BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[New search]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
THE
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
CASE REF: 9610/03 IT
CLAIMANT: Jennifer Maguire
RESPONDENT: Speechmatters
DECISION ON
COSTS
The
unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the claimant pay the
respondent £10,000 costs.
Constitution
of Tribunal:
Chairman: Ms
P Sheils
Members: Mrs
S Doran
Mr
J Hughes
Appearances:
The
claimant appeared in person and represented herself.
The
respondent was represented by Mr Mark Robinson, of Counsel,
instructed by Gary N Daly Solicitors.
Background
The
claimant lodged a claim of unfair dismissal in breach of The Public
Interest Disclosure (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 on 15 December
2003 alleging that her contract of employment had been terminated
following her having raised grave concerns of financial
irregularities and false accounting with the Chief Executive of the
respondent organisation.
In
their response dated 2 February 2004 the respondents denied that the
claimant had made any allegations against any person or persons in
respect of financial irregularities and refuted the claimant’s
claim in its entirety. The Tribunal heard the evidence on various
dates between January 2007 and April 2008, sitting for a total of 58
days. A decision was recorded in the register and issued to the
parties on 26 November 2008, dismissing the claimant’s claim.
This
Hearing
The
purpose of this hearing was to hear the respondents’
application for costs against the claimant and to hear the
claimant’s comments in relation to those submissions.
The
Tribunal heard submissions from the respondents’
representative and from the claimant.
The
Respondents’ Submissions
The
respondent’s Counsel, Mr Robinson, indicated that he was
making the application for costs on foot of Schedule 1 Rule 14 of
the Industrial Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure)
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2004. Mr Robinson also referred the
Tribunal to Harvey, Division T, Practice and Procedure at paragraph
1043 et seq.
Mr
Robinson submitted that where rule 14 of the Order obliged a
Tribunal to consider
an
application for costs that the Tribunal had discretion whether or
not to award costs. Mr Robinson urged the Tribunal to exercise its
discretion in this case and to make an award for costs up to the
maximum permitted limit.
Mr
Robinson indicated that the respondents were basing its application
for costs on the grounds of the unreasonable conduct of the
claimant. Mr Robinson submitted that when making a costs order
on this ground the discretion of a Tribunal is not fettered by any
requirement to link the award of costs causally to the costs
actually incurred as a result of the conduct deemed unreasonable.
Mr
Robinson urged this Tribunal to award the maximum amount of costs
permitted under the rules. Mr Robinson went on to suggest that
under Rule 14 a Tribunal was empowered to make three separate awards
of costs thereby permitting the maximum award to be £30,000,
as opposed to £10,000. Mr Robinson suggested that this was on
the basis that the Order provided three separate grounds on which
costs could be awarded, being the vexatious, abusive, disruptive or
unreasonable behaviour of the claimant in (1) bringing or (2)
conducting these proceedings or (3) that her actions in bringing
these proceedings have been misconceived. However Mr Robinson
offered no authority in case law or other commentary to support this
submission.
Mr
Robinson submitted that the Tribunal should award costs against the
claimant for her bringing the case on the basis that in doing so the
claimant manufactured a case against the respondents. The
respondents’ need to respond to this case cost the respondents
dearly, not only in legal expenses but also in the time spent by the
witnesses attending the Tribunal and not being at their posts.
Mr Robinson indicated that the case
as manufactured by the claimant necessitated a full fraud
investigation and audit carried out by the Department of Health and
Social Services and Public Safety and the Counter Fraud Unit in the
Northern Ireland Health Service. Mr Robinson also indicated that in
answering the claimant’s manufactured claim the respondent had
to call on six witnesses external to the respondent organisation.
Mr
Robinson submitted that the claimant manufactured the entire claim
on the basis of her hatred for the Chief Executive of Speechmatters,
Mrs Jacquie White. Mr Robinson stressed that the claimant had
attacked Mrs White’s professional reputation and ability and
sought at all times to undermine her honesty and integrity. Mr
Robinson submitted that the claimant had not confined herself to
doing this within the claimant’s employment environment but
had gone further and had sought to discredit Mrs White as publicly
as possible.
In
this regard Mr Robinson referred the Tribunal to the e-mails sent by
the claimant to MLAs, journalists, numerous Government Departments
and finally to the Inland Revenue. In this latter regard Mr
Robinson submitted that the claimant had deliberately distorted the
legal advice she had been given in relation to the Inland Revenue by
suggesting that she had been directed by her lawyers to report Mrs
White when in fact this had not been the case.
Mr
Robinson also submitted to the Tribunal that paragraph 237 of the
Tribunal’s decision supported the respondents’
submission that the claimant had not made an attempt, in the
bringing of her claim and the conduct of the hearing, to assess the
viability of the evidence in the case or on the strength of her
claim. Mr Robinson stated that his submission in this regard was
further borne out by the claimant’s refusal during the hearing
to accept the independent evidence from Mr Anderson, Mr Barkley and
the financial accounts as prepared by the independent accountants.
Mr
Robinson drew the Tribunal’s attention to instances of the
claimant’s behaviour during the hearing that he submitted were
unreasonable. He submitted that these included the following; the
claimant’s attempt to “bully” the respondent by
requesting the Press to attend the first day of the hearing, her
claimant’s allegation that the respondent’s witnesses
were discussing evidence while under oath; her constant sighing
throughout the hearing in response to the evidence of the
respondent’s witnesses.
Mr
Robinson also submitted that the claimant’s behaviour was
unreasonable, at the outset of the hearing and throughout its
entirety, in that the claimant’s claim was based on the
allegation that all staff members in the respondent organisation had
been part of a conspiracy against the claimant and that during the
hearing the claimant expanded this allegation of conspiracy to
include all parties and the respondent’s witnesses, including
those who were independent of the organisation.
Mr
Robinson accepted there had been some delay on behalf of the
respondents in the production of documents during the hearing.
However, Mr Robinson indicated that these were documents requested
by the claimant at
hearing
in spite of the fact that the claimant had had legal representation
up to one month before the hearing and had therefore the benefit of
advices in relation to the issues in her case and to the use of
discovery. Mr Robinson indicated that the late timing of the
claimant’s requests and the consequent search for paper work
relating to events that had occurred four years previously made the
immediate production of some documents difficult.
However,
Mr Robinson indicated that during the search for such documents the
Tribunal continued and any delay by the respondent in this regard
was dwarfed by the delay caused by the claimant’s conduct. Mr
Robinson went on to stress that if all documentation had been
produced by the first day of the hearing to the claimant the
claimant would still not have been satisfied with the answers
provided.
Mr
Robinson urged the Tribunal to find that the claimant has also acted
in an abusive manner. Mr Robinson submitted that the claimant’s
behaviour in manufacturing a case against the respondent and the way
in which she conducted the hearing amounted to an abuse of the
Tribunal system itself.
Mr
Robinson also submitted that the claimant had behaved vexatiously on
the basis that the claimant had acted out of spite toward Mrs White
which was an improper motive for bringing a claim. Mr Robinson
referred the Tribunal to Harvey at Paragraph 1044 and the cases
cited thereat and in particular the case of E
T Marler Limited –v- Robinson 1974 ICR72 where
vexatious conduct was described thus “if
an employee brings a hopeless claim not with any expectation of
recovering compensation but out of spite to harass his employers or
for some other improper motive he acts vexatiously and likewise
abuses the procedure. In such cases the Tribunal may and will
usually award costs against the employee…”.
In
another case, Keskar
–v- Governors of All Saints Church of England School 1991 ICR
493
costs were awarded against the claimant on the basis that he was
“motivated
by resentment and spite in bringing proceedings”
and that there had been “virtually
nothing to support his allegations.”
Mr
Robinson submitted that in the instant case the claimant had not
only acted out of spite and resentment against Mrs White and the
respondent, but that there was actually nothing in the claimant’s
case to support her outrageous allegations.
Mr
Robinson submitted the Solicitor’s bill to the Tribunal. The
professional costs in the case totalled £149,225.
Mr
Robinson submitted that his application for costs gave the Tribunal
an opportunity to demonstrate that if a claimant comes before a
Tribunal and lies, deceives and otherwise abuses the Tribunal
process there will be a sanction against such a claimant. Mr
Robinson went on to stress this sanction must be effective or it
would leave open the door for other claimants so to abuse the
Tribunal by raising wholly malicious and unsubstantiated allegations
against a respondent without any risk of costs.
Mr
Robinson stressed that the claimant in this case had been put on
notice by the respondents of their intention to seek costs against
her throughout the process.
The
Claimant’s Response
The
claimant submitted that much of her confusion and misunderstanding
about her claim and during the case was due to the fact that she was
unrepresented. The claimant suggests that this had been endorsed by
the Tribunal and particularly in relation to the episode where the
claimant accused the witnesses of improperly discussing the case.
The
claimant submitted that the threat of costs had been made by the
respondent before and during the hearing purely to intimidate her
and to deter her from bringing her case. In this regard the
claimant submitted a paper issued by the Citizens’ Advice
Bureau entitled “Employment Tribunals – Intimadatory Use
of Costs, Threats by Employers’ Legal Representatives”.
The
claimant indicated that although she disagreed with the Tribunal’s
decision against her she accepted that this was the Tribunal’s
decision.
The
claimant submitted a number of documents including her business
accounts, her personal accounts and a set of accounts prepared by an
accountant. The claimant also submitted a document which appeared
to have been downloaded from the internet. This document referred
to “Unusual Asthma Symptoms”. The claimant referred the
Tribunal to the fact that “the sighing” was included in
the list of unusual asthma symptoms and reiterated her explanation
that her sighing during the evidence of the respondent’s
witnesses had been due to her asthmatic condition.
The
Law
29. The
Tribunal considered the relevant legislation and case law.
The
Legislation
30. Schedule
1 Rule 14 of the Industrial Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of
Procedure) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2004. This rules states
(14—(1)
Where, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a party has in bringing the
proceedings, or a party or a party’s representative has in
conducting the proceedings, acted vexatiously, abusively,
disruptively or otherwise unreasonably, or a party’s actions in
bringing the proceedings have been misconceived, the Tribunal shall
consider making, and if it so decides, may make-
an order containing an award against
that party in respect of the costs incurred by another party;
(3)
An order containing an award against a party (“the first
party”) in respect of the costs incurred by another party (“the
second party”) shall be—
(a)
where the Tribunal thinks fit, an order that the first party pay to
the second party a specified sum not exceeding £10,000;
31. The
Tribunal read the relevant case law and in particular the cases
referred to it by the respondents’ counsel.
The
Tribunal’s Conclusions
The
Tribunal noted that in spite of the substantial changes to the rules
and regulations in relation to the awarding of costs that the
fundamental principles remain that costs are of the exception rather
than the rule and that unlike other court hearings costs do not
follow the event.
However,
the Tribunal also noted that under Rule 14 if the Tribunal concluded
that the claimant had acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or
other wise unreasonably in the bringing or conducting of these
proceedings or that her actions in bringing the proceedings has been
misconceived the Tribunal was obliged to consider making an order
for costs. The Tribunal also noted that the exercise of its power
under Rule 14 to award costs was discretionary. In reaching its
conclusion in this case the Tribunal took account of its obligations
in relation to the exercise of its discretion, namely to act
reasonably and fairly and to address the balance of issues between
the parties.
In
addition to noting that a Tribunal has a wide discretion to awards
costs on statutory grounds the Tribunal also noted the wide range of
the statutory provisions themselves and that those grounds cover
every aspect of the proceedings including the inception of the claim
itself through to the conduct of the claimant at the substantive
hearing.
The
Bringing and Conducting of Proceedings
The
Tribunal concluded that the claimant had instigated a vicious claim
against the respondents motivated almost exclusively by her hatred
and loathing of the Chief Executive of the respondent organisation.
In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal took account of the fact
that the allegations against Mrs White went beyond Mrs White’s
alleged behaviour as Chief Executive and sought to denigrate Mrs
White not only in a professional capacity but also in her personal
and private life. In this regard the Tribunal relied on the case of
ET Marler Limited –v-
Robertson 1974 ICR72
where vexatious conduct (or conducting) proceedings was described
“If
an employee brings a hopeless claim not with any expectation of
recovering compensation but out of spite to harass his employers of
for some other improper motive he acts vexatious, and likewise
abuses the procedure. In such cases the Tribunal may and doubtless
usually will award costs against the employee …”.
The
Tribunal also concluded that the claimant had invented an
unmeritorious claim for dismissal on the grounds of a protective
disclosure on the basis that this was the only possible claim where
she could attempt to challenge the respondent’s position to
dismiss her. The claimant had not sufficient qualifying service for
a claim of unfair dismissal.
Conducting
Proceedings
The
Tribunal concluded that the claimant had behaved vexatiously,
abusively and disruptively in the conduct of the hearing of her
claim. In reaching this decision the Tribunal took account of the
unfounded allegations of serious financial misconduct put to the
respondent witnesses by the claimant while all the time she knew
that these were so unfounded.
The
Tribunal also took into account the manner in which the claimant
behaved toward the respondents’ witnesses during the hearing
and in particular the way in which the claimant sighed during the
evidence of the respondent witnesses. Although the Tribunal read the
literature provided to it by the claimant on this subject the
Tribunal did not decide whether sighing was or was not an unusual
aspect of an asthmatic condition. However the Tribunal did discount
the claimant’s assertion that her sighing in these
circumstances was on account of her having any such unusual symptom
of her asthmatic condition. The Tribunal did not accept that on
those occasions when the claimant sighed during the hearing that
this was an example of that unusual asthmatic condition. The
Tribunal noted that the claimant sighed when she was at odds with
the respondents’ evidences.
The
Tribunal also concluded that the claimant behaved disruptively
throughout the conduct of the hearing of her claim. The claimant
made unmeritorious allegations of a conspiracy against all of the
respondent’s witnesses which had the effect of requiring the
respondent’s to answer these allegations. The Tribunal took
into account that the allegations of a conspiracy involving the
respondents’ witnesses was made during the hearing, the only
basis for which was the fact that the evidence of the respondents’
witnesses and their demeanour in giving it was making it clear that
the claimant’s claim was so unmeritorious and not likely to
succeed. The conspiracy allegation was born out of the claimant’s
determination that in spite of all evidence to the contrary her
claim should succeed.
The
Tribunal also took into account the claimant’s disruptive
behaviour towards the respondents’ witnesses including the
many occasions when she accused them of lying to the Tribunal and in
particular the occasion when the claimant accused the respondents’
witnesses of discussing the case during a recess. Immediately after
the recess period the claimant raised no objections to the
respondent witnesses’ behaviour. Instead the claimant raised
the matter the following morning and did so, the Tribunal concludes,
in order simply to blacken the character of the respondents’
witnesses and seek to castigate them in the Tribunal’s eyes.
Bringing
Conducting Proceedings Misconceived
The
Tribunal noted that the form of words in the statute,
“misconceived”, replaced the previous formulation
whereby costs could be awarded against the party if, in bringing or
conducting the proceedings, the party “acted frivolously”.
The Tribunal noted the case law in this regard and concluded that
the new term “misconceived” included the claimant’s
having acted in circumstances where her claim had no reasonable
prospect of success. The Tribunal decided that this test of having
no reasonable prospect of success included an objective analysis of
the substance of the case as pleaded and presented and an analysis
of the motivation and behaviour of the claimant in the bringing or
conducting of such a claim.
In
this case the Tribunal concluded, on the basis of its finding that
the claimant had invented
the claim against the respondents that the claimant’s actions
brought her well within the understanding of “the bringing and
conducting of proceedings by a party has been misconceived”.
The Tribunal also took into account that the claimant’s
perseverance in continuing with her claim to the point that its only
success was founded on the secondary invention of a conspiracy
involving all the respondents’ witnesses which indicated to
the Tribunal that the claimant had continued with a claim that had
no reasonable prospect of success.
Accordingly
the Tribunal concluded that the claimant had in bringing the
proceedings and in conducting the proceedings acted vexatiously,
abusively, disruptively and otherwise unreasonably and that her
actions in bringing the proceedings had been misconceived. The
Tribunal decided that in these circumstances to consider making an
award of costs against the claimant.
In
deciding to make an award of costs against the claimant the Tribunal
took into account the claimant’s decision as an unrepresented
claimant. The Tribunal did not accept that the claimant was either
confused or unaware of the effect of her actions in bringing her
claim or conducting the proceedings. The Tribunal noted that the
claimant had the benefit of union support at the outset of her claim
and the benefit of legal advices up to a month before the hearing.
The
Tribunal also noted that the claimant was an intelligent and
articulate woman who appeared only to have difficulty with legal or
procedural issues when these operated against her. In fact the
Tribunal decided that the claimant frequently sought to hide behind
and take advantage of her unrepresented position and has brought
some notoriety to unrepresented claimants. The Tribunal noted Mr
Robinson’s submission that an order for costs should act as a
sanction against an unrepresented claimant making an unmeritorious
and solicitous claim and pursuing it through the Tribunal. The
Tribunal agreed with that submission as far as it went but would add
that this sanction, in the Tribunal’s view, applies to any
party who comes to a Tribunal with a vexatious and/or unmeritorious
claim, represented or not.
The
Tribunal noted that under Rule 14 of the Regulations the Tribunal
was not obliged to take into account the claimant’s ability to
pay costs. However in the exercise of its discretion and mindful of
the need to find a balance between the parties the Tribunal
considered the documentation from the claimant to assist it reach
its decision. The Tribunal had sight of some documentation
purporting to be accounts in relation to the claimant’s
earnings and her outgoings. The Tribunal also had sight of the
claimant’s personal banking accounts. The claimant offered no
further evidence of her financial position.
The
claimant did not accept Mr Robinson’s submission that in the
wording of the rule the Tribunal could award on three separate
bases. The Tribunal decided that although a Tribunal could find
that a party has in bringing the proceedings or conducting
proceedings acted vexatiously abusively, disruptively or otherwise
unreasonably or that the party’s actions in bringing
proceedings have been misconceived. The Tribunal decided that these
were instances when costs could be awarded but were not
free-standing heads of possible costs awards.
The
Tribunal also noted that Rule 14(3) (a) did provide a maximum figure
in respect of any order made by the Tribunal against the second
party and that that rule specifically referred back to the first
enabling rule, thereby acting as an upper limit on the total
awarded.
Given
its conclusions of fact in relation to the claimant’s bringing
and conducting these proceedings the Tribunal decided to award the
maximum amount of costs against the claimant, in the sum of £10,000.
Accordingly
the Tribunal orders the claimant to pay the respondent the sum of
£10,000 in respect of costs.
Chairman:
Date
and place of hearing: 13 February 2009, Belfast.
Date
decision recorded in register and issued to parties:
BAILII:
Copyright Policy |
Disclaimers |
Privacy Policy |
Feedback |
Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIIT/2009/9610_03.html