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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Manson v. forth and clyde steamship Co., Ltd [1913] ScotLR 687 (23 May 1913) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1913/50SLR0687.html Cite as: [1913] SLR 687, [1913] ScotLR 687 |
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Page: 687↓
[Sheriff Court at Glasgow.
A ship's carpenter while at work on board amid shavings and with oily ftrousers was severely burned owing to the shavings being set on fire through the act of a shore labourer who had come on board lighting a cigarette and throwing down a match.
Held that the accident arose out of the employment.
Magnus Charles Manson, ship's carpenter, Leith, pursuer, having claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. VII, cap. 58), from his employers the Forth and Clyde Steamship Company, Limited, Glasgow, defenders, the matter was referred to the arbitration of the Sheriff-Substitute of Lanarkshire at Glasgow (Glegg), who assoilzied the defenders, and at the pursuer's request stated a Case for appeal.
The facts were as follows:—“(1) That appellant signed on as carpenter on board the s.s. ‘Crest,’ owned by respondents, The Forth and Clyde Steamship Company, Limited, on 2lst December 1911; (2) that his wages on board said ship were £6, 10s. monthly, together with his board and lodging, which are valued at 11s. Id. per week; (3) that on 15th January 1912, when appellant was working in the poop of the said s.s. ‘Crest’ in Leghorn Harbour, a shore labourer came down the ladder lighting a cigarette and threw a match down, which fell, still alight, among some shavings on the floor of the poop, setting fire to said shavings; (4) that the fire thus causedlighted appellant's trousers, burning him severely; (5) that appellant had previous to said fire been shifting a barrel of kerosene oil, from which some oil had leaked on to his trousers; (6) that appellant was left in hospital at Leghorn, and did not arrive back in this country until 26th September 1912; (7) that he is still incapacitated as the result of the injuries sustained on 15th January 1912.”
The Sheriff-Substitute further stated—“I found that… (2) the accident to the appellant did not arise out of and in the course of his employment with the respondents. I therefore assoilzied the respondents and found them entitled to expenses.”
The questions of law included the following:—“…(2) Was I entitled to hold that the injury to the appellant was not caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the respondents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906? ”
Argued for appellants—The accident clearly arose out of the appellant's employment, for the risk of fire was reasonably incident to employment on board ship. Moreover, the appellant was specially exposed to that risk owing to the conditions in which he was working, viz., amid inflammable materials and with oily trousers. He was therefore clearly entitled to compensation— M'lntyre v. Rodger & Company, December 1, 1903, 6 F. 176, 41 S.L. R. 107; M'Lauchlan v. Anderson, 1911 S.C. 529, 48 8.L.R. 349; Wicks v. Dowell & Company, Limited, [1905] 2 KB 225; Challis v. London and South-Western Railway Company, [1905] 2 KB 154. The case was a fortiori of Murray v. Denholm & Company, 1911 S.C. 1087, 48 S.L.R. 896, for there was an entire absence of any tortious act. As to the meaning of “reasonably incident to the employment” reference was made to Morgan v. Owners of s.s. “Zenaida,” 1909, 25 T.L.R. 446 (sunstroke case); Andrew v. Failsworth Industrial Society, [1904] 2 K.B. 32; Kelly v. Kerry County Council, 1 B.C.C. 194 (lightning cases); and to Warner v. Couchman, [1912] A.C. 35 (frostbite case).
Argued for respondents—The cases cited by the appellant were distinguishable, for in all of them— apart from the cases of Murray and Warner—the risk encountered was reasonably incidental to the employment. That was not so here, for the risk of a lighted match being thrown away by a shore labourer was not a risk reasonably incident to this man's employment. It was not enough to say that because he was working amid shavings and with oily trousers the accident arose out of his employment where, as here, the accident was due to an outside cause. It might have been different had the accident been due to a spark from the ship's fires and not, as here, to the act of a shore labourer. The respondents therefore were not liable— Falconer v. London and Glasgow Engineering Company, Limited, February 23, 1901, 3 F. 563, 38 S.L.R. 381; Burley v. Baird & Company, Limited, 1908 S.C. 545, 45 S.L.R. 416; Rodger v. Paisley School Board, 1912 S.C. 584, 49 S.L.R. 413; Armitage v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company,[1902] 2 K.B. 178; Fitzgerald v. Clarke & Son, [1908] 2 K.B. 796; Clifford v. Joy, (1909) 2 B.C.C. 32; Craske v. Wigan, [1909] 2 K.B. 635; Mitchinson v. Day Brothers, [1913] 1 K.B. 603.
Page: 688↓
Under those circumstances I think that only one result can be arrived at, namely, that the accident did arise out of and in the course of the employment of the pursuer. That it arose in the course of his employment is not doubtful. It has been argued to us that it did not arise out of the employment. Now I think it did, and for a very simple reason, the pursuer had got the oil upon his trousers owing to the work to which he was put; he was surrounded by shavings on the poop owing to the work to which he was put; and therefore it was a result of the work to which he was put that the pursuer at that moment was working in a position in which he was in more than ordinarily inflammable surroundings. An accident occurred by which the inflammable surroundings were set on fire and the pursuer was injured. That, in my view, is an accident arising out of the pursuer's employment.
I think that the fallacy of Mr Horne's argument was that he treated the throwing down of the match as the accident. It was not the throwing down of the match that was the accident; the fire was the accident; but the throwing down of the match was the cause of the accident. It was through the accident, namely, the fire, that the pursuer was injured. Well, I think that was a risk to which he was exposed to a greater extent than other people because of his employment. Other people were not exposed to the risks of that fire because they had not to work on the poop among these shavings and to work with oily trousers. He was bound to work under those conditions.
I am therefore for sending back the case to the learned Sheriff-Substitute with an instruction to him to find that the accident arose in the course of and out of the pursuer's employment, and to assess the proper compensation.
The Court pronounced this interlocutor—“Answer the second question of law in the case in the negative…. Recal the determination of the Sheriff-Substitute as arbitrator: Remit the cause to him to find that the accident arose out of and in the course of the appellant's employment, and to proceed as accords, and decern.”
Counsel for Appellant— Moncrieff, K.C.—Fenton. Agent— T. M. Pole, Solicitor.
Counsel for Respondents— Horne, K.C.—Carmont. Agents— J. & J. Ross, W.S.