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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Dunford Hepburn Plc v Quinnin [1993] UKEAT 548_91_1201 (12 January 1993) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1993/548_91_1201.html Cite as: [1993] UKEAT 548_91_1201 |
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MS B DEAN
MR T C THOMAS CBE
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCE
For the Appellants MR M WEST
(Personnel Consultant)
Peninsula Business Services
Stamford House
361/365 Chapel Street
Manchester
M3 5JY
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is a preliminary hearing, ex parte, of an appeal by Dunford Hepburn plc against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Newcastle upon Tyne, on three days in May 1991, under the Chairmanship of Mr Emmitt, which Tribunal unanimously decided that the Applicant, Mr Quinnin had been unfairly dismissed but that his conduct contributed to the dismissal to the extent of 25% and Ordered a payment of a basic award £414 and a compensatory award of £5,938.05. There is no appeal against the liability issue on the unfair dismissal and that does not entirely surprise us in the light of the facts which were set out. They are clearly set out in the decision and this was a case of constructive dismissal.
When looking at the compensatory matters, the Tribunal in paragraph 8, consider the basic award, against which there is no complaint. The assessment of future loss from the date of the hearing, against which there is no complaint. Then they look at the compensatory award between the date of dismissal, the 6th December and the date of the hearing, that in fact constituted some 24 weeks.
The issue which is raised on the appeal is that in taking the view that the Applicant had acted reasonably in mitigating his loss, the Industrial Tribunal reached a decision which was perverse, in that no reasonable Tribunal properly directing itself could have reached that decision. It was an irrational decision in industrial terms, and indeed, in legal terms. The paragraph dealing with this matter reads thus:
"8(b)As to the Compensatory Award we find as follows. Mr Quinnin has not worked since his dismissal on 6 December. He has applied to 9 companies operating in the same field as the respondents but has not been granted an interview. He believes that news of his suspension on suspected theft has circulated in the industry and that it will be difficult for him to obtain employment in the field in which he has recently specialised and within which he wishes to remain. He has no formal qualifications but has worked on computers since he left school at 18."
None of those facts are disputed by the Company. They take issue with the next sentence:
"We think he has taken reasonable steps to mitigate his loss and are therefore prepared to allow loss of earnings from 10 December when he would have resumed work until the date of the hearing, a total period of 24 weeks."
It is true to say that in assessing the future loss the Tribunal took into account that he might obtain a less specialised employment. But the issue before them, and the issue raised before us was that no one on those facts, the evidence of Mr Quinnin who was the only witness on compensation, could have reached the conclusion that it was reasonable for him not to have taken any further steps during that 20 week period. There is the issue and it is suggested that the Notes of Evidence will merely confirm that. We accept that for the moment.
The situation, therefore, is that the Industrial Members sitting with me and I myself, are in the same position this morning as we would be at a full hearing because we accept what has been put before us by Mr West on behalf of the Company. The issue therefore is this, could a reasonable tribunal, having seen and heard the witness, reach the conclusion on those facts that Mr Quinnin had taken reasonable steps to mitigate his loss. It seems to us, we did not see and hear him, but the impression of the witnesses, as well as what they actually did, is part and parcel of the whole issue, and those sitting with me and I, take the view that it is not arguable on a legal basis that this Tribunal, acting reasonably, could not have reached that decision and it must therefore be perverse.
In the circumstances, therefore, we see no purpose in allowing this appeal to go further and it is dismissed at this stage.
