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	England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Dowson & Ors v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police (Rev 1) [2010] EWHC 2612 (QB) (20 October 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2010/2612.html Cite as: [2010] EWHC 2612 (QB)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE DISTRICT REGISTRY

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		20 October 2010

CONTENTS

PART 1	Para
INTRODUCTION	1
PART II
A SUMMARY OF THE BACKGROUND AND ISSUES	2
PART III
THE EVENTS IN OUTLINE
July 2002	12
August	22
October	30
November	48
December	61
January 2003	70
February	76
March	87
May	90
July	104
Subsequent History	112
PART IV
THE LAW	125
PART V
THE TRIAL
The hearing	143
Issues of credibility	145
General impression of witnesses	153
PART VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
JD1	162
BD1 & NT2	177
BD6 & BD7	185
BD2 & BD3	190
BD4	195
GS6	199
GS7, GS8, BD11 & MH4	203
GS9	216
JD4	220
BD5	225
BD15	230
MH7	234
BD22	235
JD2	242
SD6	245
NT8	249
NT11	251
NT12	255
JD6	257
NT13	260
NT14	264
NT15, SD7, MH* & JD7	272
Summary	276
PART VII
CAUSATION	280
Mr Dowson	285
Mr Dunn	288
Mr Stewart	290
Mr Dixon	293
Mr Thompson	295
Mr Hoggins	298
PART VIII
POSTSCRIPT	298
PART IX
SUMMARY	299

Mr Justice Simon:

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

1. These proceedings consist of 6 linked claims made by police officers of Northumbria Police against the Chief Constable under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ('the Act'). The allegations centre on the actions of Detective Chief Inspector Bob Pallas from July 2002 until July 2003; and the basis of the claim is that his actions amounted to harassment of officers under his command for which the Defendant is vicariously liable.

PART II

A SUMMARY OF THE BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

2. Some of the witnesses have retired since the relevant events and others have been promoted. It is therefore convenient to refer to all the police officers (other than the Claimants) by the rank they held at the time.
3. In 2002 the Force Crime Department of the Northumbria Police was headed by D/Ch/Supt Christopher Machell. Within this Department were two teams: Crime Team North (CTN) based at Morpeth, and Crime Team South (CTS) based at Sunderland. These two Crime Teams were headed by D/Supt Greg Vant.
4. Each of CTN and CTS consisted of three teams, dealing with major crime, surveillance and stolen motor vehicles. CTN, like CTS, was managed by an officer with the rank of Detective Chief Inspector. In addition each Crime Team had two Detective Inspectors, a number of Detective Sergeants, as well as Detective Constables and other support staff.
5. The two Crime Teams were tasked with investigating serious crimes which transcended local Area Commands and which might extend beyond the boundaries of the Northumbria Police Force. Their workload included large scale drugs supply, firearm offences, armed robbery and similar serious and organised crime. These might involve lengthy and detailed investigations.
6. Until January 2002 the DCI in charge at CTN was DCI Ian Stephenson and the Detective Inspector in charge of the Major Crime Team within CTN was one of the Claimants, DI Bruce Dowson. In January 2002 DCI Stephenson was promoted and left CTN. DCI Pallas replaced him. Because he was involved in a major investigation in London, DCI Pallas was unable to take up his post immediately, and it was not until early July 2002 that he became the active DCI at CTN. In the meantime, and from January until July 2002, Mr Dowson had 'acted up', in other words he had taken on the responsibilities of the DCI while retaining the rank of DI.
7. Mr Dowson's responsibility as DI within CTN included the Operational Support and Development Unit (OSDU), whose work involved intelligence gathering, including the handling of what had once been known as Police Informants, but are now referred to as Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHISs). Detective Sergeant Gordon Stewart, another Claimant in this action, was the DS in charge of the OSDU. Among the other officers in that unit were DC Nick Thompson and DC John Dixon (Claimants in the action); and DC Richie Bloomfield and DC Paul Miller, whose claims were struck out. Two of the remaining Claimants, DC Mick Hoggins and DS Steven Dunn, were also members of the Major Crime Team at CTN. DI George Taylor was the other DI in CTN and his duties broadly covered those not carried out by Mr Dowson.
8. The six Claimants claim that from the moment he arrived in July 2002, DCI Pallas adopted a hostile and critical attitude, that he harassed each of them on the basis that they were part of Mr Dowson's 'team' or 'clique' and that this harassment continued until each of them had left CTN by July 2003.
9. Although it will be necessary to consider 30 detailed allegations of harassment it is convenient to summarise the general nature of the allegations at this stage.
10. Some complaints are about instructions which required them to act contrary to the law or incompatibly with the standards of behaviour expected of a member of the Force. There are other complaints that DCI Pallas covered up his own shortcomings by blaming the Claimants for his own failings; and in doing so accused the Claimants of lying or failing in their duty. There are also complaints of vulgar abuse, particularly in front of subordinates. There are other complaints of unjustified and otherwise demeaning criticisms made by DCI Pallas which were intended to undermine individual Claimants and which he would have known would be repeated to them. There are further complaints that that the Claimants suffered further consequences of his harassment in the treatment of their formal complaints of bullying and harassment against him under the Northumbria Force Grievance Procedure. It is also alleged that these complaints were rejected and that the Claimants were removed from CTN because senior Officers accepted DCI Pallas's untruthful denials of misconduct.
11. In order to understand the claims it will be necessary to explain in more detail the events that followed the arrival of DCI Pallas in early July 2002 and some of the operations undertaken by the Major Crime Team at CTN.

PART III

THE EVENTS IN OUTLINE

July 2002

12. DCI Pallas took over operational command of CTN on 1 July 2002. At this stage Mr Dixon was one of the CHIS handlers in the OSDU at CTN. CHISs are important resources for the Police since they can provide information about criminal activity. The handling of CHISs is now subject to a rigorous regime of oversight designed to ensure both the safety of the CHIS and that information provided or activity undertaken by the CHIS is properly documented for the purpose of the Prosecution's Disclosure obligation in any criminal proceedings.
13. At approximately 1800 hours on 4 July Mr Dixon received information from an active CHIS ('AB') in relation to two police officers: Police Constables Graham Brown and EF. The information was recorded on a Fib 3 form, whose relevant parts are set out in a Confidential Appendix to this judgment. The 4 July Fib 3 form is an important document because it is contended by Mr Dixon that he handed a copy of the form to DCI Pallas and that, in effect, DCI Pallas ignored it, later blaming Mr Dixon for failing to tell him about its contents. This gives rise to a complaint of harassment (JD1). DCI Pallas's evidence was that he was never given the Fib 3 form and was never told about its contents, at least in so far as there was a suggestion that Constable EF was corrupt.
14. It appears that DCI Pallas's first official day in the office as the head of CTN was Monday 8 July; and on that day he addressed a meeting of the CTN personnel.
15. It is common ground that either at this meeting or at another meeting soon after his arrival, DCI Pallas made a remark about shaven-headed detectives from Newcastle North. What exactly was said, as well as its context and tone, is in issue. Both Mr Dowson and Mr Thompson were shaven-headed and had previously been stationed at Newcastle North police station. This gives rise to allegation BD1 and NT2.
16. It is the Claimants' case that from almost the moment he arrived at CTN, DCI Pallas adopted an unreasonable and oppressive attitude towards Mr Dowson; and that this is evidenced by notes at the back of DCI Pallas's diary recording that Mr Dowson was out on surveillance duties on 8, 9 and 10 July. One of the specific allegations which is made on behalf of Mr Dowson (BD5) is that DCI Pallas was openly hostile and belittling to him at the Daily Meetings and the weekly Intelligence Meetings, and undermined his authority in front of junior officers. Much later, Mr Dowson gave a description of what he complained about.

From the outset … DCI Pallas was negative and became very much autocratic … He commented that our operations took 'too long' and he would be looking for much quicker, short term jobs. In a nutshell he criticised what we had been doing and what we were about to do. Our strategies and tactics had been directed and approved by me and his behaviour at the time I put down to stamping his authority. His behaviour and comments, however, were hasty and negative and had an immediate effect on officers present at meetings … In the presence of many officers DCI Pallas constantly criticised my decisions, policies, strategies and undermined my position as [DI] within the Major Crime Team.

17. Although written in retrospect, Mr Dowson's observations highlight an important aspect of the case. Both sides agreed that where there were differences of opinion about police operations (strategies and tactics), these had to be resolved with the Senior Officer's view prevailing. For this reason it was common ground that DCI Pallas was entitled to question and to change previous strategic and tactical decisions made by Mr Dowson during the time that he was acting-up as the DCI. By the end of the trial the Claimants had, in my view rightly, abandoned complaints based on what were on proper analysis stark differences of opinion on operational matters.
18. In 2002 the Northumbria Force used Personal and Development Reviews ('PDRs') as a means to assist an individual police officer's professional development. PDR forms were based on the principle of self-assessments prepared by the Officer setting out his or her targets and priorities. The PDR forms were intended to provide evidence showing the extent to which those targets and priorities had been met. The PDR form also provided for comments by line managers and for the award of marks out of 4. It will be necessary to consider the controversial issue of marking later in this judgment.
19. On 22 July DCI Pallas made an entry on Mr Dowson's PDR form,

You need to develop your ability to manage and develop staff by providing performance feedback using PDR ...

DCI Pallas had noticed that two of the Sergeants in the Major Crime Team had PDR forms which were not up to date. In his view, they should have had contemporaneous entries evidencing the work they were carrying out and Mr Dowson should have been providing feedback on the entries as their line-manager.

20. Mr Dowson was displeased both by the nature of the comment and the lack of consultation with him before it was made. On the same day he made his own entry in his PDR form,:

Noted the above. As stated to you at the time of this discussion, my gradings and comments relating to my D/Sgts' PDRs are evidenced by the fact that I work very closely operationally with them. This way I see first-hand what their skills and abilities are and it is this evidence which has provided the basis for grading/appraisal. Nevertheless I will endeavour to review more frequently but fail to see how a written comments or act leads to better management/development than verbal.

This entry highlights a clear difference of approach between the two Officers: Mr Dowson worked closely with his Detective Sergeants on operations and felt that this enabled him to observe their skills and abilities. DCI Pallas had formed the view that Mr Dowson spent too much time on operations and that the PDR form required written entries which provided the required evidence. This was one of a number of established CTN practices which DCI Pallas disapproved of.

21. On 23 July DCI Pallas went on leave and returned on 30 July

August

22. In early August there was a meeting at which 'tactical losses' were discussed. The details of the issue are referred to in the Confidential Appendix. Ultimately Mr Pallas's view about this practice prevailed, but the way in which he handled the matter gives rise to allegations of harassment [BD6 and 7] since it is said that DCI Pallas accused Mr Dowson of carrying out a surveillance operation which was 'unlawful and illegal'.
23. On 14 August there was a meeting of a number of officers within CTN to discuss an operation which later became Operation Halogen. The operation eventually included investigations into criminality involving the running of brothels in Newcastle and Gateshead and the activities of a number of suspects, including two known criminals, Graham Davie and Tommy Hay. Another aspect of the investigation was into the possible corruption of the Police Officer mentioned in 4 July Fib 3 form, PC Graham Brown. As I have already noted the allegation in relation to this Fib 3 form (JD1) relates to the other police officer mentioned in the form, Police Constable EF.
24. It appears that Mr Dixon had told other officers in CTN (including Mr Thompson) that Police Constable EF was corrupt; and was surprised to discover later that this Officer had been transferred to the CTN Surveillance Team. In §21 of his witness statement Mr Dixon describes the 'great concern' among members of the Operation Halogen Team

… who could not understand why DCI Pallas came to this decision knowing the information about [EF].

25. There is a stark difference of recollection at what occurred at the 14 August meeting attended by DCI Pallas, Mr Dowson, Mr Dixon, Mr Thompson, DC Fiddes, DS Hetherington and DC Barrett. In summary, the evidence of Mr Dixon, Mr Thompson and DC Fiddes is that Mr Dixon mentioned the information received from CHIS AB linking Police Constable EF with prostitution. In his witness statement Mr Thompson states,

62. … Initially DC Dixon was very reluctant to name PC [EF] to the other officers present, but did so following DCI Pallas instructing him to identify him as he commented there were no secrets within the room. When the other officers present at the meeting became aware of the information about PC [EF] they raised immediate concerns, as he had recently transferred to the surveillance team at CTN who operated out of the same building as ourselves.

26. Neither Mr Pallas nor Mr Dowson recalled the matter being raised; and the only contemporary note (9/236) is ambiguous:

John [Dixon] highlights West End Source [AB] who we may have to approach … DCI Calvert consider control/handling issue.

27. On 16 August Mr Dowson went on leave until 15 September.
28. On 23 August there was a conversation between Mr Stewart and DCI Pallas in which it is alleged that DCI Pallas said of Mr Dowson, 'He's just a glorified DC. He's always on surveillance and I'll get rid of him'. DCI Pallas admits that he spoke of 'glorified DCs', but says it was not directed to Mr Dowson. This gives rise to issue BD 2.
29. There is an entry in Mr Stewart's pocket book, which is not entirely clear and as to which there is an issue of authenticity,

… [Mr Pallas] said that it is the DI who is to blame – senior D/C going out on surveillance when he should be doing his job rid of & he will have words with him.

The words 'rid of' are also relied on in support of another allegation (BD 3) that DCI Pallas said that he wanted to get rid of Mr Dowson. Mr Dowson was not present at the meeting on 23 August or any other meeting when the words 'rid of' may have been used. However, the general submission made on the Claimants' behalf is that DCI Pallas would have known that this sort of remark made to one Officer within CTN (Mr Stewart) was bound to be passed on to another (Mr Dowson) and, in any event, provides potent proof of DCI Pallas's attitude towards Mr Dowson.

October

30. There is an allegation that on 3 October a conversation took place at the Morpeth Conservative Club involving DCI Pallas, Mr Dixon, DC Bloomfield and DC Roulstone during which DCI Pallas,

announced that DI Dowson had better watch what he was doing or he would be on his way. Pallas went on to say he wanted a proper DI like John Cox.

As reported to Mr Dowson by DC Roulstone, DCI Pallas said that Mr Dowson was 'on borrowed time.' This gives rise to allegation BD4.

31. On 16 October there was a briefing on Operation Halogen, and soon after this the preparatory work on Operation Halogen came to an end, and the arrest and charging phase began.
32. A number of suspects were arrested and interviewed on Monday 21 and Tuesday 22 October. A considerable amount of evidence was given about the circumstances in which DCI Pallas and DI Taylor left the operational headquarters of Operation Halogen to attend a Conference organised by the DVLA in Warwickshire. The decision to leave the operation in the hands of Mr Dowson and Mr Stewart is no longer a matter of complaint; but DCI Pallas's explanations for the circumstances in which Mr Dowson was left in charge of the operation at short notice are relied on by the Claimants as throwing light on the general credibility of DCI Pallas.
33. Operation Halogen was an operation in which the Professional Standards Department ('PSD') of Northumbria Police was involved, since it involved investigating the corruption of PC Graham Brown. Supt Mitchell and DI Docherty were both involved in the Operation and their evidence was relied on by the Claimants as providing a detached view of DCI Pallas's conduct.
34. DCI Pallas left the Operation Halogen Headquarters at Morpeth Police Station in the early afternoon of Tuesday 22 October. At that stage PC Graham Brown and Messrs Davie and Hay had been arrested and were in the process of being interviewed. Mr Dunn and DC Jones conducted the interviews of Davie; and Mr Dowson applied for, and was granted, an extended Warrant to extend the period during which Davie could be legally detained and questioned. Shortly after this a mistake occurred for which Mr Stewart was plainly to blame. He had concluded that there was not enough evidence to charge Davie with the offences of conspiracy which DCI Pallas had directed should be charged against him. More significantly and without taking advice from the CPS he formed the erroneous view that Davie could not be released on police bail because he had been detained and interviewed under a Warrant of Further Detention. Davie was released without being bailed, with the disposal, 'No Further Action'.
35. On 24 October DCI Pallas realised that Davie had been released unconditionally; and was highly critical of both Mr Stewart and Mr Dowson. Mr Dowson's description of what occurred is set out in his witness statement.

106. On the day of Davie's release I received a telephone call from an angry DCI Pallas who was far from happy. He stated 'what the fuck do you think you are doing?' and words to the effect that there was 'bucketloads' of evidence against Davie and he should have been fucking charged. He asked me to get 'a fucking meeting' together for the same day and told me I was 'fucking wrong.'

107. He had been absent for two days and was extremely angry. His anger was irrational and disproportionate. I could not understand why he was so angry about this. There was no doubt that Davie was involved in some degree of criminality but at that stage there was simply insufficient evidence to proffer a charge.

36. Mr Stewart also described DCI Pallas's behaviour on 25 October in his witness statement

101 … he was also angry and aggressive towards me regarding the release of Graham Davie, without charge. He was shouting even louder than normal, criticising my decision making and professional ability. It was a torrent of abuse which included multiple uses of the word 'Fuck'. He appeared to be totally losing his temper. He was extremely red faced and sweating as he continued his tirade. He was clenching his fists.

37. Similar allegations of harassment are made on the basis of DCI Pallas's reaction to the release of Davie by Mr Dowson (BD11), Mr Stewart (GS7) and Mr Hoggins (MH4). In the case of Mr Stewart it is said that DCI Pallas imputed wholly improper motives, by asking him whether Davie was a relation.
38. DCI Pallas was also highly critical of a decision to move the operational headquarters of Operation Halogen from Morpeth Police Station to Force Headquarters at Ponteland. This had happened at the insistence of officers in the PSD while DCI Pallas was away at the DVLA Conference. These Officers had become concerned at the lack of security at Morpeth Police Station. Since DCI Pallas was the Senior Investigating Officer for Operation Halogen and had neither been consulted, nor given his approval to the move, his surprise and annoyance when he returned and discovered the move can be understood. The manner in which he expressed his annoyance gives rise to an allegation (GS6). At §104 of his witness statement Mr Stewart sets out the nature of another complaint (GS8).

On or about 30 October 2002, I was summoned by DCI Pallas. He was angry as moving the enquiry team was inconvenient for him, but I had no input in the decision. However, DCI Pallas said, 'It was all my fucking fault', even though he knew I had nothing to do with it. He was furious. He then handed me the PDR entry which he had pre-written.

39. The entry on Mr Stewart's PDR was made by DCI Pallas on Wednesday 30 October and was highly critical of Mr Stewart's Decision Making and Leadership competencies. Whether or not the criticisms were justified, DCI Pallas set out the evidence on which he based his criticism. The entry in respect of 'Decision Making' concluded:

The number of examples given show a trend which tends to suggest that you are oblivious or unconcerned about the consequences of your decisions. This is unsatisfactory performance for a supervisor/investigator involved in such an operation [Halogen]

Under the heading 'Leadership', he wrote

You need to develop your ability to consult, seek and listen to the views of others and ensure that standards are maintained during proactive operations. Recently in the same investigation … which had an appointed SIO you released one of the main subjects without charge, without discussing the matter with the SIO. You later moved the operational base from Morpeth to Ponteland, again without any consultation with the SIO. Your role was one of support to the SIO and your performance on this occasion was unsatisfactory.

40. Mr Stewart's allegations in relation to these entries and the accompanying comments (GS9) are set out in the Claimants' Written Opening

DCI Pallas gave DS Stewart an intemperate, adverse, hostile and unreasonable appraisal as a punishment to him, knowing it would seriously affect his career. Its presentation was accompanied by a further episode of abusive behaviour and shouting from DCI Pallas.

41. It is clear that Mr Stewart was very much concerned by DCI Pallas's entries in his PDR. He spoke to DI Docherty and tried to make contact with D/Supt Vant. In §60 of his witness statement (relied on by the Claimants) DI Docherty describes Mr Stewart as being 'very emotional' about the PDR entries.
42. There was a scheme by which adverse PDRs could be subject to a Formal PDR Disagreement Procedure and referred up the chain of command for review. Unfortunately, before taking this step or waiting for D/Supt Vant to make contact or review the PDR entries, Mr Stewart took a step which caused very grave difficulties for him. Over the weekend of 2-3 November 2002 he produced two written documents which he handed to DCI Pallas on 4 November.
43. The first document was an 8-page detailed response to the adverse entries in his PDR. The tone was highly-wrought and the manner of expression was offensive. In relation to an incident on 16 October he wrote,

The way in which you spoke to me during this meeting was disgraceful and I felt devalued, humiliated, de-motivated and bullied.

The way you took over the meeting and the way in which you treated me was commented upon by all the officers present. They were fully supportive of me and believed your attitude was unbecoming of a senior officer.

He accepted that the decision to release Davie was his alone,

You queried the reason why the subject was not bailed. It is not possible to bail someone who has been the subject of a warrant of further detention.

Mr Stewart concluded,

Unless you withdraw the PDR entry, I will consider further action against you after I have taken appropriate advice …

I feel very disappointed in your belief that I have failed in any way. However, I will never agree to carry out instructions which I know are wrong and will adversely (affect) others, such as charging a person with insufficient evidence.

Your actions have caused me, my family and work colleagues an immense amount of stress as well as frustrating the investigation. Any professional respect that I may have had for you has been lost.

The last sentence effectively put to an end any relationship between them.

44. The second document was in the form of a PDR comment by Mr Stewart on DCI Pallas. It was addressed to him and used the headings to be found in the standard PDR form. It was on any view an astonishing document to address to a senior officer.

Professionalism,

Your attitude towards other people including staff lets you down badly …

Communication and interpersonal skills

You have consistently displayed examples of the worst form of interpersonal skills that many people have ever seen ….

Managing and developing staff

It is difficult to find anything in this section to comment favourably upon.

45. This was another highly disrespectful document which, incidentally, showed that Mr Stewart misunderstood the purpose of a PDR. The PDR was intended to provide information on performance upon which the first and second line manager would comment. It was not intended to give any single person an opportunity to carry out what was in effect a character assassination of another officer.
46. It is clear that Mr Dowson visited Mr Stewart at home over the weekend of 2-3 November, although he denied seeing the contents of the two documents Mr Stewart was preparing.
47. Another matter of complaint (JD4) concerns a financial enquiry into the bank details of two suspects. Mr Dixon prepared the relevant application to Court and asked DCI Pallas to sign them. It is alleged that DCI Pallas declined to sign the document, and suggested to Mr Dixon that he should obtain the information unofficially 'through the back door' and, if there were anything of interest, that an official application could then be made to the Court. Mr Dixon says he refused to comply with what he understood to be an unlawful order, and that DCI Pallas then shouted at him and criticised him for not carrying out his request. He felt under pressure since, if he had carried out an illegal request, he might have been disciplined or dismissed. It is also alleged that DCI Pallas subsequently repeated his complaint about Mr Dixon's refusal to carry out a lawful order. It was unclear from Mr Dixon's evidence when this incident took place but, since he said he consulted Mr Stewart about the issue, it was probably before the end of October 2002.

November

48. After he had handed the two documents to DCI Pallas on 4 November, Mr Stewart was seen by D/Supt Vant on Wednesday 6 November. D/Supt Vant decided that Mr Stewart should immediately be moved from CTN and redeployed in Area Command with effect from 11 November. When offered the choice of Area Commands Mr Stewart chose Gateshead West based at Whickham Police Station.
49. On 13 November he issued a Notice of Grievance, seeking a return to CTN and a discussion with DCI Pallas,

about the best way that the situation can be dealt with for the benefit of all parties concerned, including Northumbria Police service as a whole.

50. The Grievance Procedure was designed to ensure that individual members of staff who felt that they had been unfairly treated were given the opportunity to have their grievances resolved in a fair and just manner. Paragraph 3 of the published Grievance Procedure process sets out the general principles.

3.1. The Grievance Procedure is intended to resolve issues as quickly as possible and not to establish guilt or provide punishment. It provides both informal and formal means of resolution

3.2. The aggrieved person and all other parties to a grievance have the right at any stage to consult with and be accompanied by a work colleague, trade union or staff association representative.

…

3.7. The procedure will be carried out in the strictest confidence, unless otherwise agreed with the parties involved, and will not prejudice the aggrieved person's current employment or future career prospects

51. Paragraph 5 made clear that the victimisation of any person involved in a grievance would not be tolerated and would be treated as a serious disciplinary matter, and paragraph 6 encouraged the aggrieved person to attempt to resolve problems with the other party. Nothing indicated that the issue of the Grievance Procedure had the effect of preventing any move from the aggrieved person's current employment.
52. There were 3 stages in the Grievance Procedure: stage 1 was resolution by the appropriate Line Manager, stage 2 was resolution at Area Command level and stage 3 was resolution by the Head of Personnel, C/Supt Gilberg.
53. Mr Dowson acted as Mr Stewart's friend in the Grievance Procedure (as provided by paragraph 3.2) until some time shortly before 19 December. In view of what Mr Stewart had said about DCI Pallas this demonstrated loyalty to Mr Stewart rather than good judgement, as Mr Dowson later recognised.
54. Following the release of Davie at the end of the first arrest phase of Operation Halogen, DCI Pallas was keen to re-arrest and charge him with what he regarded as an appropriate conspiracy offence. A number of officers, including Mr Dunn, expressed doubts about the propriety of doing this. In their view there was insufficient evidence to re-arrest him. DCI Pallas had looked through the available evidence and the interview transcripts, and had prepared a number of written questions which he thought could and should be put to Davie. It was important that these should not be questions which had already asked. If this had occurred Davie's legal advisors would be likely to object.
55. A meeting was held on Friday 15 November between DCI Pallas and DC Bloomfield. DCI Pallas intended that DC Bloomfield and another Officer (DC Williams) should carry out a second-phase interview with Davie. In order to ensure that the questioning should proceed smoothly DCI Pallas wrote out 5 pages of questions in ink. Two of the questions are of particular relevance. The first question was,

Surveillance has shown no work. How can you account for having £389, £900, £60 in cash when you were arrested?

Against this question the word 'sneak' was written in pencil in DCI Pallas's handwriting. The second question was,

How can you explain Sandra Beaney saying she is a prostitute and she was threatened by a man named Graham Davie and Thomas Hay?

Against this question the word 'cheat' was written, again in DCI Pallas's handwriting.

56. There are the two explanations for what came to be called the 'sneak/cheat' document. DC Bloomfield's account is set out in §§17-23 of his witness statement.

17. Whilst in DCI Pallas' office only he and I were present. He produced five sheets of handwritten notes which I believed he had written and were questions he wanted Davie to be asked when re-interviewed. For me this was unusual, as nobody had ever done this to me previously in such a manner. I had no problem discussing the interview with DCI Pallas, but getting an 'idiots guide' was odd. I presumed that the handwriting on the sheet was DCI Pallas'.

18. DCI Pallas went through the questions, explaining each item to me and bringing me up to speed with what had been said earlier. DCI Pallas wrote the word 'cheat' in pencil next to one question and 'sneak' next to another.

19. I have been made aware that DCI Pallas alleges that I suggested the words 'cheat' and 'sneak' to him. This is incorrect. It was DCI Pallas who mentioned these words and it was he who wrote them down in pencil against specific questions on the sheet. There was no discussion between us, just a one way dialogue from him to me instructing me what he wanted Davie to be asked. As I had not interviewed Davie on the first occasion, and therefore had little knowledge about his involvement in Operation Halogen, it would have been impossible for me to know at that time what questions had already been asked of him.

20. This meeting was the first time that I was told I would be interviewing Davie. I had not been given any documents or been party to any information regarding Davie's original interview. I was unaware that I was going to be asked to re-interview Davie until I entered DCI Pallas' office.

21. In relation to the word 'cheat', I clearly understood DCI Pallas to be instructing me that I should cheat and ask the person questions which previously had been asked. In relation to the word 'sneak', I understood him to be instructing me to sneak in a question that had already been asked about Davie in a previous interview.

22. I was very uncomfortable about this, but my impression of DCI Pallas was that he was overbearing and powerful and he did not tolerate anyone not agreeing with him. Initially I wondered whether he was carrying out an integrity test on me by asking me to 'cheat' and 'sneak'. At that time I did not think that DCI Pallas was asking me to do something illegal. However, due to the nature of Operation Halogen I believed that we should adhere to best possible practice when investigating allegedly corrupt Police officers. Using such words as 'cheat' and 'sneak', and going so far as to write them on a document which would be disclosable struck me as highly unusual and unprofessional. DCI Pallas' actions made me feel that I was being made to act in a manner which I found to be professionally offensive and inappropriate.

23. I felt pressurized and extremely alarmed by DCI Pallas' actions

57. DCI Pallas's account is different. According to his account, he wrote his notes in pen after reading the interview with Davie which had been carried out on 21-23 October. The notes were 'challenges' which he thought should be put to Davie. When DC Bloomfield came into his office he explained to him that he was going to read out the 'challenges' as he believed they were new points which had not been put in the first interview. His account of what then occurred is in §§714-715 and 718 of his witness statement.

714. ... I told him that I wanted him to tell me if he thought we had asked any of the challenges during the first interview

715. I wanted to ensure that [DC Bloomfield] understood the veracity of the additional evidence and the source of the challenges. [DC Bloomfield] came to my office and sat opposite me. I confirmed with him that he had read the interview. I said that I would read the challenges out to him and said I wanted him to tell me if any of them had been asked previously …

718. Another of the challenges that I wrote was, 'Surveillance has shown no work. How can you account for having £389, £900, £60 in cash when you were arrested?' [DC Bloomfield] said words to the effect of 'I think that's a bit of a sneak'. I asked him why he thought that. [DC Bloomfield] told me that we had asked Davie about his money previously. I wrote 'sneak' in pencil on the notes next to the challenge. I asked [DC Bloomfield] to go back and check to see if Davie had been asked about money previously.

58. DCI Pallas gives a similar explanation for the word 'cheat' against the next 'challenge': namely, that he was simply writing down DC Bloomfield's response to the challenge, and was not suggesting sneaking questions into the interview nor acting improperly so as to cheat a suspect into answering a question that he should not have been asked.
59. Although none of the Claimants was present at this meeting, the 'sneak/cheat' document, subsequently took on considerable significance. It contributed to the abandonment of the prosecution of a man charged with a serious offence, gave rise to a line of enquiry by the North Yorkshire Police into the conduct of DCI Pallas, was relied on in the present trial to challenge his credibility and as an allegation (BD17) which was abandoned in the course of the trial.
60. It appears that the 'sneak/cheat' document was not in fact used by DC Bloomfield and DC Williams in their interview of Davie which took place on Sunday 17 November. DC Bloomfield took a copy of the document and retained both the original and the copy in his briefcase. His explanation for this was that he understood that advice about their disclosure would be sought from the CPS, and that he was concerned about the security of the document if it were left in the CTN office. It was not until May 2003 that DC Bloomfield handed over the notes to DCI Adamson; and it was subsequently disclosed in the prosecution of Davie.

December

61. On 18 December DCI Pallas made entries in Mr Dowson's PDR Form as his first Line Manager. It is common ground that the comments were fair. For example under the heading, 'Professionalism', DCI Pallas wrote

You are approachable and sensitive to the needs of others … A further example was where an officer was seeking to take out a grievance in relation to the manner in which he had been treat[ed] by his management. You advised the officer and supported him throughout this difficult time.

This was a reference to Mr Stewart.

62. The final comment was:

This has been a difficult 12 months for [CTN] because of resource abstractions to major incidents, various staffing issues which have occurred and because of some major operations undertaken. The leadership you have shown during this time has been consistent and the performance of the Crime Team has increased. Arrests are up by 25% on last year and we have seen the largest recovery of drugs Northumbria has seen. Well done.

63. While Mr Dowson was right to be content with the written entries he was extremely disappointed by the grades: seven of the grades were 2 out of 4, and two were 3 out of 4.
64. The grades awarded were supposed to reflect written criteria.

Grade 4. An exceptionally high standard. Performance consistently of a high standard in all areas of work and is significantly above a level which would be acceptable

Grade 3. A good standard. Performance is acceptable and sometimes exceeds that required from an individual competent in the role.

Grade 2. A generally acceptable standard. Performance is acceptable.

Grade 1. An unsatisfactory standard. Performance is not of an acceptable standard and patterns of underperformance are consistently exhibited.

65. The problem with this very broad banding was that, while Grades 1 and 4 were relatively easy to apply, Grades 2 and 3 were not. Both were acceptable standards, with Grade 3 requiring performance which sometimes exceeded what was acceptable. Implicitly, if Grade 2 were awarded the acceptable standard was never exceeded.
66. It is to be noted that, when Mr Dowson awarded grades to Mr Stewart on 29 November 2002, he awarded two Grade 4s and seven Grade 3s. In the light of the circumstances in which Mr Stewart left CTN, this might be considered generous.
67. On 19 December Mr Dowson spoke to D/Supt Vant. Their discussion was recorded in a note taken by D/Supt Vant, which Mr Dowson accepted in evidence was an accurate account of their conversation. The first part of their discussion was about Mr Dowson's involvement in Mr Stewart's Grievance Procedure. D/Supt Vant noted,

I spoke to DI Dowson about his role in the grievance enquiry. He assured me that it had ceased and he was pleased about this. He felt uncomfortable acting as [Mr] Stewart's friend but felt obliged to do so. I discussed his working relationship with DCI Pallas and morale in general amongst the team. At this time DI Dowson was very positive about the situation. He stated that everybody had moved on since [Mr] Stewart's departure which was no longer talked about. The team was performing well and morale was good. He had had a frank discussion with the DCI about their relationship and views on management and operational matters. He felt the relationship was working well now and there were no problems … He informed me that he had just spoken with the DCI about his PDR. He expressed some disappointment about the grades received but commented on the positive things said by the DCI. He did not intend to take issue with or challenge the PDR.

68. It is clear from this account that Mr Dowson had decided not to challenge the PDR grades; and the note appears to show that the relationship between Mr Dowson and DCI Pallas was now working well.
69. Unfortunately as he explained in evidence, Mr Dowson 'festered' over the Christmas break about his PDR grades and became increasingly angry, particularly about the Grade 2 for Leadership. He now regarded the Grades 'as an affront to his professional pride and ability.' He decided to challenge the grades. This decision was to have far reaching consequences for Mr Dowson and for everyone else caught up in what followed.

January 2003

70. On 9 January Mr Dowson lodged a formal PDR Disagreement in relation to five of the Grade 2s in his PDR. The nature of the complaint was that,

… The gradings given indicate that my performance during the past 12 months was generally acceptable. I find this insulting, de-motivating and inaccurate.

This response is not meant to be personal. It is a search for what is fair and reasonable. It is impossible, however, to remove the involvement of DCI Pallas from it. It is fair to say that we have completely opposite outlooks on what makes a good supervisor/manager and what contributes to a healthy, highly-motivated workforce. In short, the morale and motivation of my staff has significantly dropped since his arrival at [CTN] … [Emphasis added]

71. D/Supt Vant considered the PDR Disagreement and on 23 January informed Mr Dowson that he was not going to change the grades. It was clear from D/Supt Vant's evidence that he considered that there were difficulties in drawing any meaningful distinction between grades 2 and 3. As he set out in §138 of his witness statement,

Following my review I did not consider that a clear disparity had been established between the grades awarded for the areas subject to disagreement and the evidence of performance available.

72. D/Supt Vant and Mr Dowson spoke again on 28 January when Mr Dowson expressed his disappointment at the outcome, and told D/Supt Vant about his continuing complaints about DCI Pallas. As D/Supt Vant recorded in his notebook,

[Mr] Dowson went on to talk further about the deteriorating relationship between himself and DCI Pallas. He stated they did not communicate. He was not appropriately consulted and DCI Pallas continued to manage in an autocratic manner. He was presently in the middle of the diversity training course and felt that he now recognised elements of management bullying and personal stress in his present working environment.

73. The Diversity Training Course which Mr Dowson had referred to had taken place on 27-28 January and plainly influenced his view of events. The reference to being 'not appropriately consulted' was a reference to the appointment of DS Hill to replace Mr Stewart. Although this was relied on as conduct amounting to harassment in the pleadings and in the opening, it was not relied on in the closing submissions. This was for good reason: it was clear from the evidence that the reason why Mr Dowson was not involved in the recruitment and interview of DS Hill, who appears to have been the only candidate for the post, was that he chose not to be.
74. It was on the same date but after this conversation that Mr Dowson made an entry on his PDR.

Meeting with D/Supt Vant re formal PDR disagreement. Informed that he was not prepared to disagree with DCI Pallas. I was extremely disappointed but not surprised. Disappointed because clearly in my opinion the PDR was unfair and unjustified. Not surprised as it only provides further evidence of how the rank is supported by the establishment and not what is right or wrong …

Unsurprisingly, when he saw this entry in February, D/Supt Vant took a dim view of the comment, which was an overt attack on his good faith. He characterised the entry as,

… inappropriate and indicative of a jaundiced attitude.

75. Following the meeting on 28 January D/Supt Vant was concerned that the continuing working relationship between DCI Pallas and Mr Dowson was having a detrimental effect on the operation of CTN. On 31 January he telephoned Mr Dowson and suggested that he consider a move to CTS. As recorded by D/Supt Vant, Mr Dowson 'rejected the suggestion out of hand.' Mr Dowson explained in his evidence why he rejected this solution. It was partly because the CTS headquarters were further from his home, but more importantly it was because he felt he was being moved as a result of his complaint about bullying.

February

76. On 5 February DCI Pallas organised a meeting of the Sergeants in CTN, to which the two Inspectors (Mr Dowson and DI Taylor) were not invited. Mr Hogarth submitted that this was a significant event, so far as Mr Dowson was concerned, since it proved to Mr Dowson that DCI Pallas's behaviour was not likely to change. Views differed among those who attended the meeting as to how significant it was. This incident gives rise to a complaint (BD15).
77. Later that day Mr Dowson rang D/Supt Vant and raised a number of points as demonstrating DCI Pallas's inappropriate behaviour. He also reiterated that he felt undervalued and vulnerable, and told D/Supt Vant that he was suffering from consequent ill-health. D/Supt Vant tried to reassure him and invited him to consider what his ultimate objectives were.
78. At a meeting at Morpeth police station the following day (6 February), Mr Dowson repeated his allegation that he was being bullied, and elaborated concerns over the appointment of DS Hill and the removal of Mr Stewart, which he described as 'wrong'. D/Supt Vant again offered a chaired meeting between Mr Dowson and DCI Pallas to see if the relationship could be improved. Mr Dowson reiterated that he would not move from CTN and would, if necessary, 'stick it out'. He then asked whether the DCIs at CTN and CTS might be exchanged. D/Supt Vant said that he would consider this and that he would suspend the selection of a new DI at CTS so as to keep open the option of transferring Mr Dowson to CTS. It was at this stage that Mr Dowson indicated that he would submit a formal Grievance Notice if he were moved.
79. D/Supt Vant investigated the possibility of exchanging the two DCIs between CTN and CTS, but it became clear that the DCI at CTS did not wish to move. The options for D/Supt Vant were narrowing.
80. On Tuesday 11 February Mr Dowson submitted a written Notification of Grievance against DCI Pallas, the contents of which he had written over the previous weekend. It was clear from the evidence that Mr Dowson believed that if he issued a Grievance he could not be moved from CTN.
81. At this point it is necessary to move the focus of attention from Mr Dowson to Mr Dixon and to Mr Hoggins. On 17 February DCI Pallas had a meeting with D/Supt Vant and D/Supt Sharp at which he was informed that the CHIS AB had provided intelligence in July 2002 that Constable EF was corrupt and that Mr Dixon had submitted an intelligence form to DCI Pallas about this at the time. DCI Pallas's evidence was that he was surprised by this, since the only information he had received about Constable EF had come from an interview with another source in December, and that the information from that interview had not specifically mentioned corruption.
82. In his witness statement Mr Hoggins described an incident which occurred sometime in February as an example of DCI Pallas's bullying (MH7);

49. The most memorable time was in the open-plan main floor in front of the whole CTN Team. Operation Halogen had been moved to the bottom office downstairs and we were not allowed to speak to anyone about the operation as it was so sensitive. I had been put in charge of Operation Halogen.

50. I walked upstairs to the main office as I needed to speak with someone. DCI Pallas shouted at me words to the effect of, 'I've told you to get this investigation concluded.' DCI Pallas was shouting and bawling. A number of officers ran out of the fire door, commonly used as a short cut, to … get out of his way. It must have seemed to them as [if] he was starting up. He went red and was pointing his finger and everyone was moving out of the way. It seemed as though he was trying to intimidate me or the others.

83. On 18 February DCI Pallas called Mr Dixon into his office. There was a confrontation as to whether he had been told about information indicating that Constable EF was corrupt.
84. According to DCI Pallas (witness statement §854), he asked Mr Dixon to explain what had gone wrong; and why he had not informed him about the intelligence (Fib 3) form. According to DCI Pallas's evidence Mr Dixon claimed that he had told him about the intelligence and DCI Pallas said he knew that this was untrue.

At this point I did become angry because as a result of John's mistakes in processing this intelligence and through no fault of my own, I had been caused great professional embarrassment.

According to Mr Dixon (witness statement §27), DCI Pallas,

…stated I had made him look a right cunt. He was banging his fist on the table and was shouting and red in the face. He called me a liar, shouting and swearing … I felt intimated and threatened by his actions. I felt my role within CTN was at risk.

85. DCI Pallas could not remember the words used, but accepted that he swore. His evidence was that he was not swearing at Mr Dixon, but at how he had been made to look. This evidence is relevant to allegation (JD1).
86. Returning to the position of Mr Dowson, on Thursday 20 February he met D/Supt Vant and was informed that he was being transferred to CTS with immediate effect. With the agreement of the senior Officers whose approval was required, he did not turn up on duty at CTS the next day or during the following week.

March

87. On Monday 3 March, Mr Dowson reported sick.
88. The circumstances in which Mr Dowson was transferred from CTN gives rise to an allegation of harassment (BD22), which is common to other claimants. In essence it is an allegation that DCI Pallas procured the transfer by his conduct, either by telling lies to the senior officers who made the decisions, or by saying that he wanted the officers moved out of CTN or by asserting that he was the victim of a conspiracy by Messrs Dowson, Dixon, Dunn, Hoggins and Thompson.
89. On about 5 or 6 March Mr Dixon spoke to D/Supt Sharp about the information that he had provided to DCI Pallas about Constable EF. Later that day, Mr Dixon alleges that DCI Pallas came into the OSDU office where he worked with DC Miller and Mr Thompson and again denied that he had ever been given information about Constable EF, and said that he would never have authorised EF being part of the surveillance team if he had known. At this point, according to Mr Dixon, DCI Pallas made generally disparaging comments about the OSDU and said that he had previously experienced problems with a similar unit when he had worked at North Shields (allegation JD2)

May

90. On 22 April DCI Adamson had been asked by Ch/Supt Gilberg to carry out a detailed fact finding exercise as part of the 3rd stage of the investigation into Mr Dowson's Grievance. DCI Adamson produced his final report on 2 July 2003. In the course of preparing the report he interviewed approximately 20 officers at CTN. He kept a record of these interviews in a day-book which has all the appearances of being a contemporary record, since it includes within it notes about a number of other unrelated police matters.
91. Among those whom DCI Adamson interviewed on Friday 2 May were DI Taylor, DS Chappell, DS Wilkinson, DS Hill, DC Barrett and Mr Dunn
92. It is alleged (SD6) that, following his interview with DCI Adamson, DCI Pallas warned Mr Dunn not to be stupid as the Police Service would back him as he was the senior officer.
93. On 6 May DCI Adamson spoke to DC Roulstone; and on 8 May, he spoke to DC Bloomfield, Mr Hoggins and Mr Thompson.
94. It is alleged on behalf of Mr Thompson (NT8) that shortly before this interview DCI Pallas told him that he knew he was a friend of Mr Dowson. It is Mr Thompson's case that, in circumstances where Mr Dowson was making a complaint against DCI Pallas, this was a direct threat to him which amounted to harassment.
95. It was during the interview with DC Bloomfield on 8 May that DCI Adamson learnt that he was in possession of both the original and a copy of the 'sneak/cheat' document.
96. It is common ground that Mr Thompson wished to record DCI Adamson's interview with him; and that DCI Adamson refused to allow this since the interview was not in relation to a disciplinary matter. It is clear from DCI Adamson's notes that Mr Thompson sensed that his position at CTN was insecure.
97. On 12 May it is alleged (NT11) that DCI Pallas had a conversation with Mr Thompson during which he criticised him about the amount of overtime he had worked. It is said that this amounted to harassment since it was said in front of other officers in CTN in an attempt to alienate him from those other officers.
98. There is further allegation (NT12) that, at about this time, DCI Pallas asked Mr Thompson about his leaving CTN. This is pleaded as a direct threat to Mr Thompson.
99. On Friday 16 May DCI Adamson interviewed Mr Dixon and DC Miller in relation to Mr Dowson's Grievance.
100. There is an allegation (JD6) that a few days after the interview DCI Pallas told Mr Dixon that he knew what he had told DCI Adamson.
101. On 21 May DCI Pallas is alleged to have criticised Mr Thompson's handling of informants, and to have said, 'wouldn't it be funny if there was a change of handlers?' to an assembled group of officers in 'The Joiner's Arms' public house (NT13). The remark was not made to Mr Thompson or in his presence; but was passed on by DC Roulstone who is said to have been present. According to Mr Thompson, when DC Roulstone reported the remark he said it sounded as if DCI Pallas intended to get rid of either Mr Thompson or his source.
102. At 12.25 on 23 May Mr Thompson submitted a Notification of Grievance to D/Supt Vant. He alleged that he was

… the victim of 'workplace bullying.' It takes the form of persistent criticism of my skills, abilities and competencies … as [an] advanced handler in the [OSDU] of [CTN] … I have also been the subject of 'exclusion' and unwelcome physical contact which made me feel uncomfortable and embarrassed …

103. Shortly after this DCI Pallas wrote a memorandum in the form of an email which was sent at 13.22 asking that control of the CHIS CD be taken away from Mr Thompson and Mr Dixon. There is an allegation that, while Mr Thompson was away on leave, DCI Pallas identified the name of CD and instructed D/Sgt Hill to search through Mr Thompson's telephone bills in order to identify the telephone number of CD. The informant was then contacted over the weekend of 26 May. It is alleged (NT14) that this conduct was 'improper and unjustified behaviour' by DCI Pallas which was 'directed against the handler of the informant … and a clear statement that he could not be trusted.'

July

104. As noted above, DCI Adamson sent his report about Mr Dowson's Grievance to Ch/Supt Gilberg on about 2 July. He set out each of the allegations made by Mr Dowson and his findings in relation to those allegations. Some of DCI Adamson's findings were based on what DCI Pallas had told him but by no means all. Where there were conflicting accounts DCI Adamson identified them.
105. In relation to complaint No.7 and the allegations about 'too many shaven-headed detectives here from Newcastle North', DCI Adamson made the following finding:

… DCI [Pallas] accepts that he made comments to this effect, however, not in this context. He claimed it was a joke, an off the cuff remark which was taken out of context by DI Dowson. Other officers spoken to had differing views. Some recall the comment as harmless, others who overtly support Dowson believe the comment was targeted at Dowson and those officers who had indeed previously worked with him at Newcastle North. Whilst no harm was intended, these were clearly ill-considered and unnecessary comments.

DCI Adamson also noted the attempts by D/Supt Vant to acknowledge and resolve the differences of opinion between the DCI Pallas and Mr Dowson.

106. The report concluded,

DI Dowson has made lengthy submissions which he believes support his claim that the actions, language and behaviour of DCI Pallas amount to bullying. Each and every point has been examined and reviewed. Over 20 staff of various ranks and positions have been interviewed in an attempt to establish the credibility or otherwise of the allegations …

In general terms, I have found little evidence of any action taken by DCI Pallas against DI Dowson, which could be perceived as bullying. There are a number of minor issues, which with the benefit of hindsight, could have been handled with a greater degree of sensitivity and professionalism. These could have been perceived as systematic of bullying by DI Dowson. However, there are also many examples of practices by the DCI which demonstrate his professionalism and appreciation of good management practice.

I am of the personal view that DI Dowson's claims of systematic bullying are without foundation or credibility.

107. DCI Adamson went on to describe a personal assessment of what he described as a 'rift' or split' within CTN

There is a small but very determined group of officers who overtly support DI Dowson and who have made concerted efforts to discredit DCI Pallas. Indeed, during the interview, these officers made unsolicited comments against DCI Pallas on issues far outside the remit of the grievance enquiry. The officers involved did not simply express their personal views and opinions of DCI Pallas's style and leadership, but openly challenged his integrity and professional credibility.

It was also apparent that these officers had clearly discussed various issues amongst themselves and in some instances, came to [the] interview … with pre-prepared lists of issues and examples they were determined to raise.

108. DCI Adamson also referred to a dispute between Mr Dowson and an immediate supervising officer, DCI McClen over PDR entries in a previous year. The incident bore similarities to his complaint about DCI Pallas's entries. The Report also referred to DCI Adamson's impression that some of those who had been interviewed had felt under pressure from Mr Dowson.
109. The conclusions were stark,

Consequently, I am of the opinion that firm action is needed to repair the situation within [CTN]. Those officers detailed below have all expressed personal opinion and made comment which, I believe, makes their own position untenable within the department. One of the officers, DC Thompson has recently submitted a grievance along very similar lines to this and that of DC Stewart. I believe more may follow. I believe that there has been a complete breakdown of trust of the below listed officers and their positions within [CTN] is now untenable.

The officers named were: Mr Dunn, Mr Thompson, DC Bloomfield, Mr Hoggins, DC Miller and Mr Dixon.

110. Over the course of the following days discussions took place which involved D/Ch/Supt Machell, as Head of Crime, and Ch/Supt Gilberg. On 17 July C/Supt Gilberg wrote recommending that the officers named in the report be removed. D/Ch/Supt Machell accepted that advice and a decision was made to move all the officers named by DCI Adamson (apart from DC Miller) from CTN .
111. The decision to move the officers over the period 18-25 July 2003 gives rise to the final group of complaints: Mr Thompson (NT15), Mr Dunn (SD7) Mr Dixon (JD7) and Mr Hoggins (MH8).

Subsequent history

112. Mr Dunn (on 4 August) and Mr Hoggins on (7 August) both submitted a notification of Grievance against D/C/Supt Machell in relation to their removal from CTN.
113. DCI Pallas remained as DCI at CTN until 6 June 2004 when he transferred to the Cumbria Constabulary, where he was subsequently promoted to the rank of Superintendent. When his successor, DCI Groom, took over in September 2004 there was still what he described as 'a divided camp' between those who supported Mr Dowson and those who supported DCI Pallas.
114. The Grievances advanced by the Claimants were all rejected, apart from two complaints in the case of Mr Thompson. However what occurred between July 2002 and July 2003 was to cast a long forensic shadow over those concerned.
115. On 24 January 2005, Messrs Dowson, Dunn and DC Bloomfield wrote a letter addressed to the Defendant in identical terms.

I request a thorough and impartial investigation into all aspects surrounding Operation Halogen

I was one of the officers involved in the operation and I feel that it is possible that criminal offences may have been committed. I am prepared, if necessary, to provide you with written evidence.

These letters had been drafted by the Police Federation on their behalf.

116. A reply was sent on behalf of the Chief Constable stating that there were no grounds to conduct an investigation into Operation Halogen.
117. As part of the investigations which followed on from Operation Halogen a man named Stuart Watson was charged with offences for which he was due to stand trial at Newcastle Crown Court. On 1 March 2005 Counsel defending Stuart Watson made contact with Counsel for the Prosecution and informed him that he had been contacted by a man named Johnson, who purported to be acting on behalf of two former CTN officers questioning the integrity of the Operation Halogen investigation. As a result of this information Defence Counsel made an application for disclosure in relation to a number of specific documents. On the following day and having heard argument, the Judge dealing with the Watson trial directed that the Grievance Procedure Files should be brought to Court. These documents were considered by a Counsel (independently instructed by the CPS) who identified the Grievance Procedure file of Mr Stewart as containing detailed criticism of what occurred during Operation Halogen. The Judge directed that Mr Dunn, Mr Dowson and DC Bloomfield should be interviewed by officers from the Professional Standards Department of the Northumbria Police Force; and on 7 March he ruled that if Mr Dunn and DC Bloomfield were called as witnesses for the Prosecution, the Defence would be entitled to cross-examine them about their concerns as to the conduct of Operation Halogen.
118. Mr Kingsley Hyland (the Head of the Complex Casework unit for the CPS North East Group) came to the conclusion that the Prosecution would be severely hampered if police officers called for the Prosecution were seen to be questioning the integrity of the Operation Halogen. In addition there were unrelated problems in relation to disclosure. In the light of these two matters, Mr Hyland decided that the Prosecution would offer no evidence against Watson and the criminal proceedings came to an end.
119. During the interviews of Mr Dowson, Mr Dunn and DC Bloomfield by the Professional Standards Department following the Judge's direction, a number of allegations were made against DCI Pallas. As a result of what was said the North Yorkshire Police were instructed by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) to conduct an investigation on its behalf in relations to 4 particular allegations of criminal conduct by DCI Pallas: first, that a decision was made to re-arrest Davie when there was insufficient evidence, secondly, that DCI Pallas had misrepresented the strength of the evidence so as to justify the re-arrest of Davie, thirdly that he had adopted an unethical and illegal strategy in the second interview with Davie (the 'sneak/cheat' document) and fourthly that, in order to suppress these matters, he had improperly interfered in the trial of Davie. DCI Pallas was interviewed under caution in relation to these allegations from 10.00 am to 7.00pm on 28 March 2006. The Claimants relied on a number of answers given by DCI Pallas during the course of this interview.
120. In the event the IPCC concluded that the allegations against DCI Pallas were unsubstantiated.
121. In the course of the North Yorkshire Police investigation, Mr Dixon made a statement (on 11 January 2006) about the Fib 3 document which he had said that he had handed to DCI Pallas in July 2002, containing information about Constable EF on which DCI Pallas had failed to act. On 19 February 2009 Mr Dixon was served with an allegation of Gross Misconduct in relation to this evidence. The allegation against Mr Dixon was that, in stating that DCI Pallas had personally received the intelligence report and had failed to act on it, he had provided false and inaccurate evidence.
122. The IPCC took over the investigation and treated it as a criminal investigation. Like the investigation into the allegations against DCI Pallas this investigation eventually concluded that the allegation was unsubstantiated.
123. On 3 December 2007 a letter before action was issued on behalf of Mr Dowson. On 1 July 2008 the claim form was issued and further claims on behalf of the other Claimants followed.
124. On 30 April 2009 Coulson J stuck out claims made DCs Bloomfield, Combe and Miller for harassment which had been made on 1 July 2008, see Dowson and others v. Chief Constable of Northumbria (No.1) [2009] EWHC QB 907.

PART IV

THE LAW

125. The most relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:

1. Prohibition of harassment

(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct

(a) which amounts to harassment of another, and

(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.

(2) For the purposes of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.

(3) Sub-section (1) does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows

(a) that it was pursued for the purpose for preventing or detecting crime…or

…

(c) that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.

2. Offence of harassment

(1) A person who pursues the course of conduct in breach of section 1 is guilty of an offence…

3. Civil remedy

(1) An actual or apprehended breach of section 1 may be the subject of a claim in civil proceedings by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question.

(2) On such a claim, damages may be awarded for (among other things) any anxiety caused by the harassment and any financial loss resulting from the harassment…

7. Interpretation of this group of sections.

…

(2) References to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress.

(3) A 'course of conduct' must involve

(a) in the case of conduct in relation to a single person, conduct on at least two occasions in relation to that person ...

(3A) A person's conduct on any occasion shall be taken, if aided, abetted, counselled and procured by another –

(a) to be conduct on that occasion of the other (as well as conduct of the person whose conduct it is …

(4) 'Conduct' includes speech.

126. Although in this area of the law each case will depend on its facts, a number of principles have been established by cases following the introduction of the Act.
127. In Thomas v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233 Lord Phillips, with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed, noted,

[29] Section 7 of the 1997 Act does not purport to provide a comprehensive definition of harassment. There are many actions that foreseeably alarm or cause a person distress that could not possibly be described as harassment. It seems to me that section 7 is dealing with that element of the offence which is constituted by the effect of the conduct rather than with the types of conduct that produce that effect.

[30] The Act does not attempt to define the type of conduct that is capable of constituting harassment. 'Harassment' is, however, a word which has a meaning which is generally understood. It describes conduct targeted at an individual which is calculated to produce the consequences described in section 7 and which is oppressive and unreasonable. The practice of stalking is a prime example of such conduct.

128. In Majrowski v Guy's and St. Thomas's NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251, it was accepted that the claimant had been bullied, harassed and intimidated by another of the Defendant's employees. The issue was whether the Defendant was vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employee. However, May LJ set out his view of the ambit of the statutory tort.

[82] … although section 7(2) provides that harassing a person includes causing the person distress, the fact that a person suffers distress is not by itself enough to show that the cause of the distress was harassment. The conduct has also to be calculated, in an objective sense, to cause distress and has to be oppressive and unreasonable. It has to be conduct which the perpetrator knows or ought to know amounts to harassment, and conduct which a reasonable person would think amounted to harassment. What amounts to harassment is, as Lord Phillips said, generally understood. Such general understanding would not lead to a conclusion that all forms of conduct, however reasonable, would amount to harassment simply because they cause distress. Employees may be distressed, and understandably so, by managerial conduct which, for instance, being properly and reasonably critical of an employee's poor performance, is entirely within the proper and reasonable scope of the manager's functions and duties.

129. When the case reached the House of Lords [2006] UKHL 34, the employer's appeal was dismissed; but members of the House made observations which were intended to reassure employers who might face claims based on vicarious liability for harassment.
130. Lord Nicholls at [29]-[30] stated:

[29] As I see it, the matter of most concern to employers is the prospect of abuse in cases of alleged workplace harassment. Employers fear the prospect of a multiplicity of unfounded, speculative claims if they are vicariously liable for employees' harassment. Disgruntled employees or ex-employees, perhaps suffering from stress at work unrelated to harassment, perhaps bitter at being dismissed, will all too readily advance unmeritorious claims for compensation for harassment. Internal grievance procedures will not always satisfy an employee who is nursing a grievance. Although awards of damages for anxiety under the 1997 Act will normally be modest, a claimant may well pursue his present or erstwhile employer, not the alleged wrongdoer himself. The claim may be put forward for the first time years after the alleged harassment is said to have occurred. The alleged perpetrator may no longer be with the employer and may not be traceable.

[30] This is a real and understandable concern. But these difficulties, and the prospect of abuse, are not sufficient reasons for excluding vicarious liability. To exclude liability on these grounds would be, to use the hackneyed phrase, to throw the baby out with the bathwater. It would mean that where serious harassment by an employee in the course of his employment has occurred, the victim - who may not be a fellow employee - would not have the right normally provided by the law to persons who suffer a wrong in that circumstance, namely, the right to have recourse to the wrongdoer's employer. The possibility of abuse is not a good reason for denying that right. Courts are well able to separate the wheat from the chaff at an early stage of the proceedings. They should be astute to do so. In most cases courts should have little difficulty in applying the 'close connection' test. Where the claim meets that requirement, and the quality of the conduct said to constitute harassment is being examined, courts will have in mind that irritations, annoyances, even a measure of upset, arise at times in everybody's day-to-day dealings with other people. Courts are well able to recognise the boundary between conduct which is unattractive, even unreasonable, and conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable. To cross the boundary from the regrettable to the unacceptable the gravity of the misconduct must be of an order which would sustain criminal liability under section 2.

131. At [66] Lady Hale noted that it is left to the Courts

… to draw sensible lines between the ordinary banter and badinage of life and genuinely offensive and unacceptable behaviour.

132. The passage in the speech of Lord Nicholls was considered by Gage LJ in the later decision of the Court of Appeal in Conn v Sunderland City Council [2007] EWCA Civ 1492, at [12-].

[12] It seems to me that what, in the words of Lord Nicholls in Majrowski, crosses the boundary between unattractive and even unreasonable conduct and conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable, may well depend on the context in which the conduct occurs. What might not be harassment on the factory floor or in the barrack room might well be harassment in the hospital ward and vice versa. In my judgment the touchstone for recognizing what is not harassment for the purposes of sections 1 and 3 will be whether the conduct is of such gravity as to justify the sanctions of the criminal law.

133. In R v. Curtis (James Daniel) [2010] EWCA Crim 123, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) considered what constituted harassment, in a judgment of the Court given by Pill LJ.

[29] To harass as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition, is to 'torment by subjecting to constant interference or intimidation'. The conduct must be unacceptable to a degree which would sustain criminal liability and also must be oppressive. We respectfully agree with the analysis of Lord Phillips MR, with whom Jonathan Parker LJ and Lord Mustill agreed, in Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233.

134. This interaction of ss.2(1) and 3(1) of the Act and the fact that the same actions may give rise to both criminal and civil liability has been further considered in later cases in the Court of Appeal (Civil Division). These cases provide a warning against confining civil claims only to those cases where a criminal case would succeed.
135. In Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46, Jacobs LJ said at [18]

… It has never been suggested generally that the scope of a civil wrong is restricted because it is also a crime. What makes the wrong of harassment different and special is because, as Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale recognised, in life one has to put up with a certain amount of annoyance: things have got to be fairly severe before the law, civil or criminal, will intervene.

136. In Veakins v. Kier Islington Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1288 Maurice Kay LJ observed,

[11] … The primary focus is whether the conduct is oppressive and unacceptable, albeit the court must keep in mind that it must be of an order which 'would sustain criminal liability.

…

[15] … It may be that, if asked, a prosecutor would be reluctant to prosecute but that is not the consideration, which is whether the conduct is of 'an order which would sustain criminal liability'. I consider that, in the event of a prosecution, the proven conduct would be sufficient to establish criminal liability. I do not accept that, in a criminal court, the proceedings would properly be stayed as an abuse of process.

137. There is one further matter of law that needs to be considered: namely, the Defendant's argument that many of the matters of complaint were acts pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, within the meaning of s.1(3)(a) and/or related to disagreements over operational decisions.
138. So far as the first point is concerned, in EDO MBM Technology Ltd v. Axworthy [2005] EWHC (QB) 2490, the Defendant argued that what might otherwise be acts of harassment were carried out to prevent criminal acts: the illegitimate supply of arms. Walker J rejected the argument at [53].

I conclude that to rely on s.1(3)(a) a defendant must have intended to prevent a crime that was both specific, in the sense that a particular victim or victims and a particular danger could be identified, and immediate and imminent.

139. On the hearing of the applications in April 2009 by the Claimants to amend and by the Defendant to strike out some of the claims, Dowson and others v. Chief Constable of Northumbria (No.1) (see above) Coulson J considered the application of s.1(3)(a). Although the EDO MBM Technology Ltd case does not appear to have been cited to him, Coulson J came to a similar conclusion.

[53] There are as yet no reported cases on the exception at section 1(3)(a) of the 1997 Act (the exclusion where the conduct complained of was pursued for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime). All of the present cases involve police officers, and the allegations arise largely out of named operations, so it was said by Mr Skelt that this exception must apply. In the absence of specific authority, I would conclude that:

a) The mere fact that harassment arises in the context of preventing or detecting crime will not, without more, trigger the exception, because otherwise the 1997 Act could not apply to the police force at all;

b) If the defendant wishes to rely on the exclusion, he or she would need to demonstrate that the course of conduct at the heart of the alleged harassment was specifically pursued for the purposes of crime prevention or detection. In most cases, it seems to me that that would require particular evidence which explained why the conduct complained of was necessary for crime prevention/detection ….

140. In the event no reliance was placed on s.1(3)(a) of the Act in the Defendant's closing submissions.
141. There was a considerable debate during the course of the trial as to the significance of what were characterised as disagreement about operational decisions. If what occurs is the expression of strong disagreement over operational or managerial decisions in the course of routine work, it is difficult to see how it can amount to an act of harassment. If on the other hand there were repeated capricious disagreements with a subordinate, amounting to oppression and accompanied by abuse, I can see little reason why it might not give rise to a claim, provided all the other requirements of the cause of action were satisfied.
142. I turn then to a summary of what must be proved as a matter of law in order for the claim in harassment to succeed.

(1) There must be conduct which occurs on at least two occasions,

(2) which is targeted at the claimant,

(3) which is calculated in an objective sense to cause alarm or distress, and

(4) which is objectively judged to be oppressive and unacceptable.

(5) What is oppressive and unacceptable may depend on the social or working context in which the conduct occurs.

(6) A line is to be drawn between conduct which is unattractive and unreasonable, and conduct which has been described in various ways: 'torment' of the victim, 'of an order which would sustain criminal liability'.

PART V

THE TRIAL

The Hearing

143. The hearing presented considerable challenges for the legal teams on each side. (A) There were a large number of documents in the court bundles, many of which were in manuscript and were only partly legible. (B) There were also a large number of witness statements as to the facts: 19 witness statements were deployed on behalf of the Claimants and 6 witnesses gave evidence on their behalf, 69 witness statements were served on behalf of the Defendant and 32 witnesses were called to give evidence on the Defendant's behalf at trial. Some of the witness statements were long: the longest (that of DCI Pallas) extended to 1,150 paragraphs. (C) Although the witness statements had cross-references, none of the cross-references were to the trial bundles. (D) Although the number of the Claimants' particular allegations were reduced in Mr Hogarth's Opening on the first day of the trial there were 69 specific factual allegations which were investigated during the course of the trial (Mr Dowson, 21; Mr Dunn, 8; Mr Stewart, 10; Mr Thompson, 14; Mr Hoggins 8; Mr Dixon, 8). The number of specific matters were further reduced by the end of the trial, but others which were not specifically pursued as acts of harassment were still relied on as throwing light on the motives and truthfulness of DCI Pallas. (E) Much of the evidence related to sensitive operational matters which (the parties agreed) had to be heard in private. This had two practical implications. The documents had to be kept secure throughout the hearing; and very frequently the public had to be invited to leave court at short notice. (F) Many parts of the witness statements contained statements of opinion: particularly as to the reasonableness or otherwise of operational decisions.
144. There were further difficulties faced by the parties and their witnesses. Most of the events in issue had taken place between 7 and 8 years before the trial. Some of the witnesses (in particular most of the Claimants and DCI Pallas) appeared to have a good recollection of events. This was in part because they had lived with the case for a long time, and DCI Pallas and Mr Dixon had been closely questioned about them in the meantime. The evidence of other witnesses was very much less certain.

Issues of credibility

145. I will deal with a number of these issues when I come to the particular allegations as they arise. However there is one discrete issue of credibility which lies at heart of what occurred: the 'sneak/cheat' document.
146. I have already set out the different accounts of this document in the witness statements of DC Bloomfield and DCI Pallas. DCI Pallas's account was the one he gave to Mr Miles Barker of the CPS in July-August 2003 and led to the decision to disclose the document at that time.
147. It is convenient to note a number of anomalies in relation to the Claimants' evidence.

(1) Although it was intended that the document would be used as the basis of the second interview of Davie, the evidence of DC Bloomfield and DC Williams, who was the other officer who interviewed Davie on the second occasion, was that the document was not referred to or used.

(2) Sgt Reeve who was supervising the re-arrest phase spoke to DC Bloomfield at the time of Davie's second interview. According to his evidence DC Bloomfield mentioned that there was a lot of new material on which to interview Davie, but did not mention the 'sneak/cheat' document.

(3) Mr Dunn's evidence was that DC Bloomfield had come to see him about the document, and that he told him to see Mr Dowson. Both he and Mr Dowson considered it to be a disclosable document.

(4) DC Bloomfield gave evidence that he told Mr Dowson about the document, and was told by Mr Dowson that the document would have to be disclosed and that he should retain it.

(5) Mr Dowson's account in his Grievance Procedure document of 27 March 2003 was that DC Bloomfield had asked for his advice about the document and it had been withheld from the disclosure schedule for 'obvious reasons'. In his witness statement at §125 and in his oral evidence, his account was different. He said that he advised DC Bloomfield to put the notes on the disclosure schedule so that disclosure was 'out of his hands.' It is difficult to reconcile these accounts.

(6) In §25 of his witness statement DC Bloomfield maintained that Davie went 'ballistic' when questioned about matters about which he had been asked in the first interview. This is wrong. DC Williams did not recall it and it does not appear from the transcripts of the interviews. As already noted, in his oral evidence DC Bloomfield maintained that the document had not been used at all and that he had gone away and prepared his own notes for interview.

(7) DC Bloomfield's evidence was that he sought advice from Mr Dunn and Mr Dowson and that Mr Dowson's advice was to keep the document. He formed the impression that advice would be taken from the CPS. When I asked him how he thought advice could be sought from the CPS about disclosure when he had the only versions of the notes, he failed to give any coherent response.

(8) It is clear that the 'sneak/cheat' document was disclosable. DCI Pallas gave clear and compelling evidence that he had no cause to be defensive about the document and expected it to be disclosed.

(9) Despite this, and with the apparent complicity of Messrs Dowson, Dunn (the deputy SIO) and Hoggins it was not disclosed, but was kept by DC Bloomfield from November 2002 until the copy and original were handed to DCI Adamson in May 2003.

148. I have concluded that DCI Pallas's account about how he came to write the words on the document was truthful and accurate. He was recording DC Bloomfield's response to his intended questions. The words 'sneak' and 'cheat' expressed DC Bloomfield's view about the legitimacy of the proposed questions, based on what he knew about the first interview, which may have been less than he revealed to DCI Pallas. DCI Pallas gave him the document with the words 'sneak' and 'cheat' on it; and asked him to look again at the first interview. The words were never intended to convey to DC Bloomfield that he should 'sneak' or 'cheat' during the interview. Shortly after this meeting DC Bloomfield showed the document to Messrs Dunn and Dowson. Whether he deliberately misled them about how the words came to be written on the document or whether he failed to correct a misunderstanding is unclear. What is likely is that there was a consensus that the document might be used as a means of embarrassing DCI Pallas.
149. If the document had been on the disclosure schedules from the start it is unlikely that a problem would have arisen, since it was disclosed in the trial of Davie and did not give rise to any issue. The reason why the document was damaging and contributed to the collapse of the trial of Stuart Watson was not because of the words written on the document; but because of the allegation made by Mr Dowson, Mr Dunn and DC Bloomfield in their letters to the Chief Constable about potential criminality. When nothing came of the letter, the telephone call was made in March 2005 to Stuart Watson's counsel. This led to the pressure to disclose this and other documents in unfavourable circumstances at trial. This was in turn one of the factors leading to the CPS's decision to offer no further evidence against Stuart Watson. It was these circumstances which in turn led to the IPCC investigation into the conduct of DCI Pallas.
150. I think it likely that one of Mr Dowson, Mr Dunn and DC Bloomfield made the telephone call which alerted Watson's Counsel to what he was entitled to view as possible criminal activity. However since each denied it and it is not possible to decide which of them was lying, I have formed no adverse view about the telephone call against any of them.
151. Nevertheless the evidence which DC Bloomfield gave about the 'sneak/cheat' document during his evidence was highly unsatisfactory both as to what he said about it and the manner he said it. I have concluded that DC Bloomfield acted in a discreditable and manipulative way in relation to the 'sneak/cheat' document and that his evidence about the document was, in most material respects, untruthful.
152. I deal separately with Mr Hoggins's part in the disclosure when dealing with allegation MH8.

General impression of the witnesses

153. Some of the most important witnesses have been plainly affected by what has occurred. It is clear for example that Mr Dowson has changed since 2002. He has suffered from a depressive illness which has made him less able to cope with the burden of giving evidence over a protracted period. Mr Stewart too was deeply affected by his sudden removal from CTN. DCI Pallas was for many months the direct object of much of the Claimants' Grievance Procedure and later faced a criminal investigation.
154. Much play was made by both sides about issues of credibility. To see this case as a challenge between the credibility of the Claimants and their witnesses and the Defendant and his witnesses is too simplistic. Perhaps inevitably over the period since 2002 positions have become entrenched. Where I have doubts about the reliability of the evidence I will identify such doubts; but apart from the evidence of DC Bloomfield and part of the evidence of Mr Stewart, I am satisfied that the witnesses who gave evidence were, (in general) trying to tell the truth, although I do not necessarily accept everything they said. There were, for example, pleaded allegations which inconsistent with the contemporary documents and which were not pursued.
155. Mr Dowson was plainly a capable and conscientious police officer. He was ambitious and keen to succeed; but he was also intensely sensitive, and in my view, over-sensitive to criticism. He wanted to be liked; and it is clear that in his time as acting DCI at CTN he inspired a strong loyalty among some of his colleagues and subordinates. A wish to be liked is not an ignoble ambition; but it is a characteristic which may lead to indulgence of bad habits where a more rigorous approach may be more appropriate.
156. DCI Pallas was not a person who particularly wanted to be liked. He struck me as a competent police officer who prided himself on bringing operations to a successful conclusion and within budget. The evidence suggests that there were those who got on well with him at CTN; but that he was sometimes insensitive, overbearing and boorish. He was prepared to listen to contrary views; but on some occasions he was strongly resistant to hearing views which differed from his own, particularly from those whom he had concluded were not up to the tasks he expected them to perform.
157. I have concluded that Mr Stewart was out of his depth at crucial stages in Operation Halogen. Although he was the Deputy SIO he made a number of poor operational decisions. Whether some of these were the consequence of unwarrantable pressure due to DCI Pallas's absence on 22-23 October and whether DCI Pallas's comments in Mr Stewart's PDR were justified, are matters that I consider later in this Judgment. He was plainly prone to exaggeration: for example in the numerous references in his witness statement [§§25, 26, 72, 78, 87, 97, 101, 106 and 117] to DCI Pallas shouting and/or going red in the face. This was in marked contrast to some of Mr Stewart's contemporary notes, and most of the evidence of other witnesses which described a characteristic self-control.
158. Mr Dunn struck me as a forceful and capable officer, who had been promoted to the rank of Inspector before he emigrated and joined the New Zealand police service. However he equivocated when asked about the extent to which the harassment which he claimed to have suffered had affected his mental state.
159. Mr Thompson was another Claimant who was deeply affected by his removal from his role at CTN dealing with CHISs. He rightly regarded himself as an experienced handler; and felt that DCI Pallas was intent on reducing his role and challenging his expertise and professionalism. In one sense he was right. It is clear that DCI Pallas was concerned that OSDU was operating according to its own rules within CTN. One of the issues for consideration is whether DCI Pallas was right in this, and more importantly whether the way in which he dealt with Mr Thompson about this and related issues gives rise to a claim for harassment.
160. Mr Dixon too had been subjected to the considerable pressures of an IPCC investigation, with the possibility of a criminal prosecution and/or dismissal for serious misconduct. His credibility is important in relation to allegations JD1 and JD2 but does not call for further comment at this stage.
161. Since 2003 Mr Hoggins had been promoted to the rank of Sergeant. He seemed, at least on the face of it, to be the least affected of the Claimants. Like Mr Dunn, Mr Hoggins's claim became relatively confined by the end of the case.

PART VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

JD1: Information about Constable EF

162. The claim by Mr Dixon relates to DCI Pallas's reaction on 18 February 2003, after he had been told about information about Constable EF which Mr Dixon says was passed on in July and August 2002. The Claimants also rely on DCI Pallas's explanations for what occurred as demonstrating that he was not a credible witness.
163. For the purpose of deciding who is telling the truth about this incident it is necessary to consider the Claimants' case in some detail.
164. The Claimants' case, at least to some extent, depends on what was contained in 4 July 2002 Fib 3 form. At various stages it has been contended by Mr Dixon and others that the information from CHIS AB was that Constable EF was corrupt. For example, Mr Dixon told the North Yorkshire Police during the 2005/6 IPCC enquiry that the Fib 3 form intelligence stated that EF was corrupt; and he made a s.9 CJA statement to that effect. This was at a stage when the 4 July 2002 Fib 3 form could not be found.
165. I set out the material parts of the contents of Fib 3 form in the confidential appendix; and it is sufficient to note here that source AB referred to Constable EF being mentioned by certain people. Although the information might have given rise to integrity issues about that EF, it was not information that he was corrupt.
166. There is nothing on the form to show that it was seen by or shown to DCI Pallas; and DCI Black (at the time the controller of CHISs) gave evidence that he would have expected to see a record on the face of the document if copies had been made.
167. It is also significant that Mr Dixon's account as to when he provided the information to DCI Pallas has changed. He originally said that he had given the form to DCI Pallas or told him about Constable EF being allegedly corrupt 'the same day or the next day'. When it was pointed out to him that DCI Pallas had spent all of 5 July in hospital with his injured son, Mr Dixon suggested that it was within a period of 48 hours. However, 5 July was a Friday, DCI Pallas did not take up his post in CTN until Monday 8 July, EF did not arrive at CTN until later in July and Operation Halo/Halogen did not begin until August.
168. DCI Pallas has always denied seeing or being told about the contents of the 4 July Fib 3 form. He has also been clear that he was not told of any suspicion of corruption in relation to EF until November/December 2002 when another source came forward with information. The evidence shows that DCI Pallas was a prolific note taker; and a close examination of his records (including his daybook) does not reveal any note about EF being corrupt, although there are references to EF in what appear to be other contexts.
169. It is also striking that if DCI Pallas had been told about an allegation about EF being corrupt, he did not do anything about it. One of the more perplexing pieces of evidence was from some of the Claimants' witnesses about what occurred on 14 August 2002. I have already set out Mr Dixon's evidence. In §59 of his witness statement, Mr Thompson says he

… was amazed that DCI Pallas had allowed the move to take place having regard to the information submitted by DC Dixon.

170. DC Fiddes was also at the meeting on 14 August in §§13-15 and describes what occurred:

13. … During the discussion, DC Dixon stated that another officer had been mentioned as also being involved with the same criminal activity (prostitution). DC Dixon had been told this by a CHIS … DC Dixon hesitated to name the officer when he began to relay the information to the briefing. DCI Pallas intervened and said, 'There are no secrets amongst us in this room. Just tell everyone.' I got the impression that DCI Pallas already knew who this officer was.

14. DC Dixon then named [EF] as the officer who featured in his intelligence report. This caused immediate concern as [EF] had been a recent recruit to CTN as part of the Surveillance Team that operated from the same building as we did.

15. … DC Dixon only disclosed the name once DCI Pallas had intervened and given him authorisation. I could see that the form DC Dixon was reading from was in DC Dixon's own handwriting, in black marker pen.

171. I do not accept this version of events. None of the witnesses who were asked about this gave any sensible explanation as to why, if they were so concerned about EF being a corrupt officer, they said nothing about it at the meeting. I also note DI Docherty's evidence (at §79 of his witness statement) that when he and DC Fiddes interviewed the new source in November 2002, DC Fiddes and DC Miller 'were completely taken by surprise.' It is also highly surprising that if something had been said about a corrupt police officer in July and August, nothing was noted about it by DCI Pallas; or that he would knowingly have allowed an officer suspected of corruption to be part of the surveillance team carrying out surveillance operations which targeted the criminal with whom he was supposedly involved. When DCI Pallas was told about what the new source was alleging in November 2002 (untruthfully as it transpired) officer EF was immediately moved from the CTN Surveillance Team.
172. It is of interest that Mr Dowson, who was present at the 14 August meeting, had no recollection of EF's name being mentioned as a corrupt officer; and that Mr Stewart, who was not at the 14 August meeting, but was clearly aware of the Fib 3 information since he had signed the document and was aware of the use of EF in surveillance, did not raise it with DCI Pallas as a matter of concern.
173. I have concluded that Mr Dixon and Mr Stewart, who had processed the Fib 3 form, did not pass on either the form or the information about Constable EF to DCI Pallas in any way which suggested that there were issues of corruption in relation this officer. Nor do I accept that anything was said which would have alerted him to the possibility that EF was corrupt on 14 August. In these circumstances, when DCI Pallas was told in February 2003 that there had been intelligence known to Mr Dixon in July about EF being corrupt, he was entitled to be annoyed that he had not been told. In fact, as I have already indicated, the information in the Fib 3 form was very much less specific.
174. The fact that the Fib 3 form was lost for a significant period of time led to it being misdescribed by Mr Dixon to the North Yorkshire Police during their investigation of DCI Pallas, and exposed DCI Pallas to the risk of prosecution. It may be right, as Mr Hogarth contends, that there were inaccuracies in DCI Pallas's account in his interview with the North Yorkshire Police; but he was being asked about events which took place some years before and without the benefit of the underlying documentation. The points made by Mr Hogarth do not undermine the quality of DCI Pallas's evidence about this incident.
175. To the extent that the evidence about what occurred at the 14 August meeting differs from that of Mr Dowson and DCI Pallas, I reject it.
176. As to the specific allegation of harassment of Mr Dixon on 18 February 2003, I accept that DCI Pallas was annoyed at what he thought were Mr Dixon's failures to process important information and that he swore at him. I do not consider that DCI Pallas's conduct was, in the circumstances, an act of harassment.

BD1 and NT2: shaven headed detectives from Newcastle North

177. It is common ground that DCI Pallas made a reference to 'shaven-headed detectives' at a meeting very soon after he arrived in July 2002. There is a dispute about the precise words used and the implications of what was said.
178. Neither Mr Dowson nor Mr Thompson was present at this meeting and they rely on the evidence of others. Linda Blanchflower (an administrative support officer) recalled an occasion, at which she thought D/Supt Vant was present, when DCI Pallas referred to 'too many shaven headed detectives from Newcastle North.' Mr Dunn also gave evidence of DCI Pallas referring to 'too many shaven-headed detectives from Etal Lane'; and that he understood this to be a reference to Messrs Dowson, Thompson and DC Miller. Mr Thompson recalls DCI Pallas using the expression later, at a time when he thought it was directed at him. In §29 of his witness statement he says:

It was not said in a joking manner and it made me feel very uncomfortable at the time. The repetition of it made it sound threatening. Why would he say it to my face other than to make a point? I understood he was saying there were too many of us, he would do something about that.

179. Mr Dowson was not present, but heard it reported.

66. … As I was one of only three detectives whom his comment could refer to, I found it both offensive and threatening … Had this been an isolated incident I would probably have ignored it as trivial, but in view of the matters mentioned above it preyed on my mind a lot.

The 'matters mentioned above' refers to the tactical loss issues (see BD6 and 7 below).

180. DCI Pallas accepted that at a large meeting soon after he first arrived at CTN he said,

..is this the new crime team uniform – black T shirts and shaved heads?

181. DS Chappell, who gave evidence for the Defendant, remembered him saying this, but did not consider it to be offensive since jokes about bald heads were common in CTN. He pointed out that DC Miller was known as 'Curly', a name which he had been given by Mr Dowson.
182. I have concluded that when he first arrived, DCI Pallas asked, whether black T shirts and shaved heads were the new uniform. Possibly pleased with this description, DCI Pallas then used it on other occasions and referred to 'too many shaven headed detectives from Newcastle North', intending to refer to Mr Dowson, Mr Thompson and DC Miller. This could have been taken to be offensive at the time; but appears not to have been. In his Notification of Grievance in June 2003, Mr Thompson made it clear that he did not place much importance on the remarks at the time, although he did in retrospect.
183. These were tactless remarks which might, depending on the circumstances, be regarded as offensive and have given rise to a disciplinary action; but I do not accept that they amounted to an act of harassment. I note that this view was shared by Coulson J in Dowson and others v. Chief Constable of Northumbria Police (No.1) (referred to above).

[90] I am in no doubt that the conduct [of] which DC Miller complains does not begin to amount to harassment. I am afraid that I consider it risible to suggest that DCI Pallas's remark about there being 'too many shaven headed detectives from Newcastle' could possibly amount to harassment.

184. I also note that the comment was considered by senior officers in the context of Mr Thompson's Grievance; and that they considered that DCI Pallas could have conducted himself better and should have avoided making this type of personal comment. DCI Pallas agreed to apologise to Mr Thompson in relation to offence caused by his comment about bald heads; and there the matter could and should have rested.

BD6 and BD7: Tactical Losses

185. It is accepted on behalf of the Claimants that DCI Pallas was entitled to choose how his team should operate within the bounds of what was lawful. The complaint, at least by the end of the trial, was that he described the tactic adopted by Mr Dowson as likely to mislead and potentially unlawful; that he did this in front of junior officers; that, having openly criticised the practice, he was unwilling to accept that he was wrong about it; and that he attempted to justify his behaviour by not being truthful about his discussions about the practice with Mr Hyland of the CPS.
186. A lot of time was taken in considering whether Mr Dowson's way of operating was unlawful or potentially misleading in the context of Disclosure. Different opinions were expressed with differing degrees of confidence and expertise. I have concluded that the means adopted by Mr Dowson were not illegal; but that they could have given rise to difficulties at trial unless a very careful record was made both of what was happening and why it was happening. It seems that this was not done.
187. I have also concluded that DCI Pallas was entitled to form his own view about the practice and to decide whether it should continue. It is clear that in fact he went further. He consulted Mr Hyland and recorded Mr Hyland's advice in his daybook. I am satisfied that DCI Pallas did not materially misrepresent Mr Dowson's practice to Mr Hyland or to anyone else; and that he accurately conveyed the advice he received from Mr Hyland.
188. What should have been a difference of view about an operational issue, in which Mr Dowson ought to have accepted the views of his senior officer, was seen by Mr Dowson as a personal attack. DCI Pallas may have been insensitive in expressing the view that the practice was unlawful; but in the circumstances of the discussion, Mr Dowson was oversensitive in regarding this as an attack on his competence and professionalism.
189. Accordingly, I do not accept that the claim advanced under these headings amounted to an act or acts of harassment

BD2 and BD3: 'He's just a glorified DC ... I'll get rid of him'

190. Allegation BD2 is based on a specific entry in Mr Stewart's pocket book under the heading 23 August. This entry was challenged by the Defendant who contended that the words were added later, and in any event did not reflect what was said. The Defendant instructed a handwriting expert whose opinion was that the words, 'rid of' were added later. That evidence was not contested and Mr Stewart admitted in evidence that the words had been 'after-added'. I agree with the Defendant's submission that the two words were added so as to bolster the weak evidential basis of this particular claim; and do not reflect well on Mr Stewart. I do not accept that DCI Pallas said on 23 August that he would 'get rid' of Mr Dowson.
191. Although in §82 of his witness statement Mr Dowson speaks of a conversation with Mr Stewart in mid-September, when Mr Stewart mentioned words similar to those alleged, that conversation most likely reflected DCI Pallas's criticism that Mr Dowson allowed two senior and experienced DC's (Gallagher and Middleton) to go out on surveillance. It was part of a broader criticism that too much time was spent by experienced officers, including Mr Dowson, on surveillance activities.
192. Allegation BD3 is based on a contention that DCI Pallas repeatedly said that Mr Dowson was a glorified detective and would soon be replaced. In §21 of Mr Dunn's witness statement, he states:

… on a number of occasions he stated that DI Dowson was a 'glorified Detective' and would soon be rid of him.

These conversations were said to have taken place in the Pub; but no date is given. I have already expressed my view about the phrase 'glorified detective'.

193. I accept that DCI Pallas spoke of 'getting rid' of Mr Dowson while chatting in the pub at some stage. However the timing and context of what was said is important; and it is convenient to consider this allegation in the more general context of allegation BD5.
194. There is a more general issue about the significance of what is said in the absence of a claimant, but which is later reported to him by a third party. I do not accept that this type of reported conduct cannot amount to an act of harassment. On the contrary it plainly may in circumstances, for example, where it is known or may be assumed that a particular type of remark is likely to be passed on. Much will depend on the facts.

BD4: Mr Dowson on borrowed time

195. This allegation relates to a conversation at the Conservative Social Club in Morpeth when DCI Pallas said that Mr Dowson better watch out what he was doing or he would soon be on his way. Mr Dixon's evidence was that he was present at this conversation, which he placed towards the beginning of October. In his interview in relation to Mr Dowson's grievance on 8 May 2003, DI Adamson noted DC Bloomfield's description of what occurred,

… all drinking late on 8 pm – all had drink … was saying/have a go in front of troops - weren't friendly and didn't rate the guy – but all been drinking. Can't remember exactly but did tell Bruce in general context had said. Didn't rate as operational DI + not running properly + … impression 'bit of a cowboy'. Present – Roulstone, John Dixon + others – not sure. Seemed out of context … may have been drink talking.

196. Although I do not accept DC Bloomfield's evidence in relation to the 'sneak/cheat' document, I consider that this description of what DCI Pallas was saying is likely to be more accurate than Mr Dixon's description. It is clear from this account that everyone had been drinking and that DCI Pallas was making clear that he did not have a high opinion of Mr Dowson.
197. Mr Dowson places the incident in the first week of October and says that heard from DC Roulstone that DCI Pallas had been making comments about him 'having to watch his back' and saying he was 'on borrowed time.' DC Roulstone, who did not give evidence at trial, told DI Adamson that he was only passing on to Mr Dowson what he had heard from someone else. There is evidence that DC Roulstone later decided that he did not want to be involved in the dispute between Mr Dowson and DCI Pallas; and this may account for his later telling D/Supt Hepworth that he had never witnessed inappropriate behaviour by DCI Pallas, and that this incident in the Pub 'definitely didn't happen'.
198. Although the evidence is slim, I have concluded that there probably was an occasion in early October at which DCI Pallas made disparaging and inappropriate remarks about Mr Dowson's capabilities in front of junior officers and that this was reported to him, as DCI Pallas should have expected.

GS6: Reaction to the move of the operational HQ from Morpeth to Ponteland

199. The allegation is that DCI Pallas shouted and verbally abused Mr Stewart for moving the operational headquarters of Operation Halogen while he was away at the DVLA conference.
200. One thing should have been clear to DCI Pallas from relatively early on: the unlikelihood that Mr Stewart would have decided to move the operational headquarters, or at least the documents, on his own initiative. The evidence shows that officers from the PSD were concerned with security at Morpeth Police Station and that it was on their initiative that the documents were moved. This might have given the impression to anyone who was not aware of the circumstances that the operational headquarters had moved.
201. DCI Pallas had not been told that this was going to happen and that he was justifiably annoyed that it had. He had returned late on 23 October and was on other duties the following day. When he went into the CTN offices on 25 October, he discovered that there was no activity on Operation Halogen taking place where he expected it to be. He was the SIO and he plainly should have been both consulted and informed. I do not accept Mr Stewart's evidence that he had tried and been unable to make contact with DCI Pallas. To his credit, Mr Stewart accepted in his evidence that DCI Pallas was justified at being annoyed about the move.
202. I have concluded that there is no evidence that DCI Pallas's reaction went beyond a justifiable expression of annoyance at what occurred.

GS7 and GS8, BD11 and MH4: Reaction to the release of Davie

203. Time was also spent at the trial in investigating the point at which DCI Pallas knew that he would have to go to the DVLA conference, when he informed Mr Dowson that he would have to take over as Acting SIO of Operation Halogen and whether Mr Dowson was placed under an unwarrantable burden. This was partly for the purpose of examining DCI Pallas's credibility. It was the Claimants' case that DCI Pallas must have known that he would be going to the conference well in advance and that, instead of telling Mr Dowson in good time that this was going to happen, he told him at the last moment.
204. It seems to me that both sides adopted extreme positions on this issue. The most likely course of events was that DCI Pallas knew at some time in the week beginning 14 October that he would be required to go to the conference; and at that stage took the view that if he left at midday on Tuesday 22 October the arrest phase of the operation would be complete and the interview phase would be well underway. At this stage he had confidence that the next phase would be carried out according to the Policies he had set out in the Operation Policy Book. On balance I am satisfied that he failed to warn Mr Dowson that he would have to take over in his absence until sometime on Monday 21 October, although it is certainly possible that it was done earlier. DCI Pallas was entitled to have confidence in Mr Dowson's ability to carry out the role of acting SIO; not least because Mr Dowson had been present (at least) at one of the early meetings, he had been tasked on 2 October to read all the documents associated with the operation, was present at the operation review meeting on 7 October and was involved in the arrest of Davie on 21 October. That DCI Pallas's confidence was well placed can be seen from the quality of the application which Mr Dowson prepared for the Warrant for the Further Detention of Davie. It was typical of DCI Pallas's tendency to praise and blame with equal fervour that, while he was critical of the decision to release Davie, he was rightly complimentary about Mr Dowson's work on the Warrant of Further Detention.
205. These findings necessarily mean that DCI Pallas's account of having told Mr Dowson that he was going to the conference 'some days before' is inaccurate.
206. It is clear from DCI Pallas's own account (witness statement §524) that Mr Dowson felt uneasy at supervising the operation when he was told DCI Pallas was leaving; and DCI Pallas should have been very much more sensitive to the pressures this placed on Mr Dowson than he was.
207. It is common ground that the decision to release Davie without charge and without bail conditions was an operational mistake which was caused by Mr Stewart's misunderstanding of the law and his failure to check with the CPS. It led to a suspect being released into the community in which he was said to be offending, making further enquiries more difficult, and the need for any re-arrest to be based on new evidence.
208. The allegation on behalf of Mr Stewart (GS7) is set out in his witness statement

101. … He was also angry and aggressive towards me regarding the release of Graham Davie, without charge. He was shouting even louder than normal, criticising my decision making and professional ability. It was a torrent of abuse which included multiple uses of the word 'Fuck'. He appeared to be totally losing his temper. He was extremely red faced and sweating as he continued the tirade. He was clenching his fists.

102. … I had previously been informed by the CPS on another matter that you could not put somebody on bail once you had applied for a warrant of further detention. He reacted with even more aggression, swearing at me and saying I was incompetent, when all I was doing was following CPS advice.

As already noted, Mr Stewart appears to have misunderstood the CPS advice, and in any event did not specifically seek advice in relation to the release of Davie.

209. It is significant that when he came to make his PDR entry in respect of DCI Pallas less than 2 weeks later, Mr Stewart recorded DCI Pallas as showing his displeasure by making a 'sarcastic remark'. I accept that DCI Pallas may well have expressed trenchant views about what had occurred; and may have used 'barrack-room' language. However, in an operational context, and bearing in mind that there had been a significant departure from the carefully planned operational strategy, with all the consequential difficulties which were caused, I reject the contention that this conduct gives rise to a claim for harassment. The fact that the criticism was repeated on 30 October (GS8) adds very little, if anything, to Mr Stewart's claim.
210. I should add that in his oral evidence Mr Stewart said that, when he tried to get in touch with DCI Pallas while he was at the DVLA conference he had the impression that DCI Pallas was drunk, giggling and inattentive. In my view this was not truthful evidence. It had never been referred to in any of Mr Stewart's numerous complaints about DCI Pallas and is not referred to among the comprehensive entries in Mr Stewart's pocket book. As on other occasions, Mr Stewart was prepared to elaborate in order to bolster his case.
211. The allegation on behalf of Mr Dowson (BD11) is contained in his witness statement.

106. On the day of Davie's release I received a telephone call from an angry DCI Pallas who was far from happy. He stated, 'What the fuck do you think you are doing?' and words to that effect and words to the effect that there was 'bucket-loads' of evidence against Davie and he should have been fucking charged. He asked me to get 'a fucking meeting' together for the same day and told me I was 'fucking wrong'.

107. He had been absent for two days and was extremely angry. His anger was irrational and disproportionate. I could not understand why he was so angry about this. There was no doubt that Davie was involved in some degree of criminality but at that stage there was simply insufficient evidence to proffer a charge.

108. By asking me to convene this meeting it placed me in a situation whereby DCI Pallas had once again questioned my decision making and once again this was patently obvious to all the staff present. It was another example of his behaviour towards me which undermined my position.

This is the only occasion where Mr Dowson records DCI Pallas losing his temper and using bad language.

212. DCI Pallas was entitled to take issue with an operational decision which ran counter to his entire policy, which was to keep the suspects off the streets until further evidence might be gathered. Unattractive as his manner of expression may have been it does not give rise to conduct amounting to harassment even when expressed as conduct intended to undermine Mr Dowson's position.
213. The nature of Mr Hoggins's claim (MH4) is set out in §14 of his Particulars of Claim:

DS Hoggins was openly criticised by DCI Pallas after Davie was released. When Davie was re-arrested on 17 November 2002, DS Hoggins was excluded from the process

214. The claim is based on what Mr Hoggins was told by Mr Dowson and Mr Davie. Mr Hoggins had been the interview advisor and it is clear that DCI Pallas was highly critical of all who had been involved in Davie's unconditional release without charge.
215. For the reasons already set out, I have concluded that DCI Pallas was entitled to be critical of those involved in the release of Davie, including Mr Hoggins; and these allegations of harassment fail.

GS9: DCI Pallas's entries in Mr Stewart's PDR

216. In §26.5 of the Claimants' Closing Submission this allegation was characterised as follows:

DCI Pallas gave DS Stewart an intemperate, adverse, hostile and unreasonable appraisal as a punishment to him, knowing it would seriously affect his career … This was unjustified criticism and an act of retaliation.

217. In my judgment this way of putting the case entirely fails. DCI Pallas's entries on Mr Stewart's PDR were material and, in so far as it is necessary to form a view about operational matters, justified. They were in any event neither intemperate nor malicious. In contrast, the criticisms by Mr Stewart of DCI Pallas in his response and in his 'appraisal' of DCI Pallas demonstrate intemperate, hostile, unreasonable and unprofessional conduct by a junior officer towards a senior officer.
218. I do not accept that Mr Stewart may have been suffering from a form of mental breakdown (as Mr Hogarth suggested), nor that DCI Pallas should have recognised or suspected this. There is no evidence of any sort (including from Mr Stewart) that he was suffering from a breakdown. What is clear is that he was extremely annoyed about the PDR entry and decided to retaliate in an impermissible way. He alone was the author of the misfortunes which followed from these actions.
219. Unlike the other Claimants, no complaint is now made on behalf of Mr Stewart about his removal from CTN. His position was assessed by D/Supt Vant who decided that, in the circumstances, he could not remain at CTN. That operational decision was fully justified.

JD4: Financial checks by the back-door

220. The allegation is that DCI Pallas instructed Mr Dixon to carry out financial checks on 2 suspects and, when Mr Dixon said he would prepare the applications for the Court, told him instead to use 'the back-door' and obtain the information unofficially. Mr Dixon describes the incident in his witness statement.

23. … I drafted the relevant court order and asked [DCI Pallas] to sign it, which he refused. Pallas suggested that I should obtain the information unofficially and 'go through the back door'; if there was anything of interest to us then we could apply for it officially. I refused to do this as it was unlawful and I found it very strange that a DCI would suggest something like this.

24. At first I thought it was an integrity test. I said no and then DCI Pallas began to shout and criticised me for not carrying out his request … I felt very uncomfortable. I could not understand that he would put me in this position as, if I had carried out this request I would have been disciplined and sacked had it ever been discovered.

221. It seems strange that Mr Dixon never asked what Mr Pallas meant by the phrase 'go through the back-door.' The allegation is not made any easier to sustain by Mr Dixon's admission in cross-examination that he could remember very little about it.
222. The factual position is that CTN officers had the numbers of credit card accounts, names and addresses which had been used to pay for advertisements by prostitutes. DCI Pallas's evidence was that he intended that Mr Dixon should ask the major high-street banks if any of the suspects in Operation Halogen had accounts at the bank. If they did, an application to the Court could be made directing the bank to list transactions from the account. If there were transactions on those accounts corresponding with payments to the credit card accounts the suspects would be linked to the advertisements.
223. Although described as a 'back-door' method, it was an informal procedure which could be carried out with the cooperation of the banks and which permitted applications for formal Production Orders to be focussed where relevant information was likely to be found. Mr Kettlewell (a Financial Analyst with the Northumbria Force's Economic Unit) gave evidence that he had made a similar type of approach under the statutory regime which applied before the coming into force of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; and that it was difficult to know what other 'back-door' approach Mr Dixon thought DCI Pallas might have had in mind. All Banks have stringent rules designed to protect client confidentiality and any employee found passing unauthorised information to the police would be likely to face, at least, serious disciplinary action.
224. I have concluded that this allegation fails. There is virtually nothing to suggest that DCI Pallas was asking Mr Dixon to undertake a task which was illegal.

BD5: DCI Pallas's openly hostile and belittling attitude to Mr Dowson

225. There is cogent evidence that DCI Pallas was dismissive of Mr Dowson, belittled him in front of junior officers and, on occasions appeared openly hostile to him. Supt Mitchell of the PSD noticed this at a meeting on 21 October, as did Linda Blanchflower (a Case Management Officer within CTN).
226. The difficulty arises from the context. Mr Dunn's witness statement describes what he observed,

18. … I was present during a number of meetings (which took place daily in respect of operations) when DCI Pallas would openly and unjustly criticise DI Dowson's leadership and direction. This had the effect of undermining [Mr Dowson] in front of junior officers.

It is clear from this passage that the criticism related to a deep difference of views about a number of operational matters: for example, the use of video surveillance and the approach to tactical losses.

227. In any hierarchical system (such as the Police) subordinates should follow the orders and directions of those in a senior rank within the confines of the Law. But there is another important and reciprocal duty: not to subvert the authority of others by disloyal remarks about fellow officers addressed to those of lower rank. This is an obligation which both DCI Pallas and Mr Dowson overlooked on occasions.
228. I have also concluded that Mr Dowson was oversensitive to criticism. Most others in his position would have accepted that their methods might have to change under a new DCI. A difficulty arose because Mr Dowson was intensely proud of his achievements as acting DCI and saw many of the changes as implicit criticisms. Where there was explicit criticism this made matters worse. It is also clear that many of the criticisms of Mr Dowson occurred at operational meetings when tactics were being discussed, inevitably in front of junior officers.
229. The Defendant draws attention to evidence from DS Chappell, Jacqui Clark and Beverley Ramshaw that Mr Dowson criticised and abused DCI Pallas behind his back. I accept this evidence; but it illustrates little more than the deplorable breakdown of trust and confidence between Mr Dowson and DCI Pallas.

BD15: The Sergeants' meeting on 5 February 2003

230. This was a meeting organised by DCI Pallas with all the Sergeants in CTN to which the two DIs, Mr Dowson and DI Taylor, were not invited.
231. A number of the Sergeants who attended the meeting found it strange that the DIs were not present or felt uncomfortable at being at such a meeting, see the evidence of DS Wilkinson, DS Hill and DS Chappell. It appears that the subject matter of the meeting included some matters which had given rise to criticism by DCI Pallas of Mr Dowson: the use of police cars, playing football in police time and claims for overtime.
232. It is clear that Mr Dowson and, to a lesser extent DI Taylor, felt excluded. It was plainly disconcerting since both later asked those who had attended what had occurred at the meeting.
233. DCI Pallas may have felt that such a meeting was necessary; but if so, it was incumbent on him to explain carefully to the DIs why they were to be excluded. This was not done. It was one of the more crass examples of DCI Pallas's management style, which further subverted the hierarchical system to which I have already referred. However I reject the contention that the exclusion of Mr Dowson was harassment of him; and it is significant that both DIs were excluded.

MH7: DCI Pallas losing his temper in February. Some officers run out of the fire-escape

234. I have already referred to the evidence in relation to this incident. It is sufficient to say that, to the extent that there was 'shouting and bawling' by DCI Pallas at a group of officers which included Mr Hoggins, I reject the contention that this constituted harassment of Mr Hoggins.

BD22: The removal of Mr Dowson from CTN

235. A common contention advanced by the Claimants is that DCI Pallas procured their removal by his conduct: by telling lies, by expressing a wish that the officers were removed and 'by insisting that he was the victim of a conspiracy by the five claimants.' The evidential basis of this submission is said to be the admission by all the senior police officers who were cross-examined (D/Ch/Supt Machell, C/Supt Gilberg and DCI Adamson) that if they had concluded that DCI Pallas had been lying and the Claimants had been telling the truth, they would have provided him with training and/or removed him from the position of DCI at CTN.
236. The difficulty with this proposition is that it assumes that the dismissal was the consequence of lies told by DCI Pallas. In fact there were a large number of issues raised by Mr Dowson in his Grievance Procedure and, as I have already indicated, there were many ways of viewing the conflict between DCI Pallas and Mr Dowson. The suggestion that it was DCI Pallas's explanations and statements to DCI Adamson which caused the departure of Mr Dowson is an oversimplification, as DI Adamson's Report plainly shows.
237. On 28 January 2003 Mr Dowson made the entry in his PDR that was critical of D/Supt Vant. The obvious solution, if D/Supt Vant was prepared to overlook the criticism, was to move Mr Dowson to CTS. Mr Dowson refused this offer, partly because the travel was inconvenient and partly in the belief that he could not or would not be moved while his grievance was being considered.
238. DCI Adamson had spoken to over 20 officers and had come to clear conclusions that there was a rift within CTN with a group of officers (including Messrs Dowson, Dunn, Dixon, Thompson and, to a lesser extent, Mr Hoggins) openly challenging the integrity and operational decisions of DCI Pallas. It was suggested in cross examination that DCI Adamson had simply accepted what DCI Pallas had said as the truth. However his evidence showed that his approach was very much more nuanced. Everyone he interviewed recognised the low morale at CTN, although there was a sharp divergence of views about what had caused it. DCI Adamson thought (rightly) that some officers were deliberately trying to discredit DCI Pallas and that others were refusing to accept his operational decisions. I am satisfied that DCI Adamson was not simply accepting what DCI Pallas was saying. He had the difficult task of interpreting what he was told in its proper context; and he would have been wrong to have rejected what he had been told by DCI Pallas as lies.
239. When he received DCI Adamson's report, D/Ch/Supt Machell, on the advice of Ch/Supt Gilberg, decided that Mr Dowson should not remain in the Crime Teams; and then had to decide where to redeploy him. D/Ch/Supt Machell and Ch/Supt Gilberg explained in their evidence that they both wanted to keep Mr Dowson in the CID. However there was a problem in that all 15 Area Command DI posts were filled; and the only available vacancies at Inspector level were in the uniform branch. It appears to have been impossible due to the Force Personnel Policy and Procedures to put Mr Dowson in a more favourable position in relation to a DI vacancy than any other candidate. In so far as any principle was involved, it seems to me to have been both nonsensical and contrary to the wider public interest.
240. The result of the application of this process was disastrous for Mr Dowson and for the public interest. He was in a vulnerable mental state at the time and the transfer from CID, where he has spent most of his career, to a uniformed post at Bedlington Police Station was regarded by him as a humiliation. It is regrettable that no one appears to have explained to him the difficulties in relation to his redeployment and to offer the prospect of continuing his career in the CID. In the event the stress which he suffered from this setback made him ill and the options for further deployment narrowed.
241. Some time was spent during the trial debating whether a transfer to the uniform branch was a demotion. There is a good argument that it was not, or at least should not have been so. In order to achieve the highest ranks in the police force it is necessary for an officer to achieve wide experience, including periods in uniform. There is an argument that good practice should require that police officers do not remain in the same position for long periods; and that regular redeployment, including periods in uniform, should be part of the career of every detective, so as to avoid officers being in the same work environment year after year. However I am concerned with the situation as I find it to be and not as it perhaps ought to be. In the present case it was generally agreed that the posting of Mr Dowson to Bedlington police as a uniformed Inspector was a waste of the talents of a competent and well-motivated detective, as well as being a professionally harmful move for him.

JD2: Repetition of JD1 on 5/6 March and general disparagement of OSDU

242. This is an allegation that DCI Pallas repeated his complaints about Mr Dixon failing to inform him about Constable EF (see allegation JD1). I have already stated my conclusions in regard to this allegation and it is unnecessary to say anything further about it.
243. It is also alleged that on this occasion DCI Pallas came into the OSDU office. According to Mr Dixon's witness statement,

39. DCI Pallas went on to rubbish the [OSDU]. He stated that it did not work and he did not like it. He said he had troubles with a similar office when he worked in North Shields. Along with what had happened before, this made me extremely anxious with regard to my position within CTN.

It is argued in the closing submissions that this was 'a thinly-veiled threat to remove Mr Dixon from his post.'

244. I reject this submission. It is clear that DCI Pallas had doubts about the effective operation of the OSDU at this time (see allegation NT13 below). The suggestion that this criticism was directed at Mr Dixon is an afterthought, as is clear from his s.9 witness statement made to the North Yorkshire police on 11 January 2006. There is no substance in this allegation of harassment.

SD6: Conversations between DCI Pallas and Mr Dunn at the time of DCI Adamson's interviews

245. This allegation has been through a number of formulations and is similar to complaints made by other Claimants (NT8 and JD6). It is said that DCI Pallas told Mr Dunn before he went to see DCI Adamson that he should not be stupid, as the Organisation would back him (i.e. DCI Pallas). Although it is pleaded that this was taken by Mr Dunn as a threat that if he told the truth he would suffer for it, this is not the natural meaning of what was said and nor is it an obvious inference.
246. I am not prepared to accept Mr Dunn's account of his conversations with DCI Pallas. In his interview with the North Yorkshire Police Mr Dunn told them that the comments were made after the interview and were not said as a threat, but as a matter of fact during 'an amiable discussion.'
247. In the closing submissions the emphasis shifted to a complaint about what DCI Pallas said to Mr Dunn after the interview with Mr Adamson and §§87-88 of Mr Dunn's witness statement,

87. … I believe it was the night after I had spoken with DCI Adamson that I was in the pub and DCI Pallas was there with other officers. DCI Pallas relayed to be in detail what I had said to DCI Adamson. He specifically mentioned the comment about 'fucking the morale and the budget', and he laughed saying he hadn't sworn had meant it as a joke. I said to him, 'I don't think you would tell them the truth as it would appear very unprofessional. [H]owever we both know what you said and what you meant.' He also repeated the phrase that the organisation would back him.

88. I felt very threatened by this conversation and extremely apprehensive about my position at CTN. It meant that DCI Adamson was discussing this confidential meeting with the person he was investigating.

248. DCI Pallas's evidence is that no threat was issued. He accepted that he had been updated by DCI Adamson about the progress of the enquiry, but not about what was said. There is no reference in DCI Adamson's note about 'fucking the morale and the budget'; and I find it extremely unlikely that DCI Adamson, who in every other respect showed himself a conscientious and capable investigator, was passing on to DCI Pallas the contents of what witnesses were saying to him. In my view Mr Dunn's evidence was at best an unjustified interpretation of his conversation with DCI Pallas.

NT8: Conversation with DCI Pallas before Mr Thompson gave evidence to DCI Adamson

249. This is a similar allegation to SD6. Mr Thompson's witness statement expresses the allegation at §94,

… He also commented that he knew I was a friend of DI Dowson. I explained to him that although I respected DI Dowson for his professionalism and experience and had worked with him previously at Newcastle, that we were not personal friends. This incident made me feel uncomfortable and vulnerable and caused me to a great deal of distress and anxiety. It felt as if he was making a veiled threat that I would be next, and it felt like he was now focusing his bullying and harassing behaviour towards me. As DI Dowson had been moved, I now felt I was the main focus.

250. I can see no reason for interpreting DCI Pallas's words as Mr Thompson says he understood them. DCI Pallas was not a man who left his views to be inferred; and in my judgment Mr Thompson has adopted an obtuse and unjustified meaning to what DCI Pallas intended as words of reassurance: namely, that he would not hold his friendship with Mr Dowson against him. Whatever faults DCI Pallas may have had, vindictiveness in his attitude to his subordinates was not one of them.

NT11: DCI Pallas's conversation with Mr Thompson about overtime on 12 May

251. On 8 May 2003 Mr Thompson was interviewed by Mr Adamson. The details of this allegation are set out in Mr Thompson's witness statement.

112. I believe It was sometime during the week of 12 May 2003, DCI Pallas came into our office and singled me out for open criticism over the amount of overtime I had worked. This was a completely inappropriate matter for him to raise with others present and I was embarrassed. The implication was also that I was claiming for hours I had not worked. He commented that I was the highest earner in the office and that DC Dixon (who was present) was near the bottom of the list. I informed him that I had not been the highest earner within the Crime Team North, and he remarked something along the lines of 'well second top earner'. He was singling me out for this criticism and it was insulting. The conversation continued in relation to overtime and general matters, at the conclusion of which DCI Pallas attempted to make some kind of joke in the conversation and as he went to leave the office, he bent down, placed his arms around me (as if in a cuddle), and said words similar to 'be happy Nick'

113. This was not said as a joke, but in a sarcastic and scathing tone. This made me feel very uncomfortable and it suggested that DCI Pallas was aware of my complaints to DCI Adamson. I found this physical contact objectionable and I took great exception to it.

It is to be noted that in his subsequent Grievance the main complaint at what occurred at this meeting was that DCI Pallas touched him inappropriately.

252. It is alleged that that this was a deliberate attempt by DCI Pallas to alienate Mr Thompson in front of other officers
253. DCI Pallas was responsible for the budget of CTN; and in both his witness statement and oral evidence he explained his concern that overtime was being claimed on an unrealistic basis by members of CTN. In §973 DCI Pallas gave his account of what occurred.

I explained that I did not think it was right that they should claim such an amount of money just to receive a phone call at home and the practise needed to stop. There was no person singled out during this conversation and it was a reasonable course to take. Nick [Thompson] asked if I had been checking the overtime records and I confirmed this. I pointed out that this was my role as their manager.

DCI Pallas considered the amount of overtime claims to be the result of Mr Dowson's more indulgent approach to such claims.

254. Again the significance of this incident appears to have been inflated for the purposes of this litigation. In his Grievance Mr Thompson said that he felt 'uncomfortable' as a result of the comment about overtime. That may be so, but it does not give rise to a justifiable complaint about harassment. The issue of the inappropriate touching was dealt with as part of Mr Thompson's Grievance and DCI Pallas was directed to apologise for it.

NT12: 12 May DCI Pallas asks Mr Thompson about leaving CTN

255. This allegation is dealt with in Mr Thompson's witness statement.

114. Also around this time, early May, DCI Pallas and I had a discussion in which he raised the subject of the setting up of the Force Dedicated Source Unit. He indicated to me that I was a strong candidate for a position within this unit as one of the 'CHIS Handlers' and mentioned that I had been 'ear marked' for a position, and joked about when I would be leaving the Crime Team North.

256. As Ms Rodway noted, there is nothing about this that indicates a direct threat, other than the timing. I accept DCI Pallas's evidence that the context of this discussion was a suggestion that all CHISs and their handlers might move to a new unit (see his witness statement at §983). I do not accept that this was a direct or an indirect threat to Mr Thompson or that it was viewed as such at the time.

JD6: DCI Pallas's conversation about what Mr Dixon had said to DCI Adamson

257. As already noted, DCI Adamson had interviewed Mr Dixon about Mr Dowson's Grievance on 16 May 2003. The allegation is that a few days after this, DCI Pallas made it clear that he knew what Mr Dixon had said. In his witness statement Mr Dixon describes DCI Pallas coming into the OSDU office.

67. …. Pallas then went on to raise points which I had raised in my interview with Adamson a few days earlier. I found this very intimidating and threatening as it was clear that DCI Adamson had informed Pallas what I had said.

68. Following this conversation, I believed that my position at CTN was under threat and that I too would be moved. This incident had a huge effect on me.

258. The allegation contains the suggestion that DCI Adamson had at the very least been highly indiscreet. A more likely explanation for how DCI Pallas came to know what was being said against him is that, in the course of interviewing DCI Pallas about Mr Dowson's Grievance, DCI Adamson raised various points with DCI Pallas with a view to asking for his response to the points which had been raised by other interviewees. However, this cannot be the explanation for this conversation since Mr Pallas was seen on 13 May before Mr Dixon, who was seen on the 16 May.
259. It is not possible to come to any more certain conclusions since DCI Adamson was not asked any questions about this or the other similar allegations (SD6 and NT8). However, I do not accept that this allegation founds a claim for harassment. Mr Dixon struck me as a robust Police Office; and I reject his evidence as to the effect of any such conversation on him, and particularly the assertion that the incident had 'a huge effect' on him.

NT13: DCI Pallas's criticism of the handling of informants

260. This is an allegation that on the 21 May DCI Pallas publicly criticised Mr Thompson's handling of his CHISs. It is one of a number of allegations which depend on what DCI Pallas was reported to have said, as is clear from Mr Thompson's witness statement.

133. … I had a conversation with DC Roulstone via our work mobile phones. He informed me that when DCI Pallas arrived in the bar it was obvious that he was extremely annoyed, he subsequently made a number of remarks which were relayed to me by DC Roulstone, such as, 'I'm foaming – they're having a meeting behind closed doors over there,' also 'the tail is wagging the dog'. DCI Pallas and DS Chappell had then made a remark similar to 'wouldn't it be funny if there was a change of handlers.' DC Roulstone commented that it sounded like DCI Pallas was either going to 'burn' me or the source, which I took to mean that he was going to get rid of me or the CHIS.

DC Roulstone did not give evidence and there was no witness statement from him.

261. It is clear from a large body of evidence that there was concern, which extended beyond DCI Pallas, that Mr Dixon and Mr Thompson had become too close to, and too proprietorial of, what they regarded as 'their' sources.
262. D/Supt Hepworth was Force Director of Special Operations, with oversight responsibility for registering and de-registering CHISs. The point is addressed in his witness statement,

23. … My general recollection is that the CHIS [CD] was dominating the handlers with information and instructions for work to be undertaken as well as the tactics to be employed by the police.

He gave evidence to similar effect in the course of the trial.

263. Since it is for the handler to direct the CHIS in relation to work to be carried out and not the other way around, the problem might legitimately be described as 'the tail wagging the dog'.
264. There was another problem. As Senior Investigating Officer for the Force Crime Department, D/Supt Sharp had been tasked to speak to the CHIS AB in relation to the investigation into the allegedly corrupt Police Officer EF. According to his witness statement, he encountered considerable difficulty in gaining access to AB.

36. [Mr Dixon and Mr Thompson] were the CHIS handlers. They were slow to facilitate this meeting. I have a record in my policy book on 10 March that DC Dixon was contacted to progress my meeting with this CHIS.

37. I recall DC Thompson ringing me and was curious to know why I wanted to speak to this source. He suggested that the source was reluctant to meet and that I provide him with the questions I wanted to ask. His suggested that he should ask these questions and get back to me with the answers.

38. This was not what I wanted and I told him to arrange the meeting as requested.

265. D/Supt Sharp also had cause to complain to DCI Pallas about further equivocation from Mr Thompson when the meeting was eventually arranged. D/Supt Sharp was struck by the 'naivety and lack of CHIS management skills' of Messrs Thompson and Dixon in arranging the interview. This evidence was fully maintained in the course of D/Supt Sharp's oral evidence at trial.
266. DCI Pallas accepted that he would have used the expression, 'the tail wagging the dog'; but said that this expression was not uncommon when discussing the relationship between a CHIS and his or her handlers.
267. Seen in the context I have described, I reject the contention that what was said by DCI Pallas properly founds a claim for harassment.

NT 14: Pallas response to NT Grievance and obtaining phone number of the informant CD on 23 May.

268. This allegation, which is also relied as casting doubt on DCI Pallas's credibility, derives from what is said to be DCI Pallas's response to Mr Thompson's Grievance against him submitted to D/Supt Vant at 12.25 on 23 May 2003. It is alleged that DCI Pallas wrote an email memorandum to D/Supt Vant which was sent at 13.22 asking for the control of CHIS CD to be taken away from Messrs Dixon and Thompson. It is pointed out that DCI Pallas's email seems to respond to a number of issues raised by Mr Thompson's Grievance. It is also said that (a) DCI Pallas continued to pursue his response to Mr Thompson's Grievance, while Mr Thompson was on leave, and using methods which were contrary to police rules to identify CHIS CD; (b) having been refused details of the CHIS's telephone number through official channels, instructed DS Hill to search Mr Thompson's telephone bill in order to identify the number of the CHIS by matching the telephone bill against the reports submitted by Mr Thompson; (c) contacted the CHIS in the week commencing 26 May 2003; and that this was improper and unjustified behaviour which was deliberately directed against Mr Thompson, as the handler of the CHIS and constituted a clear statement that he could not be trusted.
269. In my view this allegation reveals a further stark failure by Mr Thompson to understand his role as a CHIS handler. A CHIS is not the personal property of the handler: he or she is a resource available to the Police and it was for the Defendant (through the chain of command) to decide how the CHIS was to be deployed and not Mr Thompson. As already noted, a number of senior officers had become concerned about the relationship between the CHIS CD and Messrs Dixon and Thompson. One of the problems which had been identified was that CD was trying to dictate operating strategy in relation to information which he was providing rather than waiting to be tasked by his handlers. A decision was taken by D/Supt Hepworth in June that Messrs Dixon and Thompson should no longer handle CHIS CD. This decision was made independently of any view which may have been held by DCI Pallas, and appears to have been fully justified by what had occurred, including what was seen as the obstructive behaviour of Messrs Dixon and Thompson.
270. It is right that I should also record my view that there was no particular significance in the timing of DCI Pallas's email to D/Supt Vant on 23 May or in using any available means to identify CD in the absence of Mr Thompson on leave. The CHIS was a resource of the Northumbria Police Force and the telephone billing used to identify his telephone number was for a mobile phone which was owned and paid for by the Northumbria Police.
271. Accordingly I reject this allegation of harassment

NT15, SD7, MH8, JD7: DCI Pallas procured their departure from CTN

272. Each of these Claimants complains that his removal from CTN was procured by DCI Pallas and was an act of harassment.
273. I have already dealt with the difficulties that any Claimant faces in contending that DCI Pallas procured his removal from CTN, when considering the position of Mr Dowson. In short, the decision-making in relation to removal did not depend on what DCI Pallas said and, in any event, what he said is not shown to have been untrue to any material degree.
274. One of the factors which led to the removal of Mr Hoggins was that he had allowed DC Bloomfield to retain the 'sneak/cheat' document without including it on the Disclosure Schedules at a time when he was Disclosure Officer.
275. I accept that the removal of the Claimants from CTN was, at least in the short term, a blight on their careers. That decision was, however, taken for sound operational reasons by senior officers, and cannot sustain a claim for harassment based on the Defendant's vicarious liability for the acts of DCI Pallas.

Summary

276. As well as dealing with the specific allegations, it is necessary to stand back and consider the full history in so far as it could be presented in Court. Some of the history, for example, Mr Dowson's complaint that DCI Pallas had excluded him from the list of those to whom he sent Christmas cards in December 2002, throws more light on Mr Dowson's extreme sensitivity at the time than it does on the claim for harassment. Other parts of the evidence show a dysfunctional group of police officers, racked with division and backbiting, who inevitably operated at less than full efficiency, over a period of 9 months to the disadvantage of Northumbria Police.
277. For the reasons set out above I have rejected most of the factual allegations and the contention that these amounted to harassment. However, in relation to allegations BD3, BD4 and BD5 I have accepted, at least in part, the factual allegations. These all relate to Mr Dowson; and I can summarise my conclusions by saying that I am satisfied that there were occasions in his dealings with Mr Dowson when DCI Pallas was insensitive, belittling and overbearing. Sometimes this was the way in which he expressed disagreements on matters about which there were respectable views on both sides. During a period between the beginning of October and end of November Mr Dowson's life was made very difficult as a result of DCI Pallas's conduct. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that when he was spoken to about this by D/Supt Vant, DCI Pallas's attitude and conduct towards Mr Dowson improved.
278. The question is whether this conduct constituted harassment. I have concluded that it did not. This was a stressful working environment in which case-hardened officers were dealing with career-hardened criminals. Although this was more than simply a clash of personalities, it was not conduct which was calculated to cause distress and, although it was unacceptable, it was not oppressive in the sense described in the cases. It was not a tormenting by constant interference or intimidation. Rather it was a curt and dismissive attitude which was likely to have the effect, even if unintended, of undermining both Mr Dowson's own self-confidence and the esteem in which he was held by others.
279. In the light of the above and, while keeping in mind that for conduct to amount to the civil tort of harassment it must be of an order which would sustain criminal liability, I have concluded that Mr Dowson's claim fails by a considerable margin.

PART VII

CAUSATION

280. In the light of my previous findings I can summarise my view on the causation issues relatively shortly.
281. The Defendant submitted that the causation issues threw light on the credibility of some of the Claimants; and also gave rise to an argument that the Claimants' claim was in any event bound to fail since they suffered either no loss, or no significant loss, as a result of any act of DCI Pallas for which the Defendant was responsible.
282. Although there was a considerable amount of cross-examination on some of the Claimants' medical records, it was only in relation to Mr Stewart and (to a lesser extent) Mr Dunn that the causation issues assisted on the issue of credibility.
283. Each side called evidence from expert witnesses who were qualified to give opinion evidence about the Claimants' claims that they suffered psychological injury: Professor Martin for the Claimants and Dr Nadkarni for the Defendant. Some of this evidence was agreed; and where they disagreed, I preferred the evidence of Dr Nadkarni. He was an impressive witness who gave measured evidence which was easily referable to clear diagnostic criteria. Professor Martin's evidence explaining how it was that he thought some of the Claimants were suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was difficult to understand and was not easily referable to diagnostic criteria. I accept the criticisms made of Professor Martin's evidence when compared to the evidence of Dr Nadkarni in §§146-152 of the Defendant's closing submissions. Dr Nadkarni was consistently the more impressive and persuasive witness.

Mr Dowson

284. It is common ground that Mr Dowson suffers from a Depressive Disorder which has fluctuated in severity since 2003. If relevant, I do not accept Professor Martin's diagnosis of PTSD. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association 4th Edition DSM-IV describes the trigger event for PTSD as:

a traumatic event in which both of the following are present:

a) the person experienced, witnessed or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others

b) the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness or horror.

I was told that the proposed revision DSM-V has a diagnostic criterion of exposure to: 'death, threatened death, actual or threatened serious injury or actual or threatened actual or threatened sexual violation'. In both DSM-IV and V, there is an identifiable underlying traumatic event. In the case of Mr Dowson there was not.

285. Both medical experts agreed that Mr Dowson's professional achievements and the approval of his supervisors and colleagues were very important to him; and these views were supported by other evidence. Mr Dowson was described as having an excessively high regard for his own abilities; and I have little doubt that his mental illness developed as a consequence of his move from CTN in the circumstances in which it occurred. If I had been satisfied that there were acts of harassment it might have been difficult to determine the extent to which any act of harassment, rather than his move from CTN at the direction of senior officers, had caused the Depressive Disorder.
286. However, as Mr Hogarth pointed out, a claimant need only show that a tortious act has materially contributed to the injury, see for example Hatton v. Sutherland [2002] ICR 613 Hale LJ at [35]. If I had been satisfied that every act of harassment which was relied on had been proved, I would have awarded damages on the basis that the Defendant had materially contributed to Mr Dowson's illness. The decision would have been much less clear if I had found that allegations BD4-6 had amounted to the tort of harassment. In any event, I can see no reason why an award of General Damages and/or under s.3(2) of the Act should not have been made in Mr Dowson's or any other Claimant's case, regardless of whether the claim based on psychological harm succeeded.

Mr Dunn

287. The experts agreed that, on the basis of Mr Dunn's own account of what occurred, he had suffered from an Adjustment Disorder following his removal from CTN in 2003. I am extremely doubtful whether Mr Dunn's evidence about his reaction to the move from CTN can be relied on. He struck me as an extremely robust officer and although such impressions may be misleading, it is striking that when he applied to join the New Zealand Police Force in March 2008 he wrote on the application form that he had never suffered from any mental illness or psychological problems. It is very difficult to reconcile this with the contention made on his behalf, in a letter before action dated 3 December 2007, that he had 'suffered from extreme stress, not only from the harassment by DCI Pallas and his subsequent transfer ...' Mr Dunn's explanations about this area of his case were unconvincing.
288. For these reasons I would have been extremely sceptical about any claim based on psychological harm.

Mr Stewart

289. In early 2001 Mr Stewart had been the victim of a criminal assault. It is clear that he did not suffer from any psychiatric illness, in particular PTSD, as a result. Like the other Claimants he worked in an environment where he was exposed to real risks of physical injury and of psychological harm from dealing with criminals and the victims of crime.
290. In these circumstances the Defendant is entitled to suggest that it is surprising that Mr Stewart suffered severe mental harm as a result of DCI Pallas shouting at him and as a result of the circumstances of his departure from CTN in early November 2002.
291. Mr Stewart never took any time off sick after he left; and I accept Dr. Nadkarni's conclusion that Mr Stewart suffered a period of normal adjustment after November 2002. He did not describe any degree of distress to his General Practitioner nor to the Northumbria Police Occupational Health Department. Dr. Nadkarni noted that Mr Stewart had subsequently developed paranoid tendencies. However, in 2007 to 2008 Mr Stewart had been subject to serious unrelated allegations which must clearly have affected his mental state. I have therefore concluded that any distress suffered by Mr Stewart in 2003 was a normal reaction to being moved from CTN; and any later problems identified by Dr Nadkarni resulted solely from the subsequent matters.

Mr Dixon

292. In their Joint Report Professor Martin and Dr. Nadkarni identify psychological symptoms which emerged in middle of 2003. In Dr. Nadkarni's view there was a short period of an Adjustment Disorder which did not progress to a psychological illness; and a depressive episode developing much later when Mr Dixon was the subject of the disciplinary investigation enquiry. There is no record of a GP visit until February 2008.
293. Like others Mr Dixon was affected by his sudden move from CTN; and in all the circumstances any recovery of damages for psychological injury would have been limited.

Mr Thompson

294. I accept that Mr Thompson suffered from a Depressive Illness in 2005, and that this was caused by difficulties in dealing with the changes to his working life and what he considered was professional rejection following his move to CTN.
295. In these circumstances it is less easy to accept the Defendant's argument that the recovery of damages for psychological injury would have been excluded.

Mr Hoggins

296. In their Joint Report on Mr Hoggins the experts agreed that he had developed an Adjustment Disorder 'following his eventual transfer to another department' in 2003. Professor Martin amplified this when expressing the view that Mr Hoggins should have had some time off sick 'at the time of his emotional distress following the move to Gateshead.'
297. As I have already noted, Mr Hoggins struck me as the least affected of the Claimants by what occurred and, although I accept that he initially found it difficult to adjust to the sudden move from CTN, I would not have accepted that he had suffered any significant anxiety or distress by reason of any harassment on the part of DCI Pallas.

PART VIII

POSTSCRIPT

298. There are three short points that I wish to add.

(1) Much time and cost could have been saved by a less process-driven procedure for resolving the differences which occurred in this case. Such differences can occur in a stressful working environment where strong-willed individuals may clash. An early and informal mediation in which the parties are allowed to air their views may resolve grievances which would otherwise fester. For example, those against whom the complaint is made might be unaware of the impact of their action. If they are made aware of its effect it is at least possible that they will recognise that their conduct has been objectionable and change their attitude. In the present case the Grievance Procedure process created its own problems and exacerbated the situation.

(2) While views might differ over the utility of self-assessment as a process for career development, the PDR system which was used in the present case had unsatisfactory features. A system in which a year's work was 'marked' according to very broad, vague and overlapping criteria was likely to cause difficulties: both in the interpretation of the criteria and in the application of subjective judgments in a process which was intended to apply objective criteria. I am told that the PDR system which applied in 2002 is no longer used, at least by Northumbria Police.

(3) Over many years this case has cast a long shadow over the lives of police officers who were at the height of their careers. While it is not possible or practical to give general guidance in cases of harassment, where so many individual factors will apply, a well-founded claim is likely to be capable of precise, confined and prompt articulation. In the present case the opposite has occurred.

PART IX

SUMMARY

299. In the light of the above there must be judgment for the Defendant against all the Claimants.