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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Redman v. Royal Berkshire Fire Authority [2003] UKEAT 0201_03_1405 (14 May 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2003/0201_03_1405.html Cite as: [2003] UKEAT 0201_03_1405, [2003] UKEAT 201_3_1405

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR P GREATOREX (of Counsel) Instructed by: Messrs Richard C Hall & Partners Crown Buildings 121a Saughall Road Blacon Chester CH1 5ET


 


MR RECORDER LUBA QC

1. This is the Preliminary Hearing of an appeal by Mrs Karen Redman from the decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting at Reading. By its reserved unanimous decision that Tribunal dismissed a complaint which Mrs Redman had brought against her then employers, the Royal Berkshire Fire Authority. That complaint had two aspects. Firstly, there were complaints of direct sex discrimination against Mrs Redman. Secondly, there were complaints of indirect sex discrimination. As indicated, the Tribunal dismissed both aspects.
2. By a Notice of Appeal, received by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in February 2003, the Appellant challenges only that part of the Employment Tribunal's decision which dismisses her claim in respect of indirect sex discrimination. The Notice of Appeal attaches grounds of appeal extending to some 23 pages settled by Mr Greatorex who appeared for Mrs Redman in the Tribunal below.
3. It is necessary in this short judgment only to say very little about the facts. Mrs Redman was at the material time employed by the Respondent Fire Authority in the post of Brigade Control Manager. Her complaint in relation to indirect sex discrimination was that there existed in relation to her part of the fire service, i.e. the uniformed part of the fire service, an indirectly discriminatory practice. That was, and is, the fire service's authority's rule that senior posts in the uniformed branch are only available to Applicants who can demonstrate operational experience. The effect of that, claimed Mrs Redman, is to prevent women in her situation being able to obtain the senior posts available in this or any other fire authority on the uniformed side.
4. That distillation of the facts does very little justice to the very full way in which the operation and organisation of the fire authority is set out in the Extended Reasons given by the Tribunal or, indeed, in the short summaries provided by the parties before it, and in the summary provided by Mr Greatorex before us today. But it will be sufficient to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, hearing this matter in full, to have that short summation.
5. The Employment Tribunal was satisfied that the employer did in fact impose the requirement indicated, i.e. operational experience as a pre-requisite for consideration for senior level uniformed staff posts. The Tribunal further found that the rule was, in its effect, discriminatory, indirectly, in that fewer women than men could comply with that requirement. The crucial question, therefore, for the Employment Tribunal was whether the Respondent had shown that such discriminatory effect was justified.
6. In the Notice of Appeal, and in the summary of the Appellant's arguments prepared before us by Mr Greatorex, the thrust of the complaint is that the Employment Tribunal wrongly failed to appreciate properly the task upon which they were engaged. It is submitted that the Tribunal confused two questions: first, whether the actual employment structure adopted by the employers was a justifiable one and, second, whether the structure could be justified having regard to its discriminatory effect in practice.
7. It is certainly right that, on a fair reading of the Extended Reasons, the Tribunal has found that the system operated by the employer (or the structure) is a rational, logical and understandable way in which a fire authority could arrange for fire-fighting services to be undertaken in the Berkshire area.
8. The complaint made on this appeal for Mrs Redman is that the Tribunal does then not go on to ask itself whether the discriminatory effect of the arrangements can be, or has been, justified by the Respondents. Put another way (and indeed Mr Greatorex, meaning no disrespect to him, puts it in a number of different ways), the question is whether the Tribunal could properly be satisfied that maintaining the present system was necessary, having regard to its discriminatory effect and the extent of that discrimination. We are satisfied that it is at least arguable that the Tribunal failed in these respects.
9. We are not, however, satisfied that other aspects of the present Notice of Appeal are arguable, insofar as they do other than flesh out the substantive or central complaint made by the Appellant. In particular, we are satisfied that Grounds 1 and 2 broadly formulate the point which we have described as arguable. Grounds 3 and 4, with respect, add nothing to that. Ground 5 is an amplification or dimension of the ground we have found arguable. Grounds 6 and 7, as presently settled, are not, on our view, arguable at all. That is on the basis that if they are free-standing they disclose no error of law. To the extent that they are not free-standing they are already embraced by the ground that we have found arguable.
10. In those circumstances we propose to direct that this appeal do proceed to a full hearing but on terms that the Appellant do reformulate and present to the Chairman of this Employment Appeal Tribunal, within 14 days, a Notice of Appeal which properly and directly addresses the issue which we have described as arguable.
11. That amended Notice of Appeal will, it seems, have most likely three aspects. First, did the Employment Tribunal fail to appreciate the extent of the discriminatory impact of the practice? Secondly, did the Tribunal fail to note that the Respondents had not put in any evidence justifying the need to retain that system notwithstanding its discriminatory effect? Thirdly, did the Tribunal incorrectly direct itself in relation to the final question: whether it was necessary to keep the requirement notwithstanding its discriminatory impact? If the Tribunal did properly direct itself to that latter question, did it answer it? Those seem to us to be the aspects of this matter which are arguable and the only aspects. On that basis this appeal can go forward.