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United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions >> Cristopher Kerr v. Mrs Janet Dickson, and Others [1842] UKHL 1_Bell_499 (18 July 1842) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1842/1_Bell_499.html Cite as: [1842] UKHL 1_Bell_499 |
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Page: 499↓
(1842) 1 Bell 499
CASES DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, ON APPEAL FROM THE COURTS OF SCOTLAND. 1842.
No. 21
[
Subject_Prescription. —
Possession for forty years of lands de facto bounded by the sea shore, but described in the titles as bounded by a sea wall, will not avail the possessor so as to work off the effect of the limitation in his boundary, and entitle him to claim a right of making land, beyond the wall, about to be gained from the sea by artificial operations, his own property.
Subject_Property. —
The proprietor under a bounding charter of land immediately adjoining the sea-shore, has no right in the shore beyond his boundary.
On 15th September, 1770, James Guthrie, by feu-contract, disponed to James Nicoll, “All and haill that small piece or pendicle of arable land, including a small angle of Quarry holes on the south-east part thereof, being part of the estate of Craigie on the south-west part thereof, to the southward of the ferry road; and which subjects, hereby disponed, are bounded—by the road leading from Dundee to the ferry, and in a straight line with the northmost of the march stones after mentioned, upon the north; four march stones, running from the said ferry road to the River Tay, and the land and Quarry-holes feued out by the said James Guthrie, of this date, to Thomas Smart, mason in Dundee, upon the east; the River Tay on the south; and a march stone and ditch in a direct line with the east dyke, or part of the glebe belonging to the parson of Dundee, on the west parts.”—“Reserving to the Magistrates and Town Council of Dundee the privilege and use of the beach or shores of the subjects before-mentioned,
Page: 500↓
By feu-disposition, dated 3d September, 1785, James Nicoll sub-feued to John Guthrie a portion of the ground feued to him by James Guthrie, which in the feu-disposition was described as, “All and whole that piece of ground, being part of that pendicle of arable land, and others, of the lands of Craigie, feued by me from James Guthrie, Esq. of Craigie; and which piece of ground hereby feued out, lies upon the south side of the road leading from Dundee to the North Ferry, and immediately opposite to the subjects feued by the said John Guthrie from the said James Guthrie of Craigie, and consists of about three roods and six falls or thereby; and is bounded—by the said road leading from the town of Dundee to the North Ferry, on the north; by a straight line and march stones, running south from the said Ferry Road, at the distance of three feet from the east gavel wall of John Yeaman's tenement, on the west; by a straight line and march stones running south from the said Ferry Road, which divides the subjects hereby feued out from the subjects still belonging to me, on the east; and by the sea-wall which divides the subjects hereby feued out from the sea-beach, on the south parts; and which sea-wall, so far as the same extends opposite to the said John Guthrie's subjects, is to be his absolute property; with the privilege and use to the said John Guthrie and his foresaids, and their tenants, of the well at the Horse Craig, and free ish and entry thereto,—they always being at the joint expense of upholding the same, according to their interest in the said subjects feued by me from the said James Guthrie, Esq.—with free ish and entry to the subjects before disponed, and all right, title, interest, claim of right, property, and possession, which I, my
Page: 501↓
The precept in this disposition directed infeftment to be given in the land, with “free ish and entry thereto, and whole other privileges and pertinents of the said subjects, with and under the foresaid declarations, reserving always to me, my heirs and successors, full power and liberty of quarrying in the beach or shore still belonging to me, betwixt the subjects hereby disponed and the River Tay, within six feet of the foresaid seawall, being the south boundary of the foresaid subjects; and reserving to the said James Guthrie, Esq.” power and liberty to work the coals and other minerals. John Guthrie was infeft upon this disposition.
In 1790, Nicoll and Speid, as mid-superiors, granted a precept of clare constat to the son of John Guthrie, which described the lands in the same terms as the feu-disposition of 1785, but without inserting the reservation as to the sea-shore, and directed infeftment to be given in “all and whole the foresaid piece of ground, consisting of about three roods and six falls, or thereby, lying bounded and described as aforesaid, with the privilege and use of the foresaid well, and free ish and entry thereto, and whole other privileges and pertinents of the said subjects, with and under the foresaid declarations, to the said John Guthrie, as heir foresaid to his said father.” Infeftment was taken upon this precept, and duly recorded.
In 1835, the property of the land came to be vested in the appellant by purchase, the respondents being his mid-superiors, as in right of James Nicoll, the granter of the disposition of 1785.
Owing to certain operations upon the sea-shore opposite this land, which were intended to be carried into effect by Parliamentary trustees for the improvement of the harbour of Dundee,
Page: 502↓
In these circumstances the appellant, in 1837, brought an action against the respondents, alleging that he “and his predecessors in the said subjects have at all times, and especially since the date of the foresaid precept of clare constat and sasine thereon in the year 1790, been in the unlimited, unqualified, and undisturbed possession and enjoyment of the foresaid right of free access to and from the said river, and of the foresaid right of embanking and gaining ground from the river, under and in virtue of the said titles; and in particular, in the year 1793, or year 1794, David Neave, then proprietor of the said subjects, exercised the said right of embanking and gaining ground from the river, by removing the sea dyke which then formed the south boundary of the said subjects, and constructing another about thirty or forty feet farther into the river, and by filling up and embanking the intermediate space, whereby he gained a large extent of additional ground ex adverso of the said subjects; and the said David Neave and the other subsequent proprietors, and the pursuer, have had the unqualified and undisturbed possession of the said subjects, together with the said additional embanked ground, as their absolute and undoubted property, ever since.” That the respondents “now, for the first time, deny the right of the pursuer to free access to and from the river, and his right to embank and gain ground from the said river ex adverso of the said subjects, which rights have been enjoyed and exercised by him and his predecessors beyond the years of prescription, without any dispute or molestation whatever; and they now pretend that they have themselves the right to embank and gain ground ex adverso of the said subjects, and to hold the ground so to be embanked and gained by them from the river as their own absolute and undoubted property, which would thereby
Page: 503↓
Upon this statement the summons concluded, that it should be declared, “that the said Mrs Janet Jobson or Dickson, and James Ogilvie,” (the respondents) “have no right to embank or gain ground from the said River Tay, ex adverso of the foresaid subjects belonging to the pursuer, and to hold and possess the same as their own absolute and undoubted property, or in any way to appropriate the sea beach or shore, ex adverso of the foresaid subjects, so as at all to come or interpose themselves between the pursuer and the river: And it ought and should be farther found and declared by decree foresaid, that the pursuer has the undoubted right, at all times, to free access to and from the said River Tay, ex adverso of the foresaid subjects, and also, that he has the only and exclusive right to embank and gain ground from the said River Tay, ex adverso of the said subjects, in so far as the said embankments shall not interfere with, or impede the public navigation of the said River Tay, and to hold the said ground so gained from the river as his own absolute property, to the exclusion of all right thereto on the part of the said Mrs Janet Jobson, or Dickson, and James Ogilvie: And the said Mrs Janet Jobson, or Dickson, and the said Dr David Dickson, her husband for his interest, jure mariti, or otherwise, ought and should be decerned and ordained, by decree foresaid, to desist and cease from troubling and molesting the pursuer in the enjoyment and exercise of his said rights.”
The pleas in law upon which the appellant rested his action were:—
“1. The defenders have no right of property or other right in the sea-beach, ex adverso of the pursuer's subjects, nor are they
Page: 504↓
entitled to interpose themselves between the pursuer and the existing line of the river. 2. The pursuer is entitled to free access to and from the river, and to embank and gain ground from the river, in so far as he does not interfere with the public right of navigation.
3. Generally, the pursuer is entitled to decreet, in terms of the libel.”
The respondents in their defences denied the averment as to the change of boundary seaward alleged to have been made in 1793, and pleaded :—
“1. The property originally feued to Nicoll being described as bounded by the Tay, it included a right to the shore, ex adverso of it, and his right has been acquired by, and is now vested in, the defenders.
2. As the property belonging to the pursuer was described by precise measurement and boundaries, the investitures do not convey, and do not import to be a conveyance of the sea-shore, which lies beyond the boundaries, and is excluded by the measurement.
3. These investitures are strictly bounding charters, and the pursuer cannot prescribe a right to the shore in the face of his own titles: and even assuming that he had a prescriptive title, there has been no prescriptive possession.
4. According to the conception of the original feu-disposition, the shore was intended and declared to belong to the superior, and there is nothing in the subsequent investitures, which can in law be held to affect or vary the right now vested in the defenders.”
The Lord Ordinary (Moncrieff,) on the 10th March, 1840, pronounced the following interlocutor, adding the subjoined note:—
“The Lord Ordinary having considered the revised cases for the parties, and resumed consideration of the closed record and debate, and considered the various writs produced;
Page: 505↓
Finds, that the pursuer has not set forth any relevant grounds for supporting the conclusions of his summons of declarator: Therefore sustains the defences, assoilzies the defenders, and decerns; Without prejudice always to any competent objections which may in due and competent form be raised by the pursuer to any particular operation to be performed, or structure to be erected, by the defenders, on the ground or space in question, as their property reserved by their authors; and reserving the answers of the said defenders to any such objection as accords: Finds expenses due, and remits the account when lodged to the auditor to be taxed.”
“ Note.—The issue raised by the summons is, properly, Whether the space of ground in question is the property of the pursuer, or whether it remained with Nicoll, the original superior of the pursuer's author, and has been transmitted to the defender, Mrs Dickson, as in his right. The Lord Ordinary is of opinion, that in every view of the case it is not the property of the pursuer; he thinks that it is the property of the defenders; but that, at any rate, the pursuer has shewn no relevant grounds, for requiring the Court at his instance to declare the contrary.
On the plain construction and meaning of the original feu-disposition by Nicoll to Guthrie, in 1785, no doubt whatever can, in his apprehension, be entertained. It is as clear as words could make it. The ground feued, being part only of that belonging to Nicoll in virtue of his title from Guthrie of Craigie, is not only defined and limited by measurement to three roods and six falls or thereby; but a precise boundary on the south is fixed by the ‘sea-wall,’ admitted to be then in existence,—and to exclude the possibility of that being held to give, either directly or by any implication or legal inference, any right whatever to the beach beyond it, the wall itself is described as ‘the sea-wall which divides the said subjects from the sea-beach.’ These words are not at all ambiguous. But there is still another clause, which takes away the possibility of any argument on the subject. The granter Nicoll, having bound himself
Page: 506↓
It does not therefore admit of the shadow of doubt, that in the meaning and intention of the parties in the contract, the sea-beach was to remain the property of Nicoll, and Guthrie was to acquire no right whatever beyond the sea-wall as his south boundary. When the pursuer now claims to himself, as in the right of Guthrie, the property of the sea-beach, admitted to be south of the sea-wall,—the very space betwixt the subject and the River Tay,—he is undeniably claiming what was neither given and paid for, nor intended to be given, but, on the contrary, was expressly excluded and reserved to Nicoll by the contract.
The other feu-disposition granted to Yeaman a few years after-wards, though the south boundary is there differently constructed, is equally precise as to the reality of the intention, that the beach or shore should still remain the property of Nicoll. But the terms of Guthrie's title are quite sufficient for this cause.
The nature of the title being thus perfectly clear on the original contract, the Lord Ordinary is farther of opinion, that there is no real difference between it and the precept of clare constat in 1790, on which so much is founded by the pursuer. John Guthrie stood infeft on the disposition of Nicoll, precisely according to all its terms. His son, John Guthrie, made up his title by precept of
Page: 507↓
Page: 508↓
The meaning and legal import of the titles being thus clear, the Lord Ordinary is of opinion, that the case, independent of the plea of prescription, is not at all doubtful, and that the argument in the pursuer's revised case is altogether fallacious. It appears to him, in the first place, that the sea-beach is not inter regalia in the sense necessary to the pursuer's argument. It is, no doubt, publici juris in regard to navigation, and some other uses of it. But the Lord Ordinary adopts the opinion of President Campbell, in the case of Innes v. Downie, 27th May, 1807, as reported by Baron Hume, which, besides being of high authority in itself, appears to be in perfect agreement with all the other authorities,—that the sea-beach or rocks within flood-mark are not inter jura regalia, but subjects of private property for all purposes not inconsistent with the public uses. He is farther of opinion, however, that it is really unnecessary to discuss any such question, and incompetent for the pursuer to raise it. The pursuer grants, and must grant, that there was a full right in Nicoll to this ground in dispute, as in connection with the adjoining property. Nicoll gives a certain part of the subject in feu to Guthrie, with an express boundary, the nature of which is precisely ascertained. Guthrie takes the right as it is, and with all its qualifications. Except by Nicoll's conveyance to Guthrie, the pursuer has no title. How, then, can he dispute Nicoll's right, as the previous proprietor of the whole subject,—if this part of it, or this right attached to it, is not given to Guthrie, or expressly reserved to Nicoll? The pursuer says, and must say, that it is validly given by Nicoll to Guthrie; for he cannot have got it by any other title. But how can this be, if it is expressly
Page: 509↓
There is, however, a plea of prescription, founded on the precept of clare constat in 1790, with the infeftment on it, and subsequent infeftments, and an allegation of possession.
There is no doubt that, by the statute 1617, prescription may be established by infeftments standing together for forty years, though proceeding on the entry by an heir by clare constat. But there must first be a title which admits of prescription in the particular thing claimed; and then there must be clear possession of that thing. No man can prescribe any right in the face of the very title on which he founds. Hence, the rule of law is quite clear, that no man can
Page: 510↓
Now, in the present case, the Lord Ordinary could understand, that, if the boundary given in the precept of clare constat were different from that in the original feu-disposition, prescriptive possession might enable the pursuer to say, that that precept must rule as the title, and that it could not be explained by the clauses in the original grant. But there is no such case in fact. The boundary is still the same as it was at first. The precept, as well as the feu-disposition, is a bounding charter, if there ever was one, in its words, in its meaning, and in its legal effect. And this being the nature of the title, the Lord Ordinary is of opinion, that no prescription to the effect now maintained could possibly run upon it.
But in the next place, if it were possible for the pursuer to get over this difficulty, it appears to the Lord Ordinary that there is no sufficient averment of possession. There is nothing specific except only the statement, that in the year1793 or 1794, the sea-wall having been in disrepair, the feuar then in possession, in repairing or rebuilding it, changed its position by encroaching a few feet on the beach. Every thing else that is said resolves into nothing more than such use of the beach, by passing over it, as the public may at any time make of it, when it is open and unoccupied. Such possession could never establish any right, if the ground otherwise remained the property of Nicoll and his assignees. The averment as to the change of the position of the wall is denied; and if it were relevant, it would require proof. But the Lord Ordinary
Page: 511↓
On the whole, the Lord Ordinary thinks that the case is in favour of the defenders, in respect of the property of the ground; and that they will be entitled, under the Harbour Statutes, to make the beneficial use of it contemplated. But as questions of a different kind might arise in the actual application of it to such uses, he has inserted a reservation to leave every such question open.”
The appellant presented a reclaiming note against this interlocutor, on advising which the Court (Second Division,) pronounced the following interlocutor:—
“The Lords having considered this reclaiming note, with the whole process, and heard counsel thereon, adhere to the interlocutor complained of; refuse the desire of the note; of new find expenses due, allow the account to be given in, and remit to the auditor to tax and report.”
The appeal was against these interlocutors.
Mr Tinney and Mr Anderson for the appellant.—The property of land between the high and low water mark is in the crown.
[
Page: 512↓
Although the property is in the crown, it is only for the public purposes of trade and navigation. The proprietor of the land whose boundary is the high water mark, has a right of free access to his lands from the sea-shore, and to enjoy the shore like any other subject in all the ways mentioned by Skene, Verb. Sign. voce Wave. If the sea recede, however, from natural or artificial causes, so as to produce what is called sea green, i. e. land washed by the sea only at high spring tides, the land so acquired from the sea does not belong in property to the crown, but becomes the property of the owner of the land whose boundary is the sea-shore. Ersk. II. 6. 17; Bruce, Mor. 9342; Campbell v. Brown, 17 F. C. 444. Nay, such owner may embank, and gain land from the sea so long as he does not interfere with the public uses of the sea-shore. Culross v. Geddes, Hume, p. 554; Leven v. Burntisland, Hume 555; Boucher v. Crawford, 18 F. C. 64. This right of occupancy, if it may be so called, arises not from any substantive right of property, ab ante, in the solum of the shore, but is a privilege incident to his proprietorship of lands bounded by the sea; and it has been recognized in a proprietor whose lands, de facto, adjoined, or were bounded by the sea, although his titles did not, per expressum, bear that the sea was the boundary. M'Alister v. Campbell, 15 D. B. and M. 490.
The case of Smart v. Mags of Dundee, 8 Bro. Par. Ca. 119, did not alter the law in this respect, for the special ground of decision there was, that the burgh had a grant of the shore, and that every thing which was not expressly granted away from the burgh to its feuars was reserved to the burgh; and the parties expressly admitted the correctness of the general doctrine for which the appellants are contending. So in Todd v. Dunlop, 2 Rob. 333, the alveus and littus of the Clyde were specially vested by statute in the defenders for certain purposes, and upon this the case was decided.
Page: 513↓
When the authors of the respondents granted the feu-right of 1785, they parted with the land which, by their own titles, was described as bounded by the Tay, i. e. the sea; they reserved no land between the sea-shore and the land feued; nothing, therefore, remained in them in respect of which they could thereafter enjoy or assert the right of occupancy suggested. No doubt the reservation in the deed of 1785 asserts a right of property in the shore, but ex concessis the right was in the crown ; the reservation, therefore, was simply a nullity.
We apprehend not, nothing remained in the granter to reserve a title to. The reservation is an interference in truth not between Nicoll and his grantee, but between the grantee and the crown; it was simply nugatory.
[
It is for the purposes of this suit, as he has not set up any such grant. After the feu of 1785, Nicoll, like any other subject, might resort to the shore for the purposes of pleasure, but any connection with it in respect of land adjoining, so as to give him or his successors a right to embank, or claim any ground gained by natural or other causes, had altogether ceased.
[
Perhaps not; but we could that he should not build or enclose, because the estoppel must be strictly interpreted.
[
Page: 514↓
There is nothing in the reservation that says so; but however that may be, we do not claim under the charter of 1785; our claim is under the precept of clare constat of 1795, in which the reservation is not repeated, and which is with privileges and pertinents.
[
But the reservation is not contained in the precept, and we have had prescriptive possession under the precept. The effect of the reservation, therefore, whatever it may be, is done away with.
[
There could not be such possession, as the locus had no existence. We do not claim right of possession of the locus in quo, but such rights as we may acquire in respect of our possession of the land in the grant.
[
Not a distinction which can affect this question; there was nothing beyond the wall that was previously the property of Nicoll, so as to be reserved to him by the terms of the description, and there is no ambiguity in the terms of the description which makes necessary, or can justify, a reference to the previous titles to ascertain what is included within the description, and thus to revive the reservation against the appellants, who have possessed upwards of forty years under a title in which it is not contained.
[
Page: 515↓
If the reservation was immaterial, then the two grants are the same; and if it is material, then our claim is under the precept in which it is not contained; and possession for forty years, not to be sure of the locus in quo, but of the land, in respect of the possession of which a right of the particular nature claimed can be acquired, is sufficient to give that right. We were therefore entitled to a decree in terms of the second alternative conclusion of our summons, or, at all events, we were entitled to declarator in terms of the first alternative conclusion; for whatever may be the right of the appellants, the respondents cannot have any right of property in the land acquired; but the interlocutor of the Court below, by sustaining the defences in which such a right is expressly set up, has in effect recognized such a right to be in the respondents.
[
In ordinary cases it is immaterial, but here, where a right is asserted in the defences, it appears to be most material.
[
Solicitor- General for respondents.—It is exactly the form which was used in Tod v. Dunlop.]
But there the property was claimed by the defenders, and the claim was assented to by the Court, which was not done here;
Page: 516↓
[
It is difficult in that view to understand the qualification in the interlocutor.
[
That is a species of negative pregnant. It is to say we may complain of what is injurious, but not of an innocent use. The Lord Ordinary should not have sustained the defences, but simply have dismissed the action on our own shewing.
[
Page: 517↓
Now, this grantee calls upon the Court to declare a right, which he supposes himself to have not only in that which he did take, but in that which he did not take, and which was expressly excluded from the grant of 1785, and equally excluded from the grant of 1790; he not only asks the Court to declare, contrary to the terms of the grant, that he is entitled to that which he never purchased, and never intended to purchase, and which it was never intended by the other party to grant, but that the other party, whose interest was reserved, may be restricted from the exercise of such rights in that property as he may be entitled to; he prays, that the party who claims the right to that land beyond
Page: 518↓
Ordered and Adjudged, that the petition and appeal be dismissed this House, and that the interlocutors therein complained of, be affirmed with costs.
Solicitors: Richardson and Connell— Graham, Moncrieff, and Weems, Agents.
