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United Kingdom Investigatory Powers Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Investigatory Powers Tribunal >> Moran & Ors v Police Scotland [2016] UKIPTrib 15_602-CH (08 August 2016) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIPTrib/2016/15_602-CH.html Cite as: [2016] UKIPTrib 15_602-CH |
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Employment Appeal Tribunal Melville Street Edinburgh EH3 7HF |
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B e f o r e :
SUSAN O'BRIEN QC
SIR RICHARD MCLAUGHLIN
____________________
(1) DAVID MORAN (2) STEVEN ADAMS (3) MR O (4) MRS O (5) GERARD GALLACHER (6) MARJORIE GALLACHER |
Complainants |
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- and - |
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POLICE SCOTLAND |
Respondent |
____________________
Fifth & Sixth Complainants Litigants in Person
Jeremy Johnson QC (instructed by Legal Services Department, Police Scotland) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 22 July 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
See also: Order
Mr Justice Burton:
"Should the Commissioner establish that an individual has been adversely affected by any wilful or reckless failure by any person within a relevant public authority exercising or complying with the powers and duties under RIPA in relation to the acquisition or disclosure of communications data, he shall, subject to safeguarding national security, inform the affected individual of the existence of the Tribunal and its role. The Commissioner should disclose sufficient information to the affected individual to enable them to engage the Tribunal effectively."
(a) On 7 April 2015 the Respondent determined to have its CCU attempt to identify any of its current or former officers who might have been involved in the disclosure of the information that had appeared in the press about the Emma Caldwell matter. This was not a case of the Respondent investigating some matter in which it had no interest of its own.
(b) The Respondent made no sufficient attempt to assess the proportionality in all the circumstances of seeking to access communications data in support of that enquiry.
(c) The Respondent had no coherent view as to what, if any, crime might have been committed by any person. It nonetheless determined to seek to acquire the communications data it desired by using s.22(2)(b) of RIPA.
(d) The Respondent had no intelligence case suggesting that the Claimant was involved in the disclosure of material to Mr Gallacher, not even that he had access to the material thought to have been disclosed. It nonetheless resolved to seek to acquire his communications data.
(e) The Respondent, and in particular its CCU, had been made aware by its own RIPA SRO in February 2015 of the relevant content of the new Code which was to come into force the following month.
(f) Mr Donaldson, one of the Respondent's Designated Persons for the purposes of s.22(2)(b) of RIPA, had been made fully aware of the relevant content of the Code as recently as 7 April 2015.
(g) Mr Donaldson was, according to IOCCO, "a knowledgeable and experienced officer".
(h) Consistently with that description, he recalled having been made aware of the relevant content of the Code when approached for advice by Mr Stitt of the CCU as to a prospective application for the acquisition of communications data on 16 April, and provided that content, and relative advice, to Mr Stitt.
(i) The Head of the Respondent's CCU was approached by Ms Smith, the RIPA SRO, on 16 April, she having been made aware that Mr Donaldson had been approached in relation to the acquisition of material which might attract the relevant provisions of the Code, and was told by him that the matter was under consideration and she would be reverted to for further advice.
(j) She was not reverted to before any of the applications was authorised and implemented.
(k) Mr Donaldson sought and received accurate advice from the CIU SPoC as to the ambit of the Code during the afternoon of 16 April.
(l) He sought clarification of the application of that advice to circumstances in which the investigation was aware of the likely source of information, and received (the correct) advice that that made no difference to the application of the Code.
(m) The clear purpose of the application relating to the Claimant which Mr Donaldson approved was to determine a journalist's source or the communications of those suspected to have been acting as intermediaries between a journalist and a suspected source.
(n) He did not acknowledge any of the obvious deficiencies present in the application, in particular in relation to its necessity and proportionality.
(o) He did not acknowledge that his involvement in advising how applications relating to the same enquiry should be worded and presented rendered him other than independent of the enquiry for the purposes of the Code.
(p) Without known reference to any other advice, Mr Donaldson approved the application for the acquisition of the Claimant's communication data on 17 April.
i) There is no case for compensation, in the light of the authorities of this Tribunal, and the Strasbourg authorities to which we have previously referred. He reminded us of our decisions in Mr and Mrs B v Department for Social Development IPT/09/11/C, [2011] UKIPTrib 09_11, Chatwani and Ors v National Crime Agency [2015] UKIPTrib 15_84_88-CH and the remedy decision in News Group Newspapers [2015] UKIPTrib 14_176-H, in which we made reference to a number of relevant authorities, and he also referred us to the small awards in Ernst v Belgium [2004] 39 EHRR 35.
ii) Judgment for a declaration that the obtaining of the Complainants' communications data was unlawful, as being contrary to s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, as read with Article 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, with consequent judgment for the Complainants, and an order that the authorisations in each of the Complainant's cases be quashed, was an effective remedy, and would "afford just satisfaction": it is clearly no small thing that there would be a public declaration that Police Scotland had acted unlawfully. In addition, the Respondent would either destroy all the data obtained as a result of the authorisations, or, insofar as further complaints or proceedings are to continue, retain them in safe custody for such purpose and delete them on subsequent written request.
i) The only way for this Tribunal to give an effective remedy for the Complainants is to hold its own hearing to resolve the question of whether the conduct of the Respondent was wilful or reckless, and to make full findings as to what occurred.
ii) Alternatively in any case it would not be sufficient for the Complainants to be left only with the complaints that have presently been made by them to Police Scotland (which have been adjourned or stayed pending this hearing). Particularly as Police Scotland is now all one body, even if at the time when Mr Gallacher had been investigating only Strathclyde Police was involved, the Complainants cannot be confident of an independent inquiry. There is a remedy available after such an inquiry, of a complaint to the Police Investigations & Review Commissioner ("PIRC"), but this, he submits, would be limited to an investigation by the PIRC as to how the complaints had been handled by Police Scotland (s35 of the Police Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006 as amended (the 2006 Act)), which, he submitted, would not enable the complaints to be reinvestigated; although the public website of the PIRC represents that on a review "the Commissioner will then examine all the evidence and reach a view whether the complaint was dealt with to a reasonable standard " and by s 35(7) and (11) the PIRC can require reconsideration, and, if so ordered, under her supervision. Given that the PIRC does not, on the face of it, have an originating jurisdiction, although she can, by s.33A(d) of the 2006 Act, "investigate other matters relating to the Authority or the Police Service where the Commissioner considers that it would be in the public interest to do so", Mr Sandison submitted that if the Tribunal was not able or willing to carry out its own enquiry then it should make an order directing the PIRC to carry out such an investigation. This, he submitted, was within the power of the Tribunal pursuant to s.67(7) of RIPA which reads:-
"… The Tribunal on determining any proceedings, complaint or reference shall have power to make any such award of compensation or other order as they think fit; and, without prejudice to the power to make rules under s.69(2)(h),the other orders that may be made by the Tribunal include-a) an order quashing or cancelling any warrant or authorisation; andb) an order requiring the destruction of any records of information which –
(i) has been obtained in exercise of any power conferred by a warrant or authorisation;(ii) is held by any public authority in relation to any person."
i) The question of whether the conduct of the Respondents was wilful or reckless is not relevant to this Tribunal. It was necessary for the Commissioner, in order for him to reach such a conclusion before the hurdle or trigger was met, by which IOCCO was obliged to notify the Complainants. The task for this Tribunal is to conclude whether there have been unlawful acts by the Respondents.
ii) The fact that IOCCO has itself carried out an investigation is relevant, not least because this Tribunal does have power under s.68(2) to require the Commissioner to provide the Tribunal with all such assistance as the Tribunal thinks fit (including that Commissioner's opinion as to any issue falling to be determined by the Tribunal). But in any event the Complainants, who are not content with the limited conclusion by IOCCO, are not prevented from pursuing their complaints, e.g. within the Police Scotland complaints system, to which we shall refer further below.
iii) Mr Sandison's submission is that the Tribunal should nevertheless proceed with a factual hearing, notwithstanding that the Tribunal is in the position, not least in the light of the facts set out in paragraph 20 above, to make, without further evidence or examination, a determination as to the unlawful conduct of the Respondent. This, in our judgment, is as unrealistic as it would be in the High Court if, after the bringing of a claim by a claimant, the defendant conceded the case and admitted liability. The claimant would in that case, as the Complainants have in this case, have succeeded. No further examination by the Tribunal is required. Our conclusion is that the Respondent acted unlawfully and in breach of the Code; and the Respondent is a public body, liable for the acts and omissions of its officers.
SCHEDULE (see paragraph 20)
(1) STATEMENT OF FACTS IN RESPECT OF STEVEN ADAMS
(a) On 7 April 2015 the Respondent determined to have its CCU attempt to identify any of its current or former officers who might have been involved in the disclosure of the information that had appeared in the press about the Emma Caldwell matter. This was not a case of the Respondent investigating some matter in which it had no interest of its own.(b) The Respondent made no sufficient attempt to assess the proportionality in all the circumstances of seeking to access communications data in support of that enquiry.
(c) The Respondent had no coherent view as to what, if any, crime might have been committed by any person. It nonetheless determined to seek to acquire the communications data it desired by using s.22(2)(b) of RIPA.
(d) The Respondent had no colourable intelligence case suggesting that the Claimant was involved in the direct or indirect disclosure of material to any journalist, not even that he had access to the material thought to have been disclosed. It nonetheless resolved to seek to acquire his communications data.
(e) The Respondent, and in particular its CCU, had been made aware by its own RIPA SRO in February 2015 of the relevant content of the new Code which was to come into force the following month.
(f) Mr Donaldson, one of the Respondent's Designated Persons for the purposes of s.22(2)(b) of RIPA, had been made fully aware of the relevant content of the Code as recently as 7 April 2015.
(g) Mr Donaldson was, according to the IoCC, "a knowledgeable and experienced officer".
(h) Consistently with that description, he recalled having been made aware of the relevant content of the Code when approached for advice by Mr Stitt of the CCU as to a prospective application for the acquisition of communications data on 16 April, and provided that content, and relative advice, to Mr Stitt.
(i) The Head of the Respondent's CCU was approached by Ms Smith, the RIPA SRO, on 16 April, she having been made aware that Mr Donaldson had been approached in relation to the acquisition of material which might attract the relevant provisions of the Code, and was told by him that the matter was under consideration and she would be reverted to for further advice.
(j) She was not reverted to before any of the applications was authorised and implemented.
(k) Mr Donaldson sought and received accurate advice from the CIU SPoC as to the ambit of the Code during the afternoon of 16 April.
(l) He sought clarification of the application of that advice to circumstances in which the investigation was aware of the likely source of information, and received (the correct) advice that that made no difference to the application of the Code.
(m) The clear purpose of the application relating to the Claimant which Mr Donaldson approved was to determine a journalist's source or the communications of those suspected to have been acting as intermediaries between a journalist and a suspected source.
(n) He did not acknowledge any of the obvious deficiencies present in the application, in particular in relation to its necessity and proportionality.
(o) He did not acknowledge that his involvement in advising how applications relating to the same enquiry should be worded and presented rendered him other than independent of the enquiry for the purposes of the Code.
(p) Without known reference to any other advice, Mr Donaldson approved the application for the acquisition of the Claimant's communication data on 22 April.
(2) STATEMENT OF FACTS IN RESPECT OF MR "O"
(a) On 7 April 2015 the Respondent determined to have its CCU attempt to identify any of its current or former officers who might have been involved in the disclosure of the information that had appeared in the press about the Emma Caldwell matter. This was not a case of the Respondent investigating some matter in which it had no interest of its own.(b) The Respondent made no sufficient attempt to assess the proportionality in all the circumstances of seeking to access communications data in support of that enquiry.
(c) The Respondent had no coherent view as to what, if any, crime might have been committed by any person. It nonetheless determined to seek to acquire the communications data it desired by using s.22(2)(b) of RIPA.
(d) The Respondent had no colourable intelligence case suggesting that the Claimant was involved in the direct or indirect disclosure of material to any journalist. It nonetheless resolved to seek to acquire his communications data.
(e) The Respondent, and in particular its CCU, had been made aware of the relevant content of the new Code by its own RIPA SRO in February 2015.
(f) Mr Donaldson, one of the Respondent's Designated Persons for the purposes of s.22(2)(b) of RIPA, had been made fully aware of the relevant content of the Code as recently as 7 April 2015.
(g) Mr Donaldson was, according to the IoCC, "a knowledgeable and experienced officer".
(h) Consistently with that description, he recalled having been made aware of the relevant content of the Code when approached for advice by Mr Stitt of the CCU as to a prospective application for the acquisition of communications data on 16 April, and provided that content, and relative advice, to Mr Stitt.
(i) The Head of the Respondent's CCU was approached by Ms Smith, the RIPA SRO, on 16 April, she having been made aware that Mr Donaldson had been approached in relation to the acquisition of material which might attract the relevant provisions of the Code, and was told by him that the matter was under consideration and she would be reverted to for further advice.
(j) She was not reverted to before any of the applications was authorised and implemented.
(k) Mr Donaldson sought and received accurate advice from the CIU SPoC as to the ambit of the Code during the afternoon of 16 April.
(l) He sought clarification of the application of that advice to circumstances in which the investigation was aware of the likely source of information, and received (the correct) advice that that made no difference to the application of the Code.
(m) The clear purpose of the application relating to the Claimant which Mr Donaldson approved was to determine a journalist's source or the communications of those suspected to have been acting as intermediaries between a journalist and a suspected source.
(n) He did not acknowledge any of the obvious deficiencies present in the application, in particular in relation to its necessity and proportionality.
(o) He did not acknowledge that his involvement in advising how applications relating to the same enquiry should be worded and presented rendered him other than independent of the enquiry for the purposes of the Code.
(p) Without known reference to any other advice, Mr Donaldson approved applications for the acquisition of the Claimant's communication data on 17 and 22 April.
Case Nos. IPT/15/602/CH, IPT/15/603/CH, IPT/15/613/CH
IN THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL
B E T W E E N:
Complainants
Respondent
UPON the trial of the remedy of the Complainants' claims
AND UPON related police complaints having been made about the conduct of the Respondent's officers
AND UPON the said complaints having been referred to the Chief Constable of Durham Constabulary for investigation
AND UPON the Respondent having undertaken that the Respondent will provide a reasoned decision on the determination of the investigation
AND UPON the Respondent agreeing to retain all the data obtained as a result of the Authorisations herein pending the outcome of the investigation and any related legal proceedings (but, in each of their cases, and subject to any obligation to retain the material pending the outcome of the investigation and any related legal proceedings, to delete the data relating to their case if a written request to the Respondent by the Complainant is made)
AND UPON hearing Craig Sandison QC for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Complainants, and the Fifth and Sixth Complainants in person and Jeremy Johnson QC for the Respondent
IT IS DECLARED THAT the obtaining of the Complainants' communications data was unlawful, it being contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as read with Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on the Rights
AND IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. There be judgment for the Complainants and a declaration as set out above.
2. The Authorisations in each of the Complainant's cases is quashed.
3. The Respondent shall pay the Fifth Complainant £10,000 in damages.
4. There be no further order for any financial remedy.
Dated this 8th day of August 2016