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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> AG v JB [2011] ScotCS CSIH_56 (13 July 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2011/2011CSIH56.html Cite as: [2011] CSIH 56, 2011 SLT 1253, 2011 GWD 28-630, [2011] ScotCS CSIH_56 |
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SECOND DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord Justice ClerkLord EmslieLady Dorrian
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[2011] CSIH 56P1573/09 OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by THE LORD JUSTICE CLERK
in the Petition to the nobile officium by
AG Petitioner;
against
JB Respondent: _______
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For the respondent: No appearance
13 July 2011
Introduction
[1] On 4 November 2009 at Kirkcaldy sheriff
court Sheriff McCulloch found the petitioner to be in contempt of court and
sentenced her to two months imprisonment. The petitioner has applied to the nobile
officium for suspension of the finding and of the sentence.
The sheriff court action
[2] The petitioner is the mother of ARG (the child), born on 20
January 2005. The respondent is ARG's father. In February 2006 the respondent raised an action
craving an award of parental rights and responsibilities and a contact order in
relation to the child under section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.
The petitioner defended the action on both points. In her defences she alleged
that the respondent had molested her on various occasions. On 29 August 2006
she obtained interim interdict against the respondent from molesting
her.
[3] On five days between 9 November 2006 and 8 February 2007 Sheriff Braid heard
proof in the action. On 5 December 2006, at a late stage in the evidence, the
petitioner's solicitor alleged that the respondent had molested the petitioner
during the lunch adjournment. The sheriff considered that this allegation
could be relevant to the respondent's claim for contact and to the interdict
that the petitioner was seeking. At that stage the petitioner had led no
evidence about any of the alleged incidents referred to in her pleadings. In
her own evidence she had not referred at all to her crave for interdict. The
sheriff gave leave to the petitioner to lodge a minute of amendment relating to
the alleged incident. He then adjourned the proof to 11 December 2006, a date convenient to the
petitioner.
[4] On 11 December 2006 the petitioner failed
to appear. Her solicitor told the court that the petitioner was too afraid of
the respondent to attend. In an attempt to progress matters the respondent
offered not to attend court while the petitioner gave further evidence. Having
telephoned the petitioner for instructions, her solicitor agreed to that
proposal. On the petitioner's motion the sheriff adjourned the proof to 29
January 2007.
[5] On 29 January 2007 the petitioner failed to
appear. Her solicitor again said that she was afraid to do so. He was unable
to obtain further instructions and withdrew from acting. The court thereafter
received a letter from the petitioner intimating that she intended not to
participate further in the process.
[6] In the result, notwithstanding the
petitioner's minute of amendment, no evidence was led about the alleged
incident on 5 December 2006.
[7] On 8 February 2007 the sheriff, in the
absence of the petitioner, heard submissions for the respondent.
[8] On 10 April 2007 the sheriff issued his
judgment. He found that it was conducive to the child's welfare that the
respondent should have parental rights and responsibilities and that the child
should have continuing contact with him. Since there was no prospect that the
petitioner would accept that the respondent should have parental rights and
responsibilities or would voluntarily allow him to have contact, the sheriff
concluded that it was better for the child that an order be made.
[9] Sheriff Braid criticised both the
petitioner's evidence and her conduct at the proof. He considered that it was perhaps
an abuse of process that on 5 December 2006 she should have caused her solicitor to introduce a
prejudicial allegation at a late stage in the case when she was apparently
unwilling to attend court to give evidence in support of it. He observed that
when the petitioner had returned to court after the lunchtime adjournment on
that occasion she had not seemed to be unduly upset or afraid of the
respondent. The sheriff could see no reason why the petitioner could not have
instructed her solicitor to make submissions based on the evidence that had
already been heard. He concluded that the petitioner was trying to manipulate
the court into finding in her favour, or had no intention of complying with
whatever order the court might make. He considered that she had shown scant
regard for the court's authority by telling him that even if an order for
contact were to be granted, she would not comply with it. He concluded that
the petitioner's opposition to contact was now so vehement that she would be
willing to lie in furtherance of it.
[10] The sheriff assigned 9 May 2007 as a child
welfare hearing at which arrangements for contact were to be made. That
hearing did not take place because the petitioner appealed to the sheriff
principal.
[11] On 25 September 2007 the sheriff principal
refused the appeal and adhered to the sheriff's interlocutor.
[12] A further child welfare hearing was fixed
for 25 October 2007. On that date the petitioner failed to appear, having
intimated to the sheriff clerk's office that she had no intention of attending
the hearing. The sheriff ordained her former solicitors to disclose her
address. He ordained her to appear at a further hearing on 16 November 2007.
[13] On 16 November 2007 the petitioner yet again failed
to appear. The sheriff was satisfied that the petitioner had had an
opportunity to be heard. He found the respondent entitled to non-residential
contact, supervised by one of his parents, every second Saturday from 12pm until 3pm with effect from 24
November 2007.
[14] The petitioner did not obtemper the
interlocutor of 16 November 2007. On 28 November 2008 the respondent
lodged a minute to have her ordained to appear to explain her continued failure
to allow contact.
[15] On 19 December 2008 there was a hearing on a
motion in terms of the minute. The petitioner failed to appear. The hearing
on the motion was continued to 28 January 2009.
[16] On 28 January 2009 the petitioner failed to
appear. The hearing was further continued to 5 February 2009 and a warrant was granted
for the arrest of the petitioner.
[17] On 5 February 2009 the petitioner failed to
appear. The sheriff again granted a warrant for her arrest.
[18] The petitioner finally appeared on 6 July
2009. A proof on the respondent's minute was fixed for 28 September 2009. On
12 September 2009 the petitioner sent a letter to the court saying that she
would not attend the proof. The sheriff clerk told her that she had to attend.
[19] On 28 September 2009 the petitioner failed
to appear. Sheriff McCulloch heard evidence from the respondent that he had
made regular efforts to see the child. On occasion the petitioner would agree,
but would then contact him to say that he could not see her. She had told him
that he would never get to see the child. The sheriff found him to be a
credible and reliable witness. The respondent's solicitor gave evidence that
the petitioner had told him on numerous occasions that she had no intention of
obtempering the court's order for contact and would ensure that the respondent
had no contact with the child.
[20] The sheriff found that the petitioner was in
contempt of court by failing to obtemper the interlocutor of 16 November 2007.
He ordained her to appear on 21 October 2009 to explain herself. That
date was intimated to the petitioner by sheriff officers both at the address
that she had given in her letter of 12 September 2009 and at the address
given as her residence in the instance of the present petition.
[21] On 21 October 2009 the petitioner failed to
appear. The sheriff issued a further arrest warrant.
[22] The petitioner was duly apprehended by
sheriff officers. On 4 November 2009 she appeared in court. She declined
the services of a solicitor. At first her only reply to the sheriff's
questions was "no comment." She then made several baseless allegations against
the respondent, court officials and the police. She said that she was not
prepared to allow any contact, notwithstanding any court order. She said that
she had a new partner and was encouraging the child to call him "dad." The
child would now be confused if the respondent were to have contact since it had
been some time since he had seen her. The petitioner was unapologetic and
unrepentant. She said that if the sheriff were to call for a social enquiry
report she would not co-operate. The sheriff noted that the petitioner had
made no attempt to have the award of contact varied. He asked her whether she
wished to do so, but she was unable or unwilling to reply. The sheriff, having
found her to be in contempt, imposed the sentence with which this petition is
concerned.
The petition
[23] In
November 2009 the petitioner lodged the present petition. She sought recall
and reduction of the interlocutor of 28 September 2009 and of the sentence
imposed on 4 November 2009, and liberation ad interim. The basic
proposition in the petition was that the sheriff had erred in making a finding
of contempt in her absence when she had had no opportunity to explain her
reasons for failing to obtemper the relevant interlocutor. On the matter of
sentence the petitioner averred that the sentence imposed was harsh and
oppressive since the sheriff had failed to call for a social enquiry report;
that she ought to have been treated as a first offender; and that she was the
primary carer of two children.
[24] Certain material averments in the petition
were later found to be untrue. The petitioner averred that before the hearing
on 28 September 2009 she had telephoned the court to advise it that she would
be unable to attend because she was unwell. When enquiries were made, it was
found that the sheriff clerk's office had had no such contact from her. She
averred that she had been unaware of the diet on 21 October 2009; but sheriff officers had
personally served notice of it on her at her home address. The petitioner also
founded on a medical certificate dated 10 September 2009, which was not on
soul and conscience and which had expired on 21 September 2009.
[25] The petition concluded with the following
critical averments:
"She is willing to undertake to obtemper the interlocutor of 16th November 2007. A copy of her undertaking is produced herewith and referred to for its terms."
The undertaking
[26] The petitioner's solicitors lodged with the
petition a handwritten undertaking dated 13 November 2009 (6/25 of process),
signed by the petitioner and witnessed by a solicitor and notary public. It is
in the following terms:
"I, [AG] born Edinburgh 2 January 1967 and currently incarcerated at HMP Cornton Vale hereby undertake to obtemper the court's order of 16 November 2007.
I do this on the understanding that the pursuer's parents will collect and return [ARG] from my home at times stated and that the pursuer will not also be present at collection and return as I wish no direct contact with him."
After this undertaking was lodged, the petitioner moved for interim liberation. On 19 November 2009 this court granted the motion and appointed the sheriff to submit a report quam primum.
The petitioner's conduct since she was granted interim liberation
Sheriff court
[27] On 9 December 2009 a child welfare hearing took
place before Sheriff McCulloch. The petitioner was present and was legally
represented. Her solicitor informed the court that the petitioner would not
adhere to the undertaking to allow contact and would not allow the respondent
to see the child under any circumstances. He moved the court to vary contact
to nil. The sheriff refused the motion. He called for a report from a
suitably qualified psychologist to advise how best the child could be
reintroduced to the respondent and could overcome the petitioner's resistance
to contact. He continued the child welfare hearing until 24 February 2010.
[28] On 24 February 2010 the petitioner failed to
attend the child welfare hearing. She produced a soul and conscience letter
from her doctor to the effect that she was unfit to attend court that day. The
letter gave no reason. Her solicitors then withdrew from acting for her.
[29] On 17 March 2010 the sheriff fixed a child
welfare hearing for 31 March 2010. The petitioner did not attend the
hearing. Her explanation was that the weather was inclement. The sheriff
fixed a further hearing for 21 April 2010.
[30] The petitioner thereafter intimated to the
court that she would not attend the hearing fixed for 21 April 2010. She
lodged a minute seeking variation of the award of contact to nil. The sheriff
appointed a hearing on the minute to be held on 19 May 2010.
[31] At the hearing on 19 May 2010, as is recorded in the
interlocutor, the petitioner said that she was no longer adhering to the
undertaking that she had given to this court and that she wished to insist upon
her minute. The sheriff fixed a proof on the petitioner's minute for 20
September 2010. That diet was in the event discharged.
[32] On 25 February and 2 and 3 March 2011
Sheriff Williamson heard a proof on the minute for variation of contact. The
sheriff reports that the petitioner did not appear on the first day of the
proof. She said that the child was ill. The sheriff accepted this
explanation. When the petitioner did appear the sheriff explained that he
would not allow her to rehearse issues that had already been determined by
Sheriff Braid. The petitioner either did not understand this
instruction or chose to ignore it. Much of her evidence was irrelevant or repetitious.
The sheriff listed several examples of her paranoid behaviour. This included a
repetition of a claim that she had been bullied by her legal representatives
into signing the undertaking, and baseless allegations against her former
solicitors and counsel, the respondent's counsel and court officials. She
eventually said that she would not engage in the court process any further. By
interlocutor of 3 March 2011 the sheriff dismissed the minute for want of
insistence.
[33] The petitioner thereupon appealed to the
sheriff principal against that interlocutor. While that appeal was pending,
she attempted to lodge a fresh minute for variation dated 17 June 2011 in which she moved the
court "to revoke and reduce to nil [the respondent's] parental rights and
responsibilities, and contact order made November 2007."
Court of Session
[34] Meanwhile, on 29 January 2010 this court
held a By Order hearing to determine further procedure in the petition. The
petitioner did not appear. The court fixed a further By Order hearing for 10 March 2010. In due course this
hearing was further continued to 12 May, 26 May, 24 November and
15 December 2010 and 4 May 2011 to await the outcome of proceedings in the
sheriff court.
[35] On 21 May 2010 the petitioner wrote to
this court to say that she had signed the undertaking under severe duress and
on the "ill advice" of a solicitor whom she had never met before. She
described the undertaking as void.
[36] At a hearing on 4 May 2011 we found that all
material averments in the petition were contradicted by Sheriff McCulloch in
his reports. We had no reason to doubt the sheriff's account of matters. We
refused the prayer of the petition so far as it sought recall of the
interlocutor of 28 September 2009.
[37] Realising that we might also refuse the
petition in relation to sentence, the petitioner at the last minute offered to
give us a further undertaking in the following terms:
"I [AG][address] Believing that I am going to be incarcanited (sic) and agree to drop proceedings and allow [the respondent] contact with [ARG] (Sgd) [AG]"
[38] The petitioner made clear to us that by
"dropping proceedings" she meant withdrawing her defences to the sheriff court
action and abandoning her appeal to the sheriff principal.
[39] We did not accept the petitioner's
undertaking, for three reasons. Firstly, it was too vague to be of any
practical value. Secondly, we were not prepared to negotiate with the
petitioner about whether she would obtemper a court order. Thirdly, we had no
faith whatever in any undertaking from her, since she had obtained interim
liberation on an undertaking that she had thereafter disclaimed. We continued
consideration on the matter of sentence until 1 June 2011 for the preparation
of a social enquiry report. We made it clear to her that in reaching our
decision on that occasion we would take into account whether she had made
satisfactory and effective arrangements for the respondent to have contact with
the child. We continued interim liberation.
[40] On 1 June 2011 we considered the question of
sentence. Our opinion was that the sentence had been entirely appropriate when
it was passed. However, the petitioner told us that with the assistance of
Relationships Scotland she would give the respondent supervised contact with
the child on 18 June 2011.
[41] In the child's interests we were anxious not
to jeopardise these arrangements. We therefore continued our consideration of
sentence until 29 June 2011 to await a report from Relationships Scotland and to ascertain whether
the petitioner had withdrawn her defences to the sheriff court action and
abandoned her appeal to the sheriff principal, as she had said she would.
[42] The petitioner then enrolled what purported
to be a motion for review of the interlocutor of 1 June 2011. She stated that
this had been prompted by her receipt of what she considered to be an abusive
letter from the respondent. She submitted that the order for contact should be
"suspended." She enrolled a motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
[43] On 16 June 2011 the petitioner informed
Relationships Scotland that the proposed contact meeting would not take place.
[44] On the same day the petitioner wrote to our
clerk to say that she would not attend the hearing on 29 June 2011 because she had been
signed off work by her doctor for three weeks following a miscarriage. She
enclosed a copy of a certificate from Dr M Yule, Kinghorn Medical Centre, which
was not written on soul and conscience. On 23 June 2011 the petitioner submitted
a letter from Dr Yule stating on soul and conscience that the petitioner was
unable to attend the hearing due to "her current mental health". The
certificate did not specify why she was unable to attend court or when she
would be able to do so. In a covering letter the petitioner said that she was
suffering from anxiety and depression. She asked that a new date be fixed
"outwith the end of my anticipated length of illness" and taking account of her
plans for a summer holiday. The hearing was then discharged and a new hearing
was fixed for 6 July.
[45] On 5 July the petitioner submitted a
certificate from Dr Yule to the effect that she would be unable to attend
court. On 6 July the petitioner sent an email to the court at 9.43am saying that she would not attend.
We therefore pronounced an interlocutor ordaining the petitioner to appear on
13 July and ordaining Dr Yule to appear at that date and to produce the
relevant medical records of the petitioner.
[46] At this diet the petitioner told us that she
had not withdrawn her defences to the sheriff court action nor abandoned her
appeal to the sheriff principal. She also confirmed that she had recently attempted
to lodge a further minute in the sheriff court process for variation of the
award of contact to nil. In addition, she made it clear that, although the
respondent had in fact seen the child on 9 July, this was not the result of any
voluntary act on her part since she had every intention of terminating such
contact in pursuance of her minute for variation of 17 June.
Conclusions
[47] This case exemplifies yet another attempt by
a custodial parent to sever the bond between the other parent and their child
by means of delaying tactics and in due course by protracted defiance of an
order of the court. This court has already made clear its disapproval of such
conduct (TAM, Petr [2009] CSIH 44). The petitioner presented a
confrontational challenge to the authority of the sheriff by wilfully defying
his interlocutor of 16 November 2007. Her defiance not only thwarted the respondent's rights but
undermined the rule of law. Conduct of this kind constitutes a grave contempt
of court. It cannot be said that the sentence imposed was excessive.
[48] On 4 May 2011 and on 1 June 2011 we continued consideration
of the question of sentence. We did so with the child's interests in mind and
in the hope that the petitioner would see sense. The petitioner has exploited
those opportunities. Her various assurances that she would allow the
respondent to have contact in terms of the original order, that she would withdraw
her defences to the sheriff court action and that she would abandon her appeal
to the sheriff principal have been shown to be false. They were simply part of
the manipulative stratagems by which for several years she has frustrated the
respondent's attempts to obtain contact with his child.
[49] The present process has gone far enough. We
shall now refuse the prayer of the petition so far as it relates to sentence.
Contempt of court (Court of Session)
[50] There remains the question whether the
petitioner is also in contempt of this court in respect of her breach of the
undertaking dated 13 November 2009 that she granted in foro. We shall appoint a hearing
to be held on 4
October 2011
at which we shall hear submissions on that question and on the question of
sentence, if it should arise.