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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Aniedobe v London Borough Of Hammersmith & Fulham [1998] UKEAT 481_98_0111 (1 November 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1998/481_98_0111.html Cite as: [1998] UKEAT 481_98_111, [1998] UKEAT 481_98_0111

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR A EATON (Solicitor)
For the Respondent	MS K TICKNER (of Counsel) London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham Town Hall King Street London W6 9JU


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON: One of the purposes of this directions hearing was to determine what the issues are in an appeal which is being made against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal which rejected Mr Aniedobe's complaint of unlawful race discrimination brought against the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham.

The position is somewhat unusual. Mr Aniedobe put in a notice of appeal dated 13 March 1998, which is a lengthy document running to some 13 typed scripted pages and is his challenge to those points in the Industrial Tribunal decision with which he does not agree. It may be that not all of those points are themselves points of law.

The matter was put into our procedure for dealing with appeals and in due course there was a preliminary ex parte hearing at which Mr Aniedobe represented himself. The Employment Appeal Tribunal's order was that the appeal be allowed to proceed to a full hearing of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the Appellant was given leave to amend his notice of appeal with the assistance of the ELAAS scheme within 7 days and there should be an inter parties meeting for directions before a judge alone to determine the key issues of the appeal and what Chairman's notes of evidence if any are required and to consider any further directions.

I have to say that in relation to the second of those orders that I have made, namely, that the Appellant have leave to amend the notice of appeal with ELAAS was unfortunate, because the ELAAS scheme undertakes to provide representation at all preliminary hearing to those who wish to use their services, but it is not a service which extends to the drafting of notices of appeal. Although in some cases, that will be done.

Having given the Appellant leave to proceed with the case, he has applied for legal aid, was turned down initially but was then granted on an appeal, subject to the authorities being satisfied that he qualifies financially for such assistance. The position therefore is that it is likely that he will receive a legal aid certificate and one is expected in the near future.

The matters come before me on the basis of the third of the orders to which I referred, namely, the inter parties meeting for directions and I have to consider what directions now to give. It does seem to me to be quite clear having read the home-made grounds of appeal which Mr Aniedobe had drafted that there needs to be a further document to clarify the issues.

I do not consider that it is my function to seek to determine the key issues of the appeal. It seems to me that my function to make sure that whether the hearing comes before the full court, the case will be in a shape which can readily be managed. Accordingly, I think that the first steps that should be taken at this time, is to order that an amended notice of appeal be filed on behalf of the Appellant in this case and that it should be filed within 28 days of today.

If there is difficulty about complying with the time limit in that order, then I will give liberty to apply that application may be made in writing without the need for a further attendance here, and obviously the respondents must be given an opportunity to say what they wish in response to that application.

It is likely that if an application is made and granted, that there will be an Unless Order attached to that further order, because it does seem to me that the time has now arrived where we need to make clear that which is not clear at the moment and which was not clear at the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 20 July when the matter was last before it.

As to notes of evidence I have indicated to the parties the general reluctance of the Employment Appeal Tribunal to make an order for notes of evidence, for a number of reasons, not least because they are almost always not pertinent to any issue of law which must be raised in a notice of appeal, but it seems to me that no adjudication can be made on that matter until after the issues on the appeal have been properly clarified. When that has been done, if there is need to apply for notes of evidence, then such application will have to be made and supported by a skeleton argument specifying precisely what evidence is required and to what issue that relates in the amended notice of appeal and why it is said that the point cannot be dealt with without the notes.

If such an application is made whether resisted or not it will be considered at an oral hearing, ordering notes of evidence is not something that I would be prepared to do as a result of merely of a written application, whether it was opposed or not.

I am conscious that time is running; the Appellant presented his complaint to his employers which has given rise to these proceedings in January 1996 and he presented his Originating Application to the Industrial Tribunal in June 1996. The Industrial Tribunal's decision was reached after a five day hearing in January 1998 and was sent to the parties in February 1998. It follows therefore that it is now more than two and a half years since the facts giving rise to the complaint arose, and it will be over a year after the Industrial Tribunal proceedings before the Employment Appeal Tribunal will be considering the matter at a full hearing. Accordingly, time is important and I have made this point in this short judgment in order that the parties should well bear it in mind when providing us with the information which we are seeking, so I give liberty to apply.