United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

 

Upper Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/11516/2019 (V)

 

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

 

 

Heard at Bradford IAC by a remote hearing	Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 18 August 2021	On 04 October 2021

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

 

 

Between

 

D A R

(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)

Appellant

and

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

 

 

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr Holmes, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant.

For the Respondent: Ms H. Aboni, Senior Presenting Officer

 

 

DECISION AND REASONS

 

Introduction:

Rule 14: The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Anonymity was granted at an earlier stage of the proceedings because the case involves protection issues. I find that it is appropriate to continue the order. Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

1.              The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (DI Judge McClure) (hereinafter referred to as the "FtTJ") who dismissed his appeal in a decision promulgated on the 11 May 2020.

2.              Permission to appeal that decision was sought and on 8 July 2020 permission was granted by DIJ Shaerf.

3.              In the light of the COVID-19 pandemic the Upper Tribunal issued directions that the error of law issue could be determined without a face-to-face hearing and the hearing was to be listed as a remote hearing. Both parties indicated that they were content for the hearing to proceed by this method. Therefore, the Tribunal listed the hearing to enable oral submissions to be given by each of the parties.

4.              The hearing took place on 18 August 2021, by means of Microsoft teams which has been consented to and not objected to by the parties. A face-to-face hearing was not held because it was not practicable, and both parties agreed that all issues could be determined in a remote hearing.

5.              I was present at Bradford IAC and conducted the hearing from the tribunal centre. The advocates attended remotely via video. There were no issues regarding sound, and no substantial technical problems were encountered during the hearing, and I am satisfied both advocates were able to make their respective cases by the chosen means. I am grateful for the clear and careful submissions made by the advocates.

The background:

6.              The background to the appeal is set out in the decision letter and the decision of the FtTJ at paragraphs 16-32. The appellant is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity.

7.              The appellant is from a village in what is now considered a former contested area. The appellant left Iraq in 2008 and travelled to Norway where he claimed asylum. However the appellant returned to Iraq in 2008 without receiving a decision on his claim. The appellant claimed to have left Iraq again in November or December 2014 having entered the UK on 4 January 2018 and claimed asylum on the same day.

8.              The appellant claimed that his problems began in 2014 and that ISIS had been to his village and where raiding, killing and robbing its inhabitants during which time his father was taken by ISIS and during the incident he was hit on the head and knocked unconscious. ISIS had been attacking the village although not specifically the appellant's family. The appellant claimed to have spent 15 days in hospital. Initially the appellant stated that he left his village and on to Turkey where he was for 2 months. However when pointed out that the appellant claimed the attack been in July 2014 and had spent 15 days in hospital, he claimed he left Iraq in November - December 2014, the appellant then claimed that he did not travel immediately but stayed at a friend's home until he was well in Kurdistan.

9.              In a decision letter dated 8 November 2019 the respondent refused his claim. There is no dispute that the appellant was an Iraqi citizen of Kurdish ethnicity however for the reasons set out at paragraphs 21 - 25 the respondent reached the conclusion that he had not given a credible account concerning any problems in Iraq with ISIS or the PMF. The decision letter undertook an assessment of return taking into account the CG decisions that were current at the date of the decision letter ( AA (Article 15(c) Iraq CG [2017] UKUT 544 and AAH (Iraqi Kurds-internal relocation) Iraq CG UKUT 212. The respondent further took into account that the appellant claimed to have a CSID document in his home in Iraq and that having the document would enable him to replace his passport in the UK before travelling. The respondent concluded that in light of all the information provided and the points raised in the decision letter it was considered that he could feasibly return back to Iraq.

Decision of the FtTJ:

10.          The appeal came before the FtT on 16 January 2020. The FtTJ set out the basis of the appellant's claim that he faced the risk of persecution or serious harm in Iraq based on imputed political opinion as a result of being against ISIS, his ethnicity as a Kurd or his religious identity as a Sunni Muslim. However the FtTJ rejected his claim to have faced any threat from ISIS or the militias for the reasons that he gave at paragraphs [38]-[43]. The FtTJ found that the appellant was not targeted for any reason and also that neither the appellant nor any member's family had been targeted but that they were caught up in the civil war at that time (at [42]). The judge found that the appellant was not being pursued personally for any reasons and that in any event the conditions which gave rise to any general fear from ISI S no longer existed (applying the country guidance case). He further found that the circumstances were not such that the appellant for any reason would be personally at risk. The judge also found at [43] that the appellant had also internally relocated by going to Kurdistan and there was no reason to find that that resulted in any unreasonably harsh consequences for the appellant.

11.          The judge concluded that the appellant could return safely to his home area where he would not be at risk of any form of harm or mistreatment. As to the form of documentation that he would require to return to Iraq, the judge referred to the CG decision of SMO and that the appellant required a CSID card. He further noted at [45] that a further issue to be decided in accordance with the CG case was whether the appellant would be able to provide that information from the registry or would be able to obtain his CSID card or other documentation.

12.          The FtTJ noted that when in Europe previously he managed to return to Iraq without any problem and in order to do so he would have required some form of travel document to enable him to enter Iraq. The judge also noted that the appellant appeared to have entered Iraq without any difficulty. At [47] the FtTJ referred to the appellant's CSID card being left with his mother at home in Iraq and that there was no reason why the appellant could not contact his family members, which included a male family member in the form of his uncle, to obtain his documentation or the necessary information to enable him to return to Iraq.

13.          In conclusion the judge found that the appellant would be able to contact family members and would be able to obtain the necessary documentation to enable him to return to Iraq. The judge found that the appellant would not be at risk in his home area and also that having relocated in the past he was not at any risk of any mistreatment at the time that he left Iraq. He therefore dismissed the appeal.

14.          The appellant sought permission to appeal that decision and permission was granted by DIJ Shaerf on 8 June 2021 for the following reasons:

"It is arguable that the judge erred in law in not specifically applying the guidance in SMO, KSP and IM (Article 15 ( c ); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 400 (IAC) to the particular circumstances of the appellant, notwithstanding he had given sustainable reasons for his far-reaching adverse credibility findings. Permission to appeal is granted and both grounds may be argued."

The Hearing before the Upper Tribunal:

15.          By way of background to the appeal, the decision of Judge McClure was promulgated on 11 May 2020 (having heard the appeal in January 2020). The grounds issued challenging the decision were made in time and submitted on 18 May 2020. Following the grant of permission in June 2020, the appeal came before the Upper Tribunal on 7 September 2020 before a UTJ. Having heard the parties at a remote hearing, the UTJ dismissed the appeal for the reasons given. There followed an application to set aside that decision under Rule 43 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 made on 29 September 2020 on the basis that the judge had failed to have regard to the position of the respondent expressed in the latest CPIN published in June 2020. The UTJ made reference to the direction that she earlier sent to the parties and observed that as no response had been received from the respondent. It was taken that the application to set aside was unopposed and thus the judge set aside the decision to be relisted before another UTJ to determine whether the decision of Judge McClure should be set aside for error of law. That decision was dated 8 December 2020.

16.          However on 9 December 2020 the UTJ received an email from the respondent indicating that there had been previous submissions made and that due to an administrative error they had not been recorded by the Upper Tribunal's administration. As a result the UTJ withdrew the decision of 8 December 2020 and reconsidered the matter in the light of those submissions. Thus in a decision dated 7 February 2021 the judge reached the decision that it was in the interests of justice to set aside her earlier decision of 10 September 2020.

17.          I set out that procedural history to demonstrate that it is common ground between the parties that the decision that I have to make is to determine whether the original grounds of challenge demonstrate that the decision of Judge McClure involved the making of an error on a point of law such that it should be set aside.

18.          There is no dispute that the CG decision that Judge McClure was required to take into account was that of SMO and I have not been asked to take into account information that was not available to the FtTJ such as the June 2020 CPIN, which was not before the FtTJ in January 2020 when he heard the appeal nor in May 2020 when he promulgated his decision. Neither was that CPIN available on the date the grounds of challenge were filed.

19.          I therefore turn to the grounds of challenge that are advanced on behalf of the appellant.

20.          Mr Holmes, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant, made the following oral submissions. They can be summarised as follows.

21.          He began his submissions by reference to ground 2 which he submitted challenged the significance of the appellant having previously returned to Iraq in 2008 and by reference to the decision of the FtTJ at [46]. The FtTJ stated that because the appellant had previously facilitated his return to Iraq in 2008 it followed that he had documents from that time or as stated at [48] because he had previously returned the appellant would know the relevant evidence to facilitate his return now. Mr Holmes submitted that he understood the judge to mean that the appellant would know the family book from his own records.

22.          Thus he submitted that the appellant's case was that any reference made to his return to Iraq in 2008 was an irrelevant consideration and secondly that the judge conflated the issue with return with the question of obtaining a CSID.

23.          He submitted that on the face of it the lapse of time since his return in 2008 and the appeal in 2020 was that events had moved on significantly from the late 2000's as evidenced by the different country guidance decisions. There had been a civil war between the 2 periods of time and there were issues concerning documentary evidence which had become more prominent.

24.          He submitted that an example of how the judge had taken considerations beyond their limits were set out at paragraph [48] and it was difficult to see without more detailed consideration of the point what it was about his return in 2008 to assist him now in replacing his CSID. If he returned on a Laissez Passer in 2008 that would not answer the question of re- documentation now. If he had an original passport, it was difficult to see how that helped the judge to reach his conclusion and illustrates his conflation of the issues. It was a separate question of whether the appellant could be documented.

25.          Dealing with ground 1 he submitted that it was a challenge to the FtTJ's conclusion that the appellant could redocument whilst in the UK prior to return. This relied upon matters of recall of relevant details of the family book and also the "medical angle" that the appellant had a medical condition which might impact on the recall of such details as set out in the doctor's letter which the judge did acknowledge. However what was missing was how that affected his ability to recall relevant details. SMO at paragraph 392 dealt with this.

26.          As to the 2 ^nd point, present in the headnote at paragraph 13 was whether an individual could be documented in the UK. Mr Holmes submitted that there was a two-stage approach, and that SMO did not say that merely knowing the details of the family book would be sufficient. Merely knowing that reference would not be enough to establish identity. Mr Holmes referred to the conclusions of paragraph 383 of SMO which endorsed paragraph 26 of AAH where the tribunal set out the documents required. The appellant does not possess a passport.

27.          As to redocumentation by proxy Mr Holmes submitted that the judge at paragraph [47] suggested that the appellant's uncle or other family members could obtain documents on his behalf from Iraq. The judge does not tackle the question as to whether the individual's home area has adopted the INID and if so a proxy would not be available.

28.          This was set out in SMO at paragraph 389 and that the evidence of Dr Fatah (about the practice in the IKR), that an individual who is registered in a city in which the INID process has been rolled out will be unlikely to secure a replacement CSID there. When tribunal stated, "the logic which underpins Dr Fatah's evidence is irrefutable and was implicitly accepted by the respondent at [151] of her closing submissions, which spoke only of the CSID still being issued in rural areas". He submitted that at paragraph 431 the UT considered that Kirkuk was one of the areas which had an INID, but this was not as result of direct evidence but an inference. He submitted that the judge concluded that the appellant could use a proxy however looking at SMO that the tribunal made an inference as to where the INID had been rolled out and Mr Holmes invited the tribunal to adopt the same approach.

29.          Ms Aboni on behalf of the respondent submitted that if there were any errors of law as to re-documenting himself in the UK or by proxy, they were not material because the FtTJ found as a fact that the appellant previously had a CSID in Iraq which he had left there. Furthermore, the judge found that he was in contact with his family and therefore it was open to the FtTJ to reach the conclusion that by contacting his family he could obtain the CSID himself. There was no challenge to those factual findings in the grounds and no evidence that the family no longer had the document and if the CSID was with the family members he would be able to obtain them, and this would be adequate documentation to return to Iraq.

30.          By way of reply to Mr Holmes submitted that it was not an issue that the appellant was without documentation in the UK, and it was incumbent on the judge to consider the situation as it was and that he was not in possession of a CSID.

31.          Both parties submitted that if the decision of the FtTJ disclose the making of an error of law, any remaking should await the formulation of further country guidance.

32.          At the conclusion of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give.

 

 

Decision on error of law:

33.          I shall start by considering ground 2. This challenges the factual finding made by the FtTJ at paragraph [46] where he stated that the appellant had previously returned to Iraq without any problem in 2008 and that "in order to do so would have required some form of travel documents to enable him to enter Iraq. The appellant appears to have entered Iraq without any difficulty."

34.          When considering the challenge in the grounds and on the basis of the submissions made, it is important to consider the context of that finding. Firstly, there is no dispute on the facts (nor have they been challenged) that the appellant's immigration history was that he had previously left Iraq and claimed asylum in Norway, he had not waited for a decision on that claim but had returned to Iraq "without any problem" (at [23]). Therefore the factual assessment made by the FtTJ as the appellant's immigration history was entirely correct and the judge was entitled to find that the appellant had been able to re-enter on whatever travel documents he had in 2008 without any difficulty.

35.          That finding at paragraph [46] is then followed by further findings at [47]-[49]. At [47] the FtTJ found that the documentation the appellant had was his CSID which was with his mother in Iraq where he left it. This is not challenged in the grounds. The judge further found that the appellant had a male relative (his uncle) in the same area and that there was no reason why the appellant could not contact his family members to obtain the document or the necessary information (in the alternative) to enable him to return to Iraq (at [47]). At [48] the judge found that the appellant would be able to contact family members and thus would be able to obtain the necessary documentation to enable him to return to Iraq. Whilst the judge also made a reference at [49] that he would know the necessary details having returned in the past, the judge had also made sustainable findings relating to the documentation the appellant had access to and information that he had access to from family members.

36.          As can be seen from the above references paragraph [46] should be read alongside the other paragraphs which, whilst brief, set out the FtTJ's reasoning as to how the appellant could return to Iraq either with his own CSID document or to be re-documented to enable him to return to Iraq.

37.          Whilst I would accept the submission made by Mr Holmes that there was a lapse of time between 2008 and the date of the hearing before the FtTJ in 2020, and that what might have been the position in 2008 may not necessarily be the position some years later given the changes that have happened in Iraq, it does not mean that the FtTJ was in error in the latter part of his assessment where he clearly found as a fact that the appellant had the relevant document, a CSID or that they were family members with whom he could reasonably be in touch with who could obtain the document for him to enable his return.

38.          Contrary to the submission made, paragraph [46] when read with paragraphs [47 - 49] do not show any conflation of the issues and plainly deal with how the appellant could obtain documentation to enable his return to Iraq. On the factual findings made by the FtTJ which are not challenged on the grounds, it was open to the judge to find that family members could assist him in providing the CSID for him. He would therefore not need to obtain a replacement CSID as his own CSID, which the judge found was available, could be provided to him.

39.          This leads onto ground 1. Mr Holmes submitted that ground 1 was a challenge to the FtTJ's conclusion that the appellant could be re-documented whilst in the UK prior to return and relied upon matters of recall of the family book. The submission made was that whilst the FtTJ referred to the appellant having epilepsy what was missing in his consideration was how that affected his recall and thus any information that could be provided by way of the family book.

40.          Dealing with this issue, the FtTJ was plainly aware that the appellant suffered from epilepsy (at paragraph [31]) and referred to the medical note confirming this. Whilst the FtTJ recorded the appellant's evidence at [20]-[21] that he had been hit on the back of the head and that he could not remember much because of his health and that he was still being tested, the medical note exhibited in the appellant's bundle (page 3 ) did not provide any evidence in support as to how his medical condition had been caused nor did it set out how his condition affected him. There was nothing said that his condition affected his recall or memory. Consequently it has not been demonstrated that there was any evidence to support such a submission.

41.          The second point made by Mr Holmes is that by reference to SMO there is a two-stage approach and that merely knowing any references to the family book would be insufficient. In his submissions he referred to the Tribunal in SMO adopting the previous findings made in AAH at paragraph 26 as to re-documentation in the UK. SMO , read together with AAH (Iraqi Kurds - internal relocation) Iraq CG UKUT 212 (IAC) and AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 544 (IAC) explains the circumstances in which an Iraqi national present in the UK would be able to obtain a replacement CSID in the UK.

42.          Paragraph 11 of the headnote to SMO states:

Notwithstanding the phased transition to the INID within Iraq, replacement CSIDs remain available through Iraqi Consular facilities. Whether an individual will be able to obtain a replacement CSID whilst in the UK depends on the documents available and, critically, the availability of the volume and page reference of the entry in the Family Book in Iraq, which system continues to underpin the Civil Status Identity process. Given the importance of that information, most Iraqi citizens will recall it. That information may also be obtained from family members, although it is necessary to consider whether such relatives are on the father's or the mother's side because the registration system is patrilineal.

43.          Paragraph 383 of SMO states:

We have not been asked to revisit the extant country guidance on the way in which an individual might obtain a replacement CSID from within the UK, for which see [173]-[177] of AA (Iraq) and [26] of AAH (Iraq). We add only this: whilst the INID is clearly replacing the CSID in Iraq, consulates do not have the electronic terminals necessary to issue the INID and continue to issue the CSID instead, as confirmed in a Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board report which is quoted at 5.6.9 of the respondent's CPIN entitled Internal Relocation, civil documentation and returns, dated February 2019. An Iraqi national in the UK would be able to apply for a CSID in the way explained in AA (Iraq) and, if one was successfully obtained, we find that it would be acceptable evidence of the individual's identity throughout Iraq.

44.          Paragraphs 173 - 177 of AA refers to obtaining a CSID whilst in the UK.

173. As regards those who have an expired or current Iraqi passport but no CSID - Dr Fatah identifies in his first report that a CSID may be obtained through the "Consular section of the Iraqi Embassy in London", which will send a request for a replacement or renewed CSID to the General Directorate for Travel and Nationality - Directorate of Civil Status. A request for a replacement CSID must be accompanied, inter alia, by "any form of official document in support of the applicant's identity" and the application form must be signed by "the head of the family, or the legal guardian or representative to verify the truth of its contents." He also added that an applicant must also authorise a person in Iraq to act as his representative in order for that person to "follow up on the progress of the application.

174. However, Dr Fatah continued by explaining that if an individual has lost his CSID and does not know the relevant page and book number for it, then the Iraq Embassy in London will not be able to obtain one on his behalf. Instead, he or she will have to attend the appropriate local office of family registration in Iraq or give a relative, friend or lawyer power of attorney to obtain his or her CSID. The process of a giving power of attorney to a lawyer in Iraq to act "as a proxy" is commonplace and Dr Fatah had done this himself. He also explained that the power of attorney could be obtained through the Iraq Embassy.

175. Dr Fatah gave further evidence to the effect that having a marriage certificate may be useful as it would contain data found in the family records. It is, however, not possible to use a "health card" in order to obtain a CSID because there is no primary health care or GP system in Iraq, but instead patients attended hospital when they needed to do so, and no central records are held.

176. There is a consensus between Dr Fatah's evidence and the following more general evidence provided by UNHCR-Iraq in April 2015 on the issue of obtaining CSID's from abroad.

"In principle, a failed asylum seeker, or indeed any Iraqi citizen abroad, can acquire Iraqi documents through Iraqi embassies and consulates. There is a special authorization granted to these bodies to provide documents for Iraqi abroad on the condition that the beneficiaries should have any available documents in order to prove their nationality."

177. In summary, we conclude that it is possible for an Iraqi national living in the UK to obtain a CSID through the consular section of the Iraqi Embassy in London, if such a person is able to produce a current or expired passport and/or the book and page number for their family registration details. For persons without such a passport, or who are unable to produce the relevant family registration details, a power of attorney can be provided to someone in Iraq who can thereafter undertake the process of obtaining the CSID for such person from the Civil Status Affairs Office in their home governorate. For reasons identified in the section that follows below, at the present time the process of obtaining a CSID from Iraq is likely to be severely hampered if the person wishing to obtain the CSID is from an area where Article 15(c) serious harm is occurring.

45.          Paragraph 26 of AAH states:

If applying through a consulate abroad the requirements are different. Having contacted the consulate in London, and checked on the website of the Iraqi embassy in Sweden, Dr Fatah states that the authorities will require the applicant to first make a statement explaining why he needs a CSID and attach this to his application form, which must countersigned by the head of the applicant's family and stamped by the consulate or embassy; he must then produce his Iraqi passport and proof of status in the country where he is applying, the name of a representative (proxy) in Iraq, an additional form completed by the head of the applicant's family verifying that the contents of his application form were true, four colour copies of his INC, and 10 colour photographs. Crucially the applicant must be able to produce something which can establish the location of his family's details in the civil register. This should be a CSID, an INC or birth certificate. If none of these are available to the applicant he must supply the identity documents of his parents. This evidence again accords with that of Landinfo (December 2017) who conclude that it can be difficult to obtain replacement ID documents from an embassy abroad for the individual who is unable to verify his or her identity.

46.          In his decision the judge referred to SMO and at paragraphs [47] and [48] the judge stated that the appellant would be able to either "obtain the necessary documentation for his family" or at [47] that he could contact his family members to obtain the " necessary information" from his family in Iraq. Although the judge's reasoning is brief, it is plain from the reference to "relevant information" and " documentation" that the judge had in mind the volume and page reference of the entry in the Family Book in Iraq or from the documents that were available at home but also in the alternative that the appellant could obtain his own CSID from his family relatives. The 2 ^nd alternative would not require any knowledge of the family book. 

47.          The last point advanced on behalf of the appellant is that when considering the issue of redocumentation the FtTJ's finding that the appellant's uncle and or other family members could obtain documents on his behalf failed to tackle the question of whether his home area had adopted the INID.

48.          In this context Mr Holmes submits that where the INID's had been rolled out the appellant would be unlikely to secure a replacement CSID there. During his submissions he referred me to SMO at paragraph 431 in support of his submission that the UT considered Kirkuk as an area which had an INID, and it was not the result of any direct evidence that by way of an inference and that I should adopt the same inferential approach.

49.          I am satisfied that there is no error in the FtTJ's approach in the way submitted on behalf of the appellant. There is no dispute that for an INID there is a requirement for enrolment of biodata including fingerprints and iris scans and must be applied for in person (at paragraph 388 of SMO). However at paragraph 389 the UT found that in respect of the CSID they were satisfied that it was still being issued in parts of Iraq. The tribunal stated that they did not have a list of the CSA offices which did or did not have an INID terminal. Whilst Mr Holmes relies upon paragraph 431 of SMO and as recited in the written grounds, that paragraph related to the assessment made by the UT by reference to the particular circumstances of the appellant (SMO) and fails to take account of the earlier paragraph at 430 that in his particular circumstances and that in the event that his CSID is at home in Kirkuk, it could be sent to him in the UK or taken to him on arrival in Iraq. That was in essence the factual finding clearly made by the FtTJ in the present appeal.

50.          Paragraph 431 then refers to the prospects of obtaining a replacement CSID and that in the tribunal's mind it was likely that the CSA office in Kirkuk had an INID and would not issue a CSID by proxy, but they did not resolve the case as they reached the conclusion that further factual findings were necessary.

51.          There was no evidence advanced before the FtTJ that in the appellant's home area there was an INID terminal. Notwithstanding the submissions made by Mr Holmes that it should be inferred that there might be, the UT expressly stated in its analysis of the issues at paragraph 389 (rather than paragraph 431 which refer to the particular circumstances in that appellant's case) that that whilst they did not have a list of CSA offices which had an IND terminal, " it will consequently be for an individual appellant who does not have a CSID or INID to establish on the lower standard that they cannot obtain a CSID by the use of a proxy whether from the UK or on arrival in Baghdad."

52.          On the factual findings made by the FtTJ the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that the appellant had not established to the lower standard that he could not obtain a CSID. In his case the FtTJ identified 2 particular ways that he could do so; firstly by obtaining the assistance of family members in providing the relevant information but secondly that the appellant still had his CSID which could be accessed by sending it to him in the UK. Therefore even if the appellant could not recall the family book details, he would not need to because he had the relevant information in his CSID card.

53.          Consequently as the factual findings which underpinned the FtTJ's assessment are not challenged, I am satisfied on the evidence before the judge at the hearing in January 2020 and at the time he promulgated his decision in May 2020 that the country guidance set out in AAH (paragraph 26) which was adopted by the UT in SMO that it was still possible to obtain a CSID by contacting male family members in Iraq to send the documents required as well as providing the family book or page number details. In the alternative as stated in SMO if the appellant had access to a CSID which could be sent to him, that would mean that he would not be subject to Article 3 ill-treatment or serious harm (Article 15 (b) ) on return to Iraq.

54.          The obligation on a tribunal judge is to give reasons in sufficient detail to show the principles upon which the tribunal has acted and the reasons that have led to the decision. Appellate courts should not rush to find a misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or express themselves differently, and in my judgement and on a careful reading, the FtTJ did give adequate reasons for his decision and did so in a way consistent with the CG decision of SMO.

55.          Consequently it has not been demonstrated that the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law and the appeal is dismissed. The decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

 

Decision:

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law and the decision of the FtT shall stand.

 

Direction Regarding Anonymity - Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008

Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

 

 

 

Signed

Date: 19 / 8/ 2021

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds