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United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions >> Lady Baird Preston 1 v. Viscount Melville and Others [1841] UKHL 2_Rob_88 (29 March 1841) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1841/2_Rob_88.html Cite as: [1841] UKHL 2_Rob_88 |
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Page: 88↓
(1841) 2 Rob 88
CASES DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, ON APPEAL FROM THE COURTS OF SCOTLAND. 1841.
1 st Division.
(No. 4.)
[
Counsel: [
Pemberton —
Sir W. Follett —
John Stuart —
Deas.]
[
Knight Bruce —
G. Graham Bell.]
Subject_Moveable Succession, Administration of — Jurisdiction. —
Certain parties named trustees as well as executors of the will of a domiciled Scotchman, having declined to accept, the Court of Session, with consent of parties next of kin, appointed other trustees with all the powers given or competent to the original trustees. Previous to such appointment, one of the next of kin, a domiciled Scotchwoman, obtained letters of administration of the moveable estate in England from the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, and found caution there for the due execution of the office. She filed a bill in Chancery in England, praying to have the usual decree for taking the accounts, and administration of the personal estate, and that the residue might be secured for the benefit of the parties interested. The trustees then raised an action against this administratrix before the Court of Session in Scotland, concluding for declarator that all the property and estate which belonged to the testator at his death, wherever situated, in Scotland, England, or elsewhere, and in particular the funds and effects held by the administratrix under the foresaid letters of administration, now pertain and belong to and ought to be vested in and transferred to them as trustees aforesaid; and the Court having decerned to that effect, judgment of the Court of Session reversed, and cause remitted back with a declaration,—
_________________ Footnote _________________
1 16 D., B., & M., 472.
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Observed, per Lord Chancellor, “The domicile of a deceased party regulates the right of succession to his moveable property; but the administration must be in the country in which possession of his property is taken and held under lawful authority.”
( See the Statement of Facts in the preceding Report.)
Statement.
The trustees and executors named by the testator Sir Robert Preston declined to act; whereupon, by consent of several of the parties chiefly interested, including Lady Baird Preston,—Lord Melville, Mr. Hope Johnstone, and Mr. Adam Hay were appointed by the Court trustees to execute the trusts of the settlement of Sir Robert Preston, in the room of the trustees and executors named by him, and with the whole powers and privileges of these trustees. They prepared to vest themselves fully with the whole heritage, and also with the whole moveable estate left by Sir Robert, and conveyed by him to his trustees. They accordingly raised the action of declarator and constitution against Lady Hay, the heir-at-law, mentioned in the preceding report.
Previously to the respondents appointment by the Court the appellant had been confirmed executrix quà next of kin in Scotland. Her Ladyship had also taken out letters of administration in England. The respondents applied to the appellant to convey to them the moveable estate in her hands; and as she had paid a considerable number of legacies, &c. the respondents offered to discharge her and her cautioners in the English
Page: 90↓
The respondents, in January 1836, filed a bill against the appellant, first in Exchequer, and afterwards in Chancery, which prayed that she should be ordained to produce accounts of her intromissions as administratrix; that the Court should take an account of the estate left by Sir Robert Preston in England, and of Lady Baird Preston's intromissions; and that the residue of the estate, so far as extant, should be paid over to them for the trust purposes, on due provision being made for such debts and legacies as might still remain unpaid.
On the 1st February 1836, the appellant, as administratrix, filed a bill in Chancery against the respondents, praying that an account might be taken under the direction of the Court of the moveable estate of Sir Robert Preston, that the same might be applied in a due course of administration, under direction of the Court, that the clear residue should be ascertained and secured for behoof of the parties interested, and that she might be discharged of her office as administratrix. She afterwards added a prayer for an injunction against the trustees proceeding in Scotland to defeat her right.
On the 25th February 1836 the respondents raised an action of declarator and payment against the appellant before the Court of Session, narrating the deeds and proceedings in Scotland above detailed, and concluding for declarator that the whole property and effects of Sir Robert Preston, of every denomination and where-ever situated, especially all moveable estate and effects, and “in particular the whole funds and effects of the said deceased Sir Robert Preston, held by the said Dame Anne Campbell Baird Preston, defender, under the foresaid letters of administration granted and issued in her favour by the foresaid Prerogative Court of the Archbishop of Canterbury, now pertain and belong, and should be vested and transferred to the pursuers, and survivors or survivor of them, as trustees nominated and appointed by our said Lords for executing the settlements of the said deceased Sir Robert Preston, in room and place of the said Sir Coutts Trotter, &c., but in trust always for the uses, ends, and purposes specified and contained in the foresaid trust disposition, deed of settlement, and will; and that the whole rights, powers, faculties, privileges, and immunities, vested in and bestowed by before recited trust disposition, deed of settlement, and will in and upon the persons therein named, are now vested in and bestowed upon the pursuers as trustees nominated and appointed by our said Lords; and in particular, that the receipt or receipts, discharge or discharges of the pursuers are good and effectual to all concerned, transacting with, purchasing from, and paying to the pursuers as trustees foresaid, so that the receipts and discharges to be granted by the pursuers to the said defender, on her paying and transferring
Page: 92↓
Then there follows a conclusion for decree ordaining the defender (appellant) forthwith to pay and transfer the moveable estate there specified, and all other moveable estate which she held or might hold as administratrix. There was also a conclusion that she ought to be ordained to deliver over the vouchers of payments by her as administratrix, “to the end the pursuers may be enabled to exoner and discharge her of her intromissions.” Sir John Hay and Miss Preston, as cautioners for the defender, were called, for their interest.
Among other defences the appellant pleaded, 1st, that being subject to the jurisdiction and control of the Prerogative Court, in which she had found caution for the due performance of the office of administratrix, she was not amenable to the Scotch courts in any question as to the funds so administered by her in England; 2d, that neither the respondents nor the Scotch courts could discharge or release her from the obligations and duties of the office of administratrix.
Judgment of Court, 8th Feb. 1838.
The Lord Ordinary, after hearing parties on a closed record, ordered cases, with which avizandum was made to the Court. The Lords pronounced the following interlocutor:—
“8th February 1838. The Lords having considered the revised cases, record, and whole cause, and heard counsel for the parties, find and declare
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in terms of the first conclusion of the libel, and decern, and to this extent allow an interim extract to go out: Quoad ultra, supersede consideration of the other conclusions of the libel, as also of the question of expenses.”
Lady Baird Preston appealed.
Appellant's Argument.
Appellant.—The question raised by the action of declarator and payment at the respondents instance against the appellant, being substantially an inquiry as to the title to administer the funds in England, such a question falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in England, these funds being now legally vested in the appellant as administratrix with the will annexed, under a title and in a character conferred by the proper ecclesiastical court in England, the validity of which title cannot be tried in the Scotch court, nor can her duties and liabilities, in her character of administratrix, be determined or released by the decree of the Court of Session.
The distinction between questions relative to the beneficial interests of parties in a moveable succession situated in a foreign country, and questions relative to the title to administer that succession, or as to the mode of taking it up and making the rights of parties thereto effectual, is a plain one, and fully recognised by the law of Scotland. The former class of cases is regulated by the lex domicilii testatoris. The latter class of cases is regulated by the lex rei sitæ. The present is a question solely as to the title to administer, the mode and manner in which the succession is to be realised, so that the rights of parties therein may be rendered effectual.
Page: 94↓
The present action, in whatever way decided, cannot affect the rights of any of the parties interested in Sir Robert Preston's succession. These rights and interests will remain the same whoever shall possess the title to administer the estates. The question here is a pure question as to the title of administration,—whether that title stands now in the persons of the respondents, or in the person of the appellant; and how the appellant is to denude of, and be discharged of, her actings in the character of administratrix, after the primary purposes for which she obtained that office are accomplished? It is, therefore, a question which falls entirely to be regulated by the law of England, and to be disposed of by the judges of that country, under whose jurisdiction the moveables are situated, from whom the appellant obtained her office, and by whom alone she can be validly discharged. The principles for which the appellant here contends are very strongly illustrated by the case of Egerton against Forbes, 27th November 1812 1, the rubric of which is, “Moveable property in England, to which the wife succeeded during the subsistence of the marriage, but which was not confirmed during the husband's life, found to have fallen under the jus mariti.” See the law as there laid down by the late Lord Meadowbank.
_________________ Footnote _________________
1 Egerton v. Forbes, 27th Nov. 1812, Fac. Coll.
Page: 95↓
Neither can the appellant discover how the Court below got over the difficulty which so prominently presents itself, from the important specialty that the appellant has been lawfully invested with the office of administratrix of the English funds by the English courts, to which she has found caution, and to which she is amenable and bound to account for her whole intromissions and management. The receipt and discharge of the respondents could not be a sufficient discharge and exoneration to the appellant. Will the appellant's statement to the English courts, from which she holds her office, that she has accounted to and been discharged by the respondents, supersede the necessity of her accounting to and being discharged by these courts? The Court of Session has found that the English funds, and the whole vouchers thereof, belong to and are vested in the respondents; but if the appellant, in deference to the judgment of that Court, should pay over these funds, and deliver these vouchers to the respondents, will this relieve her from again making payment of these funds into or under the orders of the English courts, and from there exhibiting the very vouchers and documents which she had previously placed in the possession of the respondents, and without production of which to the competent court she could not be relieved of her office, or get the account of her intromissions audited and discharged?
_________________ Footnote _________________
1 See Rep.
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The respondents contend that the decree has a more limited effect than the appellant asserts, and that it merely contains a finding, in Scotch law, of what is the legal right of the respondents, but ordains nothing to be done; it is plain, however, that it strikes at the appellant, in so far as that if such decree were well
Page: 97↓
[
Respondents Argument.
Respondents.—The plea of the appellant, that as she holds a title to the English funds from the English ecclesiastical court, her right and title thereto cannot be interfered with by the Scotch court, she being alone answerable to the courts in England, is founded upon a double misconception of the nature of the defender's title, and of the object of the pursuers' present action.
Sir Robert Preston having been a domiciled Scotchman at the period of his death, his whole personal succession, wherever situated, must be regulated and distributed according to the law of Scotland. 1 As personal property has no locality, the law holds that it is all situated within the territory of the defunct's domicile, or, as it has been expressed, gathered round his person or in his pocket at the time of his death. This is precisely the import of the case of Egerton, quoted by the appellant.
_________________ Footnote _________________
1 Selkrig v. David, 1 Rose's Rep. 478; Anstruther v. Chalmers, 2 Sim. 1; 2 My. & Cr. 513; Yeats v. Thomson, 1 Sh. & M'L. 795; Breadalbane v. Chandos, 2 My. & Cr. 739; Warrender, 2 Sh. & M'L. 154; Stanley v. Birnie, 3 Hagg. 373; ex parte Geddes, 1 Gl. & Jam. 432; Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. N. P. 103.
Page: 98↓
According to this principle, the Scotch court is the natural and competent court for determining all questions in regard to the right to or distribution of this succession, and all or every part thereof, without distinction as to where the funds or property may be situated. Being a Scotch succession it must be regulated by Scotch law; and that law, provided there be jurisdiction over the parties requiring to be called, falls to be determined by the Scotch court. If any party has got possession of or pretends right to any part of the succession, it is quite competent for the true owners, whether under intestacy or by will, to vindicate the property or seek declarator of their right thereto, before the Scotch court, as the competent and natural tribunal.
It may no doubt happen, in consequence of the parties wrongfully detaining or erroneously claiming right to the property being beyond the jurisdiction of the Scotch court, that the true owner cannot institute any competent process against these parties before the Scotch court. But such a case does not take from the general principle; that principle not being altered, but merely incapable of being applied, in consequence of the absence of the parties, or want of jurisdiction over them.
Now here the appellant has got a certain title in a portion of Sir Robert Preston's Scotch succession, under Pretence of which she claims right to that portion of the succession, and disputes the right of the pursuers, who claim the whole succession as the general disponees and executors of the testator. The appellant is confessedly within the jurisdiction of the Scotch court; and the respondents have brought this action in order to try the question of right with her.
Page: 99↓
The general principle alluded to being, it is submitted, quite sufficient to support the competency of the pursuers action, it is almost unnecessary to aid their argument. But there are other peculiarities in this case, all tending to show the competency of the action before the Scotch court, and proving the propriety and expediency of having the question determined there, and not in England. Because the succession was a Scotch succession, and the parties interested in it resident in Scotland, the application for the appointment of the pursuers over the succession was made to the Scotch and not to the English court. The parties selected, and that by the appellant herself, to administer the succession as new trustees, were Scotch and not English. The pursuers are now administering the succession under a Scotch title, being amenable in a certain degree to the Scotch court for their whole administration. They undertook the trusteeship relying upon their acquaintance with Scotch law, and believing that their rights and duties would all be regulated by that law. They have no knowledge of English proceedings, save that they understand them to be of such a nature that it is their duty to prevent any part of this succession getting connected with English forms or proceedings, either by the funds being cast into Chancery, or otherwise.
The case is now put by the appellant on new grounds. The question of domicile is held as of no importance; the existence of the English suit, and the liability of the appellant to account under it, being treated as the decisive matter in hand. Thus then the administration of an estate would be regulated by the law of the state where the property happens to be; although formerly it was considered, not merely as matter of
Page: 100↓
The respondents say that they are amenable for their administration to the Scotch courts, and they submit to these courts alone. Any person having a demand against them connected with Sir Robert Preston's trust or funds, whether these funds be situated in Scotland or in England, would be entitled to bring their action against the pursuers before the Scotch court. Suppose any party to pretend right to part of the English personalty which would go to exclude the right and title of the pursuers, the competent and proper court for trying the question of right between such claimants and the pursuers would be the Scotch court. Just suppose that the appellant had there moved as pursuer in her claim of right in competition with the pursuers, founding upon her right in the English funds, or any other ground, can it be doubted that her Ladyship might competently have raised against the pursuers in the Scotch court, either a counter action of declarator or any other process? Such an action would be not merely competent and regular because the pursuers are resident in Scotland: the main foundation of the action would lie in the fact that it was to try a question of right in regard to the succession of a domiciled Scotchman.
Again, if the general principle founded on be sound in itself, it matters not what is the foundation of the appellant's claim or pretence to that part of the succession, as to which the pursuers are now seeking to have their right declared. If a question of right has actually
Page: 101↓
[
It is thought it would; but the question here is, whether it is a correct declaration of the law of Scotland. Suppose the appellant to have acted on this declaration of right, and a creditor to sue her, she would plead plene administravit. Handing over the funds to the Scotch executors would completely discharge her.
The ecclesiastical court merely bestows administration on the party having the apparent right, or asking the letters of administration. But the ecclesiastical court has no jurisdiction to compel the administrator to execute the settlement, or administer the succession according, to the will of the testator. If legatees, creditors, or others want remedy against the administrator, they must resort to the common law or equity
Page: 102↓
Judgment deferred.
Ld. Chancellor's Speech.
Page: 103↓
The appellant is the administratrix of Sir Robert Preston in England, by virtue of letters of administration from the Prerogative Court. The pursuers have been appointed trustees by the Court of Session in the place of certain persons who were named as trustees and executors by Sir Robert Preston, but who declined to act. This appointment took place with the consent of the appellant. The act of appointment is dated 19th May 1835, and is expressed to be by such consent; and it nominates and appoints the pursuers to be trustees for executing the different powers, and carrying into effect the provisions contained in the trust disposition, deed of settlement, and will of Sir Robert Preston, and that in the room and place of the trustees named by him, who had declined to accept, and with all the powers and faculties conferred upon the said original trustees by the said trust deed.
In January 1836 the respondents filed a bill in the Exchequer in England, praying that the whole of the personal estate in the hands of the administratrix might be paid to them, they undertaking to pay the debts; or if the Court should be of opinion that such personal estate ought to be administered in this country, then
Page: 104↓
In February 1836, the appellant, the administratrix, filed a bill in the Court of Chancery in England, praying the usual decree for the accounts and administration of the personal estate, and that the residue might be secured for the benefit of the parties interested; and that the respondents, the trustees, might be restrained from proceeding in Scotland to compel the appellant, the administratrix, to pay over the personal estate to them.
In March 1836, the respondents, the trustees, abandoned their suit in the Exchequer, and filed a bill in the Court of Chancery for the same purposes.
The effect of the interlocutor appealed from is to declare that all the funds and personal estate in the hands of the appellant, or administratrix, belong and ought to be transferred to the pursuers as trustees; that is to say, that the personal estate in this country at the time of the death of Sir Robert Preston, and now in the hands of his administratrix under letters of administration from the Prerogative Court, ought not to be administered in this country, but ought to be paid and transferred to the trustees in Scotland appointed by the Court of Session, and who are not the personal representatives of the deceased.
By the law of England, the person to whom administration is granted by the ecclesiastical court is by statute bound to administer the estate and to pay the debts of the deceased. The letters of administration under which he acts direct him so to do, and he takes an oath that he will well and truly administer all and
Page: 105↓
Page: 106↓
Page: 107↓
The interlocutor, proceeding upon the ground that the trustees are entitled to have transferred to them the property in England before the administration has been completed, must, I think, be reversed; but as the pursuers may be entitled to some declaration of right and to some decree of the Court of Session, so far as the Court of Session has jurisdiction over the property, I think the better and safer course will be to declare that the property of Sir Robert Preston in England ought to be administered by the appellant, by virtue of the
Page: 108↓
The House of Lords ordered and adjudged, That the said interlocutor complained of in the said appeal be and the same is hereby reversed: And it is declared, That the property of Sir Robert Preston, baronet, (mentioned in the appeal,) in England, ought to be administered by the appellant by virtue of the letters of administration granted to her by the Prerogative Court of Canterbury: And it is further ordered, That, with this declaration, the cause be remitted back to the Court of Session in Scotland, to consider and adjudicate upon the first conclusion of the libel, either separately, or together with the other conclusions of the libel (mentioned in the appeal), as such Court shall think fit, in conformity with the said declaration.
Solicitors: Spottiswoode and Robertson — Meggison, Pringle, and Manisty, Solicitors.