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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions >> John Hay and Others - Lushingto - Shadwell v. Augustus W. H. Le Neve and Others - Solicitor-General Wetherell [1824] UKHL 2_Shaw_395 (15 June 1824) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1824/2_Shaw_395.html Cite as: [1824] UKHL 2_Shaw_395 |
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Page: 395↓
(1824) 2 Shaw 395
CASES DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, ON APPEAL FROM THE COURTS OF SCOTLAND, 1824.
1 st Division.
No. 49.
Subject_Reparation — Collision of Ships. —
One ship having run down another, and this having been occasioned equally by the fault of both;—Held, (reversing the judgment of the Court of Session), That the owners of the ship which ran down the outer were liable only for the one-half of her value, provided that did not exceed the value of their own ship.
The brig Wells, belonging to the respondents, Le Neve and others, sailed from London on the 18th February 1814, having on board a cargo of logwood, bound for Leith; and on the 28th of that month she arrived in the Firth of Forth; and in
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On the 24th of the same month, the smack Sprightly, belonging to the London and Edinburgh Shipping Company, (of which the appellants were the trustees), sailed from London with a general cargo for Leith. She entered the Firth of Forth about midnight of the 28th, at which time the wind was blowing strongly from the south-west, almost directly against her; a heavy sea was running; and the night was dark and rainy. The captain and the whole crew, with several passengers, were on deck during the night. In proceeding up the Firth, it appeared that the top-mast was struck, the mainsail double-reefed, and that in attempting to stay the vessel she missed stays. With the exception of one man, the crew were occupied in attending to the management of the vessel, and this man was placed towards the bow, (over which the sea broke), to keep a look-out; but he occasionally gave his assistance to the rest of the crew. In beating up against the wind the Sprightly stretched towards the north, and, with a view of tacking, came towards the south, being directly towards the point where the Wells was lying. This was at four o'clock in the morning. No light was aboard of the Wells, and being heavily laden she lay deep in the water, and had all her sails taken in. The only person on deck was the mate, who having perceived the approach of the Sprightly hailed her more than once, but no answer was returned; and when the vessels were within a short distance of each other, he heard an order given on board the Sprightly, “Head a-weather, bear up, there's a ship riding;” and immediately the helm was put hard up. The Sprightly thereupon ran with her starboard bow against the starboard quarter of the Wells, carried away her main-boom and gaff, knocked away the companion, and stove in her starboard quarter. One of the hands jumped on board the Sprightly. The rest took to the boat, and the vessel almost immediately went to the bottom. The Sprightly continued to hover about in
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An action was then brought by the respondents against the appellants, concluding for damages, in which, after giving their own statement of the facts, they alleged, “that had those on board the said smack Sprightly kept a proper look-out for ships at anchor, or had they used the proper means, after the said man on board of the Sprightly called out as aforesaid, they might have avoided the Wells, and said mischief would not have happened; and therefore the loss of the said ship and cargo, and all the damages thus occasioned to the owners of the Wells and her said cargo, is entirely imputable to negligence or improper conduct on the part of the master and crew of the said smack Sprightly.” This having been denied by the appellants, who alleged that the accident was imputable entirely to the Wells having anchored in the fair-way without hanging out a light; and that besides she was so insufficiently anchored that she was actually drifting when the vessels came in contact; and therefore they could not be liable in damages.
The Judge-Admiral (Murray) ordered each party to lodge a condescendence, and thereafter allowed a proof, requiring the appellants “to bring a correct proof of the precise hour when the collision happened, the state of the light at the time, and the distance which intervened between the Sprightly and the Wells when the latter was first discovered.” And thereafter he found “it admitted by the pursuers, that they had no light in the binnacle of the Wells, the reason of which is accounted for; but allowed the defenders to prove, if they can, that it was the duty of those on board that vessel, and that it is customary so to do, viz. to shew a light when they see a vessel in danger of running foul of them through scarcity of light to observe her; and allowed the defenders to prove the state and condition of the Wells at the time she was run down.” A proof was accordingly taken, on advising which the Judge-Admiral found, “that the collision of the Sprightly with the Wells, by, which the latter was sunk, arose from the carelessness in the master and ship's company of the Sprightly, and the want of that due attention and precaution which was necessary for their own preservation and that of other vessels; and therefore found the defenders, jointly and severally, liable to the respective pursuers for damages and expenses.” Thereafter having resumed consideration of the cause, he held, “of consent of all parties, that the value of the Sprightly was L.1800 sterling, and the amount
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“I have received your letter of the 2d instant, together with the printed pleadings, and evidence adduced by both parties in an action at the instance of the proprietors of the late brig Wells against the owners of the Sprightly, she having run the former vessel down whilst lying at anchor between the north shore of the Firth and the island of Inch-Keith; and I have also to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of their Lordships' interlocutor, directing the said printed pleadings and evidence to be transmitted to me, and requesting
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I would report to the Court, in writing, the opinion which the perusal of them might enable me to form respecting the degree of precaution which ought to have been taken by both these vessels, under the circumstances in which they were respectively placed. Having looked over the said pleadings and evidence accordingly, and considered the relative situation which the Sprightly and Wells bore to each other on the morning of the 1st of March 1814, I am of opinion that blame is attachable to both these vessels:—To the Wells, for not having a light in her binnacle, or one in a lanthorn in readiness to be shewn to the vessels passing near her, particularly as she was lying in a fair-way. But I think that much more blame is imputable to the Sprightly, for not having kept a better look-out when beating to windward in such a fair-way, where vessels frequently anchor to stop tide: also for not having put the helm hard down instead of hard up, when she saw the Wells; for if she had put in stays, she would either have avoided her altogether, or would have so much deadened or lost her way, that if they had come in contact the concussion could not have been of serious consequence; but by putting her helm hard a-weather, she thereby neared the Wells, and her velocity at the same time increasing (by the act of bearing away), the concussion, therefore, became much greater and more dangerous. This negligence and subsequent misconduct of the Sprightly was, in my opinion, the great cause of the accident.”
On advising this report, the Court, on the 21st of February 1822, “recalled the interlocutor reclaimed against, and found the petitioners liable in two-third parts of the damage, and of the expenses incurred, and remitted to the Lord Ordinary to proceed accordingly.”
The respondents then lodged a petition, praying for explanation in regard to the interest; and the Court, on the 7th March 1822, “found the claim for interest applies, in so far as the same shall not exceed the value of the Sprightly.” *
Against these judgments the appellants having entered an appeal, the House of Lords found, “That both ships in this case were in fault, and that the whole of the damage sustained by the owners of the ship Wells, and of the cargo, which were sunk and lost, should be borne equally by the parties; and find, therefore, that the appellants are liable to the respondents in the sum of L.1535. 16s. one-half of the value of the Wells and of her cargo, such half not exceeding the value of the
_________________ Footnote _________________
1. Shaw and Ballantine, No. 452.
Page: 400↓
Sprightly and her freight. And the Lords further find, that the appellants are not liable to pay interest on the said sum of L.1535. 16s.; and that they and the respondents, respectively, ought to bear and pay their own expenses of the proceedings: And it is therefore ordered and adjudged, that the parts of the interlocutors complained of, which are inconsistent with the above findings, be reversed: And it is further ordered, that the cause be remitted back to the Court of Session, to do in the conjoined processes as shall be consistent with this judgment, and as shall be just.”
My Lords, —In consequence of this accident a proceeding was instituted by the owners of the ship Wells against the owners of the ship Sprightly, before the Judge-Admiral, and interlocutors pronounced by him, the result of which was making the owners of the ship Sprightly liable to the full extent of the value of the Wells, and of her cargo—limited, however, as that responsibility is by Act of Parliament, to the amount of the value of the ship occasioning the loss, and her freight. The result of that judgment is, that but for that Act of Parliament the owners of the ship Sprightly would have been liable to the whole injury sustained by the ship Wells, the Judge-Admiral being of opinion that the fault rested entirely with the Sprightly.
My Lords, —The cause was removed to the Court of Session; and the Court of Session, after a great deal of inquiry, referred the evidence to Sir John Beresford, the Port Admiral at Leith. Sir John Beresford made a report upon the evidence, and his judgment was,
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My Lords, —This gives rise to a question undoubtedly of very great importance, —I mean the law of the Admiralty. In the Court below two cases were cited, decided by one of the most eminent Judges of this or any period, I mean my Lord Stowell, whose learning and whose accuracy are too well known to need any panegyric— indeed panegyric would be impossible. The first was the case of the Woodrop, Sims, which came before him in 1815, which was of the nature I will now state. “It was a case of damage at the instance of Thomas Potts and George Taylor, the owners of the brig Industry, against the above ship the Woodrop, Sims, her tackle,” &c.;—it was by an accident which had happened by collision. In this case the Court called in the assistance of two of the elder brethren of the Trinity-House, acting as assessors to the Court, feeling it to be desirable, as in this case, to obtain the opinion of persons conversant with the nature of the subject. Lord Stowell, then Sir William Scott, states the law thus:—
“This is one of those important cases, in which the entire loss of a ship and cargo has been occasioned by two vessels running foul of each other. There are four possibilities under which an accident of this sort may occur. In the first place, It may happen without blame being imputable to either party, as where the loss is occasioned by a storm, or any other vis major. In that case the misfortune must be borne by the party on whom it happens to light, the other not being responsible to him in any degree. Secondly, A misfortune of this kind may arise where both parties are to blame, where there has been a want of due diligence or of skill on both sides. In such a case the rule of law is, that the loss must be apportioned between them, as having been occasioned by the fault of both of them. Thirdly,”
he says, “It may happen by the misconduct of the suffering party only; and then the rule is, that the sufferer must bear his own burden. Lastly, It may have been the fault of the ship which ran the other down; and in this case the injured party would be entitled to an entire compensation from the other.” Now, your Lordships perceive in this case, Sir William Scott lays it down to be the law of the Court of Admiralty, that where a misfortune happens from the want of due diligence or skill on both sides, the loss must be apportioned between them, as having been occasioned by the fault of both.
Page: 402↓
My Lords, —The subsequent case, which is reported by Dr Dodson, was a case in which the parties below have been enabled to obtain a very full note (I believe a short-hand note) of the judgment of Lord Stowell. It was the case of the Lord Melville in the year 1816. Sir William Scott pronounced his judgment as follows:—
“The Counsel having declined to make any further observations, the Court has now to decide upon this very melancholy case, for such it is certainly to be described, being attended not only with the loss of a valuable cargo, but with the destruction, infinitely more precious, of lives, produced by the accident, if it may be so described, of one ship running foul of another and sinking her. I have had occasion to observe, that accidents of this kind may happen in several very different ways. They may happen in a way which amounts to mere misfortune, and to nothing else, as where it is produced by the irresistible force of the elements, which human skill and human efforts are not able to controul; that is a case of mere misfortune. It may happen, secondly, by the misconduct of both parties; there may be negligence, or there may be want of skill, as well on the one side as the other. And in the former case, where it was the effect of accident uncontrollable by human skill and industry, then the misfortune rests with the party on whom it happens to light; but when it happened by the common fault of both parties, the ancient rule of the Admiralty was, that it should be considered a common loss to which they were justly liable. A third way in which it may happen is by the default of the crew of the vessel to whom the misfortune has occurred: it may be the consequence of their own negligence, of their own obstinacy, of their own want of attention, —in which case she is to suffer the consequences: or it may happen by the fault alone of the vessel which strikes the other, —in which case, however slight the misconduct may be that is imputable to this vessel, she is undoubtedly answerable for the whole of the consequences.”
Your Lordships will perceive, that, according to the note of this case, Lord Stowell there uses this expression,—“The ancient rule of the Admiralty was, that it should be considered a common loss.”
My Lords, —These were the cases cited in the Court of Session, and on these dicta undoubtedly the Court of Session proceeded in the apportionment of the damages. It was argued at your Lordships' Bar, that though any dictum proceeding from that learned person, particularly in such a question, was entitled to the highest weight, yet that no case could be produced in which that law of the Admiralty, if it was the law of the Admiralty, had ever been acted upon, —that no case had been produced in which there had been such an application of it. It was therefore contended, that from the inconveniences, particularly from its conflicting with another law which prevailed in all Courts, that a party had no right to complain of a loss sustained partly by his own fault, the dictum of my Lord Stowell adopted by the Court of Session could not now be considered as the law of the
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It affords me great satisfaction to have got possession of this case in the Court of Admiralty, because at the Bar it was undoubtedly stated, both by the learned civilian who argued for the appellants, and the learned civilian who argued for the respondent, that they were not aware of any case in which that rule had been laid down. But it was argued, that whether such authority was found or not, the authority, of Lord Stowell ought to decide that question: but it is satisfactory to find, that in addition, if it were necessary to the authority of that noble and learned Lord, you are deciding upon a point which has already received the express decision of the Court of Admiralty, the rule having been already applied under circumstances similar to those which occur in the present case. My Lords, it also gives me great satisfaction to state to your Lordships, that I have had the advantage of a communication with that noble and very learned person upon the subject of this case, feeling it to be my duty, in consequence of the difficulty from its being a branch of the law with which I am not particularly conversant. My Lords, if I felt a hesitation on the dictum pronounced by that noble and learned person, I should still feel great difficulty in advising your Lordships to pronounce against it, after the communication with that noble and learned person, and the authority of the judgment in 1789, with which I have been furnished. I apprehend, that that laid down in the case of the Woodrop, Sims, is established to be the law of the Court of Admiralty, and has been acted upon by the Court: and, my Lords, I have the less difficulty in asking your Lordships to come to a decision of equally apportioning the loss in this case, for your Lordships must have seen, I think, that it would be extremely difficult in this case to balance the degree of negligence in the one and the other.—I think they were, perhaps, equally culpable; and I have no difficulty, therefore, in recommending to your Lordships to apply the judgment of Sir James Marriott in the case of the Judith Randolph. If your Lordships were to take any other rule, one cannot conceive any mode of properly apportioning the loss which the Court of Session have found to have occurred. It might be extremely difficult to regulate the quantum of neglect on the one side and the
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Appellants' Authorities.— Pardessus, p. 505.; 1. Emer. 416.; Valin, 170.; Sea Laws, p. 187.; Laws of Oleron, art. 14.; 2. Bynk. 467.; Welwood, ch. 120.; 2. Molloy, 6. 10.; Stypm. ch. 19. § 51.; Marshall, 493.; Case of the Lord Melville, Nov. 26. 1816, per Lord Stowell.
Respondents' Authorities.—2. Dods. 83.; Jeremy's Dig. 121. p. 2.
Solicitors: J. Richardson— John Butt, —Solicitors.
(Ap. Ca. No. 64 .)
