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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Strachan v. Ealing [2002] UKEAT 979_01_2101 (21 January 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2002/979_01_2101.html Cite as: [2002] UKEAT 979_01_2101, [2002] UKEAT 979_1_2101 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE LINDSAY (PRESIDENT)
MISS A MACKIE OBE
MR P M SMITH
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | MR M MULLINS (of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme |
MR JUSTICE LINDSAY (PRESIDENT)
"Non eligibility for membership of employers pension scheme which was open to full-time employees only"
She indicated that her employment had ceased in April 1989. The IT1 was directed to the London Borough of Ealing Education Authority. On 1 March the Employment Tribunal wrote to Ms Strachan saying that her claim had been stayed, awaiting a House of Lords decision, but that the stay was then lifted, and they said:
"The House of Lords has ruled that, to be valid, a complaint must be presented to the Employment Tribunal not later than 6 months from the date on which the employment relationship ended and there is no provision for extending that time limit.
A Chairman has reviewed your Originating Application and it appears that it was presented after that six month time limit had expired.
On that basis, the tribunal is now proposing to make an order striking out your application. If you wish to show cause why such an order should not be made, you should do so in writing within 28 days of the date of this letter."
"My grounds for doing so are that my complaint was presented within the prescribed period of not later than 6 months from the date on which my employment relationship ended with a body that was a successor to the London Borough of Ealing".
This was a slightly confusing possibility because the successor was not identified and precise dates were not identified either. She was then asked when her employment within the successor body ceased. On 8 June 2001, Ms Strachan indicated that employment with the successor body ceased on 21 August 2000. That, therefore, gave rise to the question of when did whatever six month period that was relevant, expire?
"2 The date on which her employment with that employer came to an end was 21 August 2000 which was more than six months prior to the commencement of these proceedings.
3. The time limit for bringing such a complaint is six months from the ending of the employment relationship in question, and there is no provision for extending that limit in any circumstances.
4. Accordingly, by letter dated 1 March 2001 the Applicant was invited to show cause why her complaint should not be struck out under rule 13(2)(d) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993, on the grounds that, as it must inevitably fail, it would be frivolous or vexatious to pursue it.
5. The Applicant has failed to show cause why the complaint should not be struck out, and I therefore Order that it be struck out under rule 13(2)(d)."
Then on 7 August, Ms Strachan put in her Notice of Appeal. The relevant six month time limit is provided for in the Equal Pay Act 1970 section 2(4) that says:
"(4) No claim in respect of the operation of an [equality clause] relating to a woman's employment shall be referred to an [employment tribunal] otherwise than by virtue of subsection (3) above, if she has not been employed in the employment within the six months preceding the date of the reference."
"if she has not been employed in the employment within the six months preceding the date of the reference."
That kind of computation time is rarely found and Mr Mullins has been looking to find analogous authorities but, rather than our embarking on a study of them, we do see that there is an arguable question of law fit to go to a full hearing, given that one has to be very precise in the computation in this particular case because it would seem that, even in the worst possible case for her, Ms Strachan is only day out. One only needs to shift the computation a little and her complaint would be in time. But it does not seem to us to be right for us to embark on a ruling as to the proper construction of section 2(4) of the Equal Pay Act in the absence of the Respondent, and equally unfair on Mr Mullins to bear the whole weight of citation of all authorities that might be relevant. We are very grateful to him for his assistance; he has, in our view, identified an arguable (one has to underline the word "arguable") point of law, and we allow the matter to go forward.