APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE BY JB AGAINST HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE [2020] ScotHC HCJAC_35 (25 August 2020)
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Lord Menzies
Lord Pentland
APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
[2020] HCJAC 35
HCA/2020/000078/XC
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD MENZIES
in
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
by
JB
against
HER MAJESTY’S ADVOCATE
Appellant: Duff; WSA Solicitors
Respondent: Gray, solicitor advocate, AD; Crown Agent
Appellant
Respondent
25 August 2020
[1] The appellant appeared at the High Court at Glasgow on 6 January 2020 and
tendered a plea in terms of the section 76 procedure to an indictment which libelled that on
14 April 2019 at an address in Edinburgh he did assault Adam Shafie and did repeatedly
strike him on the body with a knife, to his severe injury, permanent disfigurement and to the
danger of his life and did attempt to murder him.
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[2] At an adjourned diet at the High Court at Glasgow on 7 February 2020 the appellant
was sentenced to 4 years detention (backdated to 6 January 2020), this being discounted
from a starting point of 6 years to reflect the early plea of guilty. It is against this sentence
that the current appeal is directed. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the
sentencing judge erred in imposing a custodial sentence in all the circumstances – most
importantly because of the appellant’s youth (he was aged 16 at the date of the offence as
was his victim), the fact that he had no previous convictions and had never been in any
trouble and the offence was quite out of character. Alternatively if the court concluded that
the sentencing judge was correct to take the view the offence was so serious that only a
custodial sentence was appropriate, it was submitted that the starting point of 6 years
detention before discount was excessive in all the circumstances.
[3] The facts of the incident were set out in an agreed narrative, the salient features of
which were as follows:
“At 1700 hours on 14th April 2019, the complainer and a friend were walking on
Gilmerton Road, Edinburgh across from Aldi. The appellant was in the house at
403 Gilmerton Road (his friend’s house). He and his friend ran out of the house. The
appellant was carrying a pink kitchen knife. He ran to the complainer and attacked
him by stabbing him repeatedly with the knife. The appellant then left and went back
to the house and then ran towards the woods at Ellen’s Glen.”
The complainer collapsed at the side of the road and a number of passers-by stopped to help
him. Police with dogs conducted a search of the woods near to Ellen’s Glen but did not find
the appellant. The incident was captured on CCTV footage, a detailed synopsis of which
was given in the narrative of facts. This showed the appellant running with his hands in his
pockets, on the roadway towards the complainer. He removed his hands from his pockets
just prior to reaching the complainer. The knife could be seen in the appellant’s right hand.
It was held in the fist and pointed towards the ground. It was pulled back prior to striking
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the complainer. The appellant could clearly be seen holding the knife at head height and
striking the complainer three separate blows with the knife.
[4] The complainer was treated by paramedics at the scene and then taken to Edinburgh
Royal Infirmary. He sustained three penetrating stab wounds to his left anterior chest (5cm),
left flank (15cm) and a superficial wound to his left back. He sustained a
haemopneumothorax, a splenic laceration, injury to the tail of the pancreas, bronchopleural
fistula, and left upper lobe collapse. He required surgery, from which he will have a scar. It
is anticipated he will make a full physical recovery without any significant impairment, but
his injuries were life threatening.
[5] At the diet on 6 January 2020 counsel for the appellant told the court that the
appellant was aged 17 and had been aged 16 at the time of the offence. He had never been
in trouble and lived with his mother, who was present in court with him. He was in
employment. At school he had obtained a qualification to become a mechanic and had been,
at the time of the incident libelled, in the process of qualifying to become an electrician. He
had acted impulsively as a teenage boy who now bitterly regretted his actions. The
appellant knew that there was only one sentence which the court would impose. A sentence
of detention was inevitable, the appellant’s counsel observed, and the appellant had faced
up to what he did.
[6] At the adjourned diet for sentence on 7 February 2020 the criminal justice social work
report was available, and in addition there was provided on behalf of the appellant a
psychological report from Dr Suzanne Zeedyk, a developmental psychologist who
considered whether the appellant had experienced childhood trauma. Dr Zeedyk concluded
that he had indeed experienced significant childhood trauma resulting in toxic childhood
stress which altered the body’s self-regulatory system, leaving individuals less able to
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manage strong emotions. In light of the CJSWR and Dr Zeedyk’s report, and on the basis of
the well-known authorities regarding the principles to be applied when sentencing a child,
all as helpfully set out in a very detailed and full written plea-in-mitigation, counsel
submitted that in the particular circumstances of this case a robust community disposal as
an alternative to custody was an appropriate and proportionate sentence that reflected all
that is required by society but that has, as a primary consideration of sentencing, the best
interests of this child.
[7] The sentencing judge has provided a very careful and balanced report to this court,
which includes his sentencing remarks. He has clearly taken account of everything said to
him in mitigation, and the terms of the CJSWR and Dr Zeedyk’s report. His sentencing
remarks included the following:
“[4] In the whole circumstances I have concluded nevertheless that the gravity of
the index offence in your case requires, in the public interest and having regard to
the sentencing objectives of deterrence, punishment and community safety, the
imposition of a significant custodial sentence. In the light in particular of your young
age at the time of this offence and indeed today, however, and having regard also to
the favourable terms of the reports to which I have referred, and further bearing in
mind the sentencing principles of proportionality in general and your own welfare in
particular, I consider that I can reduce the usual range of starting-point or headline
custodial sentence that would normally be imposed for such a conviction in respect
of a first offender adult in your position to a period on this indictment of 6 years. A
plea of guilty was of course offered on your behalf and accepted by the Crown at the
earliest opportunity in these proceedings and you are therefore properly entitled to a
full discount on that custodial tariff.
[5] You will therefore serve a sentence of 4 years detention, duly discounted
from that period of 6 years. That period will be backdated to 6 January 2020, being
the date of your conviction and initial remand in custody.
[6] In the interests of clarity I should add that I consider that to impose any
community-based disposal such as that commended to the court by your counsel
and by the author of the background report, or indeed to impose a lesser custodial
sentence than the one I have selected in your case would be inappropriate and
unrealistic given the gravity of the crime to which you have pled guilty on this
indictment. Finally, it is to be hoped that the period of licence which this sentence
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will inevitably permit will assist you in your re-integration into the community in
due course.”
[8] In her written and oral submissions to this court counsel for the appellant argued
that, having regard to the favourable terms of the CJSWR and to Dr Zeedyk’s report, the
sentencing judge had erred in concluding that a non-custodial sentence was not appropriate
in all the circumstances. In any event, if the court was not with her in this submission she
argued a starting point of 6 years detention was, in all the circumstances, too high. Her
submissions in relation the CJSWR are summarised in paragraphs [03] and [04] of her
written submissions as follows:
“[03] The appellant is now aged 17 years of age. He had no previous convictions
and had never been trouble before. The commission of the offence was out of
character for him.
[04] The criminal justice social work report was in positive terms for the appellant.
The appellant accepted full responsibility for the offence and described his response
to what he perceived to be a threat from the victim as disproportionate and
unacceptable. He described his behaviour as impulsive. He showed a good deal of
insight into the negative impact that his actions had upon the victim and his family.
He recognised the impact on the local community and those who witnessed his
actions. He was noted to have demonstrated a positive attitude towards intervention
and authority through his engagement with the criminal justice social work report
writing process. The author of the report noted that she had received positive
feedback about his conduct in custody and that he had demonstrated resilient
personality traits. He was noted to have demonstrated that he adheres well to rules
and had been given the trusted position of “pass man” while on remand. He
exhibited positive attitudes such as viewing risky behaviour such as substance abuse
and violence as being negative and harmful. He was assessed as suitable for a
community based disposal. The author of the report identified what form a
community based disposal could take, recommending supervision, unpaid work and
a restriction of liberty order.”
[9] Counsel for the appellant also relied on the report from Dr Zeedyk. She set out in
her report what the science of Adverse Childhood Experience is and how toxic stress in
childhood causes biological alterations in the body. She highlighted that toxic childhood
stress alters the body’s self-regulatory system, leaving individuals less able to manage
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strong emotions and the behaviour that results from emotional states. Dr Zeedyk’s report
set out the childhood factors that, in her opinion, were relevant to the commission of the
offence. She concluded that the appellant had suffered from a childhood affected by adverse
childhood experience. She identified specific adversities in the appellant’s life as acrimony
in the family, family chaos, substance use, sudden disappearance of his father, erratic
disappearances of his mother, erratic housing and care, his mother’s mental health, bullying,
hospital stay, observing life-threatening violence and intergenerational trauma. Dr Zeedyk
noted demonstrable empathy and remorse from the appellant. She gave recommendations
for possible therapeutic care.
[10] Counsel for the appellant relied on the well-known line of authorities giving
guidance on the principles to be applied to the sentencing of children, and in particular
Kane v HM Advocate [2003] SCCR 749 and McCormick v HM Advocate [2016] SCCR 308. We
have given careful consideration to these authorities, and also to others, including Greig v
and Green v HM Advocate [2020] JC 90, particularly per the Lord Justice General at para [80].
[11] We have found this a particularly difficult sentencing exercise, and any remarks we
make should not be interpreted as being critical of the sentencing judge. We begin by
agreeing with his observations as to the seriousness of this crime. Notwithstanding the
youth of the appellant, this was such a serious crime that we consider that only a custodial
sentence was appropriate in all the circumstances. Without anything which might be
reasonably described as provocation by the complainer, the appellant saw him walking in
the public street past the house in which the appellant was situated; he seized a large
kitchen knife, ran out into the public road and carried out a murderous attack on the
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complainer, inflicting several blows with the knife and causing severe injury. It was only by
good fortune that death did not ensue. We are in complete agreement with the sentencing
judge that only a custodial sentence was appropriate to mark the seriousness of this crime.
[12] Was a starting point of 6 years (then discounted to 4 years) detention excessive
having regard to the appellant’s age? We have reached the conclusion that it was indeed
excessive, having regard to the very supportive terms of the CJSWR and the careful report
by Dr Zeedyk. Unlike some other cases involving young accused, this is not a case in which
there is no glimmer of hope; it appears to us possible that the appellant will be successfully
re-integrated into society. He has shown some maturity and considerable empathy. He
appears to have progressed well in detention, and it is to be hoped that this progress will
continue. It is clear from the authorities to which we have referred that the exercise of
sentencing a child such as the appellant does not involve a direct or arithmetical equation
with sentences which might be appropriate for adult offenders. From paragraph 4 of his
sentencing remarks it appears that the sentencing judge has carried out a form of
discounting exercise, taking as his starting point the sentence that would be appropriate for
an adult offender. To that extent we consider that the sentencing judge erred in the
approach he adopted. Taking all the factors in this case together, including the seriousness
of the offence, the difficulties highlighted in the appellant’s background by Dr Zeedyk’s
report, and the supportive features highlighted in the CJSWR, we have reached the
conclusion that a starting point of 6 years is indeed excessive and does not pay adequate
attention to the best interests of the appellant and his re-integration into society. We
consider that a starting of 5 years detention is appropriate in the particular circumstances of
this case.
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[13] We shall accordingly quash the sentence of 4 years detention (discounted from a
starting point of 6 years) which was imposed at the High Court at Glasgow on 7 February
2020 and substitute therefor a sentence of 40 months detention which is discounted by the
same discount as previously awarded, from a starting point of 5 years detention.
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