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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Fraser's Executrix v. Dale and Others [1893] ScotLR 30_421 (15 February 1893) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1893/30SLR0421.html Cite as: [1893] ScotLR 30_421, [1893] SLR 30_421 |
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An executrix being in possession of funds to which W was entitled to succeed, was sued for payment thereof by the trustees under an alleged deed of assignment granted by W for behoof of her creditors. The executrix also received a letter from W intimating that she would hold the executrix liable if she paid the funds away to anyone but herself personally.
Held that the executrix had been subjected to such double distress as rendered an action of multiplepoinding at her instance competent.
Miss Eliza Fraser died on 13th July 1885, and her only surviving sister was decerned as her executrix-dative. The deceased left personal estate which fell to be divided, one-half to her sister the executrix, and one-half to the children of a sister who had predeceased leaving two children, viz., Eliza Murray Wallace, and James Murray Wallace. At the date of Eliza Fraser's death James Murray Wallace had not been heard of for many years. The share falling to him in the event of his survivance amounted to £219, 18s. 8
d. On 26th May 1892 it was found by the Sheriff-Substitute of Aberdeen, in a petition under the Presumption of Life Limitation Act 1891 at the instance of Eliza Murray Wallace, that James Murray Wallace must be presumed to have died on 26th February 1880. 1 2 Thereafter the executrix of Eliza Fraser raised an action of multiplepoinding against Eliza Murray Wallace, and against Albert Dale and others, trustees under a deed of assignment alleged to have been granted by the said Eliza Murray Wallace, for the purpose of having it determined which of the defenders was entitled to receive the foresaid sum of £219, 18s. 8
d. 1 2 The pursuer after setting forth the facts already narrated, averred—“(Cond. 5) Under and in virtue of an alleged indenture or deed of assignment, referred to and produced in an action presently pending in the Court of Session at the instance of the
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defenders the said trustees, against the pursuer and real raiser hereof, the defenders, the said trustees, claim payment of the said sum of £219, 18s. 8 d., and have raised said action against the pursuer and real raiser therefor … (Cond 6) Explained that the pursuer has, inter alia, received from the said Eliza Murray Wallace a letter dated 19th August 1892, in which she states—‘I beg to intimate to you that I claim to receive payment of the sum of £219, 18s. 8 1 2 d. with interest, and that in the event of your paying the fund to any person other than myself personally, I will hold you liable.”’ 1 2 The defenders Albert Dale and others lodged defences, in which they objected to the competency of the action on the ground that there was no double distress.
A minute was thereafter lodged for Miss Eliza Murray Wallace, stating that she declined to allow the pursuer and real raiser to pay over the fund in medio to the other defenders, and that she had put in an appearance in the action, and intended to claim the fund in medio.
The alleged deed of assignment founded on by the defenders Albert Dale and others was dated 30th June 1890. The parties thereto were (1) Miss Wallace, (2) Albert Dale and others, therein called the trustees, and (3) certain parties who were creditors of Miss Wallace. It bore that Miss Wallace assigned and made over to the trustees, inter alia, the whole estate or effects to which she was or might be entitled, on proving that her brother James Murray Wallace was dead, in trust for payment of the debts due to her creditors, and for payment of any surplus that might remain to herself.
On 18th January 1893 the Lord Ordinary (
Wellwood ) sustained the objection to the competency and dismissed the action.“ Opinion—There is here no proper double distress.
The trustees under the deed of assignment executed by Miss E. M. Wallace brought a direct action against the real raiser as holder of the share of Miss E. Fraser's executry estate, to which their constituent Miss Wallace has been found entitled.
That fund is expressly conveyed to the trustees by the assignment, which is certainly not revocable at the pleasure of Miss Wallace, and the trustees are given full power to uplift it and apply it for the trust purposes. The claim which is said to constitute double distress is made by Miss Wallace herself, and made solely on the ground that she desires to call her trustees to account, representing that on an accounting a balance will be due to her.
If a multipleponding were competent in such circumstances, any debtor to a trust could throw the trust into Court whenever interpelled by the truster, or the truster could raise a multipleponding in the name of the debtor whenever he was dissatisfied with the actings of his trustees.
It seems to me that the debtor's proper course here is to account to Miss Wallace's trustees if satisfied of the validity of their title, and the truster's remedy is to call her trustees to account, if she thinks fit, in the usual way.
Another course was suggested by the trustees, the defenders Albert Dale and others, as to the competency of which I express no opinion, that Miss Wallace might appear for her interest in the action at their instance against the real raiser.
On the whole matter, I think there is here really only one claim which has been assigned by Miss Wallace to her trustees, and Miss Wallace being thus divested until the trust purposes are fulfilled, she has, at most, a contingent and reversionary interest in the fund, the existence or amount of which interest is at present uncertain.
I have the less hesitation in dismissing the action that I think it appears from the correspondence in process that the real raiser, or at least her agents, have throughout made Miss Wallace's cause their own, and acted in concert with her.”
The pursuer and real raiser reclaimed, and argued—The real raiser had no personal interest in the disposal of the fund which she held, but was ready to pay it to whoever might be found to be legally entitled to receive it. The fund, however, was claimed directly both by the minuter, and by the respondents. There were thus two distinct claims based on separate and hostile grounds, creating such double distress as entitled the executrix to raise an action of multipleponding— Russell v. Johnston, June 1, 1859, 21 D. 886, per Lord Kinloch, p. 887; Lattimer v. Wright and Others, November 6, 1880, 18 S.L.R. 57; Winchester v. Blakey, June 21, 1890, 17 R. 1016. An executrix was not bound to investigate the grounds on which competing claims to the fund in her hands were rested, much less to assume the responsibility of deciding between them; nor would the Court impose such a duty upon her, or any other uninterested holder of a fund. Further, Miss Wallace's right was the foundation of the right of the trustees, and she said that she had revoked the assignation on which their right was based.
Argued for the minuter, Miss Wallace—The minuter disputed the validity of the deed of assignment, and her claim was a direct claim to the fund, made in bona fide, and intended to be pressed. Being antagonistic to the claim of the trustees, it created double distress.
Argued for the defenders and respondents—The real question was whether the trustees had a valid title to discharge the executrix. That was not a question appropriate to a multipleponding— Moncrieff v. Bethune, June 1, 1844, 6 D. 1100; Connell's Trustees v. Chalk, March 6, 1878, 5 R. 735. Besides, it could be conveniently settled in the direct action brought by the respondents against the executrix which had been raised prior to the multipleponding, and to which the minuter had been invited to become a party. The Court would not readily extend the scope of the action of
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multipleponding, and always required that these should be separate and distinct claims founded on hostile grounds— Kyd v. Watherston, &c., June 5, 1880, 7 R. 884; Robb's Trustees v. Robb, &c., July 3, 1880, 7 R. 1049; Dennistoun v. Stewart & Company, December 5, 1853, 16 R. 154. The claims here were not of that character, as one source of right was common to the minuter and to the respondents. She could only take the fund through them, and her claim was merely a rider upon that of the respondents. In any view, there was no relevant statement of double claims. Bare intimation of a claim such as the minuter made was not enough to constitute double distress. It must first be contituted— Clark v. Campbell, December 12, 1873, 1 R. 281. Further, the holder of a fund was not entitled to accept the fact of two claims being made as sufficient ground for raising a multiplepoinding. He must be able to show that there was some reasonable foundation for both claims. In this case the terms of the assigation were sufficient to show that the minuter had lost all direct right to the fund in medio, and that her sole right was to an accounting by the trustees. The action was therefore incompetent. At advising—
On the question whether the real raiser has set forth a case of double distress in the sense in which that term is now understood, I am quite willing to take the definition urged upon our acceptance by Mr Johnston, which is given by Lord Kinloch in the case of Russell v. Johnston, June 1, 1859, 21 D. 886. I think the claim made in Miss Wallace's letter comes up to what is there required, and is an intimation of a competition created by “double claim to one fund on separate and hostile grounds,” each party claiming to have the right to receive the money. I could quite understand that the question whether or not there was double distress might become contentious, and even be matter of evidence, if it was said in answer to the real raiser, “You take this letter as creating double distress, but it does not represent the true claim of the writer.” I could understand that the effect and saliency of such a letter might be destroyed on the consideration of what were the true facts of the case, and that it might be made out that there was no case of double distress. But here, as I have said, the argument rests on the terms of the letter, and I find it to contain a clear intimation of a claim hostile to that of the trustees, while there is no doubt as to the claim of the trustees, for they have already brought the executrix into Court in another action. Taking the case therefore on the averments, and not on the representations made to the Lord Ordinary as to the real character of Miss Wallace's claim, I think there is such double distress as to render an action of multiplepoinding competent.
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I agree with Lord M'Laren that if an action of this kind were raised by a competing claimant we would then scrutinise the terms of the condescendence more rigorously than where the action is brought by the holder of the fund, because the real raiser in such a case undertakes to set forth his own case, and if he is to set forth a real case of double distress he must aver a relevant ground of claim. But where the real raiser is the holder of the fund he is not bound to know the exact nature of the competing claims, and all that he is required to do is to make a relevant statement of their having been competing claims made to him. At the same time I agree with Lord M'Laren that it is not enough for the real raiser merely to say that claims have been made to him, without stating some ground for them, but the material fact here is that the claim which is said to be too vague is the claim by the true creditor, and in such a case I do not think that the executrix is called upon to ascertain whether the true creditor has or has not made a valid assignation of her rights.
The Court recalled the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary, and repelled the objection to the competency of the action.
Counsel for the Pursuers and Real Raiser— Salvesen— Younger. Agent— W. Croft Gray, Solicitor.
Counsel for the Defenders Albert Dale, &c.— H. Johnston— N. J. D. Kennedy. Agents— Rusk & Miller, W.S.
Counsel for the Defenders Eliza Murray Wallace— Constable. Agent— William Balfour, Solicitor.