) If it appears to the trial court that there is not a sufficient case to put the accused on trial for any charge to which the application relates, the court shall dismiss the charge.
(5)(a) Oral evidence may be given on an application under subsection (1) only if it appears to the trial court that such evidence is required in the interests of justice.
(7) Where a charge is dismissed by the trial Court under subsection (4), the prosecutor may, within 21 days after the dismissal date, appeal against the dismissal t the Court of Criminal Appeal.
(8) On an appeal under subsection (7), the Court of Criminal Appeal may-
(a) affirm the decision of the trial court, or
(b) quash the decision of the trial court, in which case the trial of the accused may proceed as if the charge had never been dismissed.”
Submissions.
The appellant submits that the old “preliminary examination” has been abolished by the 1999 Act and replaced by an entirely new statutory dispensation. This, says the appellant, is a broad and unqualified one: he has an absolute entitlement to apply to dismiss the charges against him. The grounds of such application are not limited in any way: nothing is excluded. In the course of submissions the applicant indicated the nature of his challenge to the sufficiency of the case against him in some detail: he said that the search warrant issued does not, on the face of it, relate to the premises where the drugs in question were allegedly found.
In his statement of evidence, the guard who applied for the search warrant, Garda David Kennedy, said that he received information “that a premises connected to Farrell O’Brien Metal Fabricators on Knockmitten Lane, Killeen Road, Dublin 12” was being used to store and distribute drugs. The warrant eventually issued was for: “(a premises) (land) of Farrell O’Brien, Knockmitten Lane, Killeen Road, Dublin 12.” One or other of the words “a premises” or “land” was supposed to have been deleted but this did not occur. Counsel for the applicant said that he would require to call a small amount of oral evidence to establish that the place where the drugs were seized was not the same as the place mentioned in the documents served on the accused. He said however that there was provision for such evidence in subsection (4) of the new s.4E. He pointed out that challenging a search warrant is a matter which would normally be dealt with in the absence of a jury on a voir dire and that a jury would not be involved in the determination at all. He referred to the provision in the new Section for oral evidence with the leave of the trial judge and submitted that the intention of the Oireachtas in inserting that Section was to prevent the many voir dire applications that may occur, from delaying or obstructing the course of a trial already commenced. He said that, in a pre-trial hearing, a judge could determine an issue of law and if the judge determined that issue in favour of the accused at a pre-trial hearing pursuant to s.4E, that would avoid the necessity for the trouble and expense that a trial necessarily involves. He also submitted that the new s.4E plainly envisaged that a result which would bring the entire trial to an end might follow an application under s.4E by providing that the Director could appeal against a dismissal of the charge. He has no right of appeal against a directed verdict at Trial.
The Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that the Oireachtas did not intend, in passing the 1999 Act, to effect what he described as “a fundamental change in the nature of the criminal process”. He said that the main aim of the 1999 Act was simply to move the focus of the preliminary stages of a criminal trail from the District Court to the court “in respect of which the accused was returned”. He conceded that:
“When looked at on its own it is true to say that s.4E does not place any express limitations of what can be raised in a motion to dismiss.”
However he pointed out that the Act of 1967 did not do so either “so it is difficult to see what this proves”. He said that the Section should be looked at against the background of the whole concept of a criminal trial as understood in Ireland. “The interpretation contended for by the applicant would undermine the unitary nature of a criminal trial. Significant issues which would normally only be dealt with once a jury had been sworn in would now be determined in advance and could be the subject of appeal. If the applicant is correct, motions to dismiss could presumably canvass all types of issues such as the legality of detention or the admissibility of confession.”
Both sides, as it happened, relied on the fact that there had long been calls for the provision of some mechanism, preliminary to trial, where evidential and legal issues could be determined. The report of the Working Party on the Jurisdiction of the Courts: the Criminal Jurisdiction of the Courts, which was published in May 2003, called for the introduction of a new preliminary hearing mechanism for all cases on indictment. One of the purposes of this was “to enable the determination of those types of issues of admissibility of evidence which by their nature are capable of being dealt with prior to trial” (see paragraph 85 of the Report). The applicant says that the Director of Public Prosecutions himself has frequently made a similar suggestion but the respondent says that the fact that the Working Party called for this in 2003 shows that it did not regard the innovations introduced in 1999 as constituting such a mechanism. But the views of the very respected Working Party cannot be dispositive of the issue, which is fundamentally one of statutory interpretation. The Working Party, indeed, may not have addressed this issue at all.
The appellant makes a further submission which arises from the fact that he is charged, inter alia, with an offence contrary to s.15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act. He points out that, by reason of the terms of this Section, he would on conviction be subject to the imposition of a statutory minimum sentence of ten years. However, if he could demonstrate “specific and exceptional” circumstances, then the statutory minimum sentence might not apply. The Act specifically identifies that a fact of which the court is entitled to take into account is a plea of guilty and the time at which and circumstances in which a plea is tendered. He says that the result of this is that he is entitled to be advised as to the legality of the warrant at the earliest possible stage so that he can decide on his course of action in relation to the accusation against him on the basis of such advice. If the issue is not determined until the trial he may be prejudiced in terms of sentence as a result of a finding that he did not offer an early plea of guilty.
This seems to me to be a matter which it is very proper for the appellant and his advisers to take into account but, again, one which could not be dispositive on the question of the true meaning of s.4E.
The new subsection.
The 1999 Act abolished preliminary examination in the District Court. Under the former system it was possible for a defendant to have the charges against him dismissed in the District Court if that Court was not satisfied that there was a sufficient case to put him on trial. Although that procedure has been abolished, the Act of 1999 conferred certain compensating entitlements on defendants. These, however, were required to be exercised in the “trial court” rather than in the District Court. The right to apply for the dismissal of the charges against one, pursuant to s.4E, is one such entitlement. These are important entitlements. Quite clearly (to speak only of the right to apply to have a charge dismissed) if there is a single point which may avail the defendant to the extent of fatally undermining the charges against him, it is a great advantage to have this determined before the trial itself. Disposal in this way represents a major saving of time and expense to both sides, avoids inconvenience to witnesses and to the often forgotten jury persons, brings a rapid end to the defendant’s anxieties (which in this case must be considerable since one of the charges against him carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment) and brings about a resolution of the action between the prosecutor and the defendant at the earliest possible time, freeing up court time for other cases.
There is, accordingly, no doubt but that the applicant was entitled to seek the dismissal of the charges against him in the Circuit Court. The question is whether he was entitled to seek it on the basis of the invalidity or insufficiency of the search warrant which was exhibited in the documents served on him.
The answer to this question must depend on the terms of the statutory provision already quoted. The applicant has undoubtedly brought his application in the “trial court” which is what the subsection envisages. The Director submits that the question of the invalidity or insufficiency of the warrant can be determined only by the trial judge. Undoubtedly it would have been open to the Oireachtas to lay down that this should be so but it has not done so, speaking only of the “trial court”. His Honour Judge O’Donnell is undoubtedly a judge of the Circuit Court. The applicant cannot know in advance who the judge presiding over the trial will be so that, if he wishes to avail of s.4E he must bring his motion in the Circuit Court and await its assignment by the proper authorities to whatever judge they regard as appropriate. He cannot determine the identity of the Judge who will decide the result of his motion. The identity of the trial judge is usually not known (in Dublin) until the morning of the trial.
Equally, it seems to me, that the fact that there is authority for the proposition that a judge conducting a preliminary examination (prior to 1999) should not determine the validity of a warrant is without relevance to the present issue, because the former preliminary examination has been abolished by statute and this new procedure substituted. If there is one thing that can be said with certainty about the intention of the legislature in enacting the Act of 1999 it is that such intention certainly extended to the abolition of the preliminary examination procedure and to its replacement with this entirely new procedure. See the long title to the 1999 Act. Accordingly, the relief sought in the Applicant’s motion seems to me to be within the power conferred by s.4E.
The most fundamental ground urged by the Director is that to have important issues determined by a preliminary motion would interfere with the essential unity of a criminal trial. He cites in this regard a well know passage from Chief Justice Ó Dálaigh in The People (Attorney General) v. McGlynn [1967] IR 232 at 239:
“The nature of a criminal trial by jury is that once it starts, it continues right through until discharge of verdict. It has the unity and continuity of a play.”
Ó Dálaigh C.J. continued, in a passage which requires knowledge of the facts of the case to make comprehensible: “It is something unknown to the criminal trial for a jury to be recessed in the middle of a trial for months on end and it would require clear words to authorise such an unusual alteration in the course of a criminal trial by jury.”
McGlynn’s case was one in which a Circuit Court judge purported to state a case for the opinion of the Supreme Court after the evidence in a criminal trial had closed and before the jury’s verdict. Section 16 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1947, enabled him to state a case in a matter “pending before him”.
The Supreme Court declined to entertain the Case Stated on the basis that the matter was, strictly speaking, pending before the jury or the judge and the jury, and not before the judge alone. The passage quoted above, and relied on in the Director’s submissions is in the nature of an additional observation and is introduced by the words “There is, moreover, the nature and history of a criminal jury trial” (p.239).
Apart from any of these considerations, it is clear that the course of action which the appellant wishes to take here would not involve the adjournment of a criminal jury trial for any period, long or short. It would, on the contrary, facilitate the unitary disposition of the case by a jury by resolving in advance a question which would have to be determined otherwise in the absence of the jury, perhaps delaying for several days their participation in the case.
It has, unfortunately, become all too common for juries to be sent away for long periods during the course of a criminal trial. Indeed, it has become quite common for a case to be opened and the jury sent away immediately while issues such as those sought to be raised here under the s.4E procedure, are determined. The judge will normally send the jury away with some words of apology and attempt at an explanation but the fact is that the present system makes little or no attempt to minimise the time for which the jury’s absence from their ordinary avocations and duties is required.
We live in an era of case management, when a serious attempt is being made to deal with all litigation, civil or criminal, in an efficient manner. The most superficial consideration of efficiency will lead to the conclusion that it is considerably more efficient to deal with matters, which must by their nature be dealt with without a jury in any event, before the jury is sworn and taken away from their ordinary occasions rather than afterwards. I accord the fullest possible respect to Chief Justice Ó Dálaigh’s statement about the essential unity and continuity of a criminal trial and entirely agree with it. Disposing of evidential issues before the jury is sworn will assist and emphasise, rather from detracting from, that unity and continuity. In other jurisdictions where pre-trial motions to suppress evidence and similar procedural devices are well established, the fundamental nature of a jury trial is not considered to be trenched upon.
According to the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the government must, at or as soon as possible after arraignment notify the defendant of its intention to use specific evidence at trial, “In order to afford the defendant an opportunity to object before trial under Rule 12(B)(3)(C)” (which provides for a motion to suppress testimony). Rule 47 of the Rules applies to pre-trial motions and a motion to suppress evidence is one that must be made before trial. Similarly, “The Court must decide every pre-trial motion before trial unless it finds good cause to defer a ruling”. For the position in the United Kingdom, see Sprack Criminal Procedure, paragraph 16.08 and sections 39 - 43 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996. It is clear that in neither of these jurisdictions does the making of significant rulings at pre-trial hearings constitute a radical departure from the essential nature of jury trial.
On a careful examination of s.4E I can see nothing that excludes the procedure which the appellant was seeking to have adopted. Indeed, it is conceded on behalf of the Director that there is nothing express prohibiting the procedure he seeks to adopt and he has grounded his opposition under the broader basis indicated above. I would therefore quash the decision of the learned Circuit Judge not to consider the motion brought by the defendant on the ground of a lack of jurisdiction and remit the matter to the Circuit Court to be dealt with in accordance with law.
