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England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Fairford Water Ski Club Ltd v Cohoon & Ors [2020] EWHC 290 (Comm) (28 February 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2020/290.html Cite as: [2020] EWHC 290 (Comm) |
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BUSINESS & PROPERTY COURTS AT BRISTOL
CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT
2 Redcliff Street Bristol BS1 6GR |
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B e f o r e :
(Sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
____________________
FAIRFORD WATER SKI CLUB LIMITED |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) CRAIG RONALD COHOON (2) SCOTT RICHARD COHOON (3) JANE LOUISE COHOON (4) CRAIG COHOON WATERSPORTS (A FIRM) |
Defendants |
____________________
HUGH SIMS QC and KATIE GIBB (instructed by Harrison Clark Rickerbys Limited) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 7th to 11th and 17th October and 29 November 2019
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
HH JUDGE RUSSEN QC:
(1) Introduction and Background: paras. 2 to 25
(2) The Proceedings: paras. 26 to 46
(3) Legal Principles: paras. 47 to 158
(4) Witnesses: paras. 159 to 190
(5) The Claims
a) Management Fees and Charges: paras. 191 to 307
b) Unexplained Payments (presumed to be for a defendant's benefit): paras. 308 to 330
c) Specific Payments (alleged to be for a defendant's benefit): paras. 331 to 386
d) Payments Not Collected or Not Accounted For: paras. 387 to 415
e) Property-related Dealings: paras. 416 to 530
(6) Conclusion: para. 531
(1) Introduction and Background
(2) The Proceedings
(3) Legal Principles
The Pleaded Duties
(1) under section 171, the duty to act in accordance with the Club's constitution and to exercise the powers given to him as a director only for the purposes for which they are conferred;
(2) under section 172, the duty to act in a way the director considers in good faith would be most likely to promote the success of the Club for the benefit of its members as a whole. This duty is to be exercised having regard to the matters non-exhaustively set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 172(1) but none of those was suggested by either party to have any particular impact upon the over-arching duty;
(3) under section 174, the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. Again, the partly objective and partly subjective determination of the standard to be observed by the particular director, as required by section 174(2), was not suggested to have any particular resonance in this case; and
(4) under section 175, the duty to avoid any situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company.
(1) Section 171: the duty to act for proper purposes. They submitted that a director's liability is fault-based and a director should not be liable unless he knows that he is acting for an improper purpose or in breach of his fiduciary duty. They accepted, as Mr Atkins had pointed out, that this means either for purposes which the director knows are improper or where he has knowledge of the facts which make the purpose improper without necessarily being conscious that it is an improper one or involves a breach: see Madoff Securities International Ltd v Raven [2013] EWHC 3147 (Comm) at [195]-[200], per Popplewell J. The defendants' counsel said that, on a proper analysis few, if any, of the Club's heads of claim fell under this category of alleged breach.
(2) Section 172: the duty to act in good faith and in the Club's best interests. They said that the duty involved directors exercising their discretion bona fide in what they consider, not what a court may consider, to be in the interests of the company: Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd, [1942] Ch 304, 306, per Lord Greene MR. The test is a subjective one and the relevant question is whether the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the interests of the company. The issue is as to the director's state of mind: see Regentcrest Plc v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80 at 120, per Jonathan Parker J. Counsel said it follows that a director can act unreasonably and mistakenly, and will not be liable for a breach of his fiduciary duty to the company, so long as he was honest in his mistaken belief. They cited the decision of Mr Jonathan Crow, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, in Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v Scattergood [2003] 1 BCLC 598, at [89], who said that fiduciary duties are concerned with concepts of honesty and loyalty, not with competence. They further said that risk is an inherent part of any commercial activity and, as Popplewell J observed in Madoff v Raven, "Corporate management often requires the exercise of judgment on which opinions may legitimately differ, and requires some give and take....". The submission was that, on an analysis of them, most of the heads of claim were pursued in relation to this duty and the onus of establishing that the director did not act in the best interests of the company was upon the Club: The Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [2008] WASC 239 at [4596].
(3) Section 174: the duty to exercise skill, care and diligence. The defendants' counsel submitted that similar principles to those governing section 172 applied to the allegation of negligence, save that the standard of care is to be determined not only subjectively by reference to his particular knowledge, skill and experience but also on general, objective criteria: see D'Jan of London Ltd, Copp v D'Jan [1993] BCC 646, 648D-E, and, now, the language of section 174(2). They said that this duty was invoked by the Club in relation to the claims covered by Items 17 to 21 and 24 on the Scott Schedule.
(4) Section 175: the duty to avoid conflicts. Mr Sims QC and Ms Gibb said this encompassed two strands of the duty upon a fiduciary to account to his principal, frequently labelled the 'no conflict rule' and the 'no profit rule', each of which must be considered separately: see Don King Productions Inc v. Warren [2000] Ch 291 and In Plus Group Ltd v. Pyke [2002] 2 BCLC 201, 220. They said the emphasis of the Club's claim was under the latter but, in relation to the former, a fiduciary might act for more than one principal with the informed consent of each: see the observations of Millet LJ in Bristol and West BS v. Mothew [1998] Ch 1, at 18. Such consent may be express or implied: see Kelly v. Cooper [1993] AC 205. However, as they recognised, even if a fiduciary is properly acting for two principals with potentially conflicting interests, he must act in good faith in the interests of each and must not act with the intention of furthering the interests of one principal to the prejudice of those of the other (or, in other words, act so as to infringe the duty of good faith owed under section 172 to each). There is no breach of fiduciary duty in acting for both, for as long as the conflict between the interests of the principals is only a potential one and does not operate to undermine that fundamental duty of loyalty. As for the 'no profit rule', it applies even where the fiduciary has acted in good faith in making a profit through the use of his fiduciary position: see Regal Hastings v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, 144.
(1) It is no answer to an alleged breach of the duty under section 171 for the directors responsible for the relevant decision to say they were acting in the best interests of the company: see Regentcrest Plc at [123]. Observance of the duty embodied in section 172 will not excuse what is otherwise a breach of section 171.
(2) Although the duty under section 172 is expressed in subjective terms and not so as to impose an objective standard of managerial competence (which is covered by the separate duty under section 174) that does not mean that the court will not be prepared to doubt the director's honesty and professed support for the company's best interests where substantial detriment has resulted from his act or omission: see Regentcrest at [120]. The fact that his actions have caused harm to the company, and may objectively be said to have been unreasonable, might support the conclusion that in fact his alleged belief that he was acting to promote the interests of the company was not one honestly held at the time.
(3) The legal burden of establishing a breach of that duty (under section 172) is upon the party asserting the breach and, allowing for any shift in the evidential burden, it is not for the director to vindicate his own position: see Charles Forte Investments v Amanda [1964] Ch 240, 260-1. However, where his decision is one that no reasonable director could have considered to be in the best interests of the company then reliance upon his own suggested contrary belief will not avoid a finding of breach: compare Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch), [53], per Warren J.
(4) The language of section 175 reflects the scope of the fiduciary duty applicable to a trustee which (subject to the fully informed consent of the beneficiaries) applies to potential as well as actual conflicts of interest including those in respect of deemed corporate opportunities on Keech v Sandford reasoning. The language of section 175(7) covers both the 'no profit' and the 'no conflict' rules. The duty under section 175 will not be infringed where the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest or if the matter has been authorised by the directors: see section 175(4).
(5) Section 177 of the 2006 Act separately addresses conflicts of interest arising under a transaction or arrangement made between a director and the company. [For completeness, I note that section 182 (which is not one of the general duties imposed by Chapter 2 of Part 10 and which carries potential criminal consequences rather than civil ones) imposes an obligation to declare any such interest in an existing transaction or arrangement of the company unless the director concerned complied with section 177 before the company entered into it.]
(6) It is because the 'no conflict' rule extends to potential conflicts of interest under a transaction between the director and the company, even if the transaction may be beneficial to the company, that the company's articles will usually make provision for a director (who might otherwise be held accountable under section 177) to formally declare his interest to the board. In the present case the Club's Articles did so by incorporating clause 84(1) of Table A of the Companies Act 1948, which required disclosure in accordance with what was section 199 of that Act (the predecessor of section 317 of the Companies Act 1985 ("the 1985 Act") upon which the Club relied in support of its challenge to the Management Agreement with Watersports and to which I return below).
Alternate Directors
"I did not know what was expected of me as a director. As far as I was aware, I was only a director in case Craig or Scott could not attend a meeting."
Section 180 and the Club's Articles
Section 317 of the 1985 Act
"a full and frank declaration by the director, not of "an" interest, but of the precise nature of the interest he holds, and, when his claim to the validity of a contract or arrangement depends upon it, he must show that he has in letter and spirit complied with the section and article to like effect: see Lord Cairns in Liquidators of Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman (1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 189, 205."
(1) compliant disclosure in accordance clause 84(1) (and section 180(4)(b)) requires the director to have disclosed the nature and extent of his interest under the proposed transaction under consideration. In other words, full disclosure so that the other directors can see and understand the nature of that interest. If the interest involves the company making a payment to him (or to another party in which he has an interest) then the amount of that payment needs to be disclosed;
(2) even if a director cannot escape liability under section 177 of the 2006 Act (or the equivalent fiduciary duty upon which the section is based) by establishing that he acted in accordance with clause 84(1), by making adequate disclosure to the board, he may still be able to do so by establishing that the company's shareholders gave their approval to the transaction in accordance with the principle now expressly recognised in section 180(4)(a); and
(3) if the director is not able to establish circumstances which bring him within the relieving provisions of section 180(4) the result is that the transaction is voidable and he is accountable to the company for any profit he has made. But those consequences are subject to the application of any other potential bar upon the remedy of rescission and the power to relieve the director from liability under what is now section 1157 of the 2006 Act. In relation to any setting aside of the Management Agreement, the defendants raise (in the context of section 1157) the point that the court may in certain circumstances make a fair allowance for remuneration of a fiduciary who has acted in breach of duty: see Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, at 104, 112. The consequences are also subject to any limitation defence that the director may be able to raise in response to his alleged accountability. Issues of limitation are addressed below.
Section 190 of the 2006 Act
Burden of Proof: "Unexplained Payments"
"In the circumstances, I agree with Mr Miles [Mr Robert Miles QC sitting as a deputy High Court Judge in Gillman & Soame v Young [2007] EWHC 1245 (Ch), at [82]] that, once it is shown that a company director has received company money, it is for him to show that the payment was proper. In a similar way, it seems to me that, where debit entries have been correctly been made to a director's loan account, it must be incumbent on the director to justify credit entries on the account. That conclusion makes the more sense when it is remembered that the director: (a) will have been (one of those) responsible for the management of the company's business, and (b) will have had a responsibility for ensuring that proper accountings records were kept (see eg ss 386-389 of the Companies Act 2006)."
"107. Counsel for [the Club] cross examined [Scott] on Thursday 17 October about how the [defendants] had been able to explain some of the spreadsheet payments when the narrative was not provided in the pink slip [T/6/43/1]. It was noted by Counsel for [the defendants] that certain invoices which supported the detailed breakdown had been disclosed and were available, but for some reason neither side had chosen to include them in the trial bundle (though hard copies were available at Court to show the same). Further, [Scott] clarified that some comments were from his recollection e.g. 'ITT Flight' was for sewage treatment on site; or QB entries jogged his memory."
Limitation
"(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action
(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or
(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use."
And section 21(3) states:
"Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by another provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the right of action accrued.
For the purposes of this subsection, the right of action shall not be treated as having accrued to any beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property until the interest fell into possession."
"The distinction for the purposes of section 32(2) is between intentional wrongdoing on the one hand and negligence or inadvertent wrongdoing on the other: Cave v Robinson Jarvis & Rolf [2003] 1 AC 384 at [17] and [25] per Lord Millett and at [58] and [60] per Lord Scott."
Section 1157 of the 2006 Act
Witnesses
(5) The Claims
(a) Management Fees and Charges
The Annual Management Charge
"Following earlier board discussions, and the proceedings of the recent AGM, CC has invoiced the club for a £10,000 management fee for 2006. For 2007 the club will charge the ski school £20,000 rental for the water usage and the old pub buildings, and CC will charge a management fee of £35,000. New contracts in respect of each of these arrangements are being prepared by the company's solicitor."
"[Mr Hamilton] and [Mr Garner] agreed that the arrangements between the ski school should represent fair market and arm's length terms. It was also agreed that the affairs of the club had become substantially more complex in recent years, and that the current level of management fee was no longer realistic."
"it was concluded that a net figure of £15,000 to £20,000 would be paid for the management of the site. These will be effective from 2007."
"A site management fee of £5,000 (2005 £5000) and a log cabin development fee of £Nil (2005 £20,000) was payable to C Cohoon for the year ."
"Included in turnover is an amount of £20,000 (2006 £13,992) received from Cohoon Water Ski School for rental of the buildings and use of the lake and associated facilities.
A site management fee of £50,000 (2006 £5,000) was payable to Cohoon Water Ski for the year. £20,000 was outstanding at the year end and this is included within Trade Creditors .."
"During the 12 months ending 31 December 2011, Fairford Waterski Club Limited received £20,000 in rental income, paid £35,000 management fees and purchased goods and services to the value of £12,051 from Craig Cohoon Waterski & Pro shop, a partnership operated by Craig Cohoon and Scott Cohoon."
Watersports' Counterclaim
The Lodge Development Fee
"This is a claim for £50,000, being a one off payment made by the Club to Craig in 2007. The Club accepts that this falls to be dealt with as part of the annual management fee (see item 14 above)."
" . A project management fee for CC was discussed, with the possibility of this being in the form of an option on a Cabin site to be explored."
"It was further resolved that the previously agreed arrangements between the company and CC relating to the supervision of the development and sale of the Log Cabin's [sic], should be documented at the same time."
(b) Unexplained payments (presumed to be for the benefit of a defendant)
(c) Specific payments by the Club alleged to be for the benefit of a defendant
Advertisements
Cheshire Mouldings
Black Boat Repairs
Re-Stain Lodge
Swimming Pool and Boat Lift
"I made a note of what I just bear with me a second. My personal view on [document D1/53]: is item number 1, I was not sure. Item number 2, I was not sure. Item number 3 was Fairford Waterski Club's. So was item number 4, 5, and 6. 7 could possibly have been a Cohoon Watersports, along with item number 8. There does not appear to be a number 9, for some reason. Number 10 was Fairford Waterski Club. And number 11, I was not sure."
One Month's Salary
Telephone Bills
Electricity and Water Charges
Wakeboard Jumps
(d) Payments not collected for the Club or collected but not paid to the Club
Guest Fees
Membership Fees
"The reason why we have done this is we went back to all the data right from the beginning, so when we took over the club the data was scarce to say the least. When we asked Scott for the date that we can calculate all the fees on, he said he walked round the site and just made notes, then came up with his database which was in his head."
(e) Property Related Dealings
Plot 11
"Management Invoice
Work carried out for the sale of lodges based on the North shore
Of the lake 105
Total cost £21,400
Craig Cohoon"
"I imagine that the company has already passed a resolution in connection with the proposed grant of this lease, and that, for the company's part, there are no other formalities outstanding. Please let me know, however, if you have any queries about this. If your parents require any such advice in their capacity as directors, then naturally they will need to seek this from their own solicitors."
"As a result of the transaction, I had now lost the right to Plot 3, had a received a cheque for £24,000 but paid the same amount, via solicitors, into the Club's account, so was essentially back in the same position I was before the Club agreed to assign Plot 3 to me in respect of my project management services. In order to redress the imbalance another plot (Plot 11) was assigned to me. However, again as there was no urgency on my part to put a lodge on the plot, it was not until later that I decided to take Plot 11."
"Plot 3 was sold to Mr Nutt for £49,000 by way of a cheque for £24,000, cash of £10,000 and a caravan worth £15,000. However, the release payable into the Claimant to satisfy the bank came from the First Defendant's own funds, therefore although the management fee was discharged, the First Defendant was £24,000 out of pocket and this amount was effectively a loan to Claimant ."
"Well, all I can say is that I took plot 3 and then I bought, with the money that was owed to me from the company, not the 50 the 50,000, the 24,000, purchased plot 11. In actual fact, it was only for 21,400 but it should have been 24,000."
and
"So basically, I bought plot 11 for 24,000"
(1) Craig's evidence that plots were generally selling for at least £50,000 in 2014 and 2015. He did talk also about much lower sale prices (£35,000 for Plot 18 and £30,638 for Plot 10) but those were sales in 2008 when, as he explained, the Club was struggling to sell plots in the midst of the recession. Consistent with that evidence was an email sent by him to the Club's solicitors in December 2015 reported that Plot 16 had been sold for £75,000, Plot 15 for £50,000 (to Mr Godden) and Plot 13 for £60,000. Although Craig's email referred to the sale of "lodges", it is clear from his witness statement that he was reporting the prices at which the plots had been or were being sold. His witness statement referred to Mr Godden paying £50,000 for his plot.
(2) The fact that the plan attached to the lease of Plot 11 showed it to be a superior plot on the Site, on the north side of the Lake, and not so overlooked or cramped as some corner plots, with a longer frontage and more spacious perimeter than all its neighbours apart from Plot 14. Plots 16, 15 and 13 mentioned above were said by Mr Atkins to be clearly inferior to Plot 11. Therefore, he submitted, one would expect the value of Plot 11 to have been substantially in excess of that figure;
(3) Ms Owens' evidence was that Plot 16 was sold in 2016 for £70,000 (£5,000 less than Craig had reported in the December 2015 email as being the sale price on which a £10,000 deposit had been taken) and that Plot 9 was sold for £84,000 in 2018. The Site plan indicated that Plot 16 is inferior to Plot 11 as it is significantly smaller (Ms Owens said that its decking area is just 20% of Plot 11's); it is sited on an angle with an awkward triangular perimeter; it is overlooked from the front by both its neighbours (Plots 15 and 17); and it has no boat jetty and no space to put one. The Club said that Plot 9 is closer to Plot 11 in amenity, but it is smaller and has no boat jetty although there is space to put one. Mr Atkins said that, even allowing for the distance from the valuation date of January 2014, the later sales suggest a value for Plot 11 substantially in excess of the requisite £52,207. He said no rise in market values could account for prices so much higher than that on clearly inferior plots just two and four years later; and
(4) Craig's own sale of the lodge on Plot 3 to Mr Nutt for £50,000 in December 2011, the plot element of which was submitted to have been around £35,000. Plot 3 is a corner plot shared with Plot 2 and the Club said that at couple of years later Plot 11 was likely to be more valuable by a significant margin. I note that Craig's own witness statement had referred to his earlier acceptance of the value of Plot 3 being £50,000 for the purposes of satisfying his lodge development fee.
(1) The Club was not even selling the plot with the lodge in situ. Craig purchased the lodge which had been placed on the plot separately from Mr Lomas. However, I am not sure this is a persuasive point because most of the Club's suggested comparable values (save that of Plot 3 when transferred to Mr Nutt in 2011) related to the sale price of the plot and not also the lodge upon it;
(2) The sale of Plot 16 for £70,000 (or, perhaps, 75,000) reflected its sale at a premium as, with Plot 17, it was one of the last two plots left for purchase and as Craig said in evidence "so as a property developer, when you build 10 properties, the last two are where you make all your money because it's all paid for and you can sit there and wait and get a premium price, which is what we probably did.";
(3) Ms Owens' lodge at Plot 18 sits on the biggest plot and she paid only £35,000 for them in 2008. Mr and Mrs Yarrow also paid £30,638 for theirs on Plot 10 in 2008. However, I note that in referring to these sales prices at the time of the global recession Craig said "T]he main explanation for these low prices was that again the company was vastly overdrawn and we were in a dire state and I didn't have any choice but to take those prices. I didn't want to but that was I had to do that to survive". I also note that, in August 2008 and therefore during the global crash, Mr Lee was given a 2 year option to acquire a long lease of his licensed plot for a premium of £50,000 (by an addendum to his Licence Agreement which was considered in the context of Item 20 on the Scott Schedule).
(4) Plot 3 was the best plot for a slalom skier (as Mr Nutt was) because of its location on the lake;
(5) In 2016, Plot 12 sold for £40,000 (although the lease stated a premium of £24,000) and Mr Godden paid £50,000 for Plot 15 in 2017. These prices did not support the Club's contention that Plot 11 was worth more than £50,000 in 2014; and
(6) Plots sold at different times for varying amounts and Craig agreed a cut in price if necessary. Craig's evidence was that the price of £24,000 (as he suggested it to be) for Plot 11 was a fair price for a plot that had not previously sold with Mr Lomas' lodge on it. However, I note that part of Craig's explanation for it being a fair price was that he "had been owed the money for a number of years, so I thought it was perfectly fair to do the transaction." This was a reference to Craig's alternative position that his lodge development fee had not been satisfied by the agreement that he could have Plot 3 (reflected in his later receipt of the proceeds from the sale to Mr Nutt). I have rejected that suggestion.
"At the outset, the cost of a lodge was, from memory, between £40,000 to £60,000 and to purchase a long lease for the land to put a lodge on was £50,000 to £80,000."
Meyer Lodge
Mobile Home and Plot Sales
(1) £2,000 in respect of the Bolton transaction;
(2) £2,000 in respect of the Blackmore transaction;
(3) £3,000 in respect of the Barter transaction;
(4) £2,000 in respect of the Bryan transaction;
(5) £5,000 in respect of the Bellgrove transaction;
(6) £1,500 in respect of the Hoborough transaction; and
(7) £1,500 in respect of the Telling transaction.
Lodge Commission
(1) In the case of Mr Overton, he took out a lease on termination of his licence and so the commission was not payable. Craig said he decided not to charge Mr Overton commission because he knew he would buy the plot within two years. Scott said that when Mr Overton acquired the licence he had already intimated he was interested in converting to a long lease (he referred to the purchase then being delayed due to family reasons). Therefore, it was decided not to charge him commission but to encourage the purchase of the lease in the interests of continuing the Club's income stream through ground rent.
(2) In the case of Mr Johnston, Craig had decided not to charge him a commission as incoming licensee of a plot as the outgoing licensee was in financial trouble and he wanted to facilitate the purchase. Mr Johnston then transferred his plot to Mr Yarrow without telling the Club and so the chance to charge Mr Yarrow any commission was lost.
(3) In the case of Mr Yarrow, he sold his plot to Mr Ormiston quickly after he had bought it and so again the chance to charge commission was lost.
(4) In the case of Mr Ormiston, he is still a licensee on the Site. In fact, the Club says it has now recovered commission from Mr Ormiston's successor (which I assume means a family member rather than a third party purchaser who would have separately liable) so that this part of the claim is not pursued.
(5) In the case of Scott, he sold his lodge to someone who then took a lease and so no commission was payable.
(6) In the case of Mr Nutt, he took over his plot from Craig and, since no licence was involved, no commission was payable. The Club has since accepted this to be a good reason.
"(d) Before we issue the new Licence Agreement to your buyer we will charge him a commission of not exceeding 15% of the Fair Market Value of the lodge (plus Value Added Tax or any similar tax if appropriate) unless your buyer is a Family Member. In case of a Family Member the buyer from the Family Member shall pay us commission not exceeding 15% of the price actually paid on resale (plus VAT if appropriate) to a non Family Member.
(e) Apart from the commission payable by the buyer we will not make any other charges .."
"financial times were very pressing .. in the 2008, '09, '10 era and we felt we were getting, you know, we could have ended up with an empty plot, which obviously we certainly didn't want, therefore, at the time when finances were tight, we were fortunate to find somebody to move in, carry on and keep paying rent."
Club Insurance
Electricity and Water for Shower Block
Rental for Shower Block and Office
(6) Conclusion