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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Ikeji v Office of Rail and Road & Ors (Practice and Procedure) [2024] EAT 87 (05 June 2024) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2024/87.html Cite as: [2024] EAT 87, [2024] ICR D41 |
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Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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Mr Adrian Ikeji |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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(1) Office of Rail and Road (2) Ian Prosser (3) Matthew Farrell (4) Victoria Rosolia (5) Donald Wilson |
Respondents |
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Mr Gordon Menzies (instructed by TLT LLP) for the Respondents
Appeal from Registrar's Order
Hearing date: 9 May 2024
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Crown Copyright ©
SUMMARY
Practice and Procedure
The claimant brought two claims in the Employment Tribunal. The claimant sought interim relief in the second of the two claims. At a Preliminary Hearing, on 24 October 2022, the application for interim relief was refused, as was an application to amend the second claim. The appeal against those decisions was properly instituted because the claimant provided the necessary documents within time, including the ET1 claim and ET3 response for the second claim that were required to appeal against the judgment refusing interim relief. It was not necessary to provide the ET1 claim and ET3 response for the second claim to appeal against the refusal to permit the amendment of the second claim because that appeal was against an order, rather than a judgment. The claimant was not required to submit the ET1 claim and ET3 response for the first claim because he did not appeal any decision made in that claim.
His Honour Judge James Tayler:
3 (1) Every appeal to the Appeal Tribunal shall, subject to paragraphs (2) and (4), be instituted by serving on the Tribunal the following documents–
(a) a notice of appeal in, or substantially in, accordance with Form 1, 1A or 2 in the Schedule to these rules;
(b) in the case of an appeal from a judgment of an employment tribunal a copy of any claim and response in the proceedings before the employment tribunal or an explanation as to why either is not included; and
(c) in the case of an appeal from a judgment of an employment tribunal a copy of the written record of the judgment of the employment tribunal which is subject to appeal and the written reasons for the judgment, or an explanation as to why written reasons are not included; …
(e) in the case of an appeal from an order of an employment tribunal a copy of the written record of the order of the employment tribunal which is subject to appeal and (if available) the written reasons for the order;
[emphasis added].
18.1. each and every ET1 claim and ET3 response in all claims considered at the hearing at which the decision subject of the appeal was made
18.2. a pair consisting of an ET1 claim and an ET3 response from any claim considered at the hearing at which the decision subject of the appeal was made
18.3. each and every ET1 claim and ET3 response in the claim (or claims) subject of the appeal (so, for example, if there is more than one claim that was considered at the hearing, but the appeal only relates to one of the claims, only the ET1 claim(s) and ET3 response(s) for the claim subject of the appeal would be required)
18.4. only the ET1 claim(s) and ET3 response(s) relevant to the appeal (so, for example, if there was a respondent in the Employment Tribunal in the claim that is the subject of the appeal, but the appeal is not brought against that person, the ET3 response submitted by that person is not required
19. I consider that any explanation for a failure to provide required documents, where permitted, must be a genuine explanation of why the documents cannot be provided. It could not be sufficient to comply with Rule 3.1 to state that the document has not been provided because an appellant could not be bothered to do so and/or considered that the EAT should obtain the documents itself, or some similar reason that would not prevent compliance.
28. … It seems to me, first of all, perfectly clear that at all times there were two separate claims before the ET. They are identified separately by the ET, both in the endorsement on each page of the ET's decision and in the decision itself. Indeed, at the appeal stage, in acknowledging receipt of the documents lodged for the purpose of the appeal by the appellant, the EAT explicitly recognised that there were two ET1s, both of those being identified separately on the document receipt form which was issued by the EAT's officers.
29. There is no principle of common law causing those two claims to become a single claim. Nor has, Mr Downey been able to point us to any specific rule either of the ET or of the EAT which would have had the effect of merging the two claims for all purposes into one. In those circumstances it seems to me perfectly clear that an appeal was properly and fully constituted on any footing in relation to the first ET1. That being so, the discretion of the Registrar was exercised without taking into account that vital feature. Furthermore, it seems to me that, bearing in mind that the appeal in relation to the first ET1 was fully constituted and required no extension of time, there are exceptional circumstances in the present case, which inevitably would result in an extension of time being given in relation to the second ET1.
30. Mr Downey's submission that it is in practical terms impossible to deconstruct, if I can put it that way, the ET's judgment, so as to allocate certain findings in relation only to the first ET1 and others to the second ET1, cannot result in the consequence that there can be no appeal in relation to either ET1. The consequence, it seems to me, of substantially the same matters being covered in both ET1s including, in particular, the question of whether or not the appellant's mental state fell within the DDA is that it is just and right, in accordance with the Overriding Objective, that the two-day extension should be granted in relation to the second ET1 so as to constitute that also a proper appeal. [emphasis added]
10. In Carroll v The Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime [2015] ICR 835 (EAT) the difficulty for the would-be appellant was that he had been one of two claimants in the tribunal, and he had not submitted the claim and response forms for his fellow claimant to the EAT. The EAT concluded that these were required. An issue of interpretation of the EAT's Rule 3(1)(b) arose, whereby that sub-rule referred to the requirement for "any claim and response in the proceedings before the employment tribunal" to be provided. The EAT concluded that "the proceedings" were the overall proceedings involving both Mr Carroll and his erstwhile colleague, Mr Cook. At [56] the EAT said:
"In my judgment the rules do not leave this kind of editorial decision to the prospective Appellant and I reject Mr Crawford's submission that the prospective Appellant can choose, without explanation, whether or not to include the pleadings in the case of a party, who is not minded to appeal. The use of the words "any claim and response in the proceedings before the employment tribunal" in rule 3(1)(b) of the EAT Rules are to my mind clear and it is not necessary to interpret "any" as "every" in order to arrive at the meaning contended for by Ms Tuck. The "proceedings before the employment tribunal" where those involving both the Appellant and Mr Cook and "any claim and response" in my judgment clearly means both sets of pleadings in both cases."
11. The third authority to which I was referred is Shah v The Home Office [2024] EAT 21, a recent decision of Deputy High Court Judge Jason Coppel KC. Judge Coppel was concerned with a claimant who had brought a number of separate claims but was seeking to appeal the outcome in respect of only one of them. Judge Coppel considered that Sud fell to be distinguished, because the first two claims brought by Mr Shah had been formally consolidated by the tribunal, and on that footing they were to be regarded as a single claim. He cited the White Book (2024 ed.), notes to CPR 3.1.9 (see paragraph 15 of Shah).
12. I take as my starting point the decision in Sud. True it is that the Court of Appeal did not consider specifically the wording of Rule 3(1)(b), but what it did clearly say was that it did not consider that there was any basis on which the two claims could be treated as having merged into one. Furthermore, in the passage that I have cited, it did not consider that the argument that, in practice, the issues or evidential territory covered by the two claims overlapped and could not be disentangled, affected the outcome that there were nevertheless two claims; and it considered that if all the paperwork was in order in relation to one of them in time, then the appeal from the decision relating to that one claim was properly instituted in time. The fact that what was missing in respect of the other claim was only one page was said to be relevant to the issue of whether time should be extended in relation to that claim, but did not go to the point about whether, if the paperwork in relation to the first claim was complete, the appeal in respect of the decision on that claim was properly instituted.
13. Turning to Carroll, while that decision did consider the wording of Rule 3(1)(b), Sud does not appear to have been considered by the EAT in that case. It also appears to me, respectfully, that in paragraph 56, whilst stating that it was not necessary to interpret "any" as meaning "every", in order to arrive at the conclusion that Mr Carroll's paperwork was defective without copies of the claim and responses in Mr Cook's case being provided, the EAT went on effectively to reach exactly that conclusion.
14. I am not persuaded that this is the only possible or, indeed, the correct, interpretation of Rule 3(1)(b). True it is that it refers to the "proceedings", and I accept the argument, as such, that the overall proceedings may involve more than one claim, whether by the same claimant or by more than one claimant. But it seems to me that the words "any claim and response" in the proceedings do not by themselves necessarily mean "every claim and response". By themselves they might equally mean "the claim and response, if any."
15. Furthermore, I note that the rule (as it was) went on to say "… or an explanation as to why either is not included", suggesting that the drafter was making the assumption that only one of each would be needed. This interpretation is also supported by the wording in Form 1, with which rule 3(1)(a) requires an aspirant appellant to comply, which referred to "the claim (ET1)" and "the response (ET3)" and the wording of the 2018 Practice Direction at paragraph 3.1 which referred to "the claim" and "the response".
16. Judge Coppel suggested in Shah that the wording of the rule and the wording of the Practice Direction were not entirely consistent with each other and that the position on this point was not entirely clear. I would respectfully suggest that the interpretation that "any" means "if any" means that the wording can be reconciled and is consistent, the focus of the Rule being on the relevant claim and response, even if there may have been others in the wider proceedings in the tribunal.
17. Nor do I think this is a fanciful interpretation, as there will be cases in which there is no response, in particular where a respondent is appealing against a rule 21 decision granting judgment against it precisely because no response has been entered. Although a case in which there is no claim may be harder to envisage, it could be said that an appeal against a rule 12 decision refusing to accept a claim would fall into that category on the basis that – though it may be something of a linguistic point – an unaccepted claim is not a claim at all.
18. I am not persuaded, therefore, respectfully, that the reasoning in Carroll undermines the point made by the Court of Appeal in Sud, notwithstanding that Rule 3.1 was not analysed in Sud.
19. Nor, respectfully, am I persuaded that the distinction referred to in Shah, between consolidation and claims being directed to be heard together, militates against my reading of the Rules. Whilst, in the civil jurisdiction, the CPR or, at any rate, the commentary in the White Book, refer to, and identify, a formal distinction between a process of consolidation and a process of directing that claims be heard together, there is no counterpart in the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013; and indeed, the customary direction in the employment tribunal, as was given in this case, is simply for one or more claims to be heard together, though a lawyer might use the word consolidation to refer to that direction.
20. For all of these reasons I consider that, insofar as the claimant is seeking to appeal from the decision on the claims brought in the claim form, in respect of which complete copies of the ET1 and ET3, Particulars of Claim and Grounds of Resistance, were included, namely Claim No. 3320062 of 2019, his appeal has been instituted in time; but, as is accepted by Ms Reilly, it was not instituted in time in respect of Claim No. 3335322 of 2018, because the ET1 and ET3 were not provided, at the time these were required documents, and providing the Particulars of Claim and Grounds of Resistance without those forms was not sufficient to comply with the Rule at the time.