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Scottish Sheriff Court Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Sheriff Court Decisions >> Lawson v. The Broomfield Holiday Park [2007] ScotSC 36 (13 July 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotSC/2007/36.html Cite as: [2007] ScotSC 36 |
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A134/03
SHERIFFDOM OF GRAMPIAN,
|
INTERLOCUTOR In causa MORAG LAWSON, residing at Pursuer Against THE Shore Street, Ullapool, Defenders |
DINGWALL,
The Sheriff, having resumed consideration of the cause, FINDS IN FACT: -
1. The pursuer is Mrs. Morag
Lawson. She was born on
2. The defenders are The Broomfield
Holiday Park,
3. This court has jurisdiction.
4. In September 2002 the pursuer and her
husband resolved to take a holiday in
5. In the course of that holiday, on
6. A private road led from the main
entrance into the site. It led to the
reception building and afforded access to the whole site for vehicles and
pedestrians. It did not have any
pavement to its side.
7. That main road was tarmacadamed. Some distance in from the main entrance, it
contained a raised speed hump, the purpose of which was to compel drivers of
motor vehicles to slow down. The speed
hump stretched from one side of the road to the other. It sloped up gently to a height of about four
inches.
8. The speed hump was a raised area of
tarmac on the surface of the road. It
presented a hazard of tripping to pedestrians.
9. When the pursuer and her husband
entered the site in their camper van, they had to cross that speed hump (and
another speed hump) before arriving at the reception building. As they crossed the speed hump, the pursuer,
although not paying any particular attention, felt the camper van rise and fall
slightly.
10. Thereafter they checked into the
site, attached their camper van to the available services, took their dog for a
walk and had a meal. At about
11. At that time it was dark. The pursuer had not crossed the speed hump on
foot prior to the walk at
12. The pursuer and her husband walked
from their camper van along that private internal road heading towards the main
exit from, i.e. the main entrance to, the site.
13. The pursuer was wearing flat-soled
lacing shoes, suitable for the surfaces on which she was walking that night.
14. There were no signs to warn either
pedestrians or motorists of the presence of the speed hump on the road.
15. There were no other visible objects,
such as painted stones at either end of it, to warn of the presence of the
speed hump on the road.
16. The word 'SLOW' had been painted in
large letters on the side of the speed hump facing the main entrance, namely
the opposite side to that approached by the pursuer. The paint was faded and barely visible. Given its position on the speed bump and its
condition that painted mark was invisible to the pursuer as she approached the
speed hump. White marks at each of the
corners of the speed hump were equally faded and invisible to the pursuer as
she approached the speed hump.
17. The lighting in the area was
poor. The speed hump was not
illuminated. The nearest lights to the
speed hump were the public street lights on the public road outside the site,
an external light at adjacent premises, the Arch Inn, and lights at the site
reception building. None of those cast
any light on to the speed hump. The
speed hump was invisible to the pursuer and her husband.
18. Unaware of its presence, the pursuer
caught her foot, tripped over the speed hump and fell forward. She struck her face and head on the
road. She suffered personal injury.
19. On full liability, Three thousand pounds
(£3,000) sterling represents a fair and reasonable value of the loss, injury
and damage suffered by the pursuer as a result of her fall.
FINDS IN FACT AND LAW:
1.
The defenders owed the pursuer a duty of reasonable
care for her safety when walking along the private road within the site leading
to the main entrance.
2.
It was reasonably foreseeable to the defenders that
pedestrians would walk along that road during the hours of darkness. It was reasonably foreseeable that if the
speed hump were not seen there was a
risk that a pedestrian would trip over it and fall.
3.
In those circumstances reasonable precautions to
prevent such an accident would have been to illuminate the speed hump, to erect
signs or painted stones to warn of its presence or to have and maintain bright
and visible paint on the speed hump to alert pedestrians of its presence.
4.
The defenders failed to take any of those reasonable
precautions and as a result of that failure the pursuer did not see the speed
hump before she tripped on it and fell over.
5.
The pursuer suffered loss, injury and damage as a
result of the defenders' failure to fulfil their duty of care towards her.
6.
In terms of the Occupiers Liability (
7.
The unmarked, unilluminated speed hump was a danger to
pedestrians approaching it while walking along the road towards the main
entrance of the site from within the site.
The defenders' failure to paint, mark with warning signs or painted
stones, or to illuminate the speed hump were omissions for which they were as
occupier of the site responsible.
8.
The defenders failed to take reasonable care to see
that the pursuer did not suffer injury or damage by reason of that danger. That amounted to a failure to comply with
their responsibility under section 2(1) of the 1960 Act.
9.
As a result of that failure to comply with their
statutory duty, the defenders caused the pursuer to suffer loss, injury and
damage.
10. The pursuer
contributed to the occurrence of her trip and fall. She was under a duty to keep a look out as to
where she put her feet. She was aware of
the existence somewhere along the road of the speed hump. She ought to have taken some measure to take
care for her own safety, such as carrying a torch to illuminate the road ahead
of her. She failed to comply with that
duty.
11. In those
circumstances, the injury suffered by the pursuer was contributed to by her own
fault to the extent of twenty per cent.
FINDS IN
LAW:
1.
The pursuer having suffered loss, injury and damage
through the fault and negligence and breach of statutory duty, under the
Occupiers Liability (
2.
The pursuer having contributed by her own fault to the
extent of twenty per cent to her loss injury and damage, the damages awarded
fall to be reduced in terms of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act
1945, section 1, to Two thousand four hundred pounds (£2,400) sterling.
THEREFORE Sustains the
pursuer's second and, to the extent of the sum awarded, third pleas-in-law; Sustains
the defenders' fourth and fifth pleas-in-law; Repels the defenders' first and
third pleas-in-law; Grants decree against the defenders for payment to the
pursuer of Two thousand four hundred pounds (£2,400) sterling together with
interest thereon at the rate of eight per centum per annum from 8 September
2002 until payment; Certifies Mr. Mr. William G. Morrison, Consultant in Accident and Emergency
Medicine, Ninewells Hospital, Dundee as a skilled witness; Finds the
defenders liable to the pursuer in the expenses of the cause so far as not
already awarded, Allows and account thereof to be given in and Remits same,
when lodged, to the Auditor of Court to tax and report thereon.
NOTE
Introduction
[1] In this
action the pursuer sought reparation for injuries sustained by her in an
accident which she said occurred at the defenders' premises, a camping and
caravan site known as the
[2] The
speed hump stretched from one side of the road to the other. Lighting was inadequate and insufficient to
allow pedestrians such as the pursuer to see where they were walking. The word 'SLOW' had been painted on the hump
however on the date of the accident the lettering was worn and barely visible
and not visible at all in low lighting. The
pursuer was unable to see the speed hump.
She caught her foot on the upward sloping part of the speed hump and was
unable to keep her balance and fell forwards.
[3] The
pursuer averred that in the circumstances, an accident of this nature at this
location was reasonably foreseeable. The
defenders ought to have had the speed hump painted clearly with bold, clear
lettering in reflective paint, to have installed signs warning pedestrians of
the presence of the speed hump and to have had suitable and sufficient lighting
installed to allow pedestrians to walk along the road in darkness safely. Their failure to provide any of the foregoing
precautions amounted to a breach of their duty of reasonable care to the
pursuer.
[6] The defenders admit that they
owed duties of reasonable care to the pursuer
and other pedestrians. They aver that
they complied with those. In addition
they averred that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the speed hump represented
a tripping hazard to pedestrians in daylight or the hours of darkness.
[7] With regard to the statutory case
under the 1960 Act the defenders admit that they were the occupiers of the
caravan site but averred that they had fulfilled all duties of reasonable care
required of them.
[8] As a result of the accident the
pursuer averred that she suffered injuries to her face. Damages, in the event of full liability, were
agreed in the sum of £3,000 with interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum
from 8 September until the date of decree.
The defenders sought absolvitor, failing which a reduction in any
damages awarded by way of contributory negligence under reference to the Law
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, section 1.
[9] The initial writ in this action
was warranted on
Assessment of the evidence
Witnesses for the pursuer
Mrs. Morag Lawson
[10] The pursuer gave evidence on her
own behalf. Although initially somewhat
nervous, that seemed to be attributable to unfamiliarity with a court room and
the experience of giving evidence rather than to any alternative, sinister
cause. Her recollection of the
circumstances of the accident were clear.
Her account was supported by her husband's evidence and consistent with
that of the witness Donald Geddes who arrived on the scene shortly
afterwards. Of particular significance
she said that it was dark at the part of the private road where the speed hump
in question was situated; no light source cast any illumination there. There were no signs or painted stones warning
of the presence of a speed hump.
[11] Further, the word 'SLOW' was
only present in faint lettering and in any event was painted on the side of the
speed hump facing the entrance/exit, i.e. on the other side to the one from
which the pursuer was making her approach.
She said that the photographs produced by the defenders did not
accurately reflect the appearance of the speed hump as at the date of her
accident. The condition of it could be
seen in the photographs taken by her husband on
[12] Mrs. Lawson's demeanour in the
witness box was that of an honest, if nervous, individual endeavouring to
recall incidents from some four years earlier to the best of her ability. Her account was supported by other
witnesses. I found her credible and
reliable.
Donald Geddes
[13] Mr. Geddes was a 23 year old
resident of Ullapool, unemployed at the time of giving evidence. He gave an account of coming across Mr. and
Mrs. Lawson on what must have been
[14] He said that although there was
a powerful light at the Arch Inn, he did
not consider that it illuminated as far into the site as the location of the
speed hump in question. He said that
part of the road was in darkness. He
described the speed hump as a fairly low one.
[15] Mr. Geddes was visually
impaired, having no sight whatsoever in his right eye and 90% vision in the
left. He said that his night vision was
poor.
[16] Mr. Geddes was clearly doing his
best to be helpful when giving his evidence.
There was no apparent or suggested reason for him to be untruthful. His demeanour was that of an honest witness. I found him credible. Although he was visually impaired, he seemed
to have no difficulty in differentiating between light and dark areas at the
site. His perception of the level of
light in the site and at the location of the accident was consistent with that
of Mr. Lawson and the pursuer. Even
taking account of the limitation of his sight, I found him reliable.
Robin Fraser
[17] Mr. Fraser, aged 38 years, was
an experienced environmental health officer employed by the local authority,
the Highland Council. His involvement
with this matter started with a report to him on
[18] Mr. Fraser recommended to Mr.
Ross that the warning on the speed hump be re-painted. He said that Mr. Ross accepted that advice. He discussed the matter with a colleague and
decided that Mrs. Lawson's accident did not as a matter of law require to be
reported to the local authority or the Health and Safety Executive.
[19] It so happened that a few weeks
later Mr. Fraser was in Ullapool on unrelated business and decided to look in
at the site. This was at night. He did not meet Mr. Ross. However he felt confident that he had been
able to identify the speed hump in question; it seemed to him to have been
recently painted.
[20] With regard to the lighting, Mr.
Fraser confirmed that there were lights on the buildings, in particular the reception
booth. Beyond that he described the
lighting in the site as minimal. He did
not recall there being any additional lighting.
He said that at the speed hump he would not call it well lit.
[21] He accepted that it was a
shallow speed hump.
[22] Mr. Fraser gave his evidence in
a confident, professional and objective fashion. There was no reason for him to be
partial. He was simply recounting what
to him must have been a routine and relatively minor enquiry and investigation
in the course of his occupation. He was
credible and reliable.
George Andrew Lawson
[23] Mr. Lawson was the pursuer's
husband. He was the witness whose
evidence had required to be taken on commission. That had taken place on
[24] Although I did not see or hear
Mr. Lawson as he gave his evidence, I did note the points of congruity between
his and the pursuer's versions of events.
Witnesses for the defenders
Sander Mackenzie Ross
[25] Mr. Ross had been the tenant and
operator of the
[26] He said that the speed hump was
in good condition. The tar was not
crumbling. This was the first accident
of this nature ever reported to him or of which he had been made aware since
1978. The speed hump had never been
illuminated or had warning signs of its presence to the side. He said that it could be seen with the
benefit of lighting from the street, the light from the Arch Inn and the light
from the building fifty to sixty metres away.
[27] He did not recall the telephone
call from Mr. Fraser or his advice that it would do no harm to repaint the
wording on the speed hump.
[28] I found Mr. Ross's evidence
regarding the date of repainting of the
word 'SLOW' on the speed hump unsatisfactory.
In the first place I accepted the evidence from the pursuer, supported
in his evidence at the commission by Mr. Lawson , that the appearance of the
paint was much fainter on
[29] That contradicted Mr. Ross's
evidence that the speed bump had not been repainted until about Easter 2003. That was a matter entirely within his own
knowledge and control as the operator of the site. It seemed quite apparent that the situation
regarding the lettering on the speed hump as presented in the defender's
photographs was not their condition at the date of the accident; nevertheless
Mr. Ross had tried to persuade the court otherwise. It seemed that he was being deliberately
untruthful about that. That had a grave
effect on the amount of credit which could be placed on him generally as a
witness. Where his evidence diverged
from that of Mrs. Lawson, for example on the amount of light thrown on to the
area of the speed hump and its visibility, I preferred that of Mrs. Lawson who
had been straightforward on giving her evidence.
Submissions for the parties
Pursuer
[30] On behalf of the pursuer, Miss
Fraser helpfully presented written submissions.
Those are lodged in process and need not be repeated herein. She supplemented those by commenting on the
evidence of the witnesses. She invited
me to accept as credible and reliable the pursuer and Mr. Lawson. Mr. Geddes's evidence should be accepted
especially when he said that the area of the speed hump had been dark. She accepted that it was not clear how far
one could go with Mr. Fraser's evidence in that he had not seen the location of
the accident prior to his visit some weeks after the accident when the wording
on the hump seemed freshly painted.
However he was credible and reliable.
[31] She said that this speed hump
had clearly been a trip hazard in that it was a big hump on a road. She referred in that connection to the decision
of McClafferty v. British
Telecommunications plc 1987 S.L.T. 327 and suggested that the speed hump
passed the test set out in that case as being a projection on to the surface of
the road which would present a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to persons
passing along the road.
[32] With regard to the issue of
contributory negligence, she confirmed that the primary position on behalf of
the pursuer was that there should be no deduction in respect thereof. That was because of the following factors:
·
the
pursuer was not well acquainted with the site;
·
she
had not passed over the speed bump on foot prior to the accident; and
·
when
the camper van had passed over it, she had simply been a passenger and could
not be reasonably expected to remember it or its location.
[33] Miss Fraser referred to the
sheriff court decision of Brown v. City
of Edinburgh Council 1999 S.L.T. (
[34] With regard to the defenders'
argument regarding whether the speed hump was crumbling or not, she submitted
that were it not for the presence on the road of an unilluminated speed bump,
then Mrs. Lawson would not have fallen at all and the condition of the speed hump
did not have a large part to play.
[35] She invited me to sustain the
pursuer's pleas-in-law, repel the defenders' and award damages of £3,000
together with interest as craved and expenses as taxed, certifying Mr. William
G. Morrison, Consultant in Accident and Emergency Medicine, who had examined
the pursuer and written a report as a skilled witness.
Defenders
[36] For the defenders, Mr. Marshall
submitted that the pursuer's evidence pointed towards her having tripped by catching her toe at an area where the tar
had crumbled away, that was to say not on the speed hump itself but on the edge
of it. In addition she had said that she
reckoned the part where she had fallen was about half or a quarter of an inch
high. According to her evidence, she had
tripped on the very beginning of the speed hump. He therefore questioned what exactly had been
proved.
[37] The duty owed was one of
reasonable care. He referred to the
three element test to be applied in
[38] He submitted that the pursuer
had failed to establish any breach of duty at common law or under the 1950 Act
on the part of the defenders.
[39] If liability did attach to the
defenders, then he submitted that the pursuer had been contributorily
negligent. She had gone out walking in
what she said had been a dark, unlit stretch of road without a torch. He referred me to two decisions, Craig v. Strathclyde Regional Council
1998 Housing Law Reports 104 from
[40] Under reference to the
defenders' pleas-in-law, Mr. Marshall invited me to assoilzie the defenders,
failing which to make a deduction from any damages awarded by reason of contributory
negligence.
[41] With regard to expenses, he
submitted that the normal rule of expenses following success should be applied.
Discussion
Liability
[42] I have already given my
assessment of the credibility and reliability of the witnesses. In the first place, I was satisfied by reason
of the evidence of the pursuer and Mr. Lawson that an accident did take place
as averred. That was entirely consistent
with Mr. Geddes's evidence. With regard
to the mechanics of the accident, in my view the evidence pointed towards the
pursuer having tripped over the speed hump itself. It is, I think misleading to suggest that she
tripped over a low piece of crumbling tar at the end of the speed hump. The critical factor which I took from the pursuer's
evidence, supported by Mr. Lawson, is this: it was the presence of the speed hump
which caused Mrs. Lawson to fall. Had
the speed hump not been there, she would not have fallen. In my view, its condition or height at the
end of it, over which the pursuer was passing when she fell, is secondary to
the presence of the speed hump in the first place. In any event, there was little detailed
evidence about that aspect of the case.
Further the only direct evidence as to the actual, precise location of the
accident, i.e. to a certainty of inches, came from the pursuer. In my view, she was hardly likely, given the
whole circumstances of the accident and the fact that it occurred in the dark,
to be entirely reliable as to the exact location, to a matter of inches, from
left to right, of her fall.
[43] What is proved, on the evidence,
is that it was some part of the speed bump over which she tripped. On any view, the speed hump was a
substantial, raised obstruction across an otherwise flat surface. It was high enough to have been noticed by
the pursuer as a passenger at
[44] Given the size and location of
the speed hump, it seemed to me that it could easily be described as a trip
hazard. It was a short, raised section
of the main road within the site running through the site towards the main
entrance. That road had no
pavement. It was clearly foreseeable
that pedestrians would walk along it.
[45] Mr. Ross of the defenders said
that no such accident had ever been reported to him since his first involvement
with the site in 1978. Dealing with
that, I have already given my low assessment of his credibility and reliability
and the reason therefor. Further, as he
conceded in cross-examination there was not an accident book kept at the site;
so even if there had been a prior similar accident there was nowhere for that
to be recorded in writing had it been notified to a staff member other than Mr.
Ross. Accordingly, I did not feel able
to find that there had been no similar accident at the site prior to the
pursuer's.
[46] Even if, as a matter of fact,
there had not been a previous similar incident, that does not absolve the
defenders of liability, either at common law or under the 1960 Act. The question of reasonable foreseeability is
an objective one. This was a raised
section of road through a camping and caravan site. Clearly pedestrians could be expected to walk
along the road at all times of the day and night. If it were dark and there were no warning
signs on or beside the speed hump, then in my view it was reasonably
foreseeable that a person could trip over it.
Further under the 1960 Act, it seemed to me that a speed bump on a road
within the site presented a danger to visitors, in the form of a trip hazard,
and that the defenders ought to have taken such care as in all the circumstances of the case was reasonable to see
that that a person such as the pursuer would not suffer injury or damage by
reason of that danger.
[47] The pursuer averred certain
steps which, if taken, she says would have fulfilled the defenders' duty of
care towards her. They were:
·
painting
the speed bump with bold lettering in reflective paint visible at night;
·
signs
at the side of the road to alert approaching pedestrians of the presence of the
speed bump and the hazard which it presented; and
·
sufficient
and adequate lighting to allow pedestrians to walk along the road in darkness
safely.
[48] In my view, those were all
reasonable steps and if in place would have been reasonable precautions in
terms of the 1960 Act. Indeed even any
of them might have been sufficient to for the defenders to comply with their
common law duty of reasonable care and statutory responsibility.
[49] However, in my view, the
evidence clearly showed that none of these precautions was present. Firstly, the paint on the speed hump was
faint and almost illegible in daylight.
To all intents and purposes in the hours of darkness the speed hump was
unpainted. Further, the word 'SLOW' was painted
on that side of the speed hump facing the main entrance, i.e. the other side to
the one facing the pursuer on her approach on foot at 10pm. The side facing her then had at best the
faint, and in the darkness invisible, top of each of the letters. Even if I had accepted that there was bold,
visible lettering on the speed hump on
[50] There were lines painted at each
corner of the hump, but they too were quite faded and I accepted the pursuer's
and Mr. Lawson's evidence that no marking on the hump was visible to her.
[51] Secondly, there was no evidence
whatsoever of the defenders placing warning signs or painted stones at each
side of the speed hump. No such
precaution was in place.
[52] Thirdly on the issue of
lighting, I preferred the evidence of the pursuer, supported by Mr. Geddes and
Mr. Lawson, that the precise area of the speed hump was in darkness at
[53] In all those circumstances I
decided that the defenders had not put in place any reasonable precautions or
exercised reasonable care towards the pursuer.
Those failures had caused the speed hump to be invisible to her as she
approached it. Those failures caused the
accident to happen. Had the pursuer been
aware of the precise location of the speed hump, she could have taken
sufficient care to avoid tripping over it.
Her ignorance of its precise location was due to the fault and
negligence and failure to fulfil statutory duty on the part of the defenders.
Contributory negligence
[54] The next issue was whether the
pursuer herself had contributed to her accident. In that connection the following were
significant factors in my view:
·
The
pursuer was aware of the presence of two speed humps on the stretch of road
along which she was walking. She had
been aware of the camper van driving over them when she and her husband had
driven into the site earlier that day.
·
Although
her route was originally illuminated by light from the reception building, when
it became dark, she could have taken more care for her own safety, in the
knowledge of the presence on her route of the speed humps.
·
It
would have been reasonable in those circumstances for her to carry a torch or
even to return to the camper van to collect a torch. In all likelihood a torch would have
illuminated the road ahead of her and alerted her to the presence of the speed
hump.
[55] In those circumstances, it
seemed to me that the pursuer could have done more to take reasonable care for
her own safety. She therefore had to
carry a share of the responsibility for the damage arising from the accident
and the award of damages in her favour falls to be reduced by reason of
contributory negligence.
[56] Section 1(1) of the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 provides,
'Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his
own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in
respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the
person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof
shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having
regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage:'
[57] In assessing where justice and
equity lie, regard must be had both to the relative importance of the pursuer's
act in causing the damage and also to her relative blameworthiness. In my view, the pursuer's part in this
accident was minor. The principal
reasons that she tripped over the speed hump were that it was unlit,
effectively unmarked and there was no warning of its presence to approaching
pedestrians.
[58] Previous decisions are of
limited value in determining how much should be deducted by reason of
contributory negligence. However, I
noted that in Craig v. Strathclyde
Regional Council (supra) a nine year old child who injured his ankle when
carrying his mountain bike in an unlit, and completely dark, stairway, suffered
a deduction of 10% by reason of contributory negligence and that in Brown v. City of Edinburgh Council 20%
was deducted in circumstances where the sheriff held the salient factors to be
as follows: the pursuer knew
that there were
"potholes" along the length of the pavement but the pothole or
depression into which he fell was one that, because it was the same colour as
the rest of the pavement, he would not have noticed until he was almost upon
it. He was not looking where he was putting his feet, but at the time he was
legitimately looking to see if it was safe to cross the road. In the
circumstances the sheriff considered that the pursuer was contributorily
negligent to the extent of twenty per cent.
[59] In McClafferty v. British Telecommunications plc (supra) the Lord
Justice Clerk, sitting in the Outer House said that had liability been
established in a case arising out of a trip over a raised manhole cover, then
he would have deducted 50% from any damages awarded in light of the pursuer
failing to keep a good lookout and to have watched where she placed her feet
when proceeding along the pavement.
[60] In terms of the degree of
responsibility on the part of the claimant, it seemed to me that the closest of
those three cases to the present case was Brown. I considered that the pursuer's contribution
in the present case was higher than that allocated to the child in Craig.
That case had featured a particularly serious failure of duty on the
part of a local authority to illuminate a common stairway rendering it entirely
dark. In contrast, the present case
featured a tripping hazard of which in a general sense the pursuer was already
aware in an outdoor location. In all the
circumstances it seemed to me that the pursuer bore 20% of the responsibility
for her fall. I therefore decided that
she should suffer a reduction by 20% of the damages awarded by reason of her
contributory negligence.
Decision
[61] Damages were agreed on the basis
of full liability in the sum of £3,000.
In light of the pursuer's contributory negligence, that sum fell to be
reduced by 20%, namely £600. Therefore
the pursuer was entitled to decree for £2,400 together with interest at the
judicial rate, 8 per cent per annum, from the date of the accident