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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Law Commission >> Scottish Law Commission (Reports) >> Third Parties –Rights Against Insurers [2001] SLC 184(9) (Report) (July 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/other/SLC/Report/2001/184(9).html Cite as: [2001] SLC 184(9) (Report) |
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PART 9
DISTRIBUTION OF A LIMITED INSURANCE FUND TO MULTIPLE CLAIMANTS
1 The issue
9.2 This issue came before the English courts in Cox v Bankside.[1] The Court of Appeal held that, ordinarily, the insurance fund can only be distributed on a "first come, first served" basis, under which third parties with enforceable judgments are paid in full until the insurer has paid out all of the fund.[2] After that point, third parties receive nothing from the insurer. An exception to the ordinary rule applies, in cases in which a group judgment is delivered, or in which more than one judgment is delivered at the same time. In such circumstances, and subject to any agreement to the contrary, the successful litigants will take rateably.[3]
9.3 In the consultation paper, we set out some reasons why it might be thought desirable to alter the current position in a new Act. In particular, we drew attention to the fact that a third party who received nothing from the insurance fund (because he was too far back in the queue of third parties) would be worse off than if the 1930 Act had never been passed.[4] We queried whether this was an appropriate effect of an Act designed to assist third parties. We asked consultees whether a new Act should contain a new scheme setting out how a limited fund could be distributed more fairly to multiple claimants.
9.4 We also drew attention to a number of difficulties with which any such scheme would have to deal.[5] We expressed no preliminary view on whether reform in this area was desirable.
2 Position in Scots law
9.5 There is as yet no multi-party procedure in Scotland, although the courts can conjoin the actions of different pursuers against the same defender. The fund available to these pursuers can then be distributed rateably.[6]
3 Consultation
9.6 Only one consultee told us that he had experienced this problem outside the Lloyd's litigation.[7] Several consultees felt that the issue would arise very rarely, but that when it did it could involve very large claims.[8]
4 "First come, first served" retained in the draft Bill
9.9 We are not recommending reform in this area for the reasons set out below.
5 Power to order pro rata distribution in some group litigation
9.10 As we have seen,[9] it is already possible for the court to order rateable distribution in some cases. Moreover, the Court of Appeal has indicated that courts may be prepared to use their case management powers so as to enable them to do so if appropriate.[10] To the extent that the Court may already order rateable distribution it is clear that no reform is required.
6 Statutory scheme would be complex and controversial
9.11 Nevertheless, in some group litigation, as in Cox v Bankside itself, the court will not have the power to order rateable distribution. The new procedural rules in England and Wales in the CPR do not alter the position. We note, in particular, that the new mechanism for group litigation does not give the court the power to order a rateable distribution of a limited fund. [11]
9.12 Any scheme which could hope to deal justly with litigation as complex and diverse as the Lloyd's litigation would have to be immensely detailed. As Sir Thomas Bingham MR pointed out in Cox v Bankside:[12]
It would have to take account of a multiplicity of plaintiffs, with claims based on different grounds, relating to different periods, against different defendants; it would have to take account of a multiplicity of defendants, some fully insured, some not, some solvent, some insolvent with different E & O cover for different underwriting years; it would have to remain in force for a period of years, during which period the receivers of each policy fund would have to seek the approval of the Court to make interim distributions, and would no doubt have to be paid out of the proceeds of the cover...
9.14 In the consultation paper, we identified a number of the central issues with which any statutory scheme would have to deal.[13] We were not persuaded by those consultees who favoured a statutory scheme that these difficulties could easily be overcome.
9.16 Another difficulty is the need to specify an administrator of the scheme. In the consultation paper,[14] we mooted various possibilities: the court, a court appointee, the insured's insolvency practitioner, or the insurer. We mentioned the drawbacks of each. Consultees did not persuade us that this issue could be easily resolved.
7 Delay caused by a statutory scheme
8 Cost of a statutory scheme
9 Not a problem central to the 1930 Act
9.19 Cox v Bankside is the only reported case of this problem arising in the context of the 1930 Act. Only one consultee had other experience of such a problem.[15] We accept that when the issue does arise it may do so in the context of major litigation. However, we took into account the fact that this was not a common problem for users of the 1930 Act.
10 Bare power to order rateable distribution unsatisfactory
9.20 We considered the possibility of giving the courts the power to order rateable distribution without devising a detailed statutory scheme. However, such a power already exists in group litigation or where the Court is able to engineer simultaneous judgments.[16] In other cases we concluded that the courts would not welcome a bare power, which would require the presiding judge to resolve many of the above difficulties without statutory guidance.[17]
11 First come, first served is a satisfactory basis
9.21 Even if we could overcome these difficulties and construct a statutory scheme for rateable distribution, it would not always be preferable to the first come, first served basis. We accept that the first come, first served basis will not always be fair to everyone. It may penalise impoverished third parties unable to prosecute their claims, or third parties seeking to arrive at a settlement without embarking on court proceedings. There is also an element of luck involved, as the speed with which a case can be advanced, heard and judgment delivered is not entirely in a claimant's control.[18]
9.24 The first come, first served basis will, in any event, work better under the draft Bill than under the 1930 Act, as the third party will have a right at any stage to require the insurer to inform him of the outstanding value of the insurance fund.[19] This will save third parties, likely to lose out because of their position in the queue, the expense of pursuing futile litigation.
(Signed) ROBERT CARNWATH, Chairman, Law Commission
HUGH BEALE
MARTIN PARTINGTON
ALAN WILKIE
MICHAEL SAYERS, Secretary
(Signed) BRIAN GILL, Chairman, Scottish Law Commission
PATRICK S HODGE
GERARD MAHER
KENNETH G C REID
JOSEPH M THOMSON
JANE L McLEOD, Secretary
14 June 2001
Note 1 [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437. We analysed this case in detail in the consultation paper, Part 7. [Back] Note 2 The court held that, on the facts before it, there was no legal basis on which it could order any other method of distribution, whether in the 1930 Act, in procedural rules of court, in the maxims of equity, or elsewhere. The “first come, first served” system is sometimes called the “first past the post” system. The terms are interchangeable; we use the former in the text. [Back] Note 3 “there being no sensible or fair alternative” (Cox v Bankside [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437 at p 463 per Peter Gibson LJ). Peter Gibson LJ held that the exception was based on the equitable maxim “equality is equity”. The exception was applied in Cox v Deeny [1996] LRLR 288. See p 290 and p 300. [Back] Note 4 In which case he would have received a rateable share of the insolvency fund swollen by the insurance proceeds. [Back] Note 5 See consultation paper, paras 15.16-15.17. [Back] Note 6 See Bell v Lothiansure Ltd (unreported) 19 January 1990, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom. [Back] Note 7 The term “Lloyd’s litigation” refers to the mass of actions brought by members of Lloyd’s syndicates (the so-called Names) in the 1990’s in an attempt to recover damages for the disastrous losses they had suffered. See the consultation paper, para 7.2 ff, for a more complete account. [Back] Note 8 Examples suggested by consultees included mass claims against financial advisors over mis-selling of financial products and mass product liability litigation. It may be, however, that in such cases the court would find a way to order rateable distribution in any event. See para 9.10 below. [Back] Note 9 See para 9.2 above. [Back] Note 10 In Cox v Bankside Peter Gibson LJ said (at p 464) “I see no reason in principle why the Court cannot in the interests of fairness in an appropriate case...engineer a situation wherein judgments are given simultaneously so as to achieve a rateable entitlement”. [Back] Note 11 The rules on Group Litigation Orders are at CPR 19.10-19.15. We note, however, that the current situation may change. The Lord Chancellor’s Department is consulting on introducing representative actions in which a representative could bring proceedings on behalf of persons with collective interests (Representative Claims: Proposed New Procedures, CP 1/01, February 2001). Were a group of third parties to take advantage of such a new procedure, the court would under the current proposals be entitled to order rateable distribution to achieve a just settlement. [Back] Note 12 At p 459, col 2. [Back] Note 13 Consultation paper, Part 15. [Back] Note 14 Consultation paper, paras 15.10-15.12. [Back] Note 15 One reason for this may be that many insurance policies are not limited by the total value of all claims under a particular risk (or in a particular period or arising from a particular event) but by the value of each individual claim. [Back] Note 16 See para 9.10 above. [Back] Note 17 When considering a proposal that the court should order rateable distribution in the context of a 1930 Act claim inCox v Bankside, Phillips J stated that “I consider that this would be an impossibility without statutory machinery”. [Back] Note 18 One consultee pointed out the possibility that the first come, first served basis might in some circumstances arbitrarily penalise those at the front, as well as those at the back, of the queue. If the insurance policy contains a policy excess the insurer would, under this system, be entitled to deduct it in full from the payout to the first third party to bring a claim (rather than deducting it pro-rata from all the claims or deducting it from the final claim). This consultee suggested that a scheme of rateable distribution could deal with this problem too. It should be noted, however, that this problem will not arise if the excess applies to the individual claim rather than to the total amount which may be claimed under the policy. In addition, an insurer aware that he would be required to pay out the full fund, might in practice deduct the excess from the last claim rather than the first. [Back]