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United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments >> AA004222015 & AA004232015 [2016] UKAITUR AA004222015 (11 March 2016)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKAITUR/2016/AA004222015.html
Cite as: [2016] UKAITUR AA4222015, [2016] UKAITUR AA004222015

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IAC-FH-NL-V1

 

Upper Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: AA/00422/2015

AA/00423/2015

 

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS



Heard at Field House

Decision & Reasons Promulgated

On 24 February 2016

On 11 March 2016

 

 

 

Before

 

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HILL QC

 

Between

 

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Appellant

and

 

WJ & MW

(anonymity direction MADE)

Respondents

 

 

Representation :

 

For the Appellant: Mr S Staunton, Home Office Presenting Officer

For the Respondents: Mr A Khan, Counsel instructed by Thompson & Co Solicitors

 

 

DECISION AND REASONS

 

1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State in relation to a decision made by First-tier Tribunal Judge Bird that was promulgated on 9 December 2015. The appeal is brought with the permission of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lambert, granted on 4 January 2016.

 

2. In dealing with the grant of permission Judge Lambert stated:

 

"The grounds argue lack of reasoning justifying departure from Country Guidance in AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31 and failure properly to apply the principles of effective protection as established by case law. In the absence of any ascertainable consideration in the decision of AW or the legal framework for a successful claim of lack of effective protection, the grounds are arguable."

 

3. The grounds drafted on behalf of the Secretary of State were slightly more extensive than this, but the focus of the submissions made to me this morning have been narrowly addressed and confined to this discrete matter. I do not need to rehearse the facts of this case. There is no dispute so far as that is concerned and the recitation of the background and the findings of Judge Bird in that respect are not in any way subject to criticism.

 

4. The issue which is taken is the extent to which Judge Bird properly addressed the question of sufficiency of protection in the event that the respondents to this appeal were returned to Pakistan. The point is fairly made that there is no citation of the leading authority of AW (above). For convenience I need only rehearse two paragraphs of the head note of that decision:

 

"2. Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection, a claimant may still have a well-founded fear of persecution if authorities know or ought to know of circumstances particular to his/her case giving rise to the fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection the particular circumstances reasonably require (per Auld LJ at paragraph 55(vi)).

 

3. In considering whether an appellant's particular circumstances give rise to a need for additional protection, particular account must be taken of past persecution (if any) so as to ensure the question posed is whether there are good reasons to consider that such persecution (and past lack of sufficient protection) will not be repeated."

 

5. The judge's decision would have been enhanced had AW been cited and the content of the head note rehearsed. However, I have been taken to the key passages in the decision and it seems to me that, notwithstanding the lack of citation of that authority, the issues to be addressed were both raised and were determined. In particular I have regard to paragraph 38 of the decision which reads as follows:

 

"The documentary evidence that has been produced by the appellants to the lower standard corroborates their account of firstly the marriage of the second appellant and her divorce from [NA]. They also corroborate the second appellant's account that she was married to a distant relative in 2000 and that she divorced him because of his violence. It is obvious that in the cultural context for a woman to divorce her husband on those grounds would have been seen as bringing dishonour to the family. It is also highly likely that because of her divorce the first and second appellants were threatened by her ex-husband. The appellant sought to relocate within Pakistan but the ex-husband managed to trace them. They also reported the matter to the police but there is no evidence of any action being taken or any investigation being carried out by the police in Pakistan."

 

6. There is then reference in paragraph 39 to the country information and guidance that was provided which is analysed and assessed by the judge.

 

7. In paragraph 40 the judge says the following:

 

"There is also objective evidence in the respondent's bundle, the latest being a US State Department Report 2013 referring to events in 2012 which considers the police and other protection agencies. At paragraph 87 of the second appellant's bundle is a note on Security and Foreign Forces dated 17 April 2012. This report again points to the availability of protection. Against the background of the objective evidence the respondent says that the appellants can return to Pakistan and there would be sufficiency of protection. What however has to be looked at is what happened when the appellants reported the incidence of attacks. There was no action taken. The sufficiency of protection therefore against non-state agents has not been effective or available to the appellants."

 

8. Paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judge's decision read as follows:

 

"44. From the account of these appellants I find that it is likely that the second appellant's family and her ex-husband may well have seen her actions as bringing dishonour to the family. The couple relocated on a number of occasions to avoid threats being carried out. They did not receive any protection against these threats from the police despite reporting them. The threats appear to continue against the first appellant's family."

 

45. To the lower standard I find that the appellants have shown that they have a well-founded fear of being subjected to treatment that would amount to persecution because of their religious views if returned to Pakistan. For the same reasons I find that there will be a breach of their protected rights under Articles 2 and 3."

 

9. Looking at these paragraphs of the decision which I have set out fully, I am confident that the judge properly carried out the task that was required of her in accordance with AW. She had proper regard to the generic circumstances prevailing in Pakistan and read and considered all relevant country guidance and similar documentation. In addition, she went further, as she was required to do, and considered the particular circumstances of the individuals before her and took account of both past persecution and the success or otherwise of such protection as was made available giving an indication of whether past misfortunes would be repeated or not.

 

10. Matters concerning the weight to be given to the evidence and issues of credibility are properly within the province of the First-tier Tribunal Judge during the fact-finding exercise. I can find nothing to support the suggestion that there was any failing in the fact-finding nor can I find anything in the suggestion that there was an error of law in the judge's approach to the case. It seems to me that this appeal is in reality a challenge to the judge's factual findings dressed up as an alleged error of law.

 

11. Having reviewed the case thoroughly, I am satisfied that there is no error of law apparent on the face of the decision. On the contrary it is an entirely proper decision which balances the relevant issues in accordance with the required legal approach.

 

12. In all of those circumstances this appeal must be dismissed.

 

Notice of Decision

 

The appeal is dismissed.

 


Direction Regarding Anonymity - Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

 

Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

 

 

 

 

Signed Mark Hill Date 3 March 2016

 

 

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hill QC


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