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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> McCue v NTL Group Ltd [2001] UKEAT 1386_99_1710 (17 October 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2001/1386_99_1710.html Cite as: [2001] UKEAT 1386_99_1710

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT In Person
For the Respondent	MR T KIBLING (Of Counsel) Instructed by Messrs Charles Russell Solicitors 8-10 New Fetter Lane London EC4A 1RS


 


MR JUSTICE NELSON

1. On the 28th September 1999 the Employment Tribunal at Southampton concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with the Appellant's claims for race and sex discrimination since it was contemplated that his work would be wholly or mainly outside Great Britain, namely in Northern Ireland. The Appellant appeals against that decision with the permission of the EAT granted at a preliminary hearing on the 5^th July 2000.
2. At the commencement of the hearing before us the Appellant indicated to us that in spite of the fact that he would have wished to be represented, which he was not, and that there had been a recent serious family illness, he did not wish to apply for an adjournment but would present the appeal himself, adopting previous notes. His grounds of appeal and notes, consisting of twenty one pages with appendices set out both the background and his individual grounds in detail. The Appellant presented his arguments to us with skill and clarity.

The background.

3. The Appellant went to Queen's University, Belfast in 1992 to read Geology. He had left grammar school in 1969, obtained a further 'O' level in 1970 at a college of further education and then entered the employment market with British Telecom. He resumed his education in 1991 at a college of further education where he obtained 'A' levels and his place at University.
4. In about June 1994 he went on holiday to Spain with a young woman who fell into a coma whilst they were there. It transpired that the woman had diabetes and the Appellant told us that he was responsible for saving her life. He said that in return for his help, numerous allegations of sexual harassment were made against him by the woman and her father, a man the Appellant describes as a bankrupt and convicted criminal.
5. Some 304 allegations in all were made, some 302 of them were dismissed, and 2 found proved by the Queen's University Belfast disciplinary body. The charges were without merit, having been made by a woman who was hallucinating whilst suffering high temperatures from diabetes. The hearing before the University body was, the Defendant contended, wholly unfair and the matter was appealed. The appeal was heard by a Northern Irish High Court Judge, who, the Appellant described as a close personal family friend of the man who had made the complaint. The appeal went against the Appellant.
6. The Appellant was rusticated but went back and completed the course and graduated in 1996. Since then he says that he has been wrongly victimised, and that the University has "black mouthed" him and pulled strings to prevent him from gaining employment in Northern Ireland.
7. He alleges a network of corruption involving the Northern Ireland Office, John Maguire, the President of the Northern Ireland Industrial Tribunal, the Judge who tried his appeal at the University, and employees of the Queen's University Belfast itself. Whether acting singly or with others from their number the Appellant contends they have denied him both employment and justice.
8. Thus he has been denied jobs at the British Geological Survey, the Fair Employment Commission and Queen's University of Belfast itself. He also says that he has wrongly failed to progress or succeed in his various applications before the Northern Ireland Employment Tribunal by reason of the same corruption and conspiracy against him, and that this had led him to the conclusion that an appeal against those decisions, which in Northern Ireland is to the High Court, would be fruitless.
9. In his written submissions his views on these matters are expressed in strong terms. He describes, for example, the Northern Ireland High Court Judge and others as "Mississippi type" racists.

The facts relating to this appeal.

10. On the 23rd of November 1998 the Appellant was interviewed by NTL for a technician/supervisor job. He failed to obtain this and another job that he had sought, but on the 10th November 1998 he was invited to attend an interview for the vacant position of installation and repair technician. He attended the interview on the 14th January 1999 and was offered the job on the 19th January 1999 subject to satisfactory references. He attended a medical examination which he was convinced was specifically designed to find ill-health when he had none.
11. On the 14th April 1999 the conditional offer of employment was withdrawn in a letter from Maureen Walkingshaw, NTL's Human Resources Manager in Belfast. The stated reasons for this action were firstly that the Appellant had been aggressive to two members of the Respondent's staff on the telephone, secondly a sectarian comment had been made by him in a telephone conversation to one of the employees about being sent to a "Catholic" Doctor, thirdly that the reference they had received from BT, one of the Appellant's former employers was less than full and fourthly a reference had been sought from Queen's University Belfast which stated that the Appellant was not considered eligible for work with the University.
12. The Appellant denied that any of those reasons were genuine or valid. He denied that he had been aggressive or that he had made sectarian comments or that the reference from BT, for whom he had worked from 1970 until 1989 was anything other than appropriate and said that the obtaining of a reference from Queen's University Belfast when he had not put them forward as a referee was victimisation. Queen's University Belfast operated a racially motivated or sexually motivated policy he contends.
13. On the 30th April 1999 the Respondent wrote to the Appellant informing him that NTL would not consider any further job applications from him in view of his offensive remarks and aggressive approach to staff.
14. On the 3rd June 1999 the Appellant issued his originating application at the Employment Tribunal in Southampton alleging race and sex discrimination and ongoing victimisation.

The Employment Tribunal hearing and ruling.

15. The Chairman, Mr I. A. Edwards, sat alone under Rules 6 and 13(8) of the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993 in order to consider, by way of preliminary issue, whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the Appellant's claim.
16. He heard evidence from the Applicant and Miss Walkingshaw on behalf of the Respondents and considered each party's bundle of documents.
17. He noted that the test for jurisdiction was the same under section 6 and 10 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and sections 4 and 8 of the Race Relations Act 1976, namely that for the English Tribunal to have jurisdiction, the work had to be at an establishment in Great Britain and not wholly or mainly outside Great Britain. It is stated in paragraph 18 of the ruling that it was accepted by both parties that Northern Ireland was not within Great Britain and that the English Tribunal did not have jurisdiction under the statutes if the Applicant's contemplated employment was wholly or mainly outside Great Britain i.e. in Northern Ireland. Before us the Appellant has contended that the Chairman's interpretation of the contract and in particular the meaning of "Great Britain" erred in law.
18. The contract, a copy of which was sent to the Appellant when he was offered the job, stated:-

"4. You will be based at Belfast but the company reserves the right to

change this to any place within the region. You will be given at least one month's notice of any such change.

The company may require you to travel as is reasonably necessary for the

proper performance of your duty. For the avoidance of doubt the

Company does not envisage requiring you to work outside the UK for

any period exceeding one month. Should it however prove to be

necessary that you work outside the UK for more than one month the

terms of this contract may be reviewed."

19. The company were also entitled to require an employee under paragraph 3 of the contract to move from one department or office to another.
20. Mrs Walkingshaw gave evidence to the Tribunal that the Northern Ireland office of NTL only recruited for work within Northern Ireland save at a later date when a Dublin business was acquired and recruiting also took place for Dublin. She said that technicians and supervisors had never worked outside Northern Ireland and the notes of the interview, checked by her with those who had carried it out, did not refer to the

possibility of working at any place other than Northern Ireland. The job had been advertised in the Belfast Telegraph and described the role as "working throughout the Province". The application was sent to the Belfast office and all correspondence between the Applicant and the Respondent was in Belfast.

21. The Applicant said that at the interviews there was reference to him working at Huddersfield. Swansea or Cardiff were also mentioned. As a consequence he had cleared the possibility of working away from home with his wife.
22. The Chairman found that the evidence from neither party was very satisfactory. He found it surprising that the Appellant had friends in Huddersfield and yet had got muddled and referred to Bradford in a letter dated the 3rd of May. He was also not sure of the venue in South Wales. Furthermore the notes of the interview did not contain any reference to any conversation about the Applicant being required to work outside Northern Ireland. The Respondent's evidence however was also unsatisfactory in the sense that it contained hearsay, namely what the interviewers, who were not called to give evidence had told Mrs Walkingshaw, which the Chairman considered had to be treated with caution as the notes of the interviews had only been produced right at the end of the hearing when the Chairman had asked Mrs Walkingshaw about them.
23. The Chairman dealt with this difficulty on the evidence by finding, in paragraph 29, that there may have been some reference to places in England and Wales during the course of the interview but it was not intended that the Appellant would work permanently at any such place in England or Wales and that reference had been made to them "as the Applicant indicated to me, in the context of flexibility."
24. The Chairman concluded that the contract itself was clear and indicated that the Appellant's base would be Belfast. Given that base the word "region" referred to Northern Ireland. He accepted Mrs Walkingshaw's evidence that technicians and supervisors only worked in Northern Ireland and her office did not recruit for positions outside Northern Ireland. He took into account that part of the advertisement referred to "the Province" and that the advertisement itself appeared in a Northern Ireland newspaper.
25. He concluded in paragraph 32 of his decision:-

"Taking the evidence as a whole I am satisfied that it was intended that

the Applicant would be working wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland

and therefore not Great Britain, and that therefore any work elsewhere

was of a transitory nature. I conclude that quite clearly his work was

wholly or mainly outside Great Britain."

26. He noted the Appellant's comment on the unfairness of the result as cases could be transferred between England and Scotland but not between England and Northern Ireland. He stated that he was however bound by the statutory jurisdiction. He himself raised the case of Bossa -v- Nordstress Limited [1988] IRLR 284 but considered that it had no application as the Appellant based his claim on race and not on his nationality.
27. The Chairman therefore concluded that based on the facts which he had outlined any application the Appellant wished to bring should be brought in Northern Ireland.




Grounds of Appeal.

28. (1). The Chairman should have sat with the lay members rather than alone under rule 6 as the determination of the preliminary issue of jurisdiction involved the resolution of fact.

(2). The Chairman, Mr Edwards, was biased in that he knew the president of Northern Ireland Employment Tribunal, and should therefore have disqualified himself.

(3). The interpretation of the contract and in particular the meaning of "Great Britain" was incorrect and amounted to an error of law. It does not appear that leave was given in respect of this ground, which it appears was not argued before the Employment Tribunal in view of paragraph 18 of the decision. We have nevertheless considered the matter in view of the fact that the Appellant was unrepresented and that the point can be said to overlap with the findings of fact in relation to where the Appellant had to work.

(4). The findings of fact as to where the work was to be performed were perverse. The evidence of Mrs Walkingshaw was unreliable, based in part upon hearsay and relied upon the notes of interview which were produced only at the end of the hearing.

(5). The Employment Tribunal should have dis-applied sections 4 and 8 of the Race Relations Act 1976 and sections 6 and 10 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in view of the decision in Bossa.

The Submissions.

(1). The Chairman sitting alone.

29. The Appellant submits that where issues of fact are to be determined the lay members, sitting as an industrial jury, should form part of the Tribunal. Here there were substantial issues of fact which effectively determined the issue of jurisdiction and it is therefore a case where only the full constitution of the Tribunal is appropriate. He relied upon Mobbs -v- Nuclear Electric plc [1996] IRLR 536 and the obiter dicta of Mr Justice Morison in Sutcliffe and Big C's Marine [1998] IRLR 428 where he said that a preliminary issue should only be heard in exceptional circumstances and encouraged chairmen to sit with lay members where the interests of justice required it, particularly in resolving issues of whether the Applicant was an employee or working under a contract for services or other matters where the industrial jury's input may be crucial. On the facts of that particular case however, where substantial issues of fact had to be resolved, it was held that it was within the discretion of the Chairman sitting alone to determine the issue of who was the correct Respondent to the complaint of unfair dismissal notwithstanding that the determination of that question involved substantial issues of fact. Industrial Tribunal chairmen had a discretion under rule 6(1) and 13(8) to hear and determine such an issue.
30. The Respondent submitted that under rule 6 of the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993 Schedule 1 the Tribunal has power to hear a preliminary issue and under rule 13(8) the power, subject to specified exceptions inapplicable here, to sit by the chairman alone.

" Any act required or authorised by these rules to be done by a Tribunal

may be done by a chairman… "

31. The Chairman was therefore exercising a discretionary power when deciding to sit alone in order to hear the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. The Applicant must therefore show, the Respondent submitted, that he acted contrary to established principles of law or in a manner in which no reasonable Tribunal would have acted in exercising the same discretion.
32. The case of Tsangacos -v- Amalgamated Chemicals Limited [1997] ICR 154 is relied upon by the Respondent. This case establishes that an Industrial Tribunal Chairman can sit alone to determine jurisdictional points within the provisions of rule 13(8), and could so sit where issues of fact arose. The decision in Mobbs was described as failing to do justice to the legislation and producing a result which did not make any sense.
33. The Appellant attempted to distinguish Tsangacos on its facts but the Respondent submitted that the principle it established was clearly applicable here. Whilst the obiter dicta in Sutcliffe reminded Employment Tribunals of the need to consider with care whether an industrial jury was needed in order to satisfy the interests of justice in any particular case, the decision itself confirmed that it was within the discretion of the Industrial Tribunal Chairman to sit alone even where there was a conflict of evidence to be resolved.

(2). Bias.

34. The Appellant recognised that Mr Edwards, the Chairman, was exceptionally courteous and reasonable throughout the hearing and did not appear to be obviously biased but submitted that in view of the fact that he knew John Maguire, who the Appellant regarded as biased and corrupt, there was a perception of bias on Mr Edwards part. The connections between Mr Maguire, Queen's University Belfast, and Mrs Walkingshaw seeking a reference unsolicited from Queen's University Belfast, led to a perception of bias.
35. The Chairman had indicated to the Appellant at the commencement of the proceedings that he knew John Maguire as being President of the Employment Tribunal in Northern Ireland and met him at six monthly regional Chairman's conferences and occasionally at other meetings of Chairman. He made it clear that he had no personal friendship with Mr Maguire and the Appellant left the decision as to whether he should disqualify himself to him. Mr Edwards did not consider that he was in the circumstances in any way disentitled from hearing the case and therefore did not disqualify himself. This is set out in Mr Edwards letter of the 7th April 2000 answering the Appellant's allegations of bias.
36. The Respondent submits that the Chairman acted entirely appropriately and given the limited extent of his knowledge of Mr Maguire, which was entirely in a professional context at meetings of Chairmen, his decision to continue cannot possibly be criticised.

(3). The interpretation of the contract and in particular "Great Britain".

37. The Appellant submitted that the term "Great Britain" is also used to describe the United Kingdom, and that as the term "United Kingdom" means the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, it is unreasonable to construe the term Great Britain as excluding Northern Ireland.
38. Furthermore such a restricted interpretation means that a citizen of Northern Ireland is treated less favourably than other UK citizens or European citizens and thereby subjected to detriment. The Appellant contends that the interpretation offends against the EC Treaty article 6 prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality articles 8 and 8a giving every citizen of the Union the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states and article 48 securing freedom of movement and abolishing any discrimination based on nationality between workers of member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
39. It followed therefore that if the restricted interpretation by the Court of "Great Britain" was correct, sections 6 and 10 of the Sex Discrimination Act and sections 4 and 8 of the Race Relations Act were contrary to the EC Treaty and should therefore be overridden in so far as they were in conflict, in accordance with the decision in Bossa.
40. We shall consider the arguments relating to the decision in Bossa under that heading in this judgment. The interpretation of the contract argument also overlaps with the perversity argument and will be considered under that head as well. The first contention, namely that the interpretation of Great Britain was incorrect, is however unsustainable. "Great Britain" means England, Scotland and Wales under the Union with Scotland Act 1706, and the "United Kingdom" means Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (Schedule 1 Interpretation Act 1978.) It is not therefore open to the Appellant to argue that the term "Great Britain" includes Northern Ireland.

Perversity of findings.

41. The Appellant submitted that the telecom industry required flexible working all over the United Kingdom and that NTL employees could not be restricted to working in Northern Ireland. Furthermore the contract was ambiguous in its references to both Great Britain and the UK. These arguments were essentially directed to the question of perversity on the basis that the Chairman's finding of fact that it was intended that the Appellant would be working wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland was contrary to the evidence as a whole.
42. The Appellant also submitted that the Chairman should not have accepted hearsay evidence from Mrs Walkingshaw as to what the interviewers had told her and he erred in stating that NTL did not recruit out of Northern Ireland on the basis of Mrs Walkingshaw's evidence.
43. The Appellant submits that the combination of the errors in approach to the evidence and the failure to consider the contract and Mrs Walkingshaw's own evidence upon it properly led to a finding which no reasonable Tribunal could have made. Had the Chairman taken proper account of the Appellant's evidence that he was asked to work in Huddersfield or South Wales or that on promotion he would inevitably have been asked to work in Great Britain, he could not properly have concluded that the Appellant would be working wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland.
44. The Appellant complained that the Chairman also dealt incorrectly with the late production of the interview notes by Mrs Walkingshaw, in that he refused the Appellant's application to have the Respondent struck out as vexatious or made to supply the originals of the interviews. In his letter in response of the 7th April 2000 the Chairman records that his notes show that he gave the Appellant the opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the documents but there is no reference in his notes nor does he have any recollection of any application to have the Respondent struck out as vexatious or for the supply of the originals.
45. The Appellant also relied upon the case of Knulty -v- Eloc Electro-Optiek [1979] ICR 827 in support of the proposition that as NTL's main office was in the UK the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claims in the UK.
46. The Respondent contended that there is no basis upon which the findings of fact made by the Chairman can be challenged. He heard the evidence and there is no material to suggest that he dealt with it in any way other than properly. The notes were not called for and were not therefore before the EAT and the Appellant has never properly stated upon what basis the allegation of perversity is put forward. The Chairman was entitled, under rule 9, to accept hearsay evidence and, the Respondent submits, dealt with it perfectly properly by treating the evidence with caution and finding that reference was made to working at places in England and Wales during the course of the interviews, consistent with the Appellant's account. The Appellant did not apply for further time to consider the notes of interview when they were produced, and he cross-examined upon them.

The Bossa contention.

47. In Bossa -v- Nordstress Limited [1998] ICR 694 an Italian national applied for a job as a member of an airline cabin crew, advertised in the national press in England. The job would have involved the Applicant being based in Italy, living there and working out of an Italian airport. In reality Italy would have been his working base. He was refused the job on the ground that the company was not permitted to employ Italian nationals. His complaint of unlawful race discrimination was dismissed by the Industrial Tribunal on the grounds that his work would have been done wholly or mainly outside Great Britain within the meaning of section 8(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976 and that the Tribunal had therefore no jurisdiction to hear his complaint. On appeal to the EAT it was held that article 48 of the EC Treaty conferred rights upon individual workers in relation to the freedom of movement including the right to work anywhere within the Community and was enforceable by them in the courts of member states. Effect had therefore to be given to the supremacy of article 48 by disapplying section 8 of the Race Relations Act 1976.
48. Mr McCue submits that the decision in Bossa is applicable to the facts of his case and that sections 4 and 8 of the Race Relations Act 1976, and by parallel argument sections 6 and 10 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, should be disapplied. He submitted to us that he is an Ulster Scot racially; that he was British with a United Kingdom, Great Britain passport even though he was not from the mainland, that he is a European citizen and that the Chairman's basis for distinguishing the Bossa decision was wrong as race included colour, ethnicity and nationality.
49. It was essential that he was given a remedy in the English Employment Tribunals as otherwise he would have to go to the Northern Irish High Court where, based on his experience so far, he said that he would never get his case heard. He alleged that others, such as Mr Suresh Deman and Dr Rab Nawaz have been reduced to a state of extreme ill health because of the "corrupt practices" of the President of the Northern Ireland Employment Tribunal and "his henchmen".
50. In considering Bossa he submitted that the EAT should take into account that the NTL contract made employment for him, as an European citizen, less advantageous if subjected to the restrictions set out in section 8 of the Race Relations Act and section 10 of the Sex Discrimination Act. NTL were trying not to employ him by offering work in Huddersfield or Cardiff and then suggesting he may have failed his medical examination and then seeking an uninvited reference from Queen's University Belfast about the sexual harassment charges made against him years ago. It was clear that he was being discriminated against and that in the circumstances articles 6, 8 and 48 of the EC Treaty were contravened yet were not given supremacy, as they ought to have been over section 8 of the Race Relations Act and section 10 of the Sex Discrimination Act.
51. The Respondent submitted that the Bossa case concerned a breach of article 48 by the excluding of employment on the grounds of nationality. The Chairman in this case was correct in his conclusion but wrong in his reasoning. Bossa is not inapplicable because the Appellant based his claim on race not on nationality as the Chairman said, but because the cases are entirely different. Here the case is nothing to do with the restriction on movement of labour because of nationality, as the Appellant, on his case, was excluded from employment, not because he was an Ulster Scot from Northern Ireland with a British passport but because of the mala fides of Queen's University Belfast and NTL and others which caused him to lose the job which he had been initially offered. In other words this case is wholly unlike Bossa as it does not concern free movement of labour at all, it is in reality an attempt to pursue a claim in another jurisdiction as the Appellant is unhappy with his own domestic legal forum.
52. It should be noted that the Appellant raised in correspondence the making of a joinder application in respect of four decisions in the Northern Ireland Employment Tribunal, but he did not raise or seek to pursue that matter before us.

Decision.

(1). Chairman sitting alone.

53. Rule 13(8) of schedule 1 of the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993 give to the Industrial Tribunal Chairman express power to sit alone to determine, for example, jurisdictional points. The case of Tsangacos and Sutcliffe both establish that this power can be exercised even in cases where there are issues of fact to be determined. Whether or not the case is a suitable case for hearing by Chairman sitting alone is a matter for the Chairman's discretion, but that discretion has to be exercised judicially. Chairmen were reminded by Mr Justice Morison in the case of Sutcliffe to exercise caution before dispensing with the "industrial jury" and deciding to sit alone, but their power to do so in the appropriate case was clearly recognised. Tsangacos disapproves Mobbs and is clearly applicable to this case.
54. In Sutcliffe two examples were given where an industrial jury's input might be crucial. These were whether an Applicant was an employee or working under a contract for services and whether it would be just and equitable to extend time for the making of a discrimination complaint.
55. On the facts of the present case the issue to be decided was one of jurisdiction which depended in part upon interpretation of the contract but mainly upon the resolution of a factual issue on the evidence of Mrs Walkingshaw and the Appellant. The evidence was in narrow compass, limited solely to the jurisdictional issues.
56. The question which arises in these circumstances is whether the decision to sit alone was so inappropriate given the matters which had to be decided, that it can properly be said that the Chairman erred in principle or that no reasonable Tribunal exercising the same discretion would have exercised it in that way.
57. We conclude that he had the power to sit alone to hear this point of jurisdiction and that in the circumstances it was perfectly proper for him to do so. The limited nature of the dispute and of the evidence called upon it make it a perfectly proper case for the decision of a Chairman sitting alone. It was not one of those cases where the nature of the dispute or the area of the dispute was such that an industrial jury's input was crucial. We are satisfied on the facts of this case that no error was made by the Chairman in deciding to hear the matter by himself.

(2). Bias.

58. When Mr McCue swore his affidavit of the 20th January 2000 swearing that the contents and substance of his submissions to the EAT were true he listed those individuals against whom he alleged corruption or bias. That list did not include the Chairman, Mr Edwards. It was Mr Edwards who raised with the Appellant the fact that he had in the course of his Chairmen's meetings met Mr Maguire, even though he had no personal friendship with him. The Appellant left the choice of whether he should be disqualified in these circumstances to the Chairman himself. He accepted that Mr Edwards had been exceptionally courteous and reasonable throughout the hearing and did not appear to him to be obviously biased, but in view of his levels of suspicion about those named on his list and their interconnections, felt the need to be extra cautious.
59. He felt that the fact that Mr Edwards had met Mr Maguire was sufficient in the circumstances to raise the question of disqualification. In effect therefore Mr McCue was saying that the level of corruption and suspicion was such that the fact that Mr Edwards knew Mr Maguire would be sufficient to raise in the minds of right minded people the thought that the Judge was biased.
60. We have concluded that there is no proper basis upon which either bias or a perception of bias could reasonably be found. It was Mr Edwards himself who raised his knowledge of Mr Maguire with the Appellant, such knowledge having been acquired in the course of meetings which inevitably occur between regional chairmen and chairmen of Industrials Tribunals. In view of the fact that Mr Edwards had no friendship with Mr Maguire, but met him, as he met many other chairmen, only in the course of professional meetings, we do not consider that the question of bias would arise in the minds of right minded people. It is clear that Mr Edwards conducted himself in a courteous and fair manner throughout and his decision, although unfavourable to the Appellant, clearly fully and fairly considers the issues which were before him.
61. In these circumstances there is no bias or perception of bias and the decision to continue sitting and not disqualify himself was an appropriate one and not made in error.

(3). The interpretation of the contract and in particular "Great Britain".

62. In so far as the Appellant is contending that the term "Great Britain" includes Northern Ireland, we have already held earlier in this judgment that that argument is unsustainable in view of the definition of Great Britain in the Union with Scotland Act 1706 and the definition of the United kingdom in the Interpretation Act 1978 schedule 1. (See also the notes to the Interpretation Act 1978 schedule 1 under the heading United Kingdom volume 41 Halsburys Statutes page 602).
63. We shall deal with the Appellant's other submissions in relation to the interpretation of the contract and "Great Britain" under the headings of Perversity and the Bossa decision.

(4). Perversity of findings.

64. The Chairman heard the evidence and read the documents and formed his view upon the totality of that evidence. He was entitled to receive hearsay evidence from Mrs Walkingshaw, which he did, but his decision shows that he treated that with caution. Indeed he resolved the conflict of evidence to which the hearsay evidence related, by finding that England and South Wales had been mentioned as the Appellant had contended albeit in the context of flexibility as the Appellant had apparently indicated to him.
65. The wording of the contract expressly stated that the Appellant would be based at Belfast and, as the Chairman found, given that base it was quite clear that the word "region" referred to Northern Ireland rather than anything else. The fact that the second half of clause 4 enabled the company to require that the employee worked outside the UK i.e. outside Great Britain and Northern Ireland did not affect that interpretation. The use of the word "Province" in the advertisement was also consistent with the interpretation of the contract placed upon it by the Chairman.
66. There is no basis for contending that the Chairman's interpretation of the contract was in any way perverse and his interpretation of "Great Britain" as not including Northern Ireland was not only in accordance with the acceptance of both parties as set out in paragraph 18 of the decision but also in accordance with statute as set out above. The finding that, taking the evidence as a whole, it was intended that the Appellant would be working wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland and therefore not Great Britain was consistent with the evidence of Mrs Walkingshaw which the Chairman was entitled to accept.
67. His conclusions were therefore open to him upon the evidence and there is no proper basis for contending that his findings were perverse.
68. The Appellant did not apply for an adjournment at the late production of the interview notes, which the Chairman himself called for. The Appellant was given the opportunity to cross-examine upon them and in view of the finding that reference to places in England and Wales may have been made, the Appellant cannot have been prejudiced by the late introduction of the notes.
69. The case of Knulty concerns service of an originating application, not jurisdiction, and is of no assistance to this Appellant.
70. The fact that there is no transfer of proceedings between Northern Ireland and England whereas there is transfer between England, Scotland and Wales is a consequence of the statutory provisions relating to the different jurisdictions. It does not assist the Appellant's case.
71. We have considered the Chairman's decision and are quite satisfied that he gave proper consideration to the evidence both oral and in writing and that his findings cannot be said to be perverse.

(5). The Bossa contention.

72. The nature of the Applicant's claim in Bossa was that he had a good claim under article 48 of the EC Treaty and should be allowed to proceed with that claim. As the Race Relations Act 1976 failed to give supremacy to article 48, it had to be overridden, to permit such a claim to be brought. (702B). Here however the Appellant is not claiming that he was excluded from employment because of his nationality but that he was so excluded by a conspiracy between Queen's University Belfast, NTL and others. Consideration of section 8 of the Race Relations Act 1976 and section 10 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 arises therefore not because of a breach of article 48 of the Treaty, or indeed breach of any other article of the Treaty but because the Appellant has sought to bring proceedings in a jurisdiction other than Northern Ireland because of his lack of confidence in the Northern Ireland Employment Tribunal, and High Court.
73. The Appellant is correct in his contention that the reason expressed by the Chairman in paragraph 34 of his decision for distinguishing Bossa on the ground that the Appellant based his claim on race and not on his nationality was incorrect. We are however satisfied that although the reason expressed by the Chairman is wrong, his conclusion is correct. We accept the Respondent's contention that this case does not concern the curtailment of freedom of movement of labour or discrimination based on nationality but the exclusion from employment for a different reason namely the allegation of a conspiracy by Queen's University Belfast, NTL and others to prevent the Appellant from obtaining employment. Far from being excluded from employment by reason of his nationality the Appellant's own case was that he was asked if he was available to work in either England or Wales as an alternative to Northern Ireland. The case of Bossa is therefore distinguishable and there is no basis for the contention that section 8 of the Race Relations Act 1976 or section 10 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 should be disapplied because of a breach of any article of the Treaty.

Conclusion.

74. We are conscious of the fact that the Appellant feels a strong grievance against Queen's University Belfast, NTL and others and is convinced that he will not get a fair hearing in Northern Ireland. We are however concerned solely with the question of jurisdiction, not with merits. We have considered his submissions both oral and in writing as to whether the decision of the Southampton Employment Tribunal by its Chairman Mr Edwards, can properly be said to be in error in any respect. Having performed that task we are satisfied unanimously that no error was made and that the decision that the Southampton Tribunal did not have jurisdiction and that any claim should properly be brought in Northern Ireland was correct. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.