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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Howard-Flynn v Edgware Glazing Co Ltd & Anor [1997] UKEAT 704_97_1310 (13 October 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/704_97_1310.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 704_97_1310

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR E BROWN (Representative) Southwark Law Centre Hanover Park House 14-16 Hanover Park London SE15 5HS


 


JUDGE JOHN BYRT QC: This is a preliminary hearing in an appeal from the decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (North), a decision which was promulgated on 30 April 1997.

By that decision, the Tribunal held that the principal reason for Ms Howard-Flynn's dismissal was redundancy, and that the dismissal was fair. They then went on to consider a second claim, namely whether there had been sexual discrimination against her, both by reason of the fact that she was dismissed because of her pregnancy and also by words and conduct of the men in the office.

On the first issue the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the employers had no alternative but to dismiss her, having regard to their economic situation. Because she was a secretary/receptionist, no one else fulfilled that role and, having come to the conclusion they could no longer afford such a position, she was a natural candidate for redundancy. In so finding, they came to the conclusion she was not dismissed by reason of her pregnancy. Mr Brown, who has said everything that can be said on behalf of the Appellant in this matter, does not challenge that finding. The burden of this case on appeal is that there was sex discrimination against this employee by reason of what was said and done to her during the time she was at work..

There are various factors of which note should be taken when considering this matter. First, it is to be noted that she was in employment with this company since January 1986 and her dismissal occurred in the early days of 1995. Secondly, her case was not considered in isolation. Before the Tribunal were four other Applicants making similar allegations and a large part of the Industrial Tribunal's decision was taken up in considering the separate cases against each of them. This afforded them an ample opportunity to assess the atmosphere in the office.

Mr Brown's contention is that the Tribunal's reasons for dismissing the Applicant's claim of sexual discrimination were wholly inadequate. He says that the Tribunal should have made findings as to what remarks were made and thereafter, they should have considered whether they had a sexual connotation, and whether they were welcome or truly regarded as offensive. They ought to have considered whether the fact that this lady became pregnant at a particular time made any difference in the offence such conduct as was proved caused her. He also says that, whilst the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that there were no sexual remarks specifically directed at her, that it was part of the general badinage which took place in this office, the Tribunal failed to take account of the fact that the remarks were principally made by management, namely Mr Harrington and Mr Errington. As a result, the employees were at a disadvantage in that they could not really properly protest. In all, Mr Brown is saying that the Tribunal did not really consider the evidence with sufficient specific detail to be able to come to any proper and clear finding.

The Industrial Tribunal heard this case for some five days and, in our view, had the opportunity of gaining a clear view of the atmosphere which prevailed in this office, the sort of remarks which were made, and the reaction with which they were received. They came to the conclusion that none of the remarks made could be said to have been directed at the Appellant because she was a woman, but were all part and parcel of the general atmosphere in this office. In another part of the same paragraph, paragraph 6 of the decision, they reckoned that everyone really gave as good as they got. It was conceded that the Appellant was occasionally given to shouting and swearing herself. All in all, the Industrial Tribunal found that there was no sex discrimination as a result of the conduct of other people in the office against this person.

We feel that all these matters are findings of fact to which the Tribunal directed their minds during a long and careful hearing. If we were to allow this matter to go forward to a full hearing, we would in effect be inviting the Tribunal to come to conclusions of their own in substitution for those of the Industrial Tribunal.

In all the circumstances, we do not think that Mr Brown, for all that he has said to us, has been able to make out a case why this case should go for a full hearing before the Tribunal. In all the circumstances therefore, we dismiss this appeal.