United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Simon of Glaisdale

my lords.

Lord Kilbrandon

MY LORDS,

Lord Salmon

MY LORDS,

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ample evidence that just as the train was about to reach the bridge the
two appellants, who were each about 15 years of age, were jointly concerned
in pushing over the parapet the piece of paving stone which killed the guard.
They were jointly charged with manslaughter and after a very fair and
lucid summing up, each was found guilty. Both of them appealed against
conviction and sentence and their appeals against conviction were dis-
missed. The appellants now appeal to this House. The point of law
certified to be of general public importance is " can a defendant be properly
" convicted of manslaughter, when his mind is not affected by drink or drugs,
" if he did not foresee that his act might cause harm to another?"

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with Mrs. Barr and she fell in love with him. This naturally caused great
distress to Mrs. Gray and Mr. Barr and put a terrible strain on Mrs. Barr,
who was torn between her devoted sense of duty to her husband and children
and her deep love for Mr. Gray. The association between Mr. Gray and
Mrs. Barr continued. This was too much for Mrs. Gray, and her husband
set her and their children up in a home under a deed of separation. Mr.
Gray continued to live at the old family home. Mrs. Barr left her home
but did not go to live with Mr. Gray. She lived with her mother a few
miles away. Mr. Barr was doing his best to persuade his wife to come
back and live with him and their children. On the 13th June 1967 Mr.
Barr took his wife out to dinner. She promised to give up Mr. Gray. He
drove her home but when he had put his car away, he discovered that his
wife had run away and assumed that she had gone to spend the night with
Mr. Gray. Mr. Barr was beside himself. He took his 12 bore shotgun, loaded
both barrels, and set off for Mr. Gray's house, which he found in darkness.
He entered the house and found Mr. Gray standing at the top of the stairs.
Mr. Barr believed that his wife was in the bedroom. She was not; she was
later found unconscious in a field where she had attempted to commit suicide.
Mr. Barr started to mount the stairs holding his gun at the high port and
threatening Mr. Gray with it to force him to get out of the way. Mr. Gray
refused to move. Two shots were fired, one into the ceiling and the other
killed Mr. Gray. According to Mr. Barr's account, and he was the only
person left alive who knew what happened, Mr. Gray grappled with him,
the gun went off and fired one shot into the ceiling; Mr. Barr then slipped
on the stairs and accidentally the gun fired another shot which killed Mr.
Gray. There was much sympathy for Mr. Barr when he was tried at the
Old Bailey for murder. The summing-up read like an invitation to acquit
him of both murder and manslaughter—an invitation which the jury accepted
no doubt gratefully. Mrs. Gray then sued Mr. Barr for damages in respect
of her husband's death to which he in reality had no defence. Mr. Barr,
however, in the third party proceedings which he had brought against the
Prudential, claimed an indemnity under a '' hearth and home" policy
covering him against all sums he became liable to pay as damages in respect
of bodily injury to any person caused by accident. The learned trial judge
gave judgment against Mr. Barr in Mrs. Gray's favour for some £6,668
in all. He dismissed Mr. Barr's claim for an indemnity on grounds of
public policy having come to the conclusion that, in spite of the jury's
verdict. Mr. Barr was clearly guilty of manslaughter. Mr. Barr appealed,
amongst other things, against the judgment in favour of the Prudential.
That appeal was dismissed. Every member of the Court of Appeal, agreeing
with the learned trial judge, found that in spite of Mr. Barr's acquittal at the
Old Bailey he had been, on his own story, undoubtedly guilty of manslaughter.
They also agreed with the learned trial judge that on grounds of public
policy a man is not entitled to be indemnified against damages for which he
became liable as a result of committing a crime of violence.

Reg. v. Lamb [19671 2 Q.B. 981 was referred to by Lord Denning for
the proposition that in manslaughter there must always be a guilty mind.
This is true of every crime except those of absolute liability. The guilty

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mind usually depends on the intention of the accused. Some crimes require
what is sometimes called a specific intention, for example murder, which is
killing with intent to kill inflict grievous bodily harm. Other crimes need
only what is called a basic intention, which is an intention to do the acts
which constitute the crime. Manslaughter is such a crime, see R. v. Larkin
and Reg. v. Church. Reg. v. Lamb is certainly no authority to the contrary.
Two young men were playing about with a revolver which, to their know-
ledge, had two shells in chambers, neither of which was opposite the barrel.
The defendant in jest and with no intention to harm or frighten pointed the
revolver at his friend, who was also treating the incident as a joke. The
revolver fired and the friend was killed. The defendant was charged with
manslaughter on two grounds (a) killing by doing an unlawful and dangerous
act and (b) killing by criminal negligence. The defendant was convicted
hut his conviction was quashed on appeal because, luckily for him, there had
been a series of serious misdirections by the learned trial judge.

Lord Edmund-Davies

MY LORDS,

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(329843) DJ 896296 120 4/76 StS