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Jersey Unreported Judgments


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Jersey Unreported Judgments >> Q v R (Family) [2020] JRC 141 (21 July 2020)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/je/cases/UR/2020/2020_141.html
Cite as: [2020] JRC 141

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Family - applications made by the Father

[2020]JRC141

Royal Court

(Family)

21 July 2020

Before     :

Samantha McFadzean, Registrar, Family Division

 

Between

Q (the Father)

Applicant

And

R (the Mother)

Respondent

Advocate C. G. Hillier for the Applicant.

Advocate J. F. Orchard for Respondent.

REASONS

the REGISTRAR:

1.        I am concerned with an application made in October 2018 by the father of a 2 year old girl for:-

(i)        an order that his name be inscribed on her birth certificate;

(ii)       an order that he should have parental responsibility for her; and

(iii)      an order that he should have direct contact with her.

The background

2.        Child 2 is the second child of the applicant father, Q and his former partner, R.  Their older daughter, Child 1, now a teenager, was the subject of care proceedings and now lives in the UK with Q's family.  Q and R have supervised contact with Child 1 three times a year.

3.        Child 2 has never known life with both of her parents, whose relationship ended for the second time when she was still in utero.  Unlike her older sister, she has the benefit of growing up in her mother's care.  Child 1 was not as fortunate but does appear, from what I understand, to have found a good home with a member of Q's family who acts as a kinship carer.

4.        The father does not have parental responsibility.  He was not registered as Child 2's father on her birth certificate.

The application

5.        These parents have a chequered history of alcohol and illegal substance misuse, which has been the subject of expert psychological, psychiatric and substance misuse evidence.  Although the parties agreed that I did not need to hear from the experts at the final hearing, I took the written evidence of each of the experts into account when reaching my decision.

6.        The thrust of the evidence filed in the proceedings was as follows:-

(i)        Dr Engelbrecht prepared a dual diagnosis report on each parent.  The application is not for residence but I need, at least, to consider whether Child 2's welfare is best served by her mother's care.  The mother's capacity to safely parent Child 2 was not questioned by the father despite her troubled history involving neglectful parenting (leading to the loss of her older daughter and the imposition of a custodial sentence) and binge drinking, which she says started when she met the father.  There is evidence that the mother has "limited coping abilities" and has suffered from depression.  She has historically addressed conflict and poor mood by abusing alcohol.  The psychiatrist concludes in her report delivered in April 2019 that the mother's then current practice of controlled drinking was inappropriate and that abstinence was the preferred option.  She set out a range of recommendations which she hoped that the mother would follow to enable her to address her issues,  including participation in a further emotional coping skills course via the Alcohol and Drug Service ("ADS") and one to one psychological therapy through Jersey Talking Therapies.

(ii)       Dr Engelbrecht's report on the father concluded that although he did not suffer from any psychiatric disorder, he uses alcohol to deal with any emotional distress.  She outlined a history dating back to 2007, predominantly based on alcohol misuse, including misuse of opioids.  He has presented regularly at the Emergency Department and the Mental Health Service and has threatened to commit suicide.  Q had committed offences involving violence.  Q told her that he had started drinking heavily when he met R and was alcohol dependent by the age of 33 (he is now 38).  She concluded that he had likely under reported his past substance misuse, exhibited a "cluster of behavioural, cognitive and physiological phenomena that developed after repeated alcohol use, which include a strong desire to use alcohol, difficulties in controlling its use, persisting in its use despite harmful consequences, giving a higher priority to alcohol use than to other activities and obligations, an increased tolerance and a physical withdrawal state".  She noted that the father claimed that his offending behaviour was related to his use of alcohol and that on one occasion he had lost his employment after relapsing into alcohol use.

(iii)      In April 2019, not long after the father had completed a community detoxification for alcohol, Dr Engelbrecht recommended that the father should undertake the following program of treatment:

(a)       treatment through a key worker who could assist in delivering social intervention to include drug related advice and information, advice and support for social problems, harm reduction, motivational enhancement to improve patient engagement and adherence to treatment, and to prevent relapse to include completion of the Relapse Prevention Programme;

(b)       undertaking drug testing through the ADS;

(c)       continuing to use an opiate substitution treatment so that once abstinent from opiates he could take an opioid blocker to support him in remaining abstinent;

(d)       pharmacological interventions to promote abstinence from alcohol; and

(e)       residential rehabilitation at an addiction treatment centre, once detoxified from opiates.

(iv)      In view of the period of time which had elapsed since the report was first commissioned, an addendum report was produced by Dr Engelbrecht in May 2020.  She had the benefit of the results of recent urine and blood tests and nail clippings from the father which were sampled.  The urine sample showed use by the father of diazepam and cannabis.  The DNA legal analysis for Ethyl Glucuronide ("EtG") showed levels of 1469.6 pg/mg for EtG against a cut off level of 60 pg/mg (although the report explains that nail EtG levels are potentially much higher than hair samples in the same test subject).  The report concluded that the father had consumed alcohol to excess for a minimum of six months and up to twelve months before sampling.

The test result for Phosphatidylethanol ("PEth") which is intended to test for alcohol use over the previous 28 days was in excess of 1000 micrograms per litre; any result above 210 demonstrates excessive alcohol consumption.

(v)       Dr Briggs, the psychologist who met with the parents over a year before the final hearing, concluded that the father had developed a maladaptive coping strategy.  Q had not had an easy childhood, he had had a father who had misused alcohol, there had been some evidence of domestic violence and this may be reflected in the adult who now displays "emotionally labile" responses in adulthood.  It is of note that the father told Dr Briggs that at the time of the interview "he had gone off drink".  Dr Briggs describes a heightened likelihood of relapse because of his "vulnerability to substance misuse".  Dr Briggs described the father as being of sound cognitive ability and aware of the "likely negative consequences of any relapse to problematic drinking or substance misuse on his part, including the psychological impact upon a child of having a substance using parent as a role model".  The psychologist agreed with Dr Engelbrecht's recommendations and advised that the father should undertake counselling, parenting training, join an emotional coping skills group via Jersey Talking Therapies or the Alcohol and Drug    Service ("ADS") and also engage in one to one psychological therapy.

The hearing

7.        At the hearing, Q, who has the benefit of legal representation appeared in court in person.  Both Counsel and R appeared by Star Leaf video link due to the extant social distancing restrictions.  This was not ideal but as Q said that he did not have an electronic device which would enable him to appear by video, it was important that the court was able to hear what he had to say, recognising the disadvantage for the father of not having his advocate beside him in court.  I took both parents' evidence into account although for the sake of completeness, I should add that after the father had finished giving his evidence, and while the mother was giving her evidence, after several warnings, I had to ask the father to leave court  because of repeated interruptions and disruption of the proceedings by the father.  I told him that he would be welcome back in court if he was prepared to sit quietly but he chose not to return.

The father's case

8.        I had previously ordered the parties to each file a position statement setting out those orders which they would be asking me to make.  I understood from Q's advocate that he had sought, but was unable to obtain, instructions from Q in time to file a statement.

9.        Shortly before the hearing, Q advised the court through his Counsel that he wanted to pursue each of the applications he had made.  Q narrowed his application for direct contact to an hour with Child 2 every Sunday, for the time being.

10.      The father has seen very little of Child 2 in her short life.  Once engaged in proceedings, the court, guided by JFCAS, offered the father an opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to Child 2 by supplying her with cards, letters and gifts every week over a three month period.  This indirect weekly contact was followed by two direct supervised sessions of contact in December 2019 facilitated by the JFCAS officer appointed in this case.

11.      The father's evidence was that he had consumed excessive alcohol for a number of years.  His physical health had been impacted adversely by misuse of alcohol and he suffered from chronic pancreatitis.  He told me that although he had been drinking heavily since 2007, over the last year or so his alcohol consumption had become worse and he said that this was because of the stress caused by these proceedings.  He told the court that he is currently drinking about 30 cans of lager per week.  It was telling that the father considers that his drinking is not out of control but he does accept that he drinks too much.  He described his drinking as "a bit stupid" and he told the court that as recently as May 2020 he was drinking to excess.  He does not seem to consider that his current alcohol consumption is an issue because he told Court that he would not drink the day before seeing his daughter or on the day when he was due to have contact with her.  He does not consider that he has done anything wrong to any of his children and he has never drunk in front of them and does not understand what he has done to be prevented from seeing his daughter.

12.      When cross-examined by the mother's advocate, the father admitted that he had not been a responsible role model for his daughter but told the court that he would be caring when he saw her.  He explained that he is stressed because his girlfriend is currently stuck in the UK because of restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and that when he is able to see his daughter, he is back in work and his girlfriend is back in Jersey, he will be able to control his drinking.  He considers that he does not have any motivation to stop drinking at the current time.  When it was pointed out to him that his lifestyle was somewhat chaotic, he admitted that this was the case.

13.      He told the court that his use of alcohol would be different if his daughter was in his life and explained that alcohol was used by him as "a coping mechanism".  When asked about change that he could demonstrate over the course of the proceedings, he said that he had made the effort to send cards and the like to his daughter over the period requested by the court and that he thought that this was enough to enable him to build up a face-to-face relationship with his daughter.

14.      Furthermore he told the court that he did not appreciate from the previous appearances in court that there was an expectation that he would follow the recommendations of the various experts (including the Jersey Family Court Advisory Service ["JFCAS"]): he did not understand that this work was, to use his words, "compulsory".

15.      He accepted that his misuse of alcohol had led him into difficult situations, most recently at Christmas 2019 when he was the victim of a grave and criminal assault.  He was admitted to hospital as a result of the assault but left the hospital after only a short period in contravention of the advice of the treating physicians.

16.      The father was asked about a recent occasion when he was seen outside the property which had belonged to the deceased maternal grandmother while the mother was there. It was suggested that this attendance (following a relationship with R which had involved domestic violence, allegedly perpetrated by both parents) was indicative of the father's inability to make good choices.  He told the court that he was simply walking past the property and had not intended to cause trouble.  He said in evidence that he had been told by the mother that she had said that she would make sure that the daughter hated him.  He denied intending to harass or intimidate the mother by being outside her late mother's home and said that he lived around the corner and was passing.

17.      The father was taken through his recent chronological history and was asked to identify which of the recommendations in the reports of Dr Engelbrecht he had followed over the course of the fourteen months leading up to the final hearing.  The father repeated his belief that doing the work was not compulsory, that he did not want to attend any residential rehabilitation for alcohol, that he had not been able to participate in any parenting courses because of the recent pandemic; he accepted that he had only tried to get on to such a course following the most recent hearing in January 2020 as he did not think that he needed to do so before that date.

18.      I asked the father whether he had seen the acts of court made following recent hearings and he said that he had.  I asked in particular whether he had seen the Act of Court of 20th September 2019 in which I had recorded the commitment made to the court to undertake the parenting courses, pharmacological intervention and 12 week residential program recommended by Dr Engelbrecht and in which the court set out how it expected him to fully commit to and engage in addressing his alcohol misuse before the court could undertake serious consideration of his application.

19.      The father explained that he did not consider the recommendations to be compulsory and that insofar as the rehabilitation course at the addiction treatment centre is concerned, he did not want to participate as it would prevent him from working.

20.      When cross-examined the father explained that he wanted the court to award him parental responsibility for his daughter and have his name added to her birth certificate because she had a right to know her father.  He accepted that a good role model for his daughter would be responsible, caring, attentive, committed, stable, safe and capable of co-parenting.  He did not accept that he would be a dangerous role model for his daughter and said this was because he was not seeking custody of her.  Furthermore, he dismissed the impact of his chaotic lifestyle on his daughter because he was, in his words, "not in her life".

21.      The father admitted in cross-examination that he had, so far, failed to show any real commitment to his daughter but said that it would be different if he was in her life.  He thought that he had showed his commitment to his daughter by sending her cards once a week for three months.  He admitted that he had forgotten to take a Christmas card for her.  He said that he had not been given a chance.  In essence, his position was that he should be given such a chance to be in Child 2's life and he would then change his behaviour.

The mother's case

22.      The mother's written evidence described how her relationship with the father had broken down after about four years, during which time Child 1 had been born.  She put an end to the rekindled relationship when she found out that she was expecting Child 2.  She gave evidence about the stress and fear caused by the father's misuse of alcohol and in her statement claims that she has had cause to be in contact with the police as a result of the father's behaviour on 52 separate occasions.

23.      The father alluded in his evidence to the mother also being violent at times.  She was not cross examined about this or about her own difficulties with alcohol but she has been described by the JFCAS officer in this case as having "turned her life around".  Under cross examination she explained that she no longer drinks much or associates with people who do drink to excess.  She last drank alcohol on or around her birthday in February.

24.      I note that she has committed offences dating back to 1997.  The most recent offence was committed in 2013.  She accepted that she was, in part, to blame for the difficulties she and the father had had in the past, particularly when they had lost Child 1 because of previous bad habits.

25.      The mother told the court that she did not consider contact between Child 2 and her father to be in Child 2's best interests.  She told the court that the father was constantly intoxicated when they were in a relationship and that he was recently arguing with her son outside her mother's house which she found very stressful.  She told the court that the father changes when he is drinking.  He is verbally abusive, has damaged her belongings and gave her "a life of hell".

26.      Under cross examination she told the court that if the court ordered her to put his name on Child 2's birth certificate she would do so and that if the court ordered parental responsibility, she would share this with the father and would comply with any order made for contact.  However, she does not think that Q can be a good father unless he gives up the alcohol and drugs.

27.      The mother relied on the JFCAS officer's position as set out below.

The evidence of the JFCAS officer

28.      The officer reminded the court that following sight of the expert evidence, she had suggested that the father begin to demonstrate his commitment to Child 2 by attending at JFCAS once every Friday with a card or small gift for Child 2.  There were more occasions when he provided a card than when he did not but he struggled, in her view, to demonstrate any thought - he would write more or less the same words on the card every week and buy Child 2 yet another teddy.

29.      Following on from this, the JFCAS officer suggested that, subject to breath testing being negative, she would supervise three brief contact sessions between Child 2 and her father, the hope being that this would motivate Q to abstain from drinking and commit to the work which had been recommended by Dr Engelbrecht.

30.      She explained that the two direct contact sessions between Child 2 and her father had gone well, in part because R had worked hard to prepare Child 2 to meet her father.  Unfortunately these sessions had not led to Q making any commitment to make long term changes which would make a relationship with Child 2 feasible.  She struggled to get hold of the father to arrange a further session - he did not answer his phone.

31.      Her view is that he under reported his alcohol use to her quite deliberately because he thought it would serve his case to do so.  She thinks that he tells experts what he thinks they want to hear.  When he wants to undertake detoxification he gives ADS a true picture of the amount he has been drinking; when he wants to convince an expert that he has reduced consumption, he fails to give an accurate picture.

32.      Her recommendation is that indirect contact take place twice a year by card or letter.  She does not think that it is safe for Child 2 to see her father - he needs to be "safe and present emotionally" and she did not consider that he was capable of so being when he has so much of himself invested in his relationship with alcohol.  The father's failure to participate in any meaningful way in the therapy prescribed by the experts would have made a significant difference to her recommendation.  Because the father had failed to seek out or engage in such therapy, the JFCAS officer concluded that he continued to prioritise his relationship with alcohol.

33.      The JFCAS officer explained that there is simply no facility available on the island to support the sort of supervised safe contact which would need to take place to enable Child 2 to see her father safely.  The child supported contact centre is inadequate to police the father's misuse of alcohol; the JFCAS officer explained that it is, in any event, for the father to regulate himself rather than his behaviour to be regulated by an external agency.

34.      Supervised contact remains a possibility in the future but only when Q has addressed his relationship with alcohol.

35.      She did not recommend that the court made an order for parental responsibility; she considers that his attachment is to alcohol, not to Child 2 and that he had shown little commitment to overcoming alcohol.  He has chosen a chaotic lifestyle over the opportunity to develop a relationship with his daughter and emotionally Child 2 is too young to be at put at risk of being let down by his chaotic lifestyle and learning maladaptive coping strategies from him.

36.      The JFCAS officer added that the father had failed to acknowledge the extent of his problem and that unless he does so and then addresses his addiction, he should not have direct contact with Child 2.

37.      As to the extent of indirect contact when I asked her if more regular indirect contact might not benefit Child 2, so that she was reminded of her father a little more often, she was uncertain as to whether Q would be motivated to continue as she believes that he only committed to the cards/teddies for three months because he thought that this would unlock for him the face to face contact that he wants i.e. he expects to have a reward for his efforts.

38.      The JFCAS officer was sure that the mother would facilitate indirect contact and share cards and gifts with Child 2.  She saw no reason why Child 2 should not be permitted to send cards or letters to her father as frequently as she might like to do so and suggested that the father might obtain a post office box so that Child 2 has an address at which she can write to him as he is currently living in temporary bedsit accommodation.

The Law

39.      The father's application for contact is made under Article 10 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 (the "Law").  The matters to which the court must have regard when determining an application are set out in Article 2 of that Law.  They are well known but bear repeating:-

"(1)     When the court determines any question with respect to -

(a)       the upbringing of a child; or

(b)       the administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising from it, the child's welfare shall be the court's paramount consideration.

(2)       In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child.

(3)       In the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (4), the court shall have regard in particular to -

(a)       the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of the child's age and understanding);

(b)       the child's physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c)       the likely effect on the child of any change in his or her circumstances;

(d)       the child's age, sex, background and any characteristics of the child which the court considers relevant;

(e)       any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(f)        how capable each of the child's parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting the child's needs; and

(g)       the range of powers available to the court under this    Law in the proceedings in question.

(4)       The circumstances are that -

(a)       the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge an Article 10 order, and the making, variation or discharge of the order is opposed by any party to the proceedings; or

(b)       the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge an order under Part 4.

(5)       Where the court is considering whether or not to make one or more orders under this Law with respect to a child, it shall not make the order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so would be better for the child than making no order at all."

40.      No authorities relating to the proposition that the father should or should not have direct contact with Child 2 were placed before me by either party.  Both Counsel urged me to consider the terms of Article 2(3) of the Law when considering the application.  In considering the application, I take into account the Law as I am bound to do, but I have also reviewed the England and Wales' Court of Appeal's decision in In the matter of C (A Child) [2011] EWCA Civ 521 in which, at paragraph 47, the former President of the Family Division, Munby LJ, summarised the authorities as follows:-

"Contact between parent and child is a fundamental element of family life and is almost always in the interests of the child.

Contact between parent and child is to be terminated only in exceptional circumstances, where there are cogent reasons for doing so and when there is no alternative.

Contact is to be terminated only if it will be detrimental to the child's welfare.

There is a positive obligation on the State, and therefore on the judge, to take measures to maintain and to reconstitute the relationship between parent and child, in short, to maintain or restore contact. The judge has a positive duty to attempt to promote contact. The judge must grapple with all the available alternatives before abandoning hope of achieving some contact. He must be careful not to come to a premature decision, for contact is to be stopped only as a last resort and only once it has become clear that the child will not benefit from continuing the attempt.

The court should take a medium-term and long-term view and not accord excessive weight to what appear likely to be short-term or transient problems.

The key question, which requires "stricter scrutiny", is whether the judge has taken all necessary steps to facilitate contact as can reasonably be demanded in the circumstances of the particular case.

All that said, at the end of the day the welfare of the child is paramount; "the child's interest must have precedence over any other consideration".

41.      The law relating to the acquisition of parental responsibility is set out in Article 5(1) of the Law:-

"(1)     Where a child's father and mother were not married to each other at the time of the child's birth -

(aa)    subject to paragraph (1A), the father shall have parental responsibility for the child if he becomes registered as the child's father under Article 55 or 56 of the Marriage and Civil Status (Jersey) Law 2001(the "2001 Law");

(a)       the court may, on the application of the father, order that he shall have parental responsibility for the child; or

(b)       the father and mother may by agreement provide for the father to have parental responsibility for the child."

42.      Although this authority was not placed in the bundle prepared for the court, in his closing speech to the court, Advocate Hillier referred the court to LS v NS [2007] JRC 103A in which the Royal Court approved English authorities and a text book entry to the effect that the  "three strand test" to be considered by the court in determining an application for parental responsibility required consideration of the degree of the applicant parent's commitment to the child, his attachment to the child and that of the child to him and the applicant parent's motivation in seeking the order.  The text approved by the court added that parental responsibility would usually be granted "unless clearly contrary to a child's welfare".  It is clear from Article 2 that the child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration when determining this part of the father's application.

43.      The re-registration of a parent as such on a child's birth certificate is not covered by the Law but by the provisions of the Marriage and Civil Status (Jersey) Law 2001 (the "2001 Law").  Advocate Orchard, on behalf of the mother, referred the court to Article 56 of the 2001 Law and submitted that the court that does not have power to order the re-registration or addition of the father's name to Child 2's birth certificate.

44.      Article 56 reads as follows:

"Re-registration where parents not married

(1)       This Article applies where the birth of a child whose father and mother were not married to each other at the time of the birth has been registered, and no person has been recorded as the father of the child.

(2)       Subject to paragraph (3), the registrar shall re-register the birth so as to record the name of a person as the father -

(a)        at the joint request of the mother and that person;

(b)        at the request of the mother, on production of -

(i)         a declaration made by the mother that that person is the father of the child, and

(ii)        a declaration made by that person stating himself to be the father of the child;

(c)       at the request of that person, on production of -

(i)         a declaration made by that person stating himself to be the father of the child, and

(ii)        a declaration made by the mother that that person is the father of the child;

(d)        at the request of the mother or that person on production of -

(i)         a copy of a parental responsibility agreement made between them in relation to the child, and

(ii)        a declaration by the person making the request stating that the agreement was made in compliance with Article 5 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002[41] and has not been brought to an end by an order of a court;

(e)       at the request of the mother or that person on production of -

(i)         a certified copy of an order under Article 5 of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 giving that person parental responsibility for the child, and

(ii)        a declaration by the person making the request stating that the order has not been brought to an end by an order of a court; or

(f)        at the request of the mother or that person on production of -

(i)         a certified copy of an order under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Children (Jersey) Law 2002 which requires that person to make any financial provision for the child and which is not an order falling within paragraph 4(3) of that Schedule, and

(ii)        a declaration by the person making the request stating that the order has not been discharged by an order of a court.[42]

(3)       A birth shall not be re-registered under this Article except in accordance with paragraphs (4) and (5) and with the authority of the Superintendent Registrar.

(4)       On the re-registration of a birth so as to record the name of a person as the father, in addition to the requirements of Article 72, the register of births shall be signed by the registrar and, where the re-registration takes place more than 3 months after the birth, by the Superintendent Registrar.

(5)     Where the registrar re-registers the birth, he or she shall record the child as the illegitimate child of the person shown as the father, and of the mother."

(Emphasis supplied)

Discussion

Contact

45.      Any interference by the court in the rights of an individual to enjoy family life may be a breach of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Rights as enshrined in Article 8 of Schedule 1 of the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000.  I remind myself that Article 8(2) qualifies that fundamental freedom as follows:-

"There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others"

46.      I am bound to read and give effect to Article 10 of the Law in a manner which is compatible with the Convention and I do so.  It seems to me to be a draconian measure indeed for a court to take steps which have the effect of preventing contact between a child and his or her parent and that the burden on the court to ensure that there is no unnecessary interference in the Article 8 rights of either the child or the parent is as onerous in private children law proceedings as in public children law applications brought on behalf of the Minister for Children and Housing.

47.      When no other options present themselves, to ensure his welfare and to secure a child's future safety in public law proceedings, the court may permanently and irremediably sever the familial ties which bind a child to his parent by making an adoption order.  In private children applications, while the ties that bind a child to his parent may not necessarily be irreversibly broken, the impact upon the child of depriving him of the benefit of a relationship with one of his two parents for the foreseeable future, with all of the attendant upset, uncertainty, confusion and psychological ill effect that such an option may import in years to come, is also very significant.

48.      Child 2 is still a very young child and is currently unaware of the dispute that has centred on her; if she were able to express her wishes and feelings to this court, I anticipate that she would ask to be loved and to be kept safe, warm, well fed and comfortable, to have an opportunity to learn and to play, make close and strong bonds to friends and family, to be listened to and respected.  In this, she is no different from any other child.  Child 2 has no particular characteristics which I need to take into account but I remind myself the fact that Child 2 is, unfortunately, not able to grow up with her older sister, although she is able to see Child 1 every now and again.

49.      Each of Child 2's parents have each had their own struggles with alcohol; each parent has committed criminal offences, been neglectful of their responsibility to their children and neither parent can hold themselves out to be beyond reproach.

50.      Fortunately for Child 2, R has managed in the words of the JFCAS officer, to turn her life around so that Child 2's future is brighter than it was, even at the time when the father first issued this application.  Child 2 lives full time with her mother and I am not asked, nor do I currently consider it appropriate, to interfere with that status quo.  The mother appears be capable of meeting Child 2's needs currently.  She should be congratulated for making the changes that Child 2 deserves of her parents, but I do not underestimate the challenges that the mother may face going forward given her stress vulnerability.  She will need to work hard every day to avoid relapse out with the glare of court proceedings.  Dr Engelbrecht has advised that she needs to engage in further Emotional Coping Skills Training and psychological treatment to address her past traumatic experiences.

51.      I am satisfied that R is prepared to facilitate (though not necessarily encourage) a relationship between Child 2 and her father.  I do not believe that R would deliberately stand in the way of contact.  I have no reason to doubt the father's evidence that R told him that she would make sure that his daughter hated him but I read this as being an expression of R's frustration with the father's behaviour rather than an overt intention to stymy a future relationship.

52.      Sadly, the father has not proved himself equal to the fight with alcohol which he needs to win in order to play a full and active part in Child 2's life.  The court is careful to ensure that no unnecessary obstacles must be overcome or tests passed for a parent to be able to have a meaningful relationship with their child and to that extent, the father was correct when he told the court that he did not think that the treatment/therapies prescribed by Drs. Engelbrecht and Briggs was "compulsory".  The court cannot order a parent to undergo treatment but where, in a case such as this, substantial evidence of a serious and long standing issue with alcohol is before the court, it is unsurprising that as part of the dialogue in preliminary hearings the court expressed its concern about what a failure to do this work will mean for his application.  In response to those concerns, the father expressed a readiness to engage in therapy, including residential treatment at an addiction treatment centre.  It is a matter of regret to the court that the father did not take up this opportunity to address his long standing relationship with alcohol.

53.      Why does this matter?  The father asks for only an hour per week with Child 2.  He said that she deserves to know her father and in this respect, he is correct.  The issue for this court to grapple with is what effect a relationship with the father in his current condition may have on Child 2.

54.      The mother's evidence is that there is a long history of domestic violence fuelled by alcohol misuse and that she is in fear of the father's physical and verbal abuse of her.  That fear likely has, and will continue to, taint Child 2's view of her father as she grows up.  Moreover, the court recognises the efforts that the mother has made to address her own significant misuse of alcohol, a habit which could, if not kept under control, lead to Child 2, like her older sister, being the subject of care proceedings.  The mother's own vulnerability is a matter for concern for the court insofar this may itself adversely affect Child 2's welfare.

55.      The welfare of Child 2 demands that the court take such steps as it is able to ensure that her needs are met and her safety ensured so far as is possible.  The court does not doubt that the father loves Child 2 but, on the evidence currently before the court his relationship with alcohol is more important to him than his relationship with Child 2 and this puts Child 2 at risk.  It is not enough for the father to tell the court that he will not drink to excess when he sees Child 2.  The court accepts that he would not intentionally do Child 2 any harm but by not addressing his misuse of alcohol he is increasing the risk of harm to Child 2.  The risk of physical harm is patent; the father's own experience of committing offences and being the victim of serious crime when under the influence of alcohol is before the court.  To a degree, on his case, this risk could be mitigated by contact being supervised.

56.      However, it is the risk of long term emotional damage which gives the court the greatest degree of concern.  Young people learn lessons not only from what their parents say but what they do and how they behave.  A child's perception of normality is modelled on what they see as they grow up.  The mother gave evidence of the father's inconsistent behaviour and the chaotic lifestyle which he accepted that he leads.  I fear that Child 2 will be exposed to this chaos and that such exposure will be detrimental to her welfare.  While the father showed some commitment to indirect contact, he proved himself unequal to the challenge of hearing the mother's evidence and keeping himself under control for a few hours of court time.  I note that the father told Dr Briggs that he understood the "psychological impact upon a child of a having a substance missing parent as role model" but I was not convinced that he truly understood the impact of such a correlation in his own case.

57.      The JFCAS officer told the court that she considered that the father sent cards and teddies in her words, "to get a reward", rather than because he wished Child 2 to benefit.  I understood the JFCAS officer to be saying that Child 2's interests were secondary to his own; he told the court that he sent the cards because it was a passport to seeing his daughter.  He told me that that he had "sent the cards and blah, blah, blah" and that he thought that this was enough to demonstrate his commitment.

58.      There is evidence that both parents grew up with a father who had an unhealthy relationship with alcohol.  Dr Briggs reports that the parents' "legacy of their childhoods" has left them vulnerable, using maladapted strategies to deal with adversity.  The father gave evidence that he drank because he was "stressed"; stressed by these proceedings, stressed by the socio-economic environment, stressed by the absence of his girlfriend in lockdown.  Indeed, I interpreted his evidence as being that he was not responsible for his alcohol misuse; it was because of factors external to him that he drank.  The JFCAS officer explained that he does not accept that he has a problem.

59.      It seemed to the court that the father is very far from accepting responsibility for his own condition.  It is a matter of concern that he told the court that if he could see Child 2, he would stop drinking.  As the JFCAS officer told the court, this assertion puts a great deal of pressure on this very young child and his relationship with her and reinforces the court's view that the father places responsibility for his actions on loci external to him.

60.      Contrary to the father's view that his misfortune is caused by events and people who are beyond his control, I am satisfied that he is, to a degree, as an adult, the author of his own destiny, although I accept that his own childhood experiences may not have best prepared him for adversity in adulthood.  He has now had the benefit of expert assessments which have given him a clear path to recovery and to a healthy relationship with his daughter but he has chosen a different route, a route which is unsafe for Child 2.  I have therefore determined that it is not safe for Child 2 to have face to face contact with the father for the time being.

61.      Unfortunately the options available to families, like Child 2's, in Jersey are limited.  There is a charity which offers facilitated contact for children of estranged parents but this cannot offer supervised contact where testing is conducted to ensure that a child is safely able to enjoy contact for a limited period and in secure conditions with a parent with drug or alcohol issues.  The absence of such a regulated and properly run facility on the island is to the detriment of our young people who deserve every opportunity to see their parents whenever feasible.  Had such a facility been available, I would have been more inclined to consider this as an option for this child and her father.  There is no reason, in principle, why supervised contact should not take place in the long term if the welfare of the child demands it (Re S [2015] EWCA Civ 689).  However, this is not an option in Jersey and, in any event, until the father begins to address his addiction, the potential emotional harm to Child 2 outweighs the benefit to her wellbeing of growing up with a meaningful attachment to her father.

62.      In the absence of this option, I have determined that Child 2 should have indirect contact with her father in the sincere hope that the father will, in time, come to realise that Child 2 deserves his full attention and that he will finally address what are currently very concerning issues for his daughter's welfare and his physical and mental health.

63.      JFCAS have recommended that this contact should be no more than twice per annum.  The mother has agreed to read any cards/letters and pass on any gifts and I trust that she realises that it is in Child 2's best interests for her to share these with Child 2 without invective.  I consider that twice a year is not enough to ensure that Child 2 is aware of and retains a link, however tenuous, to the father who cannot currently play a more tangible role in her life, because of her young age.  I am therefore ordering that the father may exercise indirect contact with Child 2 no more than once every two months by letter, card and/or gift.  The father will need to think very carefully about ensuring that what he sends is age appropriate and that the content is intended to secure and maintain a relationship, laying a safe foundation for the time when Child 2 can safely see her father.  If, sadly, that time does not come, at least Child 2 will have tangible evidence that she has been in her father's thoughts.  If the father chooses not to take up the opportunity to be present, albeit at a distance in Child 2's life, then this will be to the detriment of both the parent and the child.

Parental responsibility

64.      Parental responsibility is usually granted by the court unless such a grant would not be in the child's best interests or is otherwise detrimental to her welfare.  Advocate Hillier, in his closing submissions, told the court that the father's commitment to the court process is evidence of his commitment to his daughter; in isolation that may be correct but it is tolerably clear that his commitment is predicated on the belief that he may gain his reward (i.e. contact) by participation.  Whether successful or not, commitment to his daughter would have been demonstrated by his engagement in prescribed treatment and therapy which might have afforded him the opportunity to create the attachment between Child 2 and him which is currently absent.  I do not doubt the father's motive in making the application - he wants to see Child 2, moreover, he considers that seeing her will assist in addressing his issues but I struggle to accept the proposition that Child 2's welfare is best served by the grant of parental responsibility to the father at this time.  I do not accept that such an order would enhance or secure Child 2's well-being or safety given the chaotic nature of the father's life.  The father is currently unable to keep himself safe.  He cannot make good choices for himself at this time, I therefore take the exceptional step of dismissing the father's application for parental responsibility.

65.      The father told the court that his name should be on Child 2's birth certificate because a child deserves to know her father.  It is, indubitably, in the best interests of every child to know the identity of their father.  I am satisfied that if the father uses the opportunity to keep in touch with Child 2 and the mother complies with her assurance to the court that she will share such communication then Child 2 need be in no doubt as to the identity of her father and the fact that she matters to him.

66.      It is not, however, within the power of this court to make an order requiring the Superintendent Registrar to alter the entries inscribed on a birth certificate.  The circumstances in which such re-registration can take place are strictly limited by the 2001 Law and the court cannot therefore make a specific issue order which has the effect of requiring the mother to comply with such re-registration which, in any event, is within the discretion of the Superintendent Registrar.  Such re-registration would have the effect of bestowing parental responsibility on the father; if the father addresses his issues, it may be that re-registration and, as a corollary, the acquisition of parental responsibility can be agreed.

Authorities

Children (Jersey) Law 2002. 

In the matter of C (A Child) [2011] EWCA Civ 521. 

LS v NS [2007] JRC 103A. 

Marriage and Civil Status (Jersey) Law 2001. 

Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000. 

Re S [2015] EWCA Civ 689. 


Page Last Updated: 03 Aug 2020


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