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	Irish Law Reform Commission Papers and Reports
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Irish Law Reform Commission Papers and Reports >> Public Inquiries Including Tribunals Of Inquiry, Report on (LRC 73-2005) [2005] IELRC 73(10) (May 2005) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/other/IELRC/2005/3(10).html Cite as: [2005] IELRC 73(10)

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10. CHAPTER 10 REPORTS AND DOWNSTREAM PROCCEEDINGS

A Reports

10.01     In this chapter, the Commission considers the law relating to the reports, both interim and final, of tribunals of inquiry.

(1) Present Law

10.02     The tribunal of inquiry legislation does not confer an express power on tribunals to publish interim or final reports despite the fact that the publication of a report is one of the central objectives of any tribunal. As the Commission pointed out in the Consultation Paper, tribunals regularly perform different actions for which there is no express statutory provision.^[1] The power to publish interim and final reports is one of these non-statutory actions which are necessary for the performance of a tribunals functions.

10.03     However the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act 2002 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Sponsoring Minister if on receipt of an interim or final report he or she takes the view that publication of the report in full or in part might prejudice criminal proceedings. Section 3(1) of the 2002 Act provides that in such circumstances the Minister should apply to the court for directions concerning publication. The Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the person affected must be notified of the application and given an opportunity to make submissions.^[2] Having heard submissions the court may direct that the report or a specified portion of it may not be published for a specified period or until the court directs. The application can be heard in public or private at the discretion of the Court. ^[3]

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(2) Commissions of Investigation

10.04     In contrast to the tribunals of inquiry legislation, the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004 deals expressly with the preparation, content, and publication of interim and final reports.

10.05     On the conclusion of its investigation, a commission must prepare a final written report, based on the evidence received by it setting out the facts it established.^[4] If a commission considers that the facts relating to a particular issue have not been established, the commission must identify the issue and may indicate its opinion as to the quality and weight of any evidence relating to the issue.^[5] The use of the word "may" envisages that a commission may, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to give its opinion as to the quality and weight which should be accorded to the evidence. A commission must endeavour to submit its report to the specified minister within the period set out at the commencement of the inquiry.^[6]

10.06     A commission is also given a discretion to exclude from the report any information which identifies, or is likely to identify any person in the following situations.^[7] First, if in its opinion, the context in which the person was identified has not been clearly established.^[8] Secondly, where disclosure of the information might prejudice criminal proceedings.^[9] Thirdly, where disclosure would not be in the interests of the investigation or any subsequent inquiry.^[10] Fourthly, where it would not be in the person's interests to have their identity made public and the omission of the information would not be contrary to the interests of the investigation or any subsequent inquiry.^[11]

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10.07     In addition, the specified Minister may at any time request a commission to furnish him or her with draft reports concerning the progress of the investigation or any aspect of the investigation.^[12]

10.08     Commissions must send a copy of the draft interim or final report, or a portion thereof, to any person who is identified or identifiable in it prior to submitting it to the specified minister.^[13] The draft report must be accompanied by a notice setting out the periods for making submissions or applying to the court for an order amending the draft report.^[14]

10.09     If a person believes that a commission has not observed fair procedures, they may (a) make a written submission setting out the reasons why the draft should be amended, or (b) apply to the court to amend the document.^[15]

10.10     In response to a written request to amend the document, a commission may amend the report, apply to the court for directions or send the report unamended.^[16] If the latter approach is adopted, it is unclear whether the person who made the submission has the right to apply to the court for a direction, or in fact will have the time to apply for a direction, in respect of the draft report before it is sent off. The Commission considers that there should be a right of appeal to the court.

10.11     If a person applies to the court for a direction, the court may direct the commission to submit the draft report to the Minister unamended, invite the aggrieved party to make submissions, or direct the commission to submit the draft report to the Minister amended.^[17]

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10.12     An application to amend a draft report may be made where the information contained is (a) commercially sensitive and (b) disclosure is not necessary for the purposes of the investigation. ^[18] A commission may accede to this request where it is satisfied that the application is made out.^[19]

10.13     On receipt of a commission's final or interim report, the specified Minister can do one of two things, publish it or, where they believe that the report, or a specified part of it, might prejudice criminal proceedings, apply to the court for directions concerning publication. The Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the person affected must be notified of the application and given an opportunity to make submissions. Having heard submissions the court may direct that the report or a specified portion of it may not be published for a specified period or until the court directs.^[20]

(3) Recommendation

10.14     The Commission considers that the procedure to be followed concerning the publication of interim and final reports should be dealt with expressly in the tribunals of inquiry legislation.

10.15     The Commission favours the approach adopted in sections 32 to 38 of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004 and recommends that it should be the basis for the amendment of the tribunals of inquiry legislation in this respect.

10.16     The Commission recommends that the procedure to be followed concerning the publication of interim and final reports should be dealt with expressly in the tribunals of inquiry legislation. The Commission favours the approach adopted in sections 32 to 38 of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004 and recommends that it should be the basis for the amendment of the tribunals of inquiry legislation in this respect.

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B Downstream Proceedings

10.17     In this Part, the Commission discusses the problems posed by public inquiries to downstream proceedings, that is, proceedings subsequent to, and concerning the same material as, a public inquiry. The Commission is conscious that downstream proceedings may take many forms including criminal proceedings, civil litigation, disciplinary hearings, or other administrative proceedings. This part is confined to a discussion of the effect of public inquiries on subsequent criminal proceedings and the evidential status of a report in subsequent civil proceedings.

10.18     A public inquiry may have a significant impact on downstream criminal proceedings in two ways. First, if evidence tendered before a public inquiry is used in subsequent criminal proceedings, this may constitute a breach of the accused's constitutional right to the privilege against self-incrimination, and secondly, the adverse publicity generated by a public inquiry may be so unfair as to render a fair trial impossible.

10.19     In light of the very significant impact that a tribunal of inquiry may have on downstream proceedings the Commission wishes to reiterate that careful consideration should be given to the establishment of inquiries. The Commission considers that such inquiries should not be used as a substitute for, or as a preliminary to, criminal proceedings.

(1) The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

(a) The Current Law

10.20     The privilege against self-incrimination, exempts persons from having to answer questions, or produce documents, that have the effect of exposing those individuals to a criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture.^[21]

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10.21     The privilege against self-incrimination has been recognised for centuries at common law as a privilege having its origins in the constitutional struggles, which resulted in the abolition of the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission in the second half of the 17th century.^[22]

10.22     The privilege against self-incrimination is also a right guaranteed protection under the European Convention on Human Rights (EHCR). Article 6(1) of the ECHR guarantees the right of an accused person to a fair trial. This right has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as including the privilege against self-incrimination.

10.23     In Saunders v United Kingdom ^[23] the ECtHR held that the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a statutory demand by a company inspector in a subsequent criminal trial constituted a breach of the privilege against self-incrimination, a privilege which was part of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6(1).^[24] This is particularly relevant in light of the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, section 2 of which provides that in interpreting, and applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, insofar as it is possible, do so in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the Convention.

10.24     In addition to its status as a common law privilege and a right guaranteed under Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the privilege against self-incrimination is also a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Law (2nd ed, First Law 2004) at 456-462, Healy Irish Laws of Evidence (Thomson Round Hall 2004) at paragraphs 13.80 – 13.109).

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10.25     In Re National Irish Bank Ltd, ^[25] the Supreme Court confirmed the status of the privilege against self-incrimination as a constitutional right. In this case, inspectors were appointed by the High Court, to investigate allegations of improper charging of interest and fees by National Irish Bank. The investigation was governed by section 10 of the Companies Act 1990, which compels the officers and agents of a company under investigation to cooperate with the inspectors and to furnish them with such documents and information as they may require. The Companies Act 1990 went on to provide that information obtained pursuant to section 10 could be used in evidence against the person giving the information.^[26] The employees of the bank claimed that these provisions violated their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information, which would incriminate them.

10.26     The question faced by the courts in this regard was twofold, first was the privilege against self incrimination a constitutional right, and secondly, in what circumstances would an interference with this right be tolerated. In response to the first question, both the High Court and the Supreme Court took the view that the privilege against self-incrimination was a correlative right to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression under Article 40.6.1º i and as such was a constitutional right. In answer to the second question, however, both courts held that the privilege was not an absolute right and could be abrogated, expressly or impliedly, by statute. The test to be applied in such situations was a proportionality test.

10.27     Applying these principles, the High Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination had been violated but that the violation was proportionate in the circumstances and accordingly, the employees of the bank were not entitled to refuse to answer questions, produce documentation or otherwise provide information. The Supreme Court upheld this decision but stated that what was objectionable under Article 38 of the Constitution was compelling a person to confess and then convicting that person based on his compelled confession. Accordingly, it stated that any confession obtained by the inspectors would not in general be admissible at a

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subsequent criminal trial of such an official unless the trial judge was satisfied that the confession was voluntary.

(2) Applicability of the Current Law to Tribunals of Inquiry

10.28     Having determined that the privilege against selfincrimination is a right guaranteed by the Constitution, the ECHR and the Common Law it is necessary to consider the extent to which that privilege applies to public inquiries. In considering this, regard must be had to the type of inquiry involved. This is important because the legislation establishing the inquiry may deal expressly with the privilege.

10.29     In respect of tribunals of inquiry, the privilege against selfincrimination is dealt with by section 5 of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act 1979 which provides that a statement or admission, which is made to a tribunal shall not be admissible as evidence against the person who made the statement in any criminal proceedings.

10.30     This type of exclusion has been described as "direct use immunity" and must be distinguished from "derivative or fruits immunity."^[27] Under the direct immunity rule, only the evidence which was tendered to the tribunal is inadmissible in subsequent criminal proceedings. As a result, the authorities may use that evidence as a springboard to discover over types of evidence, which may prove the same matter, in a manner which may be admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings. Derivative immunity is broader in scope than direct immunity and renders inadmissible not only the evidence tendered to the tribunal but also all evidence that emanates or flows from the evidence tendered before the tribunal.

10.31     In addition, it is important to note that section 5 of the 1979 Act only applies to statements and admissions made by a person before a tribunal or a commission and so does not apply to documentary evidence. This is a significant restriction of the immunity in light of the large amount of documentation presented to modern tribunals and should be contrasted with the position pertaining to witnesses giving evidence before the Joint Committees

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of the Oireachtas ^[28] or the Comptroller and Auditor General.^[29] Witnesses appearing before these bodies enjoy direct use immunity in respect of documents given to those bodies.

10.32     Furthermore, it is important to note that section 5 of the 1979 Act only applies to criminal proceedings. As a result, it does not preclude the use of statements or admissions made to a tribunal in civil proceedings.^[30]

(3) Consultation Paper Proposals

10.33     Having surveyed the law relating to the privilege against self-incrimination insofar as it applies to tribunals of inquiry in the Consultation Paper ^[31], the Commission made a number of provisional recommendations.

10.34     The Commission considered that a delicate balance needs to be struck between the individual's right to the privilege against selfincrimination and the desire to prosecute offences which are likely to depend on the evidence obtained under compulsion powers. The Commission concluded that section 5 of the 1979 Act strikes the right balance between these two positions.^[32]

10.35     Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the use of direct use immunity in section 5 of the 1979 Act, be retained albeit in an expanded form. The Commission recommended that the various forms of documentary or electronic evidence should also be included within the ambit of section 5 to place witnesses before tribunals of inquiry in the same position as witnesses before the Joint Committees of the Oireachtas or the Comptroller and Auditor General.^[33]

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(4) Recommendation

10.36     The Commission considers that many tribunals of inquiry would be rendered unworkable if witnesses appearing before it were allowed to refuse to answer questions because their answers could be used against them in subsequent criminal proceedings. Accordingly, it is necessary to provide such witnesses with a measure of protection if the tribunal is given the power to compel answers to its questions. The Commission considers that the use of the direct use form of immunity provides an adequate protection of the individual's rights while at the same time not removing the ultimate threat of a criminal trial. However, the Commission has concluded that this immunity should only apply in cases where the information, documents or material provided is used as "evidence". The Commission also notes in this respect its recommendation already made concerning suspension of a tribunal pending a criminal trial.

10.37     Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the tribunals of inquiry legislation be amended to provide as follows:

(i) Information, documents or other material provided by a person to or before a tribunal (or an investigator, as the case may be) whether pursuant to an order or request, which are used in evidence, shall not be admissible as evidence against that person in any criminal proceedings (other than proceedings in relation to an offence under section [x] and perjury in respect of such information, evidence, documentation or other material); (ii) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) ''information, evidence, document or other material'' includes data, all forms of writing and other text, images (including maps and cartographic material), sound, codes, computer programmes, software, databases and speech.

10.38     The Commission recommends that that the tribunals of inquiry legislation be amended to provide as follows:

(i) Information, documents or other material provided by a person to or before a tribunal (or an investigator, as the case may be) whether pursuant to an order or request, which are used in evidence, shall not be admissible as evidence against that person in any criminal proceedings (other than

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proceedings in relation to an offence under section 35^[34] and perjury in respect of such information, evidence, documentation or other material);

(ii) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) ''information, evidence, document or other material'' includes data, all forms of writing and other text, images (including maps and cartographic material), sound, codes, computer programmes, software, databases and speech.

C Adverse Pre-Trial Publicity

10.39     A difficulty associated with downstream criminal proceedings is the risk that the pre-trial publicity caused by a tribunal of inquiry may be so adverse as to render it difficult for an accused to obtain a fair trial in accordance with Article 38.1 of the Constitution.

10.40     It should be noted that adverse publicity could affect two types of criminal proceedings, the first being prosecutions having the same subject matter of the inquiry, and the second being enforcement proceedings being brought against an individual by the inquiry.

(1) The Law Relating to Adverse Pre-Trial Publicity

10.41     The effect of adverse pre-trial publicity was considered by the Supreme Court in D v Director of Public Prosecutions.^[35] In this case, the applicant twice stood trial on a charge of indecent assault. On both occasions, the jury had been discharged. Shortly after the discharge of the jury in the second case, the complainant gave a lengthy interview to a national Sunday newspaper. The article did not directly identify the applicant or the complainant, but included material which was both legally inadmissible and highly prejudicial to the applicant. The applicant sought an order prohibiting a retrial because the adverse publicity generated by the article rendered a fair trial impossible. The Supreme Court held that the test applicable was that the accused person must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the adverse pre-trial publicity means that there is a real risk that, he could not obtain a fair trial.

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10.42     That this is a high threshold is illustrated by Z v Director of Public Prosecutions.^[36] In this case, the applicant was charged with a number of offences against the girl at the centre of the X Case.^[37] This case had been the subject of widespread media and public controversy and the applicant contended that this negative publicity rendered it possible on the balance of probabilities that he would not receive a fair trial. The Supreme Court agreed that the test was whether, on the balance of probabilities, the applicant would receive a fair trial. The Court held that a trial is unfair if any unfairness which might arise cannot be avoided by appropriate rulings and directions on the part of a trial judge. In applying this test, the Court rejected the applicant's claim because it held that the trial judge would be able to deal with the publicity surrounding it in a very specific manner by directing the jury that the controversy and publicity surrounding the case was completely irrelevant to the trial and must be totally excluded from their minds.

(2) Prosecutions Having the Same Subject Matter as the Inquiry

10.43     The test in relation to prosecutions having the same subject matter as a public inquiry is the same as for any other type of prosecution. It is a matter for the person seeking to prevent the prosecution from proceeding to prove on the balance of probabilities that the publicity is so adverse that the individual concerned would not receive a fair trial. This is a very high threshold and it should be noted that in recent years a number of prosecutions have been taken against individuals after the conclusion of the inquiry's investigations where the inquiry concluded that the individual concerned engaged in illegal or criminal conduct. ^[38]

10.44     One mechanism of ensuring that criminal prosecutions are not prejudiced because of adverse publicity created by a public

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inquiry is to postpone the inquiry until the prosecutions are concluded. This approach was adopted by the Railway Inquiry into the Cherryville Railway Accident where the inquiry was adjourned pending the conclusion of criminal proceedings.^[39] Another approach discussed more comprehensively in Chapter 11 ^[40] would be for the inquiry to refrain from identifying individuals in its report. In addition, a prosecution could be delayed until such point as the publicity had abated sufficiently to allow a fair trial to proceed. However, it should be noted that this approach might be of limited value given the high profile of the various tribunals of inquiry and the likelihood that people will remember the participants.

10.45     At paragraph 9.05, the Commission recommended that a tribunal of inquiry should be given the power to suspend its work until the prosecutions are concluded. This, in conjunction with the recommendation that tribunals should not be used as surrogates for the criminal system, should ensure that problems with adverse publicity should not arise. In any event, recent case law suggests that adverse publicity would only prevent a tribunal of inquiry from proceeding in very exceptional circumstances.

(3) Enforcement Proceedings

10.46     The applicability of the law relating to adverse publicity to enforcement proceedings was considered by the High Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Haughey (No 2).^[41] In this case, the applicant, Mr Charles Haughey was charged with obstructing the Moriarty Tribunal. Considerable publicity surrounded the case and the Circuit Court granted an order staying the prosecution until the adverse publicity had abated.

10.47     The difficulty in respect of adverse publicity and enforcement proceedings is that such proceedings are necessary if the tribunal is to operate effectively. In the Consultation Paper, the Commission suggested that one method of removing the problem of adverse publicity from enforcement proceedings would be to

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recategorise such offences as hybrid offences triable either summarily or on indictment at the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions.^[42]

10.48     Having reconsidered the matter, the Commission has concluded that the question of whether an offence should be tried summarily or on indictment is a matter for the prosecuting authorities having regard to whether the offence is minor or non-minor. In Melling v O Mathghamhna,^[43] the Supreme Court laid down four criteria that a court should consider in deciding whether an offence is minor or non-minor. These are the severity of the penalty, the moral quality of the act, the state of law at time of enactment of the Constitution and public opinion at time of enactment.^[44]

10.49     The Commission does not consider that the success or otherwise of a prosecution in one forum over another should be a matter which the prosecuting authority should take into account. In any event, the Commission has recommended that a tribunal of inquiry should be given the power to suspend its work until the prosecutions are concluded. This, in conjunction with the recommendation that tribunals should not be used as surrogates for the criminal justice system and that recent case law suggests that adverse publicity would only prevent a tribunal of inquiry from proceeding in very exceptional circumstances, should ensure that problems with adverse publicity should not arise.

10.50     The Commission does not recommend any amendment to the tribunals of inquiry legislation concerning potential prejudice of subsequent criminal proceedings.

D The Evidential Value of Inquiry Reports in Civil Proceedings

10.51     In the Consultation Paper, the Commission noted that at common law the report of an inquiry would be admissible in civil proceedings as an exception to the hearsay rule.^[45] However, the

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question remained as to what weight should be afforded to such a report. It was noted that reports prepared by company inspectors are prima facie proof of the facts set out therein and the opinion of the inspector.^[46] The Commission considered that the report of an inquiry should be afforded the same weight as that of a company inspector's report in civil proceedings, as the report of an inquiry will be as thorough and as exacting as the report of a company inspector.^[47]

10.52     The Commission sees no reason to depart from this recommendation. Therefore it recommends that reports prepared by tribunals of inquiry should be regarded as prima facie proof in civil proceedings of the facts set out therein and the opinion of the inquiry. It recommends that the following provision be inserted into the tribunal of inquiry legislation. "A report of a tribunal of inquiry appointed under the provisions of this Act shall be admissible in any civil proceedings as evidence— i. of the facts set out therein without further proof unless the contrary is shown, and ii. of the opinion of the inspector in relation to any matter contained in the report."

10.53     The Commission recommends that reports prepared by tribunals of inquiry should be regarded as prima facie proof in civil proceedings of the facts set out therein and the opinion of the inquiry. It recommends that the following provision be inserted into the tribunal of inquiry legislation: "A report of a tribunal of inquiry appointed under the provisions of this Act shall be admissible in any civil proceedings as evidence— i. of the facts set out therein without further proof unless the contrary is shown, and ii. of the opinion of the tribunal in relation to any matter contained in the report."

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Note 1   See the Consultation Paper at paragraph 6.128.    [Back]

Note 2   Section 3(2) of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence)(Amendment) Act 2002.     [Back]

Note 3   Section 3(3) of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence)(Amendment) Act 2002.    [Back]

Note 4   Section 32(1) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 5   Section 32(2) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 6   Section 32(4) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 7   Section 32(3) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 8   Section 32(3)(a) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 9   Section 32(3)(b) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 10   Section 32(3)(c) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 11   Section 32(3)(d) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 12   Section 33 of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 13   Section 34(1). Section 34(3) provides that “A person will be regarded as being identifiable if the report contains information which could reasonably be expected to lead to the person’s identification.” Section 37 imposes a duty of confidentiality on those to whom the draft report is sent.     [Back]

Note 14   Section 34(2) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 15   Section 35(1) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 16   Section 35(2) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 17   Section 35(3) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 18   Section 36(1) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 19   Section 36(2) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 20   Section 38(3) of the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.    [Back]

Note 21   The classic formulation of this rule was given by Goddard LJ in Blunt v Park Lane Hotel ltd [1942] 2 KB 253. At 257 he stated: “no-one is bound to answer any question if the answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to expose the deponent to any criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably likely to be preferred or sued for.” For a more detailed description of the privilege see Hogan & Whyte JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th ed Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2003) at paragraphs 6.5.94 – 6.5.117, Forde Constitutional     [Back]

Note 22   For a more detailed discussion of the common law origins of the privilege see Wigmore “The History of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination” (1902) 15 Harvard Law Review 610, McNair “The Early Development of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination” (1990) OJLS 66, Langbein “The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination at Common Law” (1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 1047.     [Back]

Note 23   (1996) 23 EHRR 313.    [Back]

Note 24   For a more detailed examination of this case see the Consultation Paper at paragraphs 11.20-11.21. See also Dillon-Malone “The Privilege against Self-Incrimination in Light of Saunders v United Kingdom” (1997) 3 Bar Review 132.    [Back]

Note 25    [1999] 3 IR 145.    [Back]

Note 26   Section 18 of the Companies Act 1990. This provision has since been the amended by section 28 of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001.    [Back]

Note 27   See the Consultation Paper at paragraph 11.09ff.     [Back]

Note 28   Section 12 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Competence, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997.    [Back]

Note 29   Section 5 of the Comptroller and Auditor General and Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Special Provisions) Act 1998.    [Back]

Note 30   See Law Reform Commission Report on A Fiscal Prosecutor and a Revenue Court (LRC 72-2004) at paragraphs 3.19 to 3.34 for a discussion of the privilege against self incrimination in the context of revenue law.    [Back]

Note 31   See the Consultation Paper at paragraphs 11.03-11.32.    [Back]

Note 32   See the Consultation Paper at paragraph 11.31.    [Back]

Note 33   See the Consultation Paper at paragraph 11.32.    [Back]

Note 34   This refers to an offence under the legislation when amended.    [Back]

Note 35   [1994] 2 IR 465.    [Back]

Note 36    [1994] 2 ILRM 481. See also The People (DPP) v Nevin [2003] 3 IR 321 and Walsh, Criminal Procedure (Round Hall Press 2003).     [Back]

Note 37   See Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1.    [Back]

Note 38   For example, Mr Ray Burke was jailed for tax offences arising out of the investigations of the Planning Tribunal: see The Irish Times 29 January 2005. Similarly, the trial of Mr George Redmond, former assistant Dublin city and county manager, for alleged corruption has been fixed for December 2005; see The Irish Times 19 April 2005.    [Back]

Note 39   Report of the Investigation into the Railway Accident near Cherryville Junction, County Kildare on the 21st August 1983 (December 1984 Prl 2904) available at www.transport.ie/transport.railwaysafety/publishers.    [Back]

Note 40   See the Consultation Paper at Paragraphs 11.45-11.56.    [Back]

Note 41   [2001] 1 IR 162.    [Back]

Note 42   See the Consultation Paper at paragraph 11.43.    [Back]

Note 43   [1962] 1 IR 1.    [Back]

Note 44   [1962] 1 IR 1, 13.    [Back]

Note 45   See the Consultation Paper at paragraphs 11.12-11.14.    [Back]

Note 46   Section 22 of the Companies Act 1990.    [Back]

Note 47   See the Consultation Paper at paragraph 11.14.    [Back]