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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> David Pinto & Co v Taylor [1996] UKEAT 746_96_0612 (6 December 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/746_96_0612.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 746_96_0612, [1996] UKEAT 746_96_612

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR I MACCABE (of Counsel) Messrs David Pinto & Co Solicitors 34 Reading Road South Fleet Hampshire GU13 9QL
For the Respondent	MR S BROWN (of Counsel) Messrs Phillips Solicitors Wolverton Court London Street Basingstone Hampshire RG21 7NT


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this appeal is to determine whether we should allow an appeal against the Registrar's refusal to extend time for presenting appeals in this case.

The orders in respect of which the prospective appeal is lodged are, respectively, a decision of 1 March 1996, whereby the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal refused to postpone the hearing of the claim listed for 25 March, a refusal on 12 March to grant a repeated application for an adjournment and a decision on 21 March striking out the notice of appearance on the grounds of the Appellant's non-compliance with the interlocutory order dated 23 February.

The interlocutory order made on 23 February was in relation to particulars which were required of the notice of appearance which had been lodged on behalf of the employers. The employers in this case are a firm of solicitors. They were being taken to the Industrial Tribunal in respect of a complaint made by an employee of theirs that he was denied proper sickness pay, it being the employee's contention he was entitled to be paid in full whilst off sick. It was the solicitors' contention that he was not so entitled, and reliance was placed on the way other employees had been dealt with by the firm during their periods of sickness. The particulars that were requested were of the contention that sickness pay in full had not been made to other employees. Those particulars were manifestly of importance to the issues which were raised between the parties in this case. Those particulars were requested on 1 February. An order was made on 23 February that those particulars be provided by 8 March and the Appellants, David Pinto & Co, were warned that failure to comply with the order might result in the whole or any part of the notice of appearance being struck out. Those particulars were not provided in time and have never been provided. There was also a failure by the solicitors to comply with an order for discovery.

The matter came before the Industrial Tribunal on 21 March and on that occasion they struck out the notice of appearance, as they were entitled to do. It seems to us that this was a clear breach by a firm of solicitors of an order by an Industrial Tribunal. It is a matter which is of concern to this Court.

The notices of appeal are out of time by approximately 31 days, 20 days and 10 days. The notice of appeal that was lodged here was not accompanied by any application for an extension of time. Accordingly, the Registrar wrote on 17 May informing the firm of their default and of the need to make the application which was made. That application was heard by the Registrar on 12 July and refused.

It seems to us quite clear in this case that the Registrar was right to refuse the request for an extension of time. The leading authority on the question of time for presenting appeals and the circumstances in which extensions of time will be granted, are set out in a case called United Arab Emirates v Abdelghafar [1995] ICR 65, the substance of which has been incorporated in our practice direction, which has been issued governing the procedure at this Employment Appeal Tribunal. It is of paramount importance that parties understand that the rules of procedure here are to be strictly adhered to. The time-limit provisions for putting in a notice of appeal are not limits to be aimed at, they are time-limits to be complied with. Where there has been a failure to comply with the time-limit, then this Court will ask itself what is the explanation for the failure to put in the notice of appeal within time, does it provide a good excuse and are there any other exceptional circumstances which justify this Tribunal granting an extension of time. In this case it is manifest, as has been accepted, that there is no explanation at all to offer this Court for the failure to put in the notices of appeal within time. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that time will not be extended.

It seems to us that there is no significant merit in the point which is being canvassed, that at the 25 March hearing, as we understand it, the Tribunal made an order debarring the firm of solicitors from defending. The striking out of the notice of appearance, in our judgment, had precisely the same effect and, accordingly, it seems to us that there is nothing in that point. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal against the refusal by the Registrar. We will hear the parties on the question of costs, since an application is made in the skeleton argument put in on behalf of the Respondent to this appeal.

In this case there has been an application for costs. We take the view that this is a plain case for the award of costs. This firm of solicitors, having ignored the rules as to time, has offered no explanation to this Court as to why the appeals have been lodged out of time. Any competent firm of solicitors, applying their minds to the decision of Abdelghafar would have appreciated that that was an essential step in seeking this Court's discretion in extending time for applying for leave to appeal. Accordingly, we are of the view that the solicitors' mounting of this appeal was an unreasonable step for them to have taken in the course of this appellate process. That therefore gives us a power to exercise our discretion as to costs. We are all of the view that we should exercise our discretion in favour of making such an award in this case. It seems to us to be essential that before this Court's time is occupied by appeals, the parties concerned should have some legitimate ground for asking this Court for an extension of time. None whatever has been advanced in this case.