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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Goodman v Worthing District Health Authority [1996] UKEAT 941_93_1007 (10 July 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/941_93_1007.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 941_93_1007 |
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BUCKLEY
MR D J JENKINS MBE
MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR B P RYE
(Union Official)
UCATT
London South East Region
UCATT House
177 Abbeville Road
London SW4 9RL
For the Respondents NO APPEARANCE BY OR
ON BEHALF OF THE
RESPONDENTS
MR JUSTICE BUCKLEY: Mr Goodman, the potential applicant before the Industrial Tribunal held at Brighton, was employed by the Health Authority until May 1992. It was accepted that was the effective date of termination.
There was a preliminary issue as to whether his originating application had been presented in time, and the tribunal held on 2nd June 1993, that it had not, they declined to entertain the application. What they actually held was that the originating application was not presented in time, also that it was reasonably practicable for the application to have been so presented. Those findings of course inevitably led them to the conclusion that they had no jurisdiction.
The facts are somewhat strange. It seems to be common ground that time ran out on a Sunday, which was 2nd August 1992. Mr Goodman might perhaps be criticised for being at the last minute, albeit it is fair to say that he had prior to that time been trying to persuade his union to assist and process the matter and so forth. But be that as it may, he went to the Employment Office on the Friday, that is 31st July 1992 with his originating application and the advice they gave him was to send it by Registered Post. In fact, the tribunal find that he did just that, he sent it on 31st July 1992 by Recorded Delivery First Class, that is in paragraph 6 of the reasons.
Unknown to Mr Goodman, it appears that the Central Office of Industrial Tribunals at Bury St Edmunds has an arrangement with the Post Office, that Recorded Delivery mail is not delivered on a Saturday because there is nobody there to give a receipt or signature for the acceptance of it, and the Post Office hold the delivery until the Monday, and that is precisely what happened in this case, and Monday was of course out of time. The tribunal found as a fact that the envelope was stamped with the Monday the 3rd, and that satisfied them that it had been delivered in that way. They held that for that reason it was out of time. They also held that this was not a case, as has arisen in the past where there was no letter box, and that there was no reason therefore to extend the time limit from the Saturday, or even the Sunday to the Monday, because the application could have been presented within time. What the Industrial Tribunal did not have was the information which we have just recited of the arrangement between the Central Tribunal and the Post Office. That information which we have since received from both parties, that is the Post Office and the Central Office, and there is no dispute over it now. This tribunal by order of 16th January 1996, gave leave that that further evidence should be placed before us when they ordered that the matter should proceed to this hearing. So we are in a better and different position on the evidence from the Industrial Tribunal.
Mr Rye, who has represented the appellant today, has referred us to two cases. The one we find presents the closest analogy is Lang v Devon General Ltd [1987] ICR 4. That was a case in which the facts, so it seems to us, were sufficiently close to the present case, as to make no practical difference. The only point of distinction that could be made was that in the present case Mr Goodman might possibly by enquiry have ascertained that his letter would or might even have guessed that a Recorded Delivery (requiring a signature) posted on a Friday would not be able to be delivered on the Saturday or prior to the Monday. We recognise that as a theoretical difference, but in view of the fact that Mr Goodman was only acting on advice from the Employment Office, we would regard it as unduly harsh and legalistic to hold that against him. On any view, he was only a day out of time and had made a bona fide and genuine attempt to ensure that his originating application was presented in time. It was only this arrangement between the Post Office and the tribunal that prevented his First Class Recorded Delivery missive, from being received by the Central Office within time.
In those circumstances we are prepared to hold, as in the Lang case, that this application was presented in time. It is not necessary to look at the other limb of the argument, which is that it was not reasonably practicable to deliver in time. We can see some difficulty with that, where someone leaves their attempts to deliver too rather late in the day. It may be though in this particular case, and given the evidence that we now have and the tribunal did not have, that the tribunal might have been persuaded in the exceptional circumstances of this case, that they could have allowed this to go forward, but we say no more about that. It is in time, and the appeal will be allowed.
We remit this matter; it is probably sensible to remit it to a differently constituted tribunal so that the matter can proceed as soon as may be.