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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Bayode v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2008] UKEAT 0499_07_2205 (22 May 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2008/0499_07_2205.html Cite as: [2008] UKEAT 0499_07_2205, [2008] UKEAT 499_7_2205 |
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At the Tribunal | |
On 8 April 2008 | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE REID QC
MR B R GIBBS
MR M WORTHINGTON
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
For the Appellant | MS MELANIE PLIMMER (of Counsel) Instructed by: Messrs Russell Jones & Walker Solicitors 1st Floor St James House 7 Charlotte Street Manchester M1 4DZ |
For the Respondent | MR MARK LEY-MORGAN (of Counsel) Instructed by: Force Solicitor Derbyshire Constabulary Legal Services Butterley Hall Ripley Derbyshire DE5 3RS |
SUMMARY
Race Discrimination - Detriment
The Appellant is a police officer in the Derbyshire Constabulary. He made a race discrimination complaint against a colleague which he withdrew. He subsequently brought race discrimination proceedings against the Chief Constable. Among many complaints was one of victimisation by his colleagues on the ground of the earlier proceedings. His colleagues had recorded a number of matters about him. This recording and reporting was said to amount to a detriment because of the effect on the Appellant. The ET dismissed all his complaints and in dealing with the victimisation complaint held that the mere act of making a written record where no inappropriate action was taken in respect of the issues recorded was not a detriment. On the correctness of this single point the Appellant was given permission to appeal.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE REID QC
"The claimant relies on the following matters (which the Tribunal takes from paragraph 153 of Miss Plimmer's submissions);
(a) PCs Buckley, Martin and Twort treated him less favourably by recording and reporting matters which were unnecessary and unjustified, particularly the matters they reported to Sergeant Brett which she then used in the PDR;
(b) Sergeant Brett and/or Inspector Corton advised Sergeant Measham and PCs Twort, Copson and Haighton to record matters in their PNBs or submit reports about incidents. (The reference here to Sergeant Measham appears to be a mistake. Sergeant Measham provided his report on his own initiative, not at the request of Sergeant Brett or Inspector Corton.)
Miss Plimmer accepts at paragraph 170 of her submissions that there were actual incidents which gave rise to the reports but contends that the particular proximate reason or concern was not the real or effective reason for doing so."
"117. As regards victimisation, this occurs if, in any circumstances relevant to the 1976 Act, the claimant is treated less favourably than others because he has done a protected act. The primary object of the victimisation provisions is to ensure that persons are not penalised or prejudiced because they have taken steps to exercise their statutory rights or are intending to do so. This involves identifying the protected act, the less favourable treatment alleged to have occurred because of it, and the reason for the treatment. An issue which arises in this case is whether, put simply, individuals are entitled to protect themselves by recording events because they fear that the claimant will complain or pursue a claim alleging race discrimination. This involves consideration of the decisions of the House of Lords in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] ICR 1065 and St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v Derbyshire [2007] IRLR 540. Both cases concerned situations where there was litigation in progress, which is not this case, but the principles are of general application. In Khan, the House of Lords advanced the principle that employers who took honest and reasonable steps to protect themselves pending discrimination proceedings ought not to lay themselves open to allegations of victimisation in that they would be acting not because the employee had done a protected act, but because they needed to protect their position. In Derbyshire, the House of Lords cast doubt on this concept of an "honest and reasonable employer" defence, and the "by reason that" rationale for it. Instead, the House of Lords focussed on the concept of detriment. An unjustified sense of grievance would not amount to detriment; the grievance must be objectively reasonable. Thus an employee could not legitimately complain about a sense of grievance engendered by an employer's reasonable steps to defend itself in litigation.
118. For both race discrimination and victimisation, in this particular case, the claimant must establish that any less favourable treatment amounted to a detriment. "Detriment" is widely defined, and the Tribunal must be satisfied that a reasonable worker would or might take the view that he had been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which he had to work. Disadvantage has to be judged from the standpoint of the employee, but an unjustified sense of grievance cannot be a detriment. Similarly, to repeat the conclusion in Derbyshire, a sense of grievance engendered by the employer's honest and reasonable conduct may not amount to detriment if it was not in those circumstances objectively reasonable."
"178. The Tribunal agrees with Miss Plimmer that if these PNB entries amounted to a detriment, it would be immaterial that PC Buckley and PC Martin acted out of a desire to protect themselves in the event of a claim, and not from a desire to cause harm to the claimant. But the issue for the Tribunal is whether to make the entries in the PNBs was a detriment for the claimant. The Tribunal cannot find that the mere act of making a written record of issues which concerned PCs Buckley and Martin, where no inappropriate action was then taken in respect of those issues was in itself a detriment. It is not the claimant's case that the entries were inaccurate. The Tribunal acknowledges that detriment is widely defined, and it is to be viewed from the claimant's standpoint, but the Tribunal cannot accept that the entries that were made in themselves amounted to detriment for the purposes of the claimant's race discrimination or victimisation claims. The entries related to matters which concerned them, and the act of making a record could not in the Tribunal's judgment amount to a detriment."
"…. The word "detriment" draws this limitation on its broad and ordinary meaning from its context and from the other words with which it is associated. Res noscitur a sociis. As May LJ put it in De Souza v Automobile Association [1986] ICR 514, 522G, the court or tribunal must find that by reason of the act or acts complained of a reasonable worker would or might take the view that he had thereby been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which he had thereafter to work.
35. But once this requirement is satisfied, the only other limitation that can be read into the word is that indicated by Lord Brightman. As he put it in Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [1980] QB 87, 104B, one must take all the circumstances into account. This is a test of materiality. Is the treatment of such a kind that a reasonable worker would or might take the view that in all the circumstances it was to his detriment? An unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to "detriment": Barclays Bank plc v Kapur and others (No 2) [1995] IRLR 87…."