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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Trask v Strayfield International Ltd [1992] UKEAT 614_91_0707 (7 July 1992) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1992/614_91_0707.html Cite as: [1992] UKEAT 614_91_707, [1992] UKEAT 614_91_0707 |
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At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
(AS IN CHAMBERS)
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MISS J EADY
(Of Counsel)
Messrs Sarjeant & Sheppard
Solicitors
150 Friar Street
Reading
RG1 1HE
For the Respondents MR M D ROSS
(Solicitor)
Messrs Paris Smith & Randall
Solicitors
9 College Place
Southampton
SO1 2ZD
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal by Strayfield International Ltd from an Order of the learned Registrar dated the 20th December 1991 extending the time for the Notice of Appeal from a decision of an Industrial Tribunal by one day. The learned Registrar had before her three letters, one of the 14th November 1991 seeking an extension of time and giving some reasons for so doing, a reply from the Company's Solicitors of the 26th November, and riposte from the Solicitors acting for the Applicant of the 11th December. I have the same documents before me but I have had, which the learned Registrar did not have, the benefit of submissions made before me orally.
The decision of the Industrial Tribunal was given on the 23rd September 1991 and the last date therefore for the Notice of Appeal was Monday 4th November.
The Notice of Appeal did not reach us until Tuesday, 5th November, one day late. It is well established that time limits will be strictly applied and will only be extended in special or exceptional circumstances. The reasons given by the Solicitors acting for the Applicant, who are not the Solicitors appearing before me today, are first, that by posting the letter by first class post on Friday, 1st November, they anticipated that it would arrive at the Employment Appeal Tribunal by Monday, 4th. That is clearly not an expectation within the Rules for delivery of documents by post. In a decision of this Tribunal St Basil's Centre Ltd v. McCrosson which is reported, at least in Time's Law Reports of 18th October 1991, we emphasise for guidance of practitioners that we would abide and apply the Practice Direction of the Queen's Bench Division Postal Service at [1985] 1 WLR 489. Applying those guidance Rules of Practice the Solicitors could not have anticipated that the document would arrive until the Tuesday. So that that point, in my judgment, is not a valid point, and it is fair to Mr Ross that he does not seek to support it.
There are then further points. Secondly, that the Applicant, the proposed Appellant, was to be supported by the Hambro Legal Protection Limited and that they had not indicated their support until the last minute. That is an invalid excuse because that really is very similar to the position under Legal Aid, and in the Practice Direction of this Tribunal at [1981] ICR 287, it is made quite clear that the application for Legal Aid is not a valid reason for not filing a Notice of Appeal within time.
The third reason advanced is that there was some doubt about the merits of the appeal, and that, in my judgment, is not a valid reason nor does Mr Ross seek to support that second or third reason.
The last reason which was given caused me some anxiety.
The Solicitors acting for the proposed Appellant realised that they were up against a time limit and they not only sent the Notice of Appeal by post, but they tried to send a faxed document to this Tribunal on Friday, 1st November. I accept that they were unable to obtain the number from the telephone director of enquiries, and that is something which has caused some problems in the past, but there is no reason, first, why the Solicitors should not have telephoned the local industrial tribunal to obtain our fax number and perhaps more importantly, there was no reason why the Solicitors should not have checked on the morning of Monday 4th that the Notice of Appeal had arrived, because if it had not they could have sent it through by facsimile on that morning of the 4th November, in which case it would have been in time. It is suggested that other methods such as London Agents or a Courier Agency or personally taking the appeal up by train could have been used. They seem to me a little extreme, but it does seem that a check could have been made on the Monday morning to ensure that the Notice of Appeal had arrived as anticipated. When time is short this could usefully be accepted by practitioners as a safeguard.
In those circumstances, therefore, I agree both with Mr Ross and Miss Eady that that fourth point, in the circumstances of this case, is not a valid excuse. It follows therefore that the reasons put forward by the Solicitors, then acting, are not themselves special and exceptional excuses which should warrant an extension of time. The point taken by Mr Ross and the only point he takes, is this, that there ought to be some certainty of decision and that the decision of the learned Registrar should be upheld because there is no further information before me than there was before the learned Registrar. Whilst I appreciate the importance of that point, it is fair to say, in this present case, that my attention had been drawn to a number of authorities and that I have received great help from both the advocates before me. Therefore, I am in perhaps a somewhat better position than the learned Registrar to reach a decision.
As I have said this is a re-hearing, as we indicated in the case of Martin v. British Railways Board [1989] ICR 24, and I take the view here that the excuses put forward are not valid excuses. It is important, as both the advocates before me appreciate, that practitioners must ensure that these Notices of Appeal are presented within the strict time limits. Many steps can be taken, apart from those that have arisen in this case, and indeed if problems are envisaged then communication with the learned Registrar is always possible and her help and guidance can be sought. It may be that a Notice of Appeal, in somewhat simple form, just setting out the points of law can be filed, and thereafter can be amended to include more detailed reasons. Whatever the steps that are taken, thought must be given, and careful thought given, to the problems which can arise. I am afraid that in the present case I am not satisfied that the reasons given by the Solicitors are sufficient to warrant an extension of time.
This appeal therefore will be allowed and the Notice of Appeal will be struck out.