Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Owners of Steamship "Marpessa." [1907] UKHL 619 (29 May 1907)
BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you
consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it
will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free
access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
You are here:BAILII >>
Databases >>
United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions >>
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Owners of Steamship "Marpessa." [1907] UKHL 619 (29 May 1907)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1907/45SLR0619.html Cite as:
[1907] UKHL 619,
45 ScotLR 619
,
Lords Ashbourne,
Macnaghten,
Robertson, and
Atkinson.)
45 SLR 619
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board
v.
Owners of Steamship “Marpessa.”
Subject_Ship — Collision — Damage — Measure — Demurrage — Dredger Unable to Dredge for Nine Days — House of Lords and Questions of Amount of Damages.
Facts:
A dredger, the property of a harbour board, was run down and damaged through the fault of a steamer. For nine days she was unable to dredge, and the harbour board were unable to obtain another dredger to do her work.
Held that the owners of the steamer were liable to pay to the board, under the head of demurrage, a sum representing the ordinary cost of maintaining and working the dredger for nine days, with an allowance for depreciation.
The House of Lords, in dealing with questions as to the amount of damages, is not in the habit of interfering with the decision of the Court below, unless it is clear that a wrong principle has been adopted for ascertaining the damage. It will not correct minute mistakes.
Headnote:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (
Collins, M.R., Romer and Cozens-Hardy, L.JJ.), who had affirmed a judgment of
Sir J. Gorell Barnes.
The facts appear sufficiently from the opinion of the Lord Chancellor (
Loreburn)
infra.
Judgment:
Lord Chancellor (Loreburn)—The only question raised on this appeal is whether the damages awarded to the appellants are rightly measured. It was a case of collision, in which the steamship “Marpessa” ran down the said pump dredger “G. B. Crow,” and disabled her for nine days. This dredger is used by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board in the necessary work of dredging the bar outside Liverpool. She earns nothing in money and costs a good deal, but she does indispensable service in clearing away the sand. Negligence on the part of the steamship “Marpessa being admitted, the case came before the registrar to ascertain damages. No dispute was raised by defendants as to any of the items claimed except one—viz., the claim for demurrage for nine days at £104 per day, afterwards reduced to £102. The registrar found that £35 per day sufficed, and his report was confirmed by the President and also by the Court of Appeal. I need hardly say that your Lordships are not likely to interfere unless it is made clear that a wrong principle was adopted for the ascertainment of these damages. Now, until the case of “
The Greta Holme,”
[1897] AC 596, the view appears to have prevailed that no damages beyond the actual loss in repairs, loss of wages, and so forth, could be recovered where an injured vessel made no money for its owners and merely rendered services in dredging. That case corrected the error, and decided that in such case general damages might be recovered as well as the cost of procuring another vessel to do the work; but it did not, and could not, lay down a rule of universal application for the ascertainment of the damages in each particular case. For the damages depend upon the facts and upon the actual loss sustained by the owner, which will vary in different cases. It seems to me that the loss sustained in the present case under the claim of demurrage is the value of the work which would have been done by the dredger during those days, had she not been disabled. So many tons of sand would have been removed, which it is the duty and interest of the plaintiffs to remove, and by reason of the defendants' negligence they were not removed. If the plaintiffs had hired another vessel to do this work they could have recovered the cost of doing it. They have not done so, no other vessel being available at so short a notice, and, perhaps, not being available at all; for the construction is peculiar. Failing that evidence, the plaintiffs were entitled to put their case in another way. They might say the cost to us of maintaining and working this dredger, while it is working, amounts to so much per day, and its depreciation daily amounts to so much more. We take the total daily sum which it costs us as a fair measure of the value of its daily services to us. Those services are at least worth what we are habitually paying for them year after year, including what we sacrifice in depreciation. In fact the plaintiffs put in a mixed claim, made up mainly on the basis of what the dredger's services cost them; but they added an item for owners' profit, which was appropriate enough if they had paid it to the owner of a vessel which they hired, but had no place in a claim based on the cost to themselves of the services rendered
Page: 620↓
by the dredger. The registrar allowed them something on this head to which they were not entitled. He also deprived them of something to which they were entitled, when he gave only the daily supplies requisite in dock instead of the daily supplies requisite when the dredger was working. There is a confusion in the registrar's award in these respects, and also in regard to general damage in the circumstances of this particular case, but the original confusion was in the claim as stated by the plaintiffs. I certainly am not disposed to disturb the findings of three tribunals on such a point, when the difference between what was found and what in rigorous logic ought to have been found is trifling. And so with the complaint that the percentage allowed for depreciation was taken not on the original but on the reduced value of the dredger. I cannot say that in point of law the depreciation must be taken on the original value, nor am I prepared to exact mathematical precision in matters such as this. In my opinion, though there is error in the registrar's report there is no case for the interposition of this House. We cannot correct every minute mistake. And if we think, as I think, that after correcting the errors on both sides the registrar might quite well arrive at substantially the same figure as he has already found, we ought to dismiss the appeal.
Lords Ashbourne,
Macnaghten,
Robertson, and
Atkinson concurred.
Appeal dismissed.
Counsel:
Counsel for the Appellants—
Sir R. Finlay, K.C.—
Butler Aspinall, K.C.—
Leslie Scott. Agents—
Rawle & Company, Solicitors.
Counsel for the Respondents—
Pickford, K.C.—
Greer. Agents—
Thomas Cooper & Company, Solicitors.