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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Merlyn Holdings Ltd v Jones [1998] UKEAT 746_98_0112 (1 December 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1998/746_98_0112.html Cite as: [1998] UKEAT 746_98_0112, [1998] UKEAT 746_98_112

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR J BUTTERWORTH Representative on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent	No appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent


 


THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal against the Registrar's refusal to extend time to Merlyn Holdings Limited in relation to their Notice of Appeal which they wish to bring against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held on 15 April 1998.

The Tribunal had sat at Abergele on that date to consider Mr Jones' complaint against Merlyn Holdings Limited that there had been amounts owing to him by way of unpaid wages and also a claim for damages for breach of contract, which was added by way of an amendment. The Respondents did not attend that hearing; they were not, of course, required to do so and they exercised their right to make written representations which were considered by the learned Chairman at the hearing.

The result of the decision was that the Applicant was awarded some £1,900 odd pounds in respect of unpaid wages and damages for breach of contract. The decision was promulgated and sent to the parties on 8 May 1998 and that is the date from which time runs for the purposes of putting in an appeal. The appeal was received here on 22 June 1998 and was thus three days out of time. In a helpful skeleton argument, the Appellant through his representative, Mr Butterworth puts the position in this way: The Tribunal had been on notice that all future correspondence should be sent direct to him and not to his previous solicitors, who were listed in the relevant box in the IT3 as his representative. When the decision was sent out it was in fact sent to his previous solicitors. Therefore it was not received by Merlyn Holdings Limited themselves until 21 May 1998. It may well be that the Appellant had been told by the Tribunal the result of the case within a period of about 4 days of the decision having been reached, hence the reference to that time in the Appellant's letter of 22 July 1998.

I am prepared to accept for the purposes of the hearing of this appeal that he did not receive the decision containing the extended reasons until the date he gave me, namely 21 May 1998. What then happened was that the Appellant lodged an application for a review of the decision on 27 May 1998. The review was considered but was refused on 11 June 1998 and it was after that that he put in his Notice of Appeal. It seems to me very clear that the real reason for the delay in advancing an appeal in time was not the fact that the decision had been received on 21 May 1998, whereas it might have been expected to have been received 10 days earlier, but that the Appellant had taken the view that he should attempt in the first instance to seek a review of the Tribunal's decision and only if that failed then to advance an appeal. It is quite clear from the literature which is supplied and which is commonly available that launching an application for a review before an Employment Tribunal does not suspend the running of time for the purposes of an appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, nor does it provide a good excuse for not lodging an appeal within time. It is perfectly possible to ask for a review and at the same time lodge a Notice of Appeal, which, if it becomes unnecessary, can then be abandoned.

I am not prepared to say in the circumstances of this case that there has been any excuse such as to justify the delay in lodging the Notice of Appeal. I accept though that I have been given a full explanation for the delay. I do not take the view that the interests of justice require that an extension of time should be given in this case, taking into account all the circumstances, some of which I have referred to in this judgment. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.