APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE BY PGT AGAINST HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE [2020] ScotHC HCJAC

BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £5, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE BY PGT AGAINST HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE [2020] ScotHC HCJAC_14 (02 April 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2020/2020_HCJAC_14.html Cite as: [2020] ScotHC HCJAC_14, 2020 GWD 13-190, 2020 JC 205, [2020] HCJAC 14

[1] On 8 May 2019 at the High Court in Glasgow the appellant was convicted of

“(1) On an occasion between 13 March 1997 and 12 March 1999 … at an address in

Beechwood Road … Cumbernauld you … did indecently assault [GT] born … 1985,

your nephew, and did induce him to consume alcohol, remove his lower clothing,

touch his penis, masturbate him, push him face down onto a bed, lie on top of him,

penetrate his anus with your penis and have unnatural carnal connection with him;

(2) on an occasion between 1 … and 31 March 2000 … at an address in

Beechwood Road, Cumbernauld … you … did indecently assault [GT], born … 1985,

your nephew … and did touch his penis and testicles over his clothing; and

(3) on an occasion between 1 January … and 31 December 2006 … at …

Dalshannon Place, Cumbernauld you … did assault [BT] your wife … and did seize

hold of her, remove her lower clothing, lie on top of her, penetrate her vagina with

[2] The complainer in charges (1) and (2) is the appellant’s nephew. On the first charge,

he spoke to an incident in which, as libelled, the appellant had assaulted him and committed

an act of sodomy. This took place when the complainer was 12 or 13 years of age. He had

gone to the appellant’s home in Cumbernauld in response to a request to fix a computer.

The appellant had given the complainer alcohol, which had made him feel dizzy. The

complainer and the appellant had gone into a bedroom. The complainer remembered lying

on his back. The appellant had come in, removed the complainer’s clothing and committed

the act libelled. He said to the complainer that he (the complainer) was the black sheep of

the family and that he would get him into trouble with his parents unless he co-operated.

This made the complainer afraid, as he did not wish to upset his mother and father.

[3] The second charge related to an incident in March 2000 when the complainer was

15 years of age. It also occurred in the appellant’s home, after a party at the complainer’s

grandparents’ home to celebrate their golden wedding. The complainer had been drinking

at the party. He was given more drink when he arrived at the appellant’s home. The

incident took place in the bedroom. The appellant threatened to tell the complainer’s

parents about his (the complainer’s) bad behaviour unless he co-operated. The appellant

began to touch the complainer’s private parts over his clothing. The complainer was

frightened and ran out of the house. He did not tell anyone about either incident until 2017,

when he reported it to the appellant’s former wife (BT) who was the complainer in the third

[4] BT gave evidence about charge 3. It had occurred in 2006 when she and the

appellant had returned home after a social event. The appellant was “very drunk”. The

complainer had wanted to go to sleep and had put the light out. The appellant became

angry. He had said “you’re my wife so don’t turn off the light”. He said that he could tell

her what to do, because she was his wife. He told her that she was not going to sleep. He

then removed her lower clothing, lay on top of her and raped her. After the incident, the

appellant told the complainer not to tell her parents or sister about what had happened. He

gave her £10 to “keep her mouth shut”. The complainer had not told the police about the

incident until 2017, when she had told the complainer in charges 1 and 2.

[5] The trial judge repelled the no case to answer submission on the basis of the

following similarities between the offences which were said to permit the application of

mutual corroboration: (1) the offences took place in the appellant’s home; (2) both major

incidents involved forced penile penetration; (3) both complainers were vulnerable; (4)

each was a relative of the appellant; (5) in each crime the appellant removed the

complainer’s lower clothing; (6) the crimes were committed in a bedroom with no-one else

present; (7) in each crime the appellant took steps to ensure that the complainer did not tell

anyone else; and (8) both crimes were committed when both complainers were under the

influence of alcohol, to a greater or lesser extent, and the appellant had also consumed

alcohol. The judge took the view that the time gaps involved were not so lengthy that

[6] During the course of his address to the jury, the advocate depute explained why, in

his submission, the jury should accept the complainer GT’s evidence. This was that it was

not the only evidence in the case. Quite apart from the application of mutual corroboration,

“Why, you might ask yourselves would two entirely different people come forward

and make such similar allegations against this man? Given what you heard from

[the police] regarding the accused’s position at interview and the lines of cross-

examination … it is clear that it is the accused’s position that both complainers are

lying. But why? Why would both complainers say these things about the accused?

Why would both [GT] and [BT] accuse him of, in effect, the same thing? ... [T]he

answer is obvious: because they are telling the truth. [GT’s] account is fully

supported by that of [BT] because … If you step back and look at the case as a whole,

they are really speaking about the same thing. They have both accused [the

appellant] of abusing and sodomising or raping them because that is precisely what

[7] In relation to BT’s evidence, which was said to be corroborated by that of GT, the

“The evidence of those two people make it crystal clear that the accused pursued a

course of criminally sexual conduct towards them and that they were in effect, both

speaking to the same thing. I have already explained why I suggest that that is so

[8] The trial judge gave the jury the standard directions on the application of mutual

corroboration. He explained that, if the jury were satisfied that the crimes charged were so

closely linked by their character, circumstances, place and time as to bind them together as

parts of a single course of criminal conduct systematically pursued by the accused, then the

evidence of a single witness about the commission of one crime could be sufficiently

corroborated by the evidence of another single witness about the commission of another

crime or crimes. It was the underlying similarity of the conduct which had to be considered

in determining whether the principle applied. In order to convict of any of the charges the

jury had to accept the complainers as credible and reliable. The judge continued:

“... [I]t is the underlying similarity of the conduct ... which you have to consider in

deciding whether the doctrine applies. It does not matter that the charges have

different names or are more or less serious. For the doctrine to apply, you have to

believe the witnesses who speak to the individual charges at least about the essential

... [I]f you do not believe a complainer ... or you do not find his or her evidence to be

reliable, that charge cannot be proved and you would be bound to acquit the accused

of it. If you do accept the evidence of a complainer ... you may be able to find

corroboration from the other witness who speaks to a different charge alleging

If you do accept that witness’s evidence, you then have to decide if, by reason of the

character, circumstances, place of commission and time of each charge, the crimes are

so closely linked that you can infer that the accused was systematically pursuing a

single court of criminal conduct. ...[I]t is not enough if all that is shown is that the

accused had a general disposition to commit this kind of offence.

… You have to apply this rule with caution, particularly where there are significant

intervals of time as there may be in this case and where there are only two witnesses,

which of course the bare minimum permissible in order to allow the doctrine to be

applied. … The Crown says that the rule can be applied in this case. It relies on the

points of similarity, which were highlighted to you by the advocate depute in his

If there are significant differences in the circumstances or the individual charges, it

does not mean that you cannot find that there is mutual corroboration but the

differences would form part of your exercise of evaluation as to whether it was being

[Counsel] for the accused says that the rule should not be applied. He relies upon

the points of dissimilarity which he highlighted to you in his speech. …

… It is entirely a matter for you to decide whether the rule can and should be applied

[9] The appellant submitted, first, that there was insufficient connection between

charges 1 and 2 on the one hand and charge 3 on the other to allow the application of mutual

corroboration. On no reasonable view could it be said that the circumstances were such as

to demonstrate that the individual incidents were component parts of one course of conduct

persistently pursued by the accused (MR v HM Advocate 2013 JC 212 at para 20, cf Adam v

HM Advocate [2020] HCJAC 5). Mutual corroboration could be applicable between charges

with a comparable level of similarity but with a much shorter time gap. It could be

applicable between charges with a comparable time gap when the level of similarity was

much greater. It had no application in cases such as the present where the circumstances

were not particularly similar, the time gap between them was significant and the number of

occasions when the behaviour was said to have taken place was small. It was the time gap

which appeared from the evidence which was important; not that libelled in the charge.

[10] When determining whether it could be inferred that two incidents were truly

component parts of a course of conduct persistently pursued, time was a crucial

consideration (Moorov v HM Advocate 1930 JC 68 at 89, cited in RB v HM Advocate 2017 JC 278

at para 28). There was no arbitrary dividing line between long gap cases, which required

compelling or extraordinary similarities, and standard gap cases, which did not. The

question was always whether the allegations were capable of being considered as

constituent parts of a course of conduct persistently pursued. A lack of strength in one

similarity required extra force from the others (Tudhope v Hazelton 1985 SLT 209 at 212 citing

Ogg v HM Advocate 1938 JC 152). It was not possible to lay down a maximum period beyond

which mutual corroboration could not be applied (Dodds v HM Advocate 2003 JC 8), but a

[11] The observations in Reynolds v HM Advocate 1995 JC 142, that the application of

mutual corroboration was something which should be left to the jury unless on no possible

view could it be said that there was any connection between the charges, were, if not wrong,

prone to be misunderstood. They involved an incorrect understanding of what was said in

Moorov. What had been said in Reynolds was merely shorthand for saying that a submission

ought only to be sustained when, on no possible view of the similarities and dissimilarities

in time, place and circumstance, could it be held that the individual incidents were

component parts of one course of conduct persistently pursued (A(R) v HM Advocate 2019

SLT 1171; Donegan v HM Advocate 2019 SCCR 106 at para [38]). References to “open

country” and “middle ground” tended to suggest the existence of wide open expanses in

which the matter would lie within the province of the jury. Donegan v HM Advocate (supra)

was also apt to be misunderstood. It was not correct to say that, at the stage of a no case to

answer submission, it did not matter if there were dissimilarities. The court rejected the idea

that it was only in extreme cases that a no case to answer submission should be upheld (RF v

HM Advocate 2016 JC 189 at para 23). The role of the trial judge at that stage was more

significant than some of the observations in Donegan might suggest. The need for the court

to conduct a vigorous analysis of the evidence was doubly important, given the risks in a

mutual corroboration case. Donegan was contrary to Moorov and the reasoning in it could

not be justified by reference to Reynolds. The principle in Moorov had been developed since

the 1930s, but there were now expressions of opinion to the effect that it had been extended

beyond what had been intended (A(R) v HM Advocate 2019 SLT 1171 at paras [43] and [48]).

[12] It was not enough simply to catalogue some similarities and to dismiss others for

mutual corroboration to apply. There required to be an overall similarity (HM Advocate v

SM (No 2) 2019 SCCR 262 at para [8]). The phrase “a course of conduct” may be a useful

shorthand, but it came with the rider of “systematically pursued” (RB v HM Advocate 2017

JC 278 at paras [21-22]). The charges involved only 2 complainers and 3 incidents. There

was a significant passage of time between charges 1 and 2 on the one hand and 3 on the

other. The similarities indicated little more than a disposition towards general sexual

offending. Whilst each offence occurred in the context of familial relationships, that was no

[13] The second ground of appeal was the failure of the trial judge to correct the error in

the advocate depute’s speech in relation to using the similar nature of the different charges

in the assessment of the complainers’ credibility and reliability. The correct approach was

for the jury to assess the credibility of each complainer separately, based solely on their own

testimony and any other evidence specifically relating to the particular allegation, and

without reference to testimony concerning other allegations. Only if the jury found each

complainer to be credible and reliable could they go on and consider the applicability of

mutual corroboration. The trial judge ought to have a clear and emphatic direction that the

approach advocated by the advocate depute was incorrect. He should have directed the

jury that it was not open to them to use another sexual allegation by a different complainer

to support the credibility and reliability of a complainer in a general way, separate from and

prior to its use as corroboration. The obiter opinions of the court in Dreghorn v HM Advocate

2015 SLT 602 (at [35] and [42] et seq) were divided. Lord Malcolm’s observations were

[14] Thirdly, the trial judge had misdirected the jury in relation to the approach to mutual

corroboration. The direction, that the existence of significant differences in the

circumstances did not mean that the jury could not apply mutual corroboration, was

inconsistent with the correct direction that the circumstances had to be “so closely linked” to

bind them together as a single course of conduct systematically pursued. Given the time

gap, the jury required to find more than simply “broadly similar” conduct. It was

incumbent on the judge to give the jury a direction that they would need to find some

special feature of the behaviour which rendered the similarities compelling (see Scottish Jury

Manual: Possible Form of Direction on the Moorov Doctrine; CS v HM Advocate 2018 SCCR 329

at para [11]). It was the existence of the significant time gap that triggered the direction

recommended in the Jury Manual. If the time gap was not sufficient to require the

suggested direction, some other direction should have been given to make it clear that the

longer the time gap, the greater the need for strong similarities in character and

[15] The advocate depute submitted that the evidence led was eloquent of a single course

of criminal conduct persistently pursued by the appellant. The trial judge had correctly

allowed the matter to be considered by the jury. Although there was no maximum interval

beyond which mutual corroboration could not apply, where there was a decrease in the

similarities in time, there required to be a corresponding increase in the similarities of

circumstance. Where the gap was significant, extraordinary features of circumstance were

required (RBA v HM Advocate 2019 SCCR 349 at para [35]; AK v HM Advocate 2012 JC 74 at

paras [14-15]; and Adam v HM Advocate (supra) at para [35]). No compelling or extraordinary

similarities were required in this case (RMY v HM Advocate (supra) at para [5]). There was

sufficient evidence, as described by the trial judge, from which it could be inferred that the

individual incidents were component parts of the requisite course of conduct. Whilst there

were dissimilarities, mutual corroboration could still apply (Livingstone v HM Advocate 2014

SCCR 675 at para [17]). It could not be said that on no possible view could the episodes be

regarded as component parts of such a course (Reynolds v HM Advocate (supra) at para [146];

and HM Advocate v SM (No. 2) (supra) at para [8]). The offences occurred in a domestic

setting against a background of coercion and control. Taken in conjunction with the

penetrative nature of the sexual activity, the totality of the conduct displayed the requisite

course (SM v HM Advocate [2018] HCJAC 22 at paras [9-12]; TN v HM Advocate 2018 SCCR

109 at paras [11-17]; HM Advocate v MM 2020 SCCR 41 at paras [11-12]; McCafferty v HM

Advocate [2019] HCJAC 92 at paras [19-20]; and AL v HM Advocate [2016] HCJAC 120 at

[16] The jury were entitled to take into account the totality of the evidence when

approaching credibility and reliability of the complainers (Dreghorn v HM Advocate 2015

SCCR 349 at para [35]). Although mutual corroboration concerned sufficiency, it could also

assist in determining whether the testimony of a witness should be accepted (Adam v HM

Advocate (supra) at para [28]). The comments of the advocate depute had not detracted from

[17] The charge required to be looked at as a whole (Walker v HM Advocate 2014 JC 154 at

para [25] ). The reference by the judge to “broadly similar conduct” had to be seen in its

context, which was within his directions on mutual corroboration. The direction was at that

point in the charge when the judge was directing the jury that they had to consider the

course of conduct regardless of the particular nomen criminis. The trial judge required to

tailor his directions to reflect the live issues at trial (Lauder v HM Advocate [2016] HCJAC 30

at para [13]; Elshirkisi v HM Advocate 2011 SCCR 735 at para [13]; Fenton v HM Advocate 2014

SCCR 489 at paras [6] and [11]; and Sim v HM Advocate 2016 JC 174 at para [32]).

[18] The first question is whether the testimony of the two complainers displayed the

requisite similarities in time, place and circumstance, such as could demonstrate that the

individual incidents were component parts of one course of criminal conduct persistently

pursued by the accused. Whether those similarities exist is a question of fact and degree

(Adam v HM Advocate [2020] HCJAC 5, LJG (Carloway), delivering the opinion of the court,

at para [29], citing HM Advocate v SM (No. 2) 2019 SCCR 262 and MR v HM Advocate 2013 JC

212). It is only where “on no possible view” could it be said that the individual incidents

were component parts of such a course of conduct that a no case to answer submission

should be upheld (ibid, citing MR v HM Advocate (supra); Donegan v HM Advocate 2009 SCCR

106; and Reynolds v HM Advocate 1995 JC 142). In this case, for the application of mutual

corroboration, where there was a gap of several years between the offences, the similarities

in the place and circumstances of the offences required to be such as allowed the jury

nevertheless to draw the appropriate inference relative to a course of criminal conduct

persistently pursued. As detailed by the trial judge (supra) at para [5], there were such

similarities, notably the familial circumstances of the offences and the fact that they took

place in the appellant’s home. There were other similarities and dissimilarities, but it could

not be said that on no possible view could the jury draw the appropriate inference. In the

[19] The appellant’s second contention, that the credibility of a complainer in a mutual

corroboration case should be tested within a single silo containing only evidence relating to

that complainer’s allegation, contemplates a situation whereby, no matter how many

complainers have made allegations against an accused, perhaps of a very similar nature, the

fact of the multiplicity of complaints cannot be taken into account in the credibility equation.

This argument was rejected by the majority in Dreghorn v HM Advocate 2015 SCCR 349 (LJG

(Carloway) at para [35], Lady Cosgrove at para [48]; see also Adam v HM Advocate (supra) at

para [26]). Reference was made in Dreghorn to the reasoning in Attorney-General of Hong

Kong v Wong Muk Ping [1987] AC 5011 in which the Privy Council (Lord Bridge at pp 510-

512) stated that potentially corroborating testimony can be taken into account in the

assessment of the credibility of the witness whose testimony requires corroboration. In light

of the submission made by the appellant, it may be of value to dig a little deeper into the

Privy Council’s reasoning to see how it might resonate in Scots law.

[20] The problem, which arose in Wong Muk Ping, concerned the principle whereby the

trial judge required to direct the jury on the dangers of convicting a person on the basis of

the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices. At that time, the same principle applied in

Hong Kong to the evidence of complainers in sexual offences and that of young children.

The ground of appeal against conviction had been the trial judge’s failure to direct the jury

that the evidence of an accomplice had to be regarded as credible before it could be used as

corroboration. In particular, the contention was that the jury had, first, to consider the

credibility of the testimony of the “suspect” witness in isolation from the other evidence in

1 The citation at para [35] in Dreghorn to R v Morris is wrong and misplaced. It may have been

intended to be a reference to Morris (1969) 54 Cr App R 69, but that pre-dated Wong Muk Ping. See,

however, Willoughby (1989) 88 Cr App R 91 at 94 and Jelen (1990) 90 Cr App R 456 at 462.

the case. If they did not find it credible, it had to be rejected in limine. Only if the jury found

the testimony to be credible could the jury proceed to the second stage and use it as

corroboration. The precise dictum of the court was as follows (at 510):

“It is a commonplace of judicial experience that a witness who makes a poor

impression in the witness box may be found at the end of the day, when his evidence

is considered in the light of all the other evidence bearing upon the issue, to have

been both truthful and accurate. Conversely, the evidence of a witness who at first

seemed impressive and reliable may at the end of the day have to be rejected. Such

experience suggests that it is dangerous to assess the credibility of the evidence given

by any witness in isolation from other evidence in the case which is capable of

throwing light on its reliability; it would ... be surprising if the law requiring juries to

be warned of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a witness ...

should have developed to the point where ... the jury must be directed to make such

It was, in short (at 511), wrong to direct the jury to adopt a two stage test.

[21] Generally, evidence is admissible if it is relevant to proof of a fact in issue; ie that it

makes that fact more or less probable. That is subject to certain rules of evidence which

exclude testimony on various grounds or prohibit its use for particular purposes. It is

important that, in so far as it is necessary to do so, these rules can be explained to juries in an

intelligible manner (see generally Scottish Law Commission: Hearsay Evidence in Criminal

Proceedings (SLC no. 149) para 2.3 et seq). As a generality however, subject to these rules,

once evidence is deemed admissible, it is available for the jury’s consideration at large in the

manner which the jury deem appropriate. It is simply not practicable, nor does it accord

with common sense, to direct a jury that, although they, as well at the trial judge, may, in the

modern era, require to determine whether a complainer’s testimony is formally corroborated

by that of another, they cannot take the existence of that other’s testimony in determining

whether the first complainer’s account is credible and/or reliable. It defies reason to suggest

that the existence of a second complainer, with an account of the same nature as is required

to establish mutual corroboration, can play no part at all in assessing the credibility of the

[22] The exercise for the jury is not one to be carried out in isolation or in strict sequence.

The jury require to determine whether they accept the complainers as credible and reliable.

They also need to decide whether mutual corroboration is applicable. If the jury does not

consider both (or more) complainers to be credible and reliable, or if the jury consider that

mutual corroboration does not apply, an acquittal must follow. How a particular jury goes

about these tasks, which are concerned with the assessment of matters of fact, is for the jury

to determine. There may be a degree of circularity, but it is none the worse for that. In some

cases the value of the other complainer’s evidence in the assessment of credibility and

reliability may be minimal. In others, where the similarities are great, it may be

considerable. These considerations fall firmly into the jury’s province and involve a

practical application of the jury’s combined intelligence and experience. In the Scots system,

as explained in Adam v HM Advocate (supra) at para [26], there is already a limiter on the

type of evidence which is put before a jury for this exercise, notably the exclusion of general

similar facts evidence which is not capable of providing mutual corroboration in the

conventional manner. The trial advocate depute’s approach in addressing the jury cannot be

faulted. There was no need for a correction by the trial judge. This ground of appeal is

[23] On the third ground of appeal, the trial judge’s directions on the application of

mutual corroboration were unexceptionable. He stressed the need to hold that it could only

apply if the jury held that the incidents were parts of a single course of conduct

systematically pursued by the appellant. He focussed the jury’s mind on the necessity to

find an underlying similarity in the conduct. He said that mutual corroboration had to be

applied with caution, particular where there were significant intervals of time and only two

complainers. The reference to “broadly similar conduct” was made in the context of a

direction that it was not necessary for the nature of the conduct to involve the same crime or

level of seriousness. No misdirection is apparent. This ground also fails, with the

[24] The trial judge described the circumstances in charge 1 as a vicious attack, involving

forced penile penetration committed against a 12 or 13 year old child. Charge 3 was the rape

of the appellant’s wife in circumstances in which he sought to exert control and authority

over her as her husband and subjected her to a cruel and humiliating attack. The appellant

had three previous convictions, all of which were for sexual offences. In 1980 he had been

placed on probation on 4 charges of lewd and libidinous practices. In October 1980 in

relation to that case, he had been committed to a mental hospital. In 1983 he was placed on

probation in respect of 2 charges of lewd and libidinous practices. In 1985 he was convicted

of assault with intent to ravish and again committed to a mental hospital. He was

transferred to the State Hospital Carstairs, where he remained until 1988. He was

discharged conditionally from Lennox Castle Hospital in 1992. Although the appellant did

not suffer from a mental disorder, he was of low intelligence and suffered a degree of

[25] It was submitted that 10 years was excessive, having regard to the appellant’s mental

deficiencies, the absence of previous custodial sentences and his age (56). He had had a

heart attack in 2017 and suffered from high blood pressure. The judge could have imposed

[26] There was no basis for an extended sentence. For such a sentence to have been

imposed, the sentencing judge would have to have been satisfied that, upon his release, the

appellant would pose a risk of serious harm to the public (Criminal Procedure (Scotland)

Act 1995, s 210A). Given that the most recent of the offences occurred at least 13 years ago

and the appellant was now aged 56, it is difficult to say that, even were he to be released on

parole in 4 or 5 years time, the appellant would pose such a risk; although that is what the

[27] Were it not for the significantly low level of the appellant’s intelligence, the period of

custody selected by the trial judge could not be regarded as other than appropriate. Once

the appellant’s level of intellectual functioning is taken into account, the court is satisfied

that the sentence is excessive. It will quash that of 10 years and substitute one of 8 years

Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons