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Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) >> JM [2009] UKUT 145 (AAC) (29 July 2009) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/AAC/2009/145.html Cite as: [2009] UKUT 145 (AAC) |
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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER |
Appeal Nos. CIS/1366/2008 CH/1367/2008 |
Before: UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ROWLAND
Decision: The claimant's appeals are dismissed.
REASONS FOR DECISION
"A claimant shall be treated as possessing capital of which he has deprived himself for the purpose of securing entitlement to income support or increasing the amount of that benefit except …"
The other provisions are to similar effect although each refers to the purpose of securing entitlement to that particular benefit. Quite why depriving oneself of capital for the purpose of securing entitlement to any income-related benefit should not result in a person being treated as possessing capital when entitlement to any other benefit is being considered I am not sure but nothing arises in this case because the claimant plainly expected that entitlement to income support would lead to entitlement to the other benefits. Capital that a person is treated as possessing is known as "notional capital", as opposed to "actual capital".
"40. The effect of all these decisions is therefore that, if a claimant realised that one consequence of depriving himself of capital was that he might become entitled to jobseeker's allowance or income support and he nonetheless deprived himself of that capital, there arises the question whether obtaining benefit was a significant operative purpose of the deprivation. Because there will almost always be some other purpose as well, that question is determined by deciding whether, given his knowledge, it was reasonable in all the circumstances for him to act as he did, bearing in mind not only his obligation to tax payers to support himself, but also his obligations to other people. Moreover, insofar as his obligation to support himself is concerned, it is necessary to have regard to the long term as well as the short term.
41. This meets the problem caused by the use of the word "purpose" in the legislation in a context where it is possible to have more than one motive and where it is not always reasonable to assume that a person desires or intends the natural consequences of his actions. There is, in truth, no other practical test that could be applied. The test was clearly appropriate in relation to the supplementary benefit scheme, which appeared to confer an element of discretion on those making the decisions. I do not consider any different approach is intended under the present legislation, which must have been enacted with R(SB) 38/85 and R(SB) 40/85 well in mind. Although, in R(SB) 38/85, Mr Commissioner Hallett described the discretion in the supplementary benefit legislation as "unlimited", he qualified that by saying that it had to be exercised judicially and Mr Commissioner Monroe's view in R(SB) 40/85 was effectively that it was difficult to see how, once it had been decided that a claimant had deprived himself of a resource for the purpose of obtaining benefit, the discretion could properly be exercised in favour of the claimant, save to permit a non-statutory diminishing capital rule. Since the Tribunal of Commissioners has held in R(IS) 1/91 that even the non-statutory diminishing capital rule did not depend on the discretion, it seems to me that the discretion was more apparent than real and its removal has not made much practical difference. What the mandatory "shall" requires is merely due attention to the proper test of reasonableness for determining a person's intention, as explained in R(SB) 38/85 and R(SB) 40/85, with proper weight being given to the interests of the general body of tax payers and not just the interests of the claimant or his family and friends."
"With respect to my colleague, I consider that his reasoning is based on a misreading of the authorities and that his decision erroneously converts an evidentiary factor of reasonableness into a legal test and a subjective test of purpose into an objective test of reasonableness."
I am not persuaded. The statutory test is, of course, a subjective one but the requisite degree of subjectivity is obtained both because it is necessary always to prove that a claimant knew of the capital limit, at least in general terms, and therefore understood that a consequence of the expenditure would probably be entitlement to benefit (R(SB) 9/91, R(SB) 40/85) and because the claimant's personal situation will fall to be taken into account when regarding the reasonableness of his or her expenditure. The test of reasonableness is not, strictly speaking, a legal one but it is likely to be determinative in many cases once the required knowledge is proved because there are no other relevant considerations not subsumed within the assessment of the reasonableness of the expenditure. It is from the test of reasonableness that one infers whether the claimant intended to gain entitlement to benefit through the expenditure or merely knew that that would be the consequence of the expenditure. Mr Commissioner Jacobs suggests that a feckless claimant may escape the effects of the legislation because he or she simply gives no thought as to what will happen when capital has all been spent even though he or she knows of the capital limit, whereas a claimant who knows full well that benefit will become payable will not. That, I suggest is not an attractive distinction and cannot have been intended by the legislator. A person who knows of the capital limit must be taken to realise that benefit may be payable if he or she disposes of capital above that limit and to intend that consequence if the expenditure is unreasonable.
"Ordinarily I would not have accepted £28,306.00 expenditure on a caravan, in my opinion a less expensive caravan could have been purchased. However I have accepted the total cost of the caravan purchase in my reassessment of the capital, due to the fact that including this expense has not reduced [the claimant's] capital below £16,000."
That is not a very satisfactory approach because, while it is true that it made no difference to the claimant's immediate entitlement. it affected the diminishing capital calculation and therefore the date from which he would requalify for benefit. In those circumstances, it was not necessary for the tribunal to explain why it preferred the Secretary of State's approach.
MARK ROWLAND
29 July 2009