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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Robertson v. Drewitt (t/a Ready Steady Go) [2000] UKEAT 82_00_2507 (25 July 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2000/82_00_2507.html Cite as: [2000] UKEAT 82__2507, [2000] UKEAT 82_00_2507

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Mr Robertson in Person
For the Respondent	No appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent


 


JUDGE CLARK

1. The Appellant, Mr Robertson was employed by the Respondent Mrs Drewitt t/a Ready Steady Go, the proprietor of an after school club, from 24 March 1998 until his summary dismissal on 18 June 1`999.
2. Following his dismissal he presented an Origination Application to the Employment Tribunal on 17 September 1999 complaining of unfair dismissal and sex discrimination. The claims were resisted and were listed for hearing before the Southampton Employment Tribunal on 24 November 1999.
3. Prior to that hearing date the Appellant

(a) applied for 3 witness orders by letter of 11 November 1999

(b) applied for a postponement of the hearing by letter dated 22 November.

4. Those applications were refused by a letter from the Employment Tribunal dated 23 November. He did not attend the hearing on 24 November.
5. The hearing went ahead in his absence before an Employment Tribunal chaired by Mr A Edwards
6. The Employment Tribunal revisited the earlier interlocutory orders in respect of witness orders and the adjournment application and affirmed the earlier orders. They then proceeded to consider the substantive complaints under Rule 9(3), taking into account the Appellant's Origination Application and evidence which they heard from the Respondent and a supervisor, Mrs Heywood. For the reasons given in a decision promulgated with extended written reasons on 26 November 1999 they dismissed the complaints.
7. By a letter dated 12 January and received on 14 January 2000 the Appellant gave Notice of Appeal against the Employment Tribunals decision, 7 days out of time.
8. On 9 February he applied for an extension of time for appealing, stating that since the 10 January he had been doing 12 hour split shifts for a local employment agency 7 days a week. I note that that work began immediately after the time for appealing had expired, and did not then prevent him from lodging a Notice of Appeal during his first week of work.
9. He also makes points on substance on the Employment Tribunal decision, including an allegation that the Chairman was fabricating evidence against him by stating, in the extended reasons that the Appellant had set off a fire alarm, although the Respondent in her Notice of Appearance alleged that he rang a fire bell. The application was opposed by the Respondent who wrote to the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 13 March setting out her grounds of opposition.
10. On 31 March 2000 the Registrar made an order refusing an extension of time for appealing. Against that order he has appealed by letter dated 10 April 2000. It is that appeal which is before me today.

Extension of Time for Appealing

11. Time for appealing to the Employment Appeal Tribunal will only be extended in exceptional circumstances United Arab Emirates –v- Abdelghafar (1995) ICR 65; approved by the Court of Appeal in Aziz –v- Bethnal Green City Challenge Co Ltd (2000) IRLR 11. 12 In order to exercise my discretion in favour of granting an extension of time I must be satisfied that the Appellant has provided a full, honest and acceptable explanation for he delay.
12. Mr Robertson has appeared before me today. The explanation he gives for not entering a Notice of Appeal in time is that it took him some time to get his evidence together, that he is a bit slow on the uptake and that he has a good case on the merits and wishes to argue that case. I am not greatly concerned with the merits of the substantive appeal, see Mr Justice Mummery's observation in Abdelghafar page 72B.
13. As to the explanation for he delay, I am not satisfied that it provides a good excuse. The original explanation that he commenced work on a 12 hour day, 7 day a week basis after the time for appealing had expired seems to me to be wholly irrelevant. The explanation he advances this morning does not take him any further.
14. In these circumstances this is not one of those exceptional cases in which in my judgment I should exercise my discretion in favour of allowing an extension of time.
15. Accordingly this appeal is dismissed.